Information shocks and the empirical evaluation of training programs during unemployment spells

We study the role of notifications in the evaluation of training programs for unemployed workers. Using a unique administrative data set containing the dates when information is exchanged between job seekers and caseworkers, we address three questions: Do information shocks, such as notification of future training, have an effect on unemployment duration? What is the joint effect of notification and training programs on unemployment? Can ignoring information shocks lead to a large bias in the estimation of the effect of training programs? We discuss these issues through the lens of a job search model and then conduct an empirical analysis following a “random effects” approach to deal with selectivity. We find that notification has a strong positive effect on the training probability but a negative one on the probability of leaving unemployment. This “attraction” effect highlights the importance of accounting for notifications in the evaluation of active labor market policies.     

Evaluating job-search programs for old and young individuals: Heterogeneous impact on unemployment duration

This paper exploits an area-based pilot experiment to identify average treatment effects on unemployment duration of treated individuals of two active labor market programs implemented in Portugal. We focus on the short-term heterogeneous impact on two subpopulations of unemployed individuals: young (targeted by the Inserjovem program) and old (targeted by the Reage program). We show that the latter program has a small and positive impact (reduction) on unemployment duration of workers finding a job upon participation, whereas the impact of Inserjovem is generally negative (extended durations). These results are robust to a wide variety of constructions of quasi-experimental settings and estimators. The identification of heterogeneous effects showed that the program results were less satisfactory for young workers, for those over 40 and for the less educated. Women also benefited less from the programs. The results seem to improve slightly for young workers in the 2nd semester of implementation, but they deteriorate in the medium term. The lack of wage subsidies in the Portuguese programs may explain the minor impacts obtained, when compared to similar programs.     

Does early intervention help the unemployed youth?

This paper evaluates a measure targeted at unemployed individuals aged 20–24. The main purpose of the measure is to prevent long-term unemployment by guaranteeing an assignment to some labor market program within 100 days of unemployment. Municipalities voluntarily agree to offer the guarantee. To identify the effect of the measure, we use three conditions: The guarantee covers individuals aged 24 but not 25, one fifth of the municipalities does not provide the guarantee, and the guarantee existed in 1998 but not in 1997. We find no evidence that the measure did significantly improve the future labor market situation of the youth, which suggests that early intervention in the unemployment spell is not important.     

The impact of territorially concentrated FDI on local labor markets: Evidence from the Czech Republic

This paper investigates the impact of a large and territorially concentrated foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow on local labor market outcomes in the Czech Republic. A conditional difference-in-differences technique is employed for an estimation of the impact and block bootstrapping is used for computing consistent standard errors. The results indicate a positive and statistically as well as economically significant effect of a large investment project on the local unemployment outflow rate, which is driven mainly by increases in the aggregate unemployment exit hazard rates for unemployment durations smaller than nine months. Subsequent to the investment, the unemployment rate decreased by 1.7 percentage points and the employment rate increased by 3.7 percentage points in the host district. However, the impact on long-term unemployed was negligible as the exit hazard rates for durations longer than nine months remain unchanged. Moreover, a simple cost–benefit analysis suggests that investment incentives paid from a state budget would pay off only in a horizon of twelve years.     

Are self-employment training programs effective? Evidence from Project GATE

We examine the efficacy of providing self-employment training to unemployed and other individuals interested in self-employment using data from Project GATE. This experimental design program offered self-employment training services to a random sample of individuals who expressed a strong interest in self-employment. We find that Project GATE was effective in helping unemployed participants to start their own business, leading to significant impacts in self-employment and overall employment soon after program entry. The program also helped unemployed participants remain self-employed and avoid unemployment even five years after program entry. However, the program was not effective in improving the labor market outcomes of participants who were not unemployed.     

Duration of UI periods and the perceived threat effect from labour market programmes

In this paper, we study whether the prospect of compulsory programme participation motivates individuals to leave the unemployment insurance (UI) system prior to participation. In some systems, individuals may experience very different risks of enrolment even when they face identical formal rules. If individuals learn that programme enrolment does not deterministically follow regulations, estimated effects based solely on institutional regulations may be downward biased. This means that the true effect of potential enrolment may be underestimated. We analyse data from the Danish labour market which includes information on a series of reforms that have enforced programme participation in return for unemployment benefit entitlement. First, we find that unemployed individuals do indeed have different risk of compulsory enrolment even when regulations indicate that the risk should be identical. Second, we find that individuals do react strongly and significantly to the prospect of programme enrolment. However, since individuals experience different risks of programme enrolment, the resulting response observed in individuals' hazard out of unemployment is also different as the unemployment spell progresses.     

