Institutional investment in online business lending markets

We provide new insights into the business lending decisions of institutional investors in online credit markets by benchmarking their lending performance against that of retail investors.We find superior performance for loans financed by institutional investors, although large sized retail investor groups achieve equivalent performance. Lending decisions of institutional investors are not default risk minimising, and we quantify lending inefficiencies. From a platform perspective, we show that (i) the platform-administered loan allocation process is not biased in favour of institutional investors, (ii) institutional participation in the retail marketplace is not a distorting factor in loan performance, and (iii) the platform’s move to a fixed rate system had detrimental effects on loan outcomes for institutional investors. The superior loan performance achieved by institutional investors is confined to the auction period, when institutional investors had autonomy over setting interest rates.     

Screening, Bidding, and the Loan Market Tightness

Bank loans are more available and cheaper for new and small businesses inthe U.S. in concentrated banking areas than in competitive banking areas. Weexplain this anomaly by analyzing banks' decisions to screen projects andtheir competition in loan provisions. It is shown that, by exacerbating thewinner's curse, an increase in the number of banks can reduce banks'screening probability by so much that the number of banks that activelycompete in loan provisions falls and the expected loan rate rises. This isthe case when the screening cost is low, which induces all active bidders tobe informed. The opposite outcome occurs when the screening cost is high, inwhich case there are sufficiently many uninformed banks in bidding toattenuate the winner's curse. We also examine the social optimum     

框架效应与贷款决策:一项金融素养的实验研究

过度借贷是一个常见的非理性决策。近年来,网络借贷市场的激烈竞争降低了申请贷款门槛,导致金融素养较低的人群开始参与网络借贷,进一步加剧了过度借贷现象。本文采用实验室实验方法,给被试者提供本质上完全等价的贷款产品,同时外生地变化贷款成本形式(绝对数值形式的利息相比于百分数形式的利率、单期利率相比于多期复利),研究贷款成本的展示形式对贷款意愿是否存在影响。结果表明,相比于月利率,展示月利息使得被试者的贷款接受率显著上升21.3个百分点;相比于年化复利,展示月利率使得被试者的贷款接受率显著上升7.91个百分点。这两种框架效应可分别由金融素养的知识层面和思维层面所解释。本文对网络小额贷款场景下的过度借贷提出了一种新的解释——贷款成本的框架效应,并采用实验经济学方法对此提供了可靠的证据。本文研究结论提示,加强金融教育和制定相关法规双措并举,有助于人们做出更审慎的贷款决策。     

An Analysis of Mortgage Contracting: Prepayment Penalties and the Due-on-Sale Clause

The due-on-sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan. We analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low. In that case, the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments. We also demonstrate, by a risk-sharing argument, that the due-on-sale clause is optimal in some settings, even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales.     

金字塔结构、业绩波动与信用风险

本文以手工收集的金字塔层级数据为基础,研究企业集团内部企业"地位"与业绩波动的关系以及银行信贷决策是否考查企业的业绩波动。我们的实证研究表明企业处在金字塔越低端,业绩波动越大;企业的国有属性能降低金字塔层级与业绩波动的关系;业绩波动越大,获得的银行贷款越少。用Heckman(1979)解决自选择问题后,以上结论依然成立。本文不仅丰富了金字塔结构经济后果的文献,还对企业的信用风险管理和银行信贷决策有一定帮助。     

The Effects of Information and Cognitive Processes on Decision Making

This article examines the efficacy of a two-stage cognitive model of decision making within the context of loan decisions. A covariance structural analysis of the cognitive processes that loan officers and MBA students used to reach loan decisions was examined through measures designed to test the proposed two-stage processing model. The results indicated that, during the first stage of cognitive processing, conceptually-driven and data-driven perceptual biases caused different assessments of loan information. The results also indicated that judgments made during the second phase of processing significantly affected decision choice. The well documented conservatism bias was also evident in the results. The result was that experienced loan officers did not out-perform novice students on most of the loan decisions. The relative usefulness of the two-stage model is discussed and general suggestions for future decision making research are offered.     

