THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL DEFICITS: A SURVEY

Abstract This paper surveys recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, regarding political explanations for fiscal deficits. Political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind the emergence of deficits: (1) Opportunistic politicians generate deficits to win elections, even in conflict with general welfare; (2) Conflicts of interests between politicians’ partisan preferences create incentives for (at least some) incumbents to run deficits and (3) Conflicts of interest between different social groups or regions generate tensions in the allocation of government resources leading to overspending. This paper reviews these different strands of the literature. It also covers contributions that highlight the crucial role of budget institutions in determining the extent to which the political motivations to generate deficits are indeed translated into poor fiscal outcomes. Promising avenues for future research are highlighted.     

DESIGNING ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED FISCAL SYSTEM

Abstract When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to take the region, and the government, as a given; that is, this work has neglected important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the various levels of government. It typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?     

THE EFFECTS OF DISCRETIONARY FISCAL POLICY ON MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES: A REAPPRAISAL

Abstract Fiscal stimuli to recover? A cascade of academic and layman articles debate the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy backed up by different economic models and empirical support. This paper surveys the theoretical predictions and recent empirical vector autoregression evidence on the short‐run effects of discretionary fiscal policy on macroeconomic aggregates.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE

As a key concern for human survival and development, environmental issues have been widely perceived to be impacted by various political institutional factors. A considerable body of literature has attempted to investigate how different political factors affect environmental policymaking and outcomes. In this paper, we critically review related scholarly works published in peer‐reviewed economic journals in the past 30 years, with an emphasis on the empirical literature. Political institutional factors considered in this survey include corruption, the general concept and specific elements of democracy, and the vertical structure of environmental regulation authority within different levels of governments (i.e. environmental federalism). Studies focusing on the interplay of these factors are also highlighted. Based on a critical review, we provide a guide to the datasets, methodologies, and main findings of the literature. We also point out the existing gaps, and put forward suggestions for future research directions.     

REAL‐TIME DATA AND FISCAL POLICY ANALYSIS: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

This paper surveys the empirical research on fiscal policy analysis based on real‐time data. This literature can be broadly divided into four groups that focus on: (1) the statistical properties of revisions in fiscal data; (2) the political and institutional determinants of projection errors by governments; (3) the reaction of fiscal policies to the business cycle and (4) the use of real‐time fiscal data in structural vector autoregression (VAR) models. It emerges that, first, fiscal revisions are large and initial releases are biased estimates of final values. Secondly, strong fiscal rules and institutions lead to more accurate releases of fiscal data and smaller deviations of fiscal outcomes from government plans. Thirdly, the cyclical stance of fiscal policies is estimated to be more ‘counter‐cyclical’ when real‐time data are used instead of ex post data. Fourthly, real‐time data can be useful for the identification of fiscal shocks. Finally, it is shown that existing real‐time fiscal data sets cover only a limited number of countries and variables. For example, real‐time data for developing countries are generally unavailable. In addition, real‐time data on European countries are often missing, especially with respect to government revenues and expenditures. Therefore, more work is needed in this field.     

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE QUANTITY AND DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION: A SURVEY

Abstract The focus of this survey is to discuss different attempts at incorporating the distributional dimension of human capital into the theoretical and empirical growth framework. We present a series of models which deviate from the direct link between the aggregate or average level of human capital and economic growth in that they introduce the distribution of education as a new element in explaining the relationship under investigation. After surveying the theoretical literature, we present recent empirical work on the relation between economic performance and the average level, as well as the distribution of education, respectively.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE

Abstract The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5% to 1% lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth. One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market‐friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by ongoing research.     

WORDS, DEEDS AND OUTCOMES: A SURVEY ON THE GROWTH EFFECTS OF EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES

Abstract.  Recent studies on the growth effects of exchange rate regimes offer a wide range of different, sometimes contradictory results. In this paper, we systematically compare three prominent contributions in this field. Using a common data set, a common specification and common estimation methods, we argue that the contradictory findings can be explained by the fact that these studies use regime classifications which reflect fundamentally different aspects of exchange rate policy.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE – A COMMENT

In contrast to the commonly held view, Bergh and Henrekson (2011) conclude that a consensus has almost been reached on the thesis that government size is negatively correlated with economic growth in developed countries. They underpin this by claiming that the only study in the survey to deviate from this consensus view, i.e. Colombier (2009), was rebutted by Bergh and Öhrn (2011). This comment shows that the claim by Bergh and Henrekson (2011) cannot be upheld because the analysis by Bergh and Öhrn (2011) is based on a flawed dataset. The re‐estimation of Colombier's (2009) regressions with time‐fixed effect does not reject his main findings. Moreover, it is demonstrated that recent empirical evidence on the growth impact of government size in rich countries is not as unanimous as the survey by Bergh and Henrekson (2011) suggests. Thus, the claim that a consensus view has been reached is premature.