发挥失业保险预防失业、促进就业的作用

关于失业保险的功能定位问题,目前的争论主要是要不要进一步发挥失业保险预防失业和促进就业的功能,还是仅降低缴费率而保失业保险金的发放。笔者认为,发挥失业保险预防失业和促进就业的功能不仅在理论上可行,也是国际发展趋势。我国《就业促进法》有专门预防失业的法律要求,面对金融危机的挑战失业保险已经发挥了稳定就业和预防失业的作用。因此,有必要把失业保险预防失业促进就业的作用写入《社会保险法》。     

服刑人员能否继续领取失业保险待遇

案例回放《失业保险条例》第十五条规定,失业人员在领取失业保险金期间＂被判刑收监执行或者被劳动教养的＂,停止领取失业保险金,并同时停止享受其他失业保险待遇。那么失业人员在领取失业保险金期间缓刑、假释,以及服刑期满后仍旧失业的,能否继续领取失业保险金,并享受其他失业保险待遇？     

失业保险金申领时限

案例回放《社会保险法》第四十五条规定,失业人员同时符合“失业前用人单位和本人已经缴纳失业保险费满一年的”“非因本人意愿中断就业的…已经进行失业登记,并有求职要求的”三个条件的,从失业保险基金中领取失业保险金。并未规定失业保险金申领期限。《失业保险金申领发放办法》（劳动保障部令第8号）第六条规定：“失业人员应在终止或者解除劳动合同之日起60日内到受理其单位失业保险业务的经办机构申领失业保险金。”终止或者解除劳动合同之日起60日以后,失业人员可否申领失业保险金？     

有问有答

问 退休前领取失业保险金的次数和年限有没有限制？ 答 根据《失业保险条例》规定,同时具备“按照规定参加失业保险,所在单位和本人已按照规定履行缴费义务满1年的”“非因本人意愿中断就业的”“已办理失业登记,并有求职要求的”失业人员,可以领取失业保险金。由此,领取失业保险金的次数并无限制。     

甘肃：失业人员可接续享受医保

近日,甘肃省下发《关于领取失业保险金人员参加职工基本医疗保险有关问题的通知》。《通知》规定,领取失业保险金人员参加职工基本医疗保险应缴纳的基本医疗保险费从失业保险基金中支付,个人不缴纳基本医疗保险费。领取失业保险金人员按规定参加职工基本医疗保险,可享受基本医疗保险待遇,参加职工基本医疗保险的缴费年限与其失业前参加职工基本医疗保险的缴费年限累计计算,其参加职工基本医疗保险当月起按规定享受相应的住院和门诊医疗保险待遇,并且不再享受原由失业保险基金支付的门诊和住院医疗补助金待遇。     

调整失业保险缴纳标准之建议

失业保险费缴纳标准是享受失业保险制度的基础之一,本文将缴纳标准分为缴费率和缴纳时间。缴费率即个人和单位缴纳失业保险费的费率;缴纳时间即失业人员要领取失业保险金必须缴纳一定的时间。我国《社会保险法》（2011）规定：职工应当参加失业保险,     

关于我国失业保险制度的完善与创新问题

我国的失业保险制度的最初形成是在二十世纪八十年代后期，其目的是为了配合国有企业改革，实行劳动合同制。失业保险制度的建立，对促进经济发展、维护社会稳定曾经起到了积极的作用，对促进经济发展、维护社会稳定曾经起到了积极的作用，然而随着我国社会主义市场经济体制的建立和完善，最初建立的失业保险制度已不能完全适应经济的发展要求，因此，国务院于1999年1月又发布了《失业保险条例》。该条例将失业保险的实施范围扩大到城镇各类企事业单位及其职工，并且规定较为详细的失业保险制度又向前迈了一步。但是，该条例的实施表明其仍无法抵御失业保险可能存在的风险，在一定范围内甚至可能影响到“十五”规划的顺利实施。我国在“十五”规划中重点是进行经济结构的战略性调整，在调整中不可避免会有一部分职工失业，加上大量已下岗人员和企业富余职工，今后的失业人数会很多，对失业保险金的需求量就更大。与此同时，为了加快现代企业制度建设的步伐，在“十五”期间我国将基本建立起适应市场经济体制的劳动力就业体制，企业下岗再就业服务中心将退出历史舞台，新增的失业者和下岗职工将直接进入劳动力市场，由失业保险为他们提供基本生活保险。     

