Central bank independence and sacrifice ratios

Do countries with independent central banks enjoy lower output costs during disinflation? Credibility should allow independent central banks to adjust quicker and thereby suffer lower output costs. The objective of this study is to test the credibility hypothesis that countries with independent central banks suffer lower output losses over a disinflationary cycle than do countries with less independent central banks.     

中国人民银行央行票据的可持续性问题分析

自2003年我国中央银行票据开始登上公开市场的舞台,并且逐步发展成为中央银行公开市场操作的主流工具之一。本文主要从央行票据在公开市场操作中的作用、我国流动性过剩、存款准备金等货币政策的局限性和央行票据所承担的新的政策职能的角度来说明因为我国所处特殊经济金融的环境,央行票据作为我国公开市场操作的中长期工具,具有可持续性。最后本文还对完善央行票据制度提出几点政策建议。     

我国中央银行外汇市场干预的现状、问题及对策

本文从分析中央银行外汇市场干预的主要渠道入手,总结出我国中央银行外汇市场干预的现状及存在的主要问题,最后结合人民币汇率制度的改革,提出了完善我国中央银行外汇市场干预的若干对策建议。     

Maastricht: New and Old Rules

Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty and similar arrangements, central banks nowadays enjoy considerable independence. This is generally believed to be the result of relatively recent debates, which led to the conclusion that sheltering monetary authorities from the pressures of fiscal policymakers is a prerequisite for monetary stability. However, in history this point has in fact been a recurrent tenet. We start with David Ricardo’s arguments in favour of central bank independence and against monetisation of public deficits. After WWI, the latter issue was at the heart of the 1920 International Financial Conference of the League of Nations, which fostered and guided the establishment of many new central banks, and shaped various policymaking arrangements of today’s monetary authorities. JEL Classification Numbers: B12, B22, E42, E58, E61     

Designing a central bank: Social player,monetary agent,or banking agent?

This paper reviews recent advances on the role of the central bank in the money supply process and its effects on inflation. The literature is presented according to a three-stage process, with the central bank acting first as social player, then as monetary agent, and finally as a combined monetary and banking agent.     

The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness

This paper introduces a parameter for central bank independencein a monetary policy game with a conservative central bankerIt tries to explain the optimal degree of central bank independenceand conservativeness by four economic and political determinants,both theoretically and empirically There appears to be a tradeoff between central bank independence and conservativeness.Then, by comparing the optimal degree of conservativeness andindependence with the actual degree of independence, we wantto identify the optimal degree of conservativeness for 12 memberstates of the European Union.     

A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence

A Nonnormative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence. — The authors study monetary policy under different central bank constitutions when the labor-market insiders set the minimal wage so that the outsiders are involuntarily unemployed. If the insiders are in the majority, the representative insider will be the median voter. The authors show that an independent central bank, if controlled by the median voter, does not produce a systematic inflation bias, albeit equilibrium employment is too low from a social welfare point of view. A dependent central bank, in contrast, is forced by the government to collect seigniorage and to take the government’s re-election prospects into account. The predictions of their theory are consistent with the evidence that central bank independence decreases average inflation and inflation variability, but does not affect employment variability.     

Political consensus, uncertain preferences, and central bank independence

Models where monetary policy is delegated to an independentcentral bank using contracts or targets usually assume thatthe preferences of the principal and the agent are known withcertainty. However, if there is no consensus in society aboutthe relative costs of inflation and output stabilisation, thedelegation solution may not produce a better outcome for themedian voter than discretion This paper examines the robustnessof the institutional solutions to the credibility problem withuncertain preferences We also examine the related issue of whetherpolitical parties have an interest in moving towards centralbank independence     

Disinflation costs, accelerating inflation gains, and central bank independence

Disinflation Costs, Accelerating Inflation Gains, and Central Bank Independence. - This paper considers the impact of central bank independence on both the costs of disinflation and the gains of accelerating inflation. For this purpose, sacrifice ratios for disinflation episodes and benefice ratios for accelerating inflation episodes are constructed by using a new method. The ratios are calculated for 19 industrial countries over the period 1960–1992. The results indicate that central bank independence only matters during disinflation episodes: Sacrifice ratio and output loss are higher, the more independent the central bank is; whereas during accelerating inflation episodes, central bank independence has no influence on either the benefice ratio or the output gain.     