利率市场化、信贷资源配置与民营企业增长期权价值——基于贷款利率上、下限放开的准自然实验证据

利率市场化对于提高资金配置效率、推动经济高质量发展具有重要意义,来自企业的经验证据有助于理解利率市场化影响经济发展的微观路径。本文基于我国贷款利率上限与下限的放开,借助双重差分模型检验了利率市场化如何影响民营企业的信贷资源获取、投资灵活性与增长期权价值。研究表明:贷款利率市场化使得银行能够通过调节利率来匹配企业风险,相比于中等风险企业,高风险(低风险)企业在贷款利率上限(下限)放开后以更高(更低)的融资成本获得了更多信贷资源;信贷资源的增加为企业把握投资机会提供了资金支持,贷款利率上限(下限)放开后,高风险(低风险)企业的投资灵活性与增长期权价值显著提升。本文的研究发现有助于理解利率市场化促进经济增长的微观机制,为进一步健全市场化利率体系、推进经济高质量发展提供参考。     

Sovereign Debt: Optimal Contract,Underinvestment, and Forgiveness

In this paper we develop a time consistent rational expectations model which analyzes the equilibrium loan contract between a borrowing country and a foreign bank. The loan contract specifies both the amount of the loan and the promised interest payments, and rationally reflects the investment decisions of the country and the possibilities of renegotiation and repudiation of the debt. An important feature of the model is that at the initial negotiation of the loan there is uncertainty about whether the country will renegotiate for partial forgiveness in the future, and whether it will eventually repudiate the debt, even having successfully renegotiated. Moreover, the probabilities of renegotiation and repudiation, and the amount of possible forgiveness are endogenously determined. In the model the repudiation decision is directly related to the underinvestment problem; the objective of the renegotiation is precisely to alleviate this problem. The model is used to analyze the effects of four variables on both the optimal contract and the country's welfare: the degree of penalties that a bank can impose on a defaulting country, the uncertainty of production, the productivity of investments and the riskless interest rate. The analysis has policy implications as well as testable predictions.     

Liability and asset uncertainty for banks

Models of bank behavior are developed which incorporate both deposit and loan demand uncertainty. Extensions of the traditional and simple deposit uncertainty model involve the inclusion of required reserves, fixed penalty costs for reserve deficiencies, limits on normal borrowing, and uncertain spot loan demand and use of lines of credit. Results include normal borrowing limits as a new theoretical constraint on bank size and the existence of small fixed costs as a reason for the real world lack of deficient reserves. Policy conclusions include the effects of current reserve accounting and the effects of various interest rate changes.     

Interest Rate Premia on UK Small-Firm Bank Borrowings: A Research Note

This research note examines empirically the determinants of bank interest rate premia for a sample of UK small firms over the period 1986 to 1991. A number of testable hypotheses are formulated regarding the relationship between interest rate premia and a number of firm-specific risk and cost factors. The empirical results indicate that interest rate premia are significantly related to several of the firm-specific cost and risk factors. These results suggest that there has been some attempt to incorporate into loan pricing decisions both the direct costs associated with individual loan advances and the specific risk characteristics of the borrower.     

Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis

We examine whether securitization impacts renegotiation decisions of loan servicers, focusing on their decision to foreclose a delinquent loan. Conditional on a loan becoming seriously delinquent, we find a significantly lower foreclosure rate associated with bank-held loans when compared to similar securitized loans: across various specifications and origination vintages, the foreclosure rate of delinquent bank-held loans is 3% to 7% lower in absolute terms (13% to 32% in relative terms). There is a substantial heterogeneity in these effects with large effects among borrowers with better credit quality and small effects among lower quality borrowers. A quasi-experiment that exploits a plausibly exogenous variation in securitization status of a delinquent loan confirms these results.     

The Relevance of a Segment Cash Flow Statement in Lending Decisions: An Empirical Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the relevance of a segment cash flow statement in the lending decisions of commercial bank loan officers. 117 loan officers made short term, intermediate term, and long term lending decisions using case materials prepared for a company that operates in two industries—soft drinks and farm machinery/equipment. Results indicate that segment cash flow statements are relevant in lending decisions under certain circumstances. When given the ‘good news’ that a stable industry was the cash source, loan officers in the soft drinks group granted more long term loans than those in the control group. When given the ‘bad news’ that a troubled industry was the cash source, loan officers in the farm group made smaller short term loans than those in the control group.     

Loan collateral,corporate investment,and business cycle

Collateral and loan rates are observed to be highly cyclical in their use for bank lending. The effects of such cyclicality on corporate investment are analyzed in this paper using a dynamic model. We find that more collateral causes firms to select riskier (/safer) projects if the loan rate rises above (/falls below) the expected investment return. We show that the incentive effect of loan rates becomes stronger with greater collateral, with the two credit terms having larger incentive effects on lower-quality firms. These results offer a new explanation for why lenient collateral policies are associated with rising loan rates in economic upturns but stricter collateral requirements come with falling loan rates during downturns.     