企业财务风险成因及防范对策

正财务风险是指公司财务结构不合理、融资不当使公司可能丧失偿债能力而导致投资者预期收益下降的风险。其是企业一切风险的财务表现,受内外部环境及各种难以预计或无法控制的因素影响,使企业财务和经营状况具有不确定性。财务风     

G公司的财务杠杆效应及财务风险控制分析

随着市场经济快速增长,企业所处环境复杂,同行业竞争激烈。越发多的公司认识并开始运用举债经营所带来的财务杠杆的效应,按照市场经济规律进行合适的负债融资将有利于促进企业与经济良性成长。本文主要分析G公司的资本结构和财务杠杆,得出与房地产整体行业相比,G公司财务杠杆系数过大,导致财务风险过大的结论,然后对企业发挥财务杠杆效应和财务风险控制提出一些建议,促进该企业的可持续发展。     

咨询热线

享受失业保险金是否须在本地履行劳动合同主持人:我们是一家集团公司,员工分散于国内多个省份,但均在集团公司总部所在地江西省参加社会保险。有在外省工作的员工在江西省参加了失业保险,现在公司与该类员工解除或终止劳动合同,在申办失业保险金时,有工作人员表示,只有在参保地履行劳动合同才能享受失业保险金。这些员工在外地履行劳动合同,故不能享受失业保险金。请问这种说法是否合法?江西某公司江西某公司:     

Human capital costs,firm leverage,and unemployment rates

Because bankruptcy is costly for employees, theoretical studies argue that firms with higher leverage have to pay their employees higher wages. In this paper we empirically test this prediction. We find that firm leverage is positively related to the wages of employees, both in the United States and in the Netherlands. In the United States, the positive relation between wages and leverage is strongest in the 21st century, which is a period that also shows a positive relation between wages and unemployment rates. We conclude that the human capital costs of bankruptcy are an important disadvantage of debt.     

劳动力保护与企业风险——来自2008年新《劳动合同法》的证据

本文利用2003—2015年我国A股上市公司数据,借助2008年新《劳动合同法》的实施对劳动密集度不同的行业影响不同,识别了劳动力保护对以股价波动性衡量的企业风险的因果影响。结果显示,受新《劳动合同法》实施影响越大的企业,其股价波动性越小,即劳动力保护降低了企业风险。这一结论在经过平行趋势检验、排除同期其它政策的影响、使用不同方法计算企业风险和劳动密集度、使用平衡面板等一系列稳健性检验后,仍然成立。机制分析表明,新《劳动合同法》的实施会增加企业的杠杆率和违约概率,企业出于“风险规避”的动机会增加现金持有,以抓住未来的优良投资机会。由于国有企业对劳动力保护制度的执行度更强,杠杆率高和流动比率低的企业有更强的“风险规避”动机,因此新《劳动合同法》实施后,国有企业风险出现更大幅度的下降。本文的结论表明,在防范控制企业风险过程中,劳动力保护措施是可选的有效政策工具。     

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

Unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing

Labor unemployment insurance reduces unemployment concerns. We argue that these benefits moderate incentives to smooth earnings to reduce employees’ concerns about unemployment risk. Using exogenous variations in unemployment insurance benefits, we find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the link between unemployment insurance benefits and income smoothing is stronger when there is higher unemployment risk and when the firm is likely to employ more low-wage workers, who find unemployment insurance benefits especially useful. Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that public policy decisions such as unemployment insurance have significant, albeit probably unintended, externalities on corporate financial reporting.     

