美债曲线倒挂与经济衰退的关系及债券投资思考

<正>历史上美国长短期国债收益率倒挂之后往往会出现经济衰退,所以本次倒挂也使市场对于未来美国经济衰退的预期上升。2023年3月发生的美国硅谷银行、签名银行等中小银行倒闭事件更是加剧了投资者对美国经济前景和银行系统稳定性的担忧。文章研究了美国国债收益率倒挂与经济衰退的关系、经济衰退对债券市场的影响,对债券投资者如何应对经济衰退进行了相关思考。     

美国房地产周期与经济衰退的可预测性研究

本文对房地产周期与收益率曲线反转对经济衰退的预测两个变量的联合预测进行了理论探讨和实证检验。实证结果表明,房地产周期和收益率曲线反转的联合预测力远大于单变量预测力。将本文实证结果应用于2006年以来经济数据的分析表明,从预测角度看美国经济将在2007-2008年间进入衰退。     

论经济衰退的数学条件

本文通过构建一个生产依赖的货币需求模型来探讨经济衰退和经济周期问题。这个模型给出了一个生产依赖的货币需求方程和货币增速方程。基于这两个方程,我们提出经济衰退发生的数学条件,即当货币增速小于产值增速时,经济衰退就将发生。这个结论能够成功解释中国经济史上的3次衰退和2020年的第4次经济衰退,以及美国20世纪60年代以来频繁的经济衰退。除此之外,本文的模型也提供了关于经济周期现象的一个新理解。     

新加坡反经济危机的财税措施——新加坡一九九九年财政预算案述评

1997年7月爆发的亚洲金融危机迄今已持续近2年,导致东亚经济衰退、政局动荡、社会骚动.位于这场金融危机发源地的亚洲四小龙之一-新加坡是如何运用财税措施来摆脱目前困境的呢?     

利用简单的先行指标来预测经济衰退结束时间——标准普尔500指数和首次申领失业金人数

2008年12月1日,美国国家经济研究局(National Bureau of Economic Research,以下简称NBER)宣布,美国经济从2007年12月开始正式进入衰退。目前,本次经济衰退已经进入到第二十五个月,是1930年大萧条以来延续时间最长的一次经济衰退(参见表1)。     

汶川地震后的宏观经济走向评析

2008年注定是不平凡的一年。中国经济正面临着国内外经济一系列不确定性的重大挑战。由次级债危机引发的美国经济衰退的风险还没有完全消除,国际市场上石油和大米的价格也屡创新高。在国内,年初经历了罕见暴风雪灾害后,最近又发生了汶川大地震,这是对我国经济稳定增长的一次重大考验。     

关于美国次贷危机国际蔓延渠道的探讨

由于美国是世界第一大经济体、主要债务国,美元又是世界主要流通货币和储备货币,因此,美国次贷危机的国际传播,不同于以往金融危机,它是通过金融渠道、贸易渠道和货币渠道从美国蔓延到与美国经济、金融联系密切的其他国家,形成了全球性的金融危机和经济衰退.     

美国房价下跌的宏观经济效应与其经济衰退的若干问题

2007年美国房价下跌引发的次贷危机和由次贷危机引发的经济衰退已成为美国经济的一个热点问题。房产市场的衰退通过多种渠道影响经济,引发了金融领域的问题,导致消费和投资下降,从而导致经济增长下降。美国政府为避免经济衰退采取了一系列的财政政策和货币政策。根据经济周期的规律看,当前美国经济衰退是短期的。美国对外出口的快速增长和劳动生产率的增长是美国经济中的亮点,因而也成为扭转经济衰退的重要因素。     

国际金融市场资本流动新趋势与对策思考

一、国际资本流动的新情况新特点 近几年来,随着国际经济衰退、复苏和美国单极称霸的政治战乱,欧共体和欧元崛起的影响,使国际资本流动出现了以下一些新情况新特点: 1、美国是世界各国“投资天堂”的神话受到了冲击和动摇,国际资本流向美国大幅下降。“9.11”事     

