Factor saving innovations and factor income shares

We present an endogenous growth model where innovations are factor saving. Technologies can be changed paying a cost and technological change takes place only if the benefits are larger than the costs. Since the gains derived from factor saving innovations depend on factor abundance, biased innovations respond to changes in factors' supply. Therefore, as the economy becomes more capital abundant agents try to use capital more intensively. Consequently, (a) the elasticity of output with respect to reproducible factors depends on the capital abundance of the economy and (b) the income share of reproducible factors increases as the output grows. Another insight of the model is that in some economies the production function converges to an AK in the long run, while in others long-run growth is zero.     

The transition to a globalized economy: Poverty,human capital and the informal sector in a structuralist CGE model

Recent econometric evidence suggests that trade liberalization has an elusive relationship to growth and income distribution. This paper provides an explanation for these results via numerical simulations of a dynamic structuralist CGE. The conclusion is that if families become too poor to finance human capital accumulation, or the state too stingy to supply it at a reasonable cost, exports of skill-intensive goods can become uncompetitive and the transition to openness may involve increasing poverty, unemployment and stagnation. The model design incorporates an informal sector as well as accumulation of human capital. The paper simulates two trajectories, a “green” path in which per capita income grows steadily with a rapid rate of human capital accumulation and a reduction in the level of economic informality. A second, or “red” path is also possible, however, with a growth rate that is much lower, an expanding informal sector and an inadequate rate of human capital formation.     

中国汽车需求预测:基于Gompertz模型的分析

人均收入水平是影响汽车拥有率的决定性因素.本文在前人研究的基础上,运用Gomp-ertz模型研究汽车拥有率和人均收入之间的非线性关系.本文选取的研究对象既包括当今的发达国家,又包括众多发展中国家,尤其是亚洲的欠发达国家.通过对各国的时间序列数据和多国的横截面数据做回归,并对汽车拥有率及其收入弹性做国际比较,研究发现Gompertz方程能够很好地解释各国汽车拥有率发展共有趋势:在一国经济发展过程中,汽车拥有率先加速增长,在经历了一个拐点后,减速增长,最后无限趋近于共有的餍足点,本文设为0.62;而收入弹性呈先上升,在达到最大值后下降的状态.本文重点分析了近年来中国的汽车拥有率问题,并预测出中国的汽车拥有率拐点在人均GDP YIP=12 000,汽车拥有率VIp=0.2281上,假定中国人均GDP的增长速度在3%-7%的范围内,这个拐点将发生在2015-2042年之间,那时的汽车总量将大于259 996 496辆.此外,收入分配不均对中国的汽车拥有率有着重要的影响.     

The political economy of redistribution under democracy

We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. Hence, the corollary question concerns the conditions under which democracy is sustainable. We find that democracies survive in wealthy societies. Conditional on the initial income distribution and the capacity of the poor and the wealthy to overthrow democracy, each country has a threshold of capital stock above which democracy survives. This threshold is lower when the distribution of initial endowments is more equal and when the revolutionary prowess of these groups is lower. Yet in poor unequal countries there exist no redistribution scheme which would be accepted both by the poor and the wealthy. Hence, democracy cannot survive. As endowments increase, redistribution schemes that satisfy both the poor and the wealthy emerge. Moreover, as capital stock grows the wealthy tolerate more and the poor less redistribution, so that the set of feasible redistributions becomes larger. Since the median voter prefers one such scheme to the dictatorship of either group, democracy survives.We would like to thank, Daron Acemoglu, Marco Basetto, Alberto Bisin, V.V. Chari, Pat Kehoe, Onur Ozgur for very useful comments.     

The brain drain and the world distribution of income

Skilled emigration (or brain drain) from developing to developed countries is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration today. Such migration is likely to affect the world distribution of income both directly, through the mobility of people, and indirectly, as the prospect of migration affects the rate of return to education in both the sending and receiving economies. This migration pattern will therefore affect human capital accumulation and fertility decisions in both the sending and receiving economies. This paper analyzes these effects in a dynamic two country model of the world economy where agents in both countries make optimal fertility and human capital decisions. The implications of the analysis for the world distribution of income are derived in the light of recent empirical findings of the brain drain literature. The analysis shows that the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor to rich countries may in the long run increase inequality in the world distribution of income as relatively poor countries grow large in terms of population. In the short run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large developing economies with sufficiently low skilled emigration rates.     