Social networks and labor market transitions

We study the influence of social networks on labor market transitions. We develop the first model where social ties and job status coevolve through time. Our key assumption is that the probability of formation of a new tie is greater between two employed individuals than between an employed and an unemployed individual. We show that this assumption generally generates negative duration dependence of exit rates from unemployment. Our model has a number of novel testable implications. For instance, we show that a higher connectivity among unemployed individuals reduces duration dependence and that exit rates depend positively on the duration of the last job held by the unemployed worker.     

Sign reversal in LIVE treatment effect estimates: The effect of vocational training on unemployment duration

We use administrative records in Israel to identify the treatment effect of vocational training for the unemployed on the duration of unemployment. We randomize training using data on the availability of courses in and around the time of becoming unemployed. This assumes that the timing of entry into unemployment is random, and course availability around the time of entry is independent of current labor market conditions. According to naïve estimators, which ignore self-selectivity, training reduces unemployment durations. The same applies to linear (IV) estimators, which control for self-selectivity. However, the opposite is found when non-linear IV estimators are used, i.e. training prolongs unemployment durations. Sign reversal depends on how the first stage is specified. A non-nested test indicates that the nonlinear estimate of the treatment effect is preferable to its linear counterpart, in which case training prolongs unemployment spells.     

Spell durations with long unemployment insurance periods

This paper uses data from a natural experiment to investigate the potential incentive effect of a fixed unemployment insurance period. We compare two large groups of Norwegian unemployed persons who registered as unemployed in 1990 and 1991. The last group was affected by a rule change that in practice extended the length of unemployment benefits to more than 3 years. Our data are taken from official records, and we construct unemployment durations by combining information from the unemployment registers with employers' records. We use a proportional hazard model with a flexible baseline. The results suggest that the main effect of benefits running out is to make people drop out of the unemployment register. We find neither clear evidence that the hazard into employment increased when the end of benefits approached in the pre-liberalisation group, nor that behaviour in this part of the spells changed after the reform. On the other hand, our results suggest that the reform had an all over negative effect on the employment hazard.     

How does the benefit effect vary as unemployment spells lengthen?

This paper investigates how the effect of income while unemployed on the probability of an individual leaving unemployment varies with the length of time that the individual has been unemployed. We examine this question in the context of a variety of alternative econometric models. We extend the Proportional Hazards model with unrestricted baseline hazard to one in which there are unrestricted effects of a subset of the explanatory variables and also consider models that can be estimated as series of binary response models. The proportional hazard restrictions are rejected for the sample of British unemployed men analysed and in the binary sequence framework Logit and Probit models based on symmetric distributions dominate (in likelihood terms) the Extreme Value form model implied by extension of the Proportional Hazards formulation. Logit models with a flexible form for the duration dependence which also incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in a flexible way are estimated. The results for all formulations indicate a rapidly declining effect of unemployment income as a spell lengthens, with no significant effect for the long-term unemployed. The preferred specifications which allow for omitted heterogeneity indicate no significant effect after about 5 months, and this result is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of previous labour-market experience variables and to the choice of mixing distribution.     

Long-term Unemployment in the Canadian Labor Market

A bstract . Examination of the distribution of long-term unemployment in the Canadian labor market employing longitudinal administrative unemployment insurance data for the 1975–79 period indicates that over relatively long time periods, unemployment tends to be concentrated among those who have multiple unemployment episodes over time. By implication, high unemployment spell frequencies indicate a high propensity for re-employment. A great deal of long-term unemployment is found in lower skilled occupations and in seasonal occupations and industries. Youth and adult women comprise a proportion of long-term unemployed roughly commensurate with their share of the labor force.     

Housing tenure and labor market impacts: The search goes on

We develop two search-theoretic models emphasizing firm entry to examine the Oswald hypothesis, the idea that homeownership is linked to inferior labor market outcomes, and compare their predictions to three extant theories. The five models have surprisingly different predictions about the labor market at both the aggregate and micro levels. Using a suitable instrumental variable strategy, we estimate both micro and aggregate level regression models of wages and unemployment and compare the estimates to those predictions. We find that while homeowners are less likely to be unemployed, they also have lower wages, all else equal, compared to renters. In addition, higher regional homeownership rates are associated with a greater probability of individual worker unemployment and higher wages. The outcome of a horserace between our new search-theoretic models is mixed—the wage-posting model predicts observed unemployment impacts while a bargaining variant does a better job explaining observed wages and aggregate labor market outcomes. Overall, we conclude that firm behavior is important for understanding the labor market impacts of homeownership. Because this is the case, regional homeownership rates are not good instruments for individual tenure choice in empirical work. And while individual homeowners may have inferior labor market outcomes as compared to renters, from the viewpoint of society, higher homeownership rates may result in greater job creation and overall production, among other benefits.     