衰退？还是结构性衰退？——2008-2010年美国经济深度研究报告

与历次经济衰退相比,尽管2007年爆发的次债危机的潜在损失十分巨大,但对美国经济基本面的冲击深度却相对有限。这背后的一种重要原因就在于:随着美国技术革命和产业结构的调整,美国经济的弹性更强了。     

Aggregate hours worked in OECD countries: New measurement and implications for business cycles

We build a dataset of quarterly hours worked for 14 OECD countries. We document that hours are as volatile as output, that a large fraction of labor adjustment takes place along the intensive margin, and that the volatility of hours relative to output has increased over time. We use these data to reassess the Great Recession and prior recessions. The Great Recession in many countries is a puzzle in that labor wedges are small, while those in the U.S. Great Recession – and those in previous European recessions – are much larger.     

When Credit Bites Back

Using data on 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008 we document two key facts of the modern business cycle: relative to typical recessions, financial crisis recessions are costlier, and more credit‐intensive expansions tend to be followed by deeper recessions (in financial crises or otherwise) and slower recoveries. We use local projection methods to condition on a broad set of macro‐economic controls to study how past credit accumulation impacts key macro‐economic variables such as output, investment, lending, interest rates, and inflation. The facts that we uncover lend support to the idea that financial factors play an important role in the modern business cycle.     

The Role of Oil Price Shocks in Causing U.S. Recessions

Although oil price shocks have long been viewed as one of the leading candidates for explaining U.S. recessions, surprisingly little is known about the extent to which oil price shocks explain recessions. We provide a formal analysis of this question with special attention to the possible role of net oil price increases in amplifying the transmission of oil price shocks. We quantify the conditional effect of oil price shocks in the net oil price increase model for all episodes of net oil price increases since the mid‐1970s, analyze its determinants, and show that the linear model fits the data better.     

Investment‐Specific News Shocks and U.S. Business Cycles

We provide robust evidence that news shocks about future investment‐specific technology (IST) constitute a significant force behind U.S. business cycles. Positive IST news shocks induce comovement, that is, raise output, consumption, investment, and hours. These shocks account for 70% of the business cycle variation in output, hours, and consumption, and 60% of the variation in investment, and have played an important role in 9 of the last 10 U.S. recessions. Our findings provide strong support for shifting focus to IST news shocks when investigating the role of news in driving U.S. business cycles.     

The U.S. current account deficit and the expected share of world output

We investigate the possibility that the large current account deficits of the U.S. are the outcome of optimizing behavior. We develop a simple long-run world equilibrium model in which the current account is determined by the expected discounted present value of its future share of world GDP relative to its current share of world GDP. The model suggests that under some reasonable assumptions about future U.S. GDP growth relative to the rest of the advanced countries—more modest than the growth over the past 20 years—the current account deficit is near optimal levels. We then explore the implications for the real exchange rate. Under some plausible assumptions, the model implies little change in the real exchange rate over the adjustment path, though the conclusion is sensitive to assumptions about tastes and technology. Then we turn to empirical evidence. A test of current account sustainability suggests that the U.S. is not keeping on a long-run sustainable path. A direct test of our model finds that the dynamics of the U.S. current account—the increasing deficits over the past decade—are difficult to explain under a particular statistical model (Markov-switching) of expectations of future U.S. growth. But, if we use survey data on forecasted GDP growth in the G-7, our very simple model appears to explain the evolution of the U.S. current account remarkably well. We conclude that expectations of robust performance of the U.S. economy relative to the rest of the advanced countries is a contender—though not the only legitimate contender—for explaining the U.S. current account deficit.     