劳动保护、社保压力与企业违约风险——基于《社会保险法》实施的研究

本文利用2011年《社会保险法》实施的政策冲击所造成的准自然实验情境构建双重差分模型,考察了劳动保护对上市公司债务违约风险的影响。研究发现,劳动保护加强后,劳动密集型企业的违约风险显著提升了约1.5%。在此基础上,进一步检验了劳动保护影响企业违约风险的渠道,发现劳动保护提高了企业的经营性负债水平,并最终提高了违约风险。此外,在国有企业、融资约束水平较高、信息披露水平较低和创新水平较低的企业,劳动保护对企业违约风险的影响更加显著。本文拓展了劳动保护经济后果的研究,也为评价《社会保险法》的政策后果提供了新的经验证据。本研究可为"新冠"疫情期间政府制定政策减免企业社保支出提供参考。     

Labour market conditions and the corporate financing decision: A European analysis

This study examines the influence of labour market conditions on corporate capital structure in a sample of 2892 firms from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK. After considering the effect of unemployment and inflation, we analyse the impact of two market imperfections: employees’ rights and downward wage rigidity. Results indicate that financial leverage responds to changes in unemployment and inflation. We also find that the influence of employees’ rights is non-linear, whereas the negative effect of downward wage rigidity is moderated by firms’ market power. Taken together, our results show that corporate financial decisions are conditioned not only by firm-level issues but also by a country’s labour market.     

Labor unemployment risk and firm risk

This paper examines the effect of labor unemployment risk on firm risk. Using unemployment insurance benefits as a proxy for unemployment risk, we find an economically significant positive relation between unemployment risk and firm risk. This positive relation is more pronounced for firms that are more labor-intensive, have a higher layoff propensity and are more financially constrained. While existing literature that employs corporate policy measures such as debt and cash holdings suggests an opposite relationship, our paper presents evidence that the effects stemming from earnings management, earnings quality and reporting quality appear to dominate.     

政府失业目标调整与就业质量——来自微观企业层面的证据

本文探讨地方政府失业目标调整对企业就业质量的影响。以2870份市级政府工作报告中计划失业率测量政府失业目标,以企业冗员反向测量就业质量,研究发现:更宽松的失业目标调整会降低冗员,提升就业质量;这种调整影响存在非对称性,企业对失业目标的上调更为敏感,会显著降低企业冗员,但下调影响并不显著,这说明调整影响更多来自政府导向下的企业主动行为。本文也发现失业目标调整的影响在民企、补贴较少的公司和市场化程度高的地区更强。最后,本文发现更宽松的失业目标调整会提高企业全要素生产率和公司价值。本文结论表明,在失业目标管理中,除考虑就业率之外,还应关注就业质量,通过引导企业创造新的更合适的就业岗位来实现“更高质量和更充分就业”目标。     

Labor Unemployment Concern and Corporate Discretionary Disclosure

We investigate how firms strategically vary their disclosure policies in response to labor unemployment concern. Using changes in state unemployment insurance laws as exogenous variations of labor unemployment concern, we show that firms provide more bad news forecasts when unemployment concern is low. This relation is stronger when firms are financially constrained, when CEOs and CFOs have higher equity incentives, and when workers are likely to be affected more by unemployment. Our findings are not driven by earnings management reversal or underlying performance changes, and are robust to a battery of identification tests. Finally, we find a similar effect of unemployment concern on disclosure using the tone of 10‐K and 10‐Q filings as an alternative proxy for corporate disclosure. Overall, our findings suggest that labor unemployment concern is an important consideration for corporate discretionary disclosure.     

Employee representation and financial leverage

We analyze how direct employee voice affects financial leverage. German law mandates that firms’ supervisory boards consist of an equal number of employees’ and owners’ representatives. This requirement, however, applies only to firms with more than two thousand domestic employees. We exploit this discontinuity and the law’s introduction in 1976 for identification and find that direct employee power increases financial leverage. This is explained by a supply side effect: as banks’ interests are similar to those of employees, higher employee power reduces agency conflicts with debt providers, leading to better financing conditions. These findings reveal a novel mechanism of direct employee influence.