Replacement rates and labour market behaviour

This paper studies how the replacement rate, defined as the ratio of disposable income when unemployed to expected disposable income if beginning to work, affects individuals’ transition rate from unemployment. Linked register data, representing a local Finnish labour market in 1996, are analysed with piece-wise constant exponential hazard models. Results suggest that the effect of the replacement rate and, thus, of “unemployment traps”, is fairly modest. It does not seem to change with time spent unemployed. The impact on the transition rate into employment is lower than on the transition rate out of the labour force. Unemployment insurance recipients are found to be less sensitive to changes in the replacement rate than are unemployment assistance recipients.     

Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced through taxes on occupied workers. We first give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job subsidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible downgrading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leaving classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.     

Differential effects of active labour market programs for the unemployed

The differential performance of six Swedish active labour market programs for the unemployed is investigated in terms of short- and long-term employment probability and un-employment-benefit dependency. Both relative to one another and compared to more intense job search, the central finding is that the more similar to a regular job, the more effective a program is for its participants. Employment subsidies perform best by far, followed by trainee replacement and, by a long stretch, labour market training. Relief work and two types of work practice schemes appear by contrast to be mainly used to re-qualify for unemployment benefits.     

Does subsidised temporary employment get the unemployed back to work? Aneconometric analysis of two different schemes

Subsidised employment is an important tool of active labour market policies to improve the reemployment chances of the unemployed. Using unusually informative individual data from administrative records, we investigate the effects of two different schemes of subsidised temporary employment implemented in Switzerland: non-profit employment programmes (EP) and a subsidy for temporary jobs (TEMP) in private and public firms. Econometric matching methods show that TEMP is more successful than EP in getting the unemployed back to work. Compared to not participating in any programme, EP and TEMP are ineffective for unemployed who find jobs easily anyway or have a short unemployment spell. For potential and actual long-term unemployed, both programmes may have positive effects, but the effect of TEMP is larger.     

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. The proposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features: (1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and (2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflow composition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposed estimator using Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changes in distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a period of labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leaving unemployment for the short-term unemployed compared to the long-term unemployed becomes significantly higher in the 1990s.     

On-the-job search and cyclical unemployment: Crowding out vs. vacancy effects

Incorporating on-the-job search (OTJS) into a real business cycle model has been shown to increase the cyclical volatility of unemployment. Using a particularly simple model of OTJS, we show that the increased search of employed workers during expansions induces firms to open more vacancies, but also crowds out unemployed workers in the job search, resulting in an ambiguous overall effect on unemployment volatility. We show analytically and numerically that the difference between the employer׳s share of the match surplus with an employed versus an unemployed job seeker determines the degree to which OTJS increases unemployment volatility. We use this result to re-consider some related papers of OTJS and explain the amplification of volatility they obtain. Finally, we show that a plausible calibration of the OTJS model allows us to reproduce most significant features of the US labor data.     

Market conditions and worker training: How does it affect and whom?

This paper analyses the impact of labor market conditions on a firm's incentive to train its workers. In an equilibrium model of the labor market in which firms use both untrained and in-house-trained workers, we show that the incidence of training increases with the tightness of the labor market. In a multi-sector framework, the usual threat of hold-up by a trained worker is more severe for workers who change their sector of work; during downturns, this serves to bias firms' incentives in imparting training away from such workers and towards workers already in the firm and those new workers coming from the same sector. Evidence from the NLSY confirms both predictions—the incidence and duration of company-sponsored training is adversely affected by higher unemployment rates; furthermore, this negative effect is much stronger for workers who change industries as compared to those who do not.     

Search frictions,real wage rigidities and the optimal design of unemployment insurance

In this paper, we study the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme when the economy is subject to labor market imperfections characterized by real wage rigidities and search frictions. The US unemployment insurance financing is such that firms are taxed proportionately to their layoffs to finance unemployment benefits. Using DSGE methodology, we investigate how policy instruments should interact with labor market imperfections. It is shown that wage rigidities in a search and matching environment cause welfare costs, especially in the absence of an incentive-based unemployment insurance. This cost is mainly due to the distorting effect of wage rigidities which generate inefficient separations. We show that the optimal unemployment benefits financing scheme – corresponding to the Ramsey policy – offsets labor market imperfections and allows implementation of the Pareto allocation. The second-best allocation brings the economy close to the Ramsey allocation. The implementation of the optimal policies clearly highlights the role of labor market institutions for short-run stabilization.