The Distribution of Human Capital and Economic Growth

This paper analyzes the interaction between the distributionof human capital, technological progress, and economic growth.It argues that the composition of human capital is an importantfactor in the determination of the pattern of economic development.The study demonstrates that the evolutionary pattern of the humancapital distribution, the income distribution, and economic growthare determined simultaneously by the interplay between a local home environment externality and a global technologicalexternality. In early stages of development the local home environmentexternality is the dominating factor and hence the distributionof income becomes polarized; whereas in mature stages of developmentthe global technological externality dominates and the distributionof income ultimately contracts. Polarization, in early stagesof development may be a necessary ingredient for future economicgrowth. An economy that prematurely implements a policy designedto enhance equality may be trapped at a low stage of development.An underdeveloped economy, which values equality as well as prosperity,may confront a trade-off between equality in the short-run followedby equality and stagnation in the long-run, and inequality inthe short-run followed by equality and prosperity in the longrun.     

NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY*

The United Nations' newly completed study of purchasing power parities covering 34 countries varied in region, income level, and form of economic organization shows the systematic differences between the usual view of the structure of the world economy arising out of international comparisons based upon foreign exchange rate conversions and the structure one sees when actual prices are available. The real per capita GDP of developing countries is understated relative to developed countries when exchange rates are used in converting countries' national income accounts to a common currency, with the degree of understatement for any two countries being inversely related to the per capita income difference between them. The reason for this is that relative prices in the non-traded goods sector are lower relative to traded goods prices in low income countries. The systematic pattern observed in the 1975 data of the 34 countries has been extrapolated over time and space to get estimates of GDP for other years and countries. In the absence of detailed price data, the real shares of final expenditures devoted to particular components of the total can only be estimated as the proportion of own currency total expenditure devoted to the components. The observed differences in the pattern of prices of poor countries relative to rich for different components makes this clearly wrong for international comparisons, and in systematic ways. For example, (i) the relative price of services compared with commodities in poor countries is lower than in rich; so the apparent tendency of the share of services to rise as a country's income rises disappears when real quantities are considered; similarly, (ii) the relative price of capital goods is greater in poor countries compared with rich ones, so the difference in investment ratios out of GDP between rich and poor countries is understated.     

An empirical investigation of long-run growth in the UK

In this paper the long-run growth of the UK economy is analysed over the period 1855–1997, using a Markov-switching cointegration approach. We find that long-run economic growth can be explained by two permanent shocks, namely a technological shock and a labour supply shock. While technological progress seems to have a positive impact on the wage share and on income equality, the labour supply shock has the opposite effect, contributing to income inequality. Both shocks have a positive impact on aggregate output, but the bulk of long-run output growth variability is explained by the labour supply shock, suggesting that inequality is not harmful to growth.     

Capital income taxation,tax criteria,and intergenerational welfare

In a two-period overlapping-generations model, residence criteria are shown to be optimal with lump-sum transfers to the younger generation in a dynamically efficient open economy even if all wage income, corresponding to rent income under exogenous labor supply, is not taxed away. When tax revenues are also distributed to the older generation — which indeed may be desirable for short-term intergenerational welfare distribution reasons — a weighted average rule is derived for optimal international taxation. The taxation of domestic savings income follows the inverse elasticity rule in respect to savings and, surprisingly, higher investment elasticity increases the tax level. Finally, for a small open economy and for large identical economies, tax competition with a mixed scheme of residence-based taxes and source-based subsidies yields the same tax policy as tax cooperation with no restrictions on the domestic and international capital income tax instruments.     

