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1.
In a survey of banks founded from 1994–2002, we find over 85% of respondents think their small-business market was underserved,
72% felt the market needed more competition, almost half indicated they were likely to start a bank because takeover activity
displaced them, and 75% entered due to a market merger. Markets of banks started by displaced managers or following a merger
have performance and lending characteristics similar to comparable banks, but larger changes in asset growth rates. Managers
who responded that small-businesses were underserved have higher numbers and amounts of small-business loans 3 years after
entry. Managers responding that entry was due to mergers eliminating community banks have lower ROA, but larger changes in
market ROA. Markets had smaller changes in ROA when entry was to provide competition or when managers thought the small business
market was underserved.
相似文献
James W. WansleyEmail: |
2.
Ling Chu Robert Mathieu Sean Robb Ping Zhang 《Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting》2007,28(2):147-162
In this paper, we provide evidence that banks with a low level of capitalization have reduced their commitment with respect
to lines of credit after the introduction of the Basle Accord. A bank's lending behavior reflects its level of commitment
towards borrowers, which in turn affects the level of effort it exerts on screening and monitoring the activities of borrowers.
We find that the post-Basle Accord market reaction to the announcement of lines of credit issued by banks with a low level
of capitalization is significantly lower than the reaction to other types of bank credit announcements. We interpret this
result as evidence that some banks have a low level of commitment associated with lines of credit after the Basle Accord.
相似文献
Sean RobbEmail: |
3.
We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession
(DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants
of lending specialization (e.g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information
considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more
(less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks
provide important and useful services.
相似文献
Gabriel G. Ramirez (Corresponding author)Email: |
4.
In this paper we test the theory according to which multimarket contact is a crucial factor hampering competition among firms,
because it lowers the incentive to behave aggressively in one market if there is fear that rivals retaliate in other common
markets. We consider the Italian banking industry in the period 2002–2005, employing both market-level and firm-level data.
The empirical evidence supports theory predictions, since profitability is positively related to the average number of contacts
among banks, and appear to be higher for those credit institutions experiencing more links. This result has also policy implications,
given the increasing consolidation (and hence the growing number of interactions in local markets) that has characterized
this sector in the last years.
相似文献
Paolo CoccoreseEmail: |
5.
Relationship Banking and the Pricing of Financial Services 总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1
Charles W. Calomiris Thanavut Pornrojnangkool 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2009,35(3):189-224
We investigate pricing effects of the joint production of loans and security underwritings. We control for firm and borrower
characteristics, including differences in sequencing, which are important for pricing. Contrary to previous studies, when
banks combine lending and underwriting within the same customer relationship they charge premiums for both loans and underwriting
services. Abstracting from effects of joint production within relationships, depository banks engaged in underwriting price
lending and underwriting more cheaply than stand alone investment banks. One advantage borrowers enjoy from bundling products
within a banking relationship is a form of liquidity risk insurance, which is manifested in a reduced demand for lines of
credit. We also find evidence of a “road show” effect; firms enjoy loan pricing discounts on loans that are negotiated at
times close to the debt underwritings, whether or not the same bank provides both services. Relationship effects are only
visible when lending and underwriting both occur, and are stronger for equity-loan relationships than for debt-loan relationships.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
相似文献
Thanavut PornrojnangkoolEmail: |
6.
Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Christina E. Bannier 《Financial Markets and Portfolio Management》2007,21(4):445-470
Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that
such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly
relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk,
the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits,
the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision.
For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.
相似文献
Christina E. BannierEmail: |
7.
How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans? 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Bernadette A. Minton René Stulz Rohan Williamson 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2009,35(1):1-31
Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make
banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank
holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds
the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions
are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging
of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2%
of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection
and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives.
Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.
相似文献
René StulzEmail: |
8.
