Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

An Assessment of Environmentally‐ related Non‐tariff Measures

International trade can affect the environment in different ways. This may justify the introduction of border measures by the importing countries. In addition to various dispositions in the GATT, GATS, TRIPs agreements, as well as in the Agreement on Agriculture, this issue is regulated by the agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on the application of Sanitary and Phyto‐sanitary standards (SPS). Despite these rules, abuse of environmental arguments for protectionist reasons remains an open issue. In order to disentangle protectionism from dispositions justified on the grounds of true environmental concerns, we systematically review notifications of SPS and TBTs by importing countries at the tariff line level. Trade is considered as being potentially affected when an environmental SPS/TBT is notified on grounds of environmental concerns. Affected trade is defined as imports by countries notifying such barriers. Protectionist use of environmental barriers is likely when only a limited number of countries impose an environmental obstacle on the imports of a given product. Considering data for 2001, we find that 88 per cent of the value of world trade is in products potentially affected by such measures, while 39 per cent of the value of world imports is potentially subject to a protectionist use of such measures. Agriculture, the automobile industry, the pharmaceutical industry and many other sectors are concerned.     

特别贸易关注视角下技术性贸易措施对我国出口贸易的影响

为厘清具有贸易限制性的技术性贸易措施对国际贸易的作用机制,本文基于特别贸易关注的视角,利用2002—2016年我国对WTO成员的出口贸易数据实证研究了限制性的技术性贸易措施对我国出口贸易的影响。研究发现,限制性的技术性贸易措施对出口贸易额与贸易量都有着显著的负面效应;并且,如果一项特别贸易关注被WTO/TBT委员会多次讨论、我国为关注的唯一提出方、我国在提出时明确了特别贸易关注议题类型,那么这种负面影响会由于各国间的积极磋商、措施的波及范围较小以及议题的针对性而得到削弱;但具体到农产品贸易领域而言,这种负面影响则会因为农产品较高的符合成本而加剧。     

Thai Trade Policy: From Non‐discriminatory Liberalisation to FTAs

FTAs have dominated Thai trade policy recently, reflecting the general trend in east Asia. But they also reflect domestic political changes, especially the decision‐making style of the Thaksin government. Thai FTAs have become very politicised. In particular, the US‐Thai FTA negotiations have run into a storm of domestic protest. The first section of the paper surveys the national trade‐policy framework. It highlights the slowdown of unilateral trade and FDI liberalisation after the Asian crisis, though a descent back into protectionism was successfully resisted. Thailand punches well below its weight in the WTO, and not very forcefully in ASEAN, because political attention and negotiating resources have switched to FTAs. The second section identifies the main actors in Thai trade policy, and briefly describes the trade‐policy decision‐making process as well as recent developments during the Thaksin administration. The following central section deals with Thailand's FTAs. These have been driven by vague foreign‐policy goals, while credible economic strategy has been lacking. The residual commercial logic is narrowly mercantilist and ‘trade‐light’, seeking an exchange of concessions in a narrow range of sectors rather than comprehensive, trade‐creating FTAs. Weak and partial FTAs are the result. The sole exception has been the Thailand‐USA FTA negotiations, as the USA wants a strong, deep‐integration FTA. However, negotiations were suspended in 2006 in the wake of the Thai political crisis. Overall, Thai trade policy post‐Asian crisis is highly unbalanced. It stands on a shaky FTA leg, while the other WTO leg has gone to sleep and the ASEAN arm is limp. Above all, core unilateral liberalisation and related regulatory reform are lacking.     

贸易政策不确定性、关税变动与企业生存

贸易政策不确定性上升和关税变动的互动叠加,是当前影响企业生存的重要风险因素。本文测度企业层面的贸易政策不确定性、出口关税和进口中间品关税,实证研究了贸易政策不确定性和关税变动以及二者的交互作用对企业生存的影响。总体层面实证结果表明:出口贸易政策不确定性对企业生存具有显著的负向影响,出口关税对企业生存具有显著的正向影响;进口贸易政策不确定性的影响不显著,进口中间品关税对企业生存具有显著的负向影响;随着贸易政策不确定性的上升,出口关税对企业生存的正效应减弱,进口中间品关税对企业生存的负效应增强。分层实证结果显示:本土企业和小微型企业生存受到出口贸易政策不确定性和进口中间品关税的负向冲击更大。     

Trade Intermediaries and the Tariff Pass-through

This paper aims at improving our understanding of the price effects of trade policies following two perspectives. First, we wish to study how the role of intermediaries in international trade affects the transmission of tariff changes to domestic prices. Second, we explore how our results are influenced by the degree of competition in the distribution-service market. In a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model, we show how the pass-through of tariff cuts to domestic prices is limited by the market power of intermediaries producing distribution services. Our long-run equilibrium is characterized by a larger number of firms selling at a higher mark-up. Market access barriers in distribution services determine to what extent tariff cuts are transferred to domestic consumers and foreign producers, affecting the size of their welfare effects. The benefits of trade liberalization policies can be better achieved if they are complemented by competition enhancing measures in the intermediation sector.     

Contingent Self‐Esteem,Self‐Presentational Concerns,and Compulsive Buying

The present study investigates the influence of contingent self‐esteem (CSE) on compulsive buying tendencies. It is argued that this influence is mediated by the self‐presentational concerns of fear of negative evaluation (FNE) and the importance of social identity (SI). These core propositions are tested using a multimethod approach that includes a survey of 402 US adults and two experiments with 160 and 243 subjects, respectively. Survey results find that CSE's impact on compulsive buying is fully mediated by FNE and SI. The two experiments deepen understanding of this effect. Only under high levels of anxiety do those high in CSE exhibit compulsive buying. High CSE leads to higher FNE and SI regardless of anxiety levels, but only at high anxiety levels do FNE and SI lead to compulsive buying. The study's results increase understanding of the role and process by which CSE impacts compulsive buying in adults of all ages.     

Electronic Commerce,Trade and Tariff Revenue: A Quantitative Assessment

This paper assesses the quantitative importance of electronic commerce in trade and tariff revenue, in light of the WTO decision on ‘duty‐free cyberspace’. Electronic commerce is likely to boost international trade in software, digitizable media products (music, books) and many services sectors significantly. However, despite the growing importance of electronic commerce for trade, tariff revenue loss from duty‐free electronic commerce is unlikely to be significant.     

Trade Disputes and Non‐state Actors: New Institutional Arrangements and the Privatisation of Commercial Diplomacy

Critical aspects of commercial diplomacy in the United States and the European Union are undergoing a process of gradual privatisation. We examine institutional arrangements that permit private groups (predominantly industry associations and firms) to petition for the initiation of trade disputes, propose agenda items for multilateral negotiations in the World Trade Organisation, and conduct negotiations on proposals for regulatory reform outside state‐to‐state channels. These include the United States’ Section 301, the European Union's Trade Barriers Regulation, formal consultation processes surrounding WTO negotiations, and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue. We explore the reasons why governments have opened up these new access points for industry, draw comparisons among the institutions and between the US and EU experience of them, and outline patterns of industry use of the petition mechanisms by broad industrial classification. Along with building theory on comparative private‐sector policy substitutability, we consider some of the normative issues raised by institutions for privatised commercial diplomacy.