The Influence of U.S. GAAP on the Harmony of Accounting Measurement Policies of Large Companies in the U.K. and Australia

U.S. GAAP has increasingly become an influence on accounting practices in other countries, even aside from those traditionally considered under direct U.S. influence. The change arises from the large number of U.S. accounting standards, non-U.S. companies listing on U.S. stock exchanges, and the amount of U.S. direct investment abroad. As the impact of U.S. GAAP varies across countries, it may affect international accounting harmony. This idea is tested by examining the level of international harmony for eleven accounting measurement policies in matched pairs of large companies from Australia and the U.K., two countries with historically strong cultural and economic links. It is argued that, in recent decades, accounting practice in Australia, more so than in the U.K., has become increasingly U.S.-oriented. The concepts of harmony of Tay and Parker (1990) and Archer et al . (1996) are employed. International harmony is measured by the between-country C index and chi-square test; national harmony by van der Tas's (1988) H index. While considerable national harmony is found in the U.K. for seven and in Australia for five accounting policies, there is considerable or complete international harmony for only three policies. Evidence is presented of the influence of U.S. GAAP as one factor explaining the poor degree of U.K./Australia international harmony. Australian companies appear to follow U.S. GAAP to a greater extent than do U.K. companies. The state of partial harmony thus existing restricts international comparability of accounting reports and may cause problems for regulators.     

Nonlinear relationship between monetary policy and stock returns: Evidence from the U.S.

This paper studies the relationship between monetary policy and stock market return in the U.S. using nonlinear econometric models. It first employs a univariate Markov-switching model on each of the three stock indices and three monetary policy variables, displaying significant regime-switching patterns and common movements. This paper then uses a Markov-switching dynamic bi-factor model to simultaneously extract two latent common factors from stock indices and monetary policy variables to represent monetary policy changes and stock market movements separately. The smoothed probabilities of regimes demonstrate that expansionary monetary policy regimes follow economic recessions, but bear stock markets usually occur before economic recessions. The maximum likelihood estimation results show that expansionary monetary policy such as a decrease in the federal funds rate raises stock returns, but stock returns don't directly influence monetary policy decision.     

The Announcement Effects of U.S. versus non‐U.S. Bank Mergers: Do They Differ?

Non‐U.S. bank mergers are becoming an increasingly important part of the worldwide economic landscape. Are the market reactions to non‐U.S. bank mergers similar to the reaction in the United States? I address this question by examining abnormal returns of publicly traded partners on the announcement of forty‐one non‐U.S. bank mergers and comparing the returns with a U.S. control group. I find acquirers in non‐U.S. domestic bank mergers earn more and non‐U.S. targets earn less than their U.S. counterparts. However, for the subset of mergers in countries with relatively well‐developed stock markets, I find that partners earn similar returns.     

Capital Controls and the International Transmission of U.S. Money Shocks

We assess whether capital controls effectively insulate countries from U.S. monetary shocks, examining a large range of country experiences in a unified estimation framework. We estimate the effect of identified U.S. monetary shocks on the exchange rate and foreign country interest rates, and test whether countries with less open capital accounts exhibit systematically smaller responses. We find essentially no evidence of this. Other country factors such as the exchange rate regime or degree of dollarization explain more of the cross-country differences in responses. The significant differences in responses we do find are more pronounced at short horizons.     

Voluntary disclosures of intangibles information by U.S.-listed Asian companies

This paper provides evidence on the voluntary disclosure of intangibles information for U.S.-listed Asian companies. The paper examines the following issues: (1) the effect of firm size, ownership concentration, proportion of foreign revenue, and leverage on voluntary disclosures of intangibles information by U.S.-listed Asian companies; and (2) the use of international standards, and the effect of domestic and global culture on those disclosures. Results indicate that larger firms, firms with greater ownership dispersion, and firms with lower leverage provide more voluntary disclosure of intangibles information. The paper also documents that companies from countries that are more individualistic provide more voluntary disclosure of intangibles information than companies from countries that are collectivist. Therefore, it appears that domestic culture does affect the voluntary disclosure of intangibles information in the U.S. This paper uses the index developed for Portuguese companies by Oliveira, Rodrigues, and Craig (2006), to measure voluntary disclosures of intangibles information thereby providing external validity to their instrument.