中央银行宏观经济背景下独立性问题研究

对于中央银行独立性,究其根本是指中央银行相对于所在国政府的独立性,其独立程度也反映了该国政府对中央银行的控制和影响程度。文章通过对中央银行独立性问题的分析,提出对我国中央银行独立性的建议,以期对我国中央银行的独立性有所助益。     

对网络统计系统的若干思考

随着信息技术的发展 ,网络银行将成为未来银行的重要组成部分 ,促使银行机构虚拟化 ,推进货币电子化和全球金融一体化。传统银行应调整经营战略 ,裁减营业网点 ,增强网上交易功能。     

货币从紧政策下央行票据的货币调控效果探析

我国目前的货币政策工具中占主要地位的是央行票据。它的发行引起了社会的广泛关注。它代表了中央银行对目前宏观经济的调控方向。本文从它收缩市场上流动货币的能力及它与各项经济指标的关联性入手,分析它在货币政策调控中的效果。     

Measuring central bank independence: a tale of subjectivity and of its consequences

The paper first scrutinises the two indices of central bankindependence (CBI) most commonly used in the empirical literature.It defines and discovers an impressive interpretation spread,a major criteria spread but a negligible weighting spread inthose indices Second, it framing the robustness of the empirical‘common knowledge’ on the benefits of CBI. It findsthat, when rankings produced by various CBI indices are regressedwith, among others, average inflation, 87 5% of die regressioncoefficients are not statistically significant Third, followingrecent theoretical developments, it suggests an alternativeapproach to the measurement of a central bank's operationalstatus.     

DSGE模型框架下我国货币政策规则的比较分析

货币政策规则是中央银行为了保持通货膨胀和产出稳定并使经济更快发展所使用的货币政策的指导原则。目前,通行于各个国家的货币政策规则主要有利率规则和货币供应量规则。过去一段时间以来,西方发达国家都已逐渐从货币供应量规则过渡到利率规则,而在我国不管是应用方面还是理论研究方面,对于哪一个货币政策规则更适合我国始终都还没有定论。因此,本文试图在DSGE模型的框架下,对我国的货币政策规则进行比较分析。结果得出,相比于货币供应量规则,利率规则下:(1)货币政策更有效;(2)技术冲击所引起的通货膨胀和产出波动更小;(3)技术冲击对通货膨胀和产出的影响更短暂。因此,研究得出,我国更适合使用利率的货币政策规则。     

银行排队问题的分析和解决方案

上银行,排长队,似乎已成了"家常便饭",经过几年时间并没有得到有效解决,本文深入分析了银行排队的原因,及解决的一些可行方法。     

Costs of separating budgetary policy from control of inflation: a neglected aspect of central bank independence

We investigate the importance of co-ordinating monetary andfiscal policy in a fully dynamic model. The monetary authorityseeks to control inflation while the fiscal authority has abudgetary target We investigate the resulting Nash equilibriumand the consequences of a period of learning which may ariseif each authority is not ex ante sure of the responses of theother. Both of these impact considerably on the outcome andindicate that there may be considerable costs to separatingmonetary and fiscal policy.     

Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor

Controlling inflation is a central problem in transition economies. This paper asks under what conditions or even whether central bank independence helps in this task. The conclusion shows that merely imposing legal independence on the central bank may be ineffective or even counterproductive. It is necessary to make a monetary strategy and the responsibilities and restrictions of central bank policy transparent to the public. In addition, it is important that the right nominal anchor is selected—one that is, or is believed to be, effective and sustainable. Both monetary targeting and inflation targeting are assumed to be unsuitable for most transition countries. Instead, some kind of dynamic exchange rate targeting appears to be the most reasonable choice.     

银行信贷信息不对称与风险防范

本文认为银企之间贷前信息不对称是银行贷款风险的主要原因;通过对信息不对称形成原因的分析,提出了防范银行贷款风险应采取的措施。     

我国银行实施海外战略的思考

从银行国际化的历史来看,进行海外扩张,投资国际市场是一个银行发展壮大的必由之路。但是在这一进程中,也存在着很多制约的因素。如何克服这些不利的因素,走好海外战略的步伐,是中资银行亟待解决的重大课题。本文结合日本银行业海外扩张的实际,在分析我国中资银行海外拓展需面对的问题之后,提出实施海外战略的建议。     

从房价上涨看中央政府与地方政府的博弈

近年来我国房价持续上涨,国家颁布一系列相关措施,但调控效果却并不显著。原因在于,分税制下中央政府与地方政府之间存在利益的冲突。地方政府关注的是房地产发展对地方经济效益的贡献,而非国民经济的均衡发展。地方政府的消极支持,使得房价有增无减。