Sophocles N. Brissimis Thomas Vlassopoulos 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2009,39(2):146-164
Although the close empirical relationship between the evolution of mortgage lending and housing prices is well established
in the literature, the direction of causation is less clear from a theoretical standpoint. We apply multivariate cointegration
techniques in order to address this issue empirically for the Greek economy. Our results, based on a cointegration relationship
that we identify as a mortgage loan demand equation, indicate that housing prices do not adjust to disequilibria in the market
for housing loans. This suggests that in the long run the causation does not run from mortgage lending to housing prices.
In the short run we find evidence of a contemporaneous bi-directional dependence.
相似文献
Thomas VlassopoulosEmail: |
9.
Elizabeth Webb 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(1):5-20
This study analyzes the effects of monitoring intensity on compensation and turnover for CEOs of publicly-traded banks. Using
a sample of banks from 1992 to 2004, I find that monitoring intensity plays a significant role in compensation levels, pay-for-performance
sensitivity, and CEO turnover. The results show that CEOs from highly-rated institutions receive smaller pay than CEOs from
competing institutions, and that monitoring intensity, as proxied by CEO age, influences the relationship between market performance
and executive incentives. These findings suggest that regulatory ratings and CEO age impact optimal bank governance structure
by varying incentive sensitivity to market performance.
相似文献
Elizabeth WebbEmail: |
10.
We report new findings on bank efficiency in East Asian countries for the pre- and post-IMF restructuring periods. We find
that bank efficiency has improved, but only to the pre-IMF intervention level, and that restructured banks are not more efficient
than their unrestructured counterparts. Different restructuring measures have different effects. Bank closures are economically
justified, but mergers show short-term efficiency losses. Recapitalization and reprivatization of badly performing banks lead
to efficiency improvement, but also increase government ownership. Ease of entry that has allowed for more foreign bank participation
results in slightly improved performance of badly performing banks.
相似文献
Luc Can (Corresponding author)Email: |
11.
Concentration of Banking Relationships in Switzerland: The Result of Firm Structure or Banking Market Structure? 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Doris Neuberger Maurice Pedergnana Solvig Räthke-Döppner 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(2):101-126
Switzerland is one of the countries with the highest concentration of bank–customer relationships. The present paper seeks
to find out whether this can be explained by the structure of Swiss firms or by the organization of the Swiss banking market.
Using survey data from small and medium-sized enterprises in 1996 and 2002, we examine the influence of firm-, loan-, and
bank-specific variables on the number of banking relationships. We find that firm and industry structure have the largest
explanatory power, while banking market structure and conduct play a minor role. Relationship lending by state-owned cantonal
banks and small regional banks tends to enhance the concentration of banking relationships.
相似文献
Doris NeubergerEmail: |
12.
Rocco Ciciretti Iftekhar Hasan Cristiano Zazzara 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2009,35(1):81-98
Very little is known about how adopting Internet activities impact traditional banks. By tracing the experience of Italian
commercial banks, we provide evidence and implications for banks’ use of new Internet technology and innovative banking products
as they relate to performance. Using different definitions for what is considered as Internet activity and by examining alternative
proxies for bank return and risk, we find a significant link between offerings of Internet banking products and bank performance.
Although this link is significantly positive for bank returns, we find a negative, marginally significant, association between
the adoption of Internet activities and bank risk.
相似文献
Cristiano ZazzaraEmail: |
13.
We examine the motives for takeovers in New Zealand surrounding the 1987 stock market crash and compare with the US findings
of Gondhalekar and Bhagwat (2003). There are a number of structural differences between the New Zealand and US markets that could impact on merger motives.
Compared with the US, New Zealand is a small capital market; with weak takeover regulation and a prolonged aftermath of the
1987 stock market crash. Consistent with US research, we find evidence of synergy and hubris motivations in New Zealand takeovers
although we find the synergy motivation is stronger. Contrary to expectations we find no evidence of agency motivated takeovers.
相似文献
Hamish D. AndersonEmail: |
14.