The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending

We investigate whether a borrower's media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media‐initiated, borrower‐specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.     

A Neural Network Approach for Analyzing Small Business Lending Decisions

In this paper, we apply the neural network method to small business lending decisions. We use the neural network to classify the loan applications into the groups of acceptance or rejection, and compare the model results with the actual decisions made by loan officers. Data were collected from a leading bank in Central New York. The sample contains important financial statement and business information of borrowers and the loan officers' decisions. We conduct the network training on the data sample and find that the neural network has a stronger discriminating power for classifying the acceptance and rejection groups than traditional parametric and nonparametric classifiers. The results show that the neural network model has a high predictive ability. Our findings suggest that neural networks can be a very useful tool for enhancing small-business lending decisions and reducing loan processing time and costs.     

International monetary transmission with bank heterogeneity and default risk

This paper compares the effectiveness, efficiency and robustness of standard and non-standard monetary policy tools, such as the banks’ refinancing interest rate, penalty interest rate on deposit facility holdings and minimum reserve requirements on attracted deposits. The assessment is performed on the basis of a numerically evaluated open economy general equilibrium model for macro-prudential analysis where optimal decisions by internationally linked banks are key determinants of international financial flows and wider economic outcomes. Banks differ in terms of balance sheet endowments and risk preferences and take decisions rationally and competitively. Default risk, borrowing and lending are endogenous results of individual decisions of private agents (banks and households), as well as systemic outcomes of market interaction.     

Crop Price Indemnified Loans for Farmers: A Pilot Experiment in Rural Ghana

Farmers face a particular set of risks that complicate the decision to borrow. We use a randomized experiment to investigate (1) the role of crop‐price risk in reducing demand for credit among farmers and (2) how risk mitigation changes farmers’ investment decisions. In Ghana, we offer farmers loans with an indemnity component that forgives 50 percent of the loan if crop prices drop below a threshold price. A control group is offered a standard loan product at the same interest rate. Loan uptake is high among all farmers and the indemnity component has little impact on uptake or other outcomes of interest.     

Loan loss provision decisions: An empirical analysis of the Spanish depository institutions

Accountants and financial economists have long held concerns that inefficient loan loss accounting may have a material impact on reported capital and earnings, especially in the banking industry. Prior research has examined banks’ incentives to manipulate loan loss provisions (LLPs) and the resulting impact. However, most of this research has focused on management incentives and other determinants of LLP decisions without addressing the relevant factors associated with best-practiced or efficient LLP decision-making. In this paper, we identify a stochastic frontier model that examines the “efficiency” of the LLP decisions of bank managers. Further we explore the relationship between efficient LLP decision-making and relevant factors that could potentially explain any inefficiency. Our evidence indicates that there is considerable inefficiency in loan loss decision-making among the sample institutions. The research is based on data from the Spanish banking industry, which is particularly relevant in light of the recent deregulatory initiatives in Spain. The findings in this study with regard to the existence of inefficiency in loan loss decisions and the causes of such inefficiency have far-reaching implications for regulators throughout Europe.     

Auditor size, tenure, and bank loan pricing

Using a large sample of U.S. bank loan data from 1996 to 2008, we investigate the relation between two auditor characteristics, namely, auditor size and tenure, and loan interest rates. Our results show the following: First, we find that the loan interest rate is significantly lower for borrowers with prestigious Big 4 auditors than for borrowers with non-Big 4 auditors. Second, we find that auditor tenure is negatively associated with the loan interest rate, suggesting that a long client–auditor relationship lowers the loan borrowing cost. Third, we find that the negative association between auditor size and loan rate is more pronounced for transaction-based term loans than for relationship-based revolving loans. Fourth, our sub-period tests show that our results are driven by the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act period. Our study provides direct evidence that auditor size and tenure are incremental credit risk-reducing factors in the bank loan market.     

What firm risk factors drive bank loan pricing and other terms? Evidence from China

This study investigates how firm risk factors affect bank loan pricing. Although firm-specific stock price crash risk affects bank loan costs directly, it also prompts other risks, including financial restatement and litigation, which in turn trigger higher bank loan costs. Strong internal and external governance mechanisms help reduce agency problems and improve information transparency, alleviating the adverse effect of stock price crash risk on loan costs. Our results confirm that bankers take good corporate governance into account in their bank loan decisions. We also show that bond investors price the adverse effect of stock price crash risk, prompting higher corporate bond costs. Futher evidence suggests that banks impose stricter non-price terms, such as smaller loan size, shorter loan maturity, and a higher likelihood of collateral requirement, on firms with higher crash risk.