In this paper we offer direct evidence that financial intermediation does impact underlying asset markets. We develop a specific
observable symptom of a banking system that underprices the put option imbedded in non-recourse asset-backed lending. Using
a dataset for 19 countries and over 500 real estate investment trusts, we find that, following a negative demand shock, the
“underpricing” economies experience far deeper asset market crashes than economies in which the put option is correctly priced.
相似文献
Susan WachterEmail: |
15.
In the syndicated loan market, borrowers and syndicate arrangers sometimes employ contractual restrictions that influence
a loan’s liquidity. We analyze two types of constraints on loan resales: (1) prior consent constraints implemented by the
borrower or the syndicate’s lead arranger and (2) a minimum denomination requirement for loan sales. We hypothesize that constraints
could be mechanisms for fostering relationships and/or facilitating the resolution of financial distress and find some support
for each notion. We find that resale constraints are more likely when borrowers are small and have relatively poor credit
ratings. We also find that loans with any type of constraint have higher all-in-spreads and are more likely to be secured
than unconstrained loans and that the marginal cost of constraining liquidity is relatively high.
相似文献
Donald J. Mullineax (Corresponding author)Email: |
16.
Bank Competition,Risk, and Subordinated Debt 总被引:2,自引:2,他引:0
Jijun Niu 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,33(1):37-56
This paper studies a dynamic model of banking in which banks compete for insured deposits, issue subordinated debt, and invest
in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The model allows banks to choose their level of risk after the interest rate on subordinated
debt is contracted. We show that requiring banks to issue a small amount of subordinated debt can reduce their gambling incentives.
Moreover, when equity capital is more expensive than subordinated debt, adding a subordinated debt requirement to a policy
regime that only uses equity capital requirements is Pareto improving.
相似文献
Jijun NiuEmail: |
17.
Bank Competition and Financial Stability 总被引:4,自引:3,他引:1
Allen N. Berger Leora F. Klapper Rima Turk-Ariss 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2009,35(2):99-118
Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and
results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more
market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make
it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need
not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking.
Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if
banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We
test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market
power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results
suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also
have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that
market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.
相似文献
Rima Turk-ArissEmail: |
18.
Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership
and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market
access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of
conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private
banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and
larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing
accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism
is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank
managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial
reporting.
相似文献
James M. WahlenEmail: |
19.
Nikolas Rokkanen 《Financial Markets and Portfolio Management》2009,23(1):31-57
The paper examines the credit spread between government and corporate bonds at different maturities. Theoretical models assume
that credit risk premiums for high quality firms monotonously increase with maturity. We find evidence suggesting that bonds
issued at maturities attracting the highest issuance volumes tend to have credit risk premiums that are on average 10 to 15
basis points higher than issues at nonconventional maturities. These results point out a shortcoming of existing theoretical
models and show that the credit yield curve is not smooth, but affected by the local supply of issues at various parts of
the yield curve. In addition, the empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that firms utilizing the bond markets
for funding could lower their funding costs by shifting the term of their debt away from the most commonly targeted maturities.
相似文献
Nikolas RokkanenEmail: |
20.
The Sensitivity of the Loss Given Default Rate to Systematic Risk: New Empirical Evidence on Bank Loans 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stefano Caselli Stefano Gatti Francesca Querci 《Journal of Financial Services Research》2008,34(1):1-34
We verify the existence of a relation between loss given default rate (LGDR) and macroeconomic conditions by examining 11,649
bank loans concerning the Italian market. Using both the univariate and multivariate analyses, we pinpoint diverse macroeconomic
explanatory variables for LGDR on loans to households and SMEs. For households, LGDR is more sensitive to the default-to-loan
ratio, the unemployment rate, and household consumption. For SMEs, LGDR is influenced by the total number of employed people
and the GDP growth rate. These findings corroborate the Basel Committee’s provision that LGDR quantification process must
identify distinct downturn conditions for each supervisory asset class.
相似文献
Francesca Querci (Corresponding author)Email: |