A model of commodity prices after Sir Arthur Lewis

We develop an idea from Arthur Lewis' paper on unlimited supplies of labor to model the long-run behavior of the prices of primary commodity produced by poor countries. Commodity supply is assumed infinitely elastic in the long run, and the rate of growth of supply responds to the excess of the current price over the long-run supply price. Demand is linked to the level of world income and to the price of the commodity, so that price is stationary around its supply price, and commodity supply and world income are cointegrated. The model is fitted to long-run historical data.     

On the level of optimal capital import in a decentralized competitive economy

In a competitive economy, capital import will affect the distribution of income among domestic economic units. Our main aim is to determine the optimal level of capital import, given that the distribution of income among people is accounted for. In order to consider explicitly the effect of capital import on saving behavior, we shall adopt a simple, two-period life cycle growth model. It will be shown that in order to know if the government can increase everybody's long-run utility, the criterion of the golden rule is important.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Capital Expansion, Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium Unemployment

A model is developed, which captures the interactions of unemployment and economic growth in general equilibrium. The economy evolves along a correct-expectations equilibrium path exhibiting endogenous job rationing, and productivity growth is driven by installation of new capital. Under the maintained hypothesis that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is less than unity, unemployment benefits are shown to shift up the whole path of equilibrium unemployment, leaving the economy with a higher natural rate of unemployment and lowering the long-run growth rate permanently. Investment tax credits financed by lump sum taxes on total income are capable of lowering the natural rate and raising the economy's growth rate.     

Replacing the U.S. income tax with a progressive consumption tax: A sequenced general equilibrium approach

This paper examines the welfare consequences of changing the current U.S. income tax system to a progressive consumption tax. We compute a sequence of single period equilibria in which savings decisions depend on the expected future return to capital. In the presence of existing income taxes, the U.S. economy is assumed to lie on a balanced growth path. With the change to a consumption tax, individuals save more and initially consume less. As the capital stock grows, consumption eventually overtakes that of the original path, and the economy approaches the new balanced growth path with higher consumption and a greater capital stock. Both the transition and the balanced growth paths enter our welfare evaluations. We find the discounted present value of the stream of net gains is approximately $650 billion in 1973 dollars, just over 1 percent of the discounted present value of national income. Larger gains occur if further reform of capital income taxation accompanies the change. We examine the sensitivity of the results, both to the design of the consumption tax and to the values of elasticity and other parameters. The paper also contains estimates of the time required to adjust from one growth path to the other.     

Indeterminacy in dynamic models: When Diamond meets Ramsey

We consider an aggregate two-periods overlapping generations model with endogenous labor, consumption in both periods of life, homothetic preferences and productive external effects coming from the average capital and labor. We show that under realistic calibrations of the parameters, in particular a large enough share of first period consumption over the wage income, local indeterminacy of equilibria cannot occur with capital externalities alone. It can nevertheless occur when there are only, even very small, vanishing labor externalities provided that the elasticity of capital-labor substitution and the wage elasticity of the labor supply are large enough. We also show that if labor externalities are slightly stronger, but still small enough to be plausible, and the elasticity of labor supply is larger, local indeterminacy occurs in a Cobb-Douglas economy. Finally, we show that a locally indeterminate steady state is generically characterized by an under-accumulation of capital. It follows therefore that while agents live over a finite number of periods, the conditions for the existence of locally indeterminate equilibria are very similar to those obtained within infinite horizon models and that from this point of view, Diamond meets Ramsey.     

地方政府对城市土地供给的影响研究： 理论与实证

地方政府片面追求地方经济增长将导致城市土地过度供给,城市土地产出弹性越大且政府在城市土地出让金中的收益比例越高,城市土地过度供给的程度就越深,并且随着城市土地供给的增加,地方经济中内生含有降低居民收益分享比例、提高政府和企业分享比例的趋势,这构成地方政府不断增加城市土地供给的重要诱因。解决我国城市土地过度供给的根源在于改变地方政府以增长为导向的适应性调整策略,优化中央与地方、地方与微观主体之间的城市土地权属关系,调整我国现有城市土地收益的分配格局,将城市土地供给置于长期化的视野以及制度化的平台上进行,使地方政府的城市土地供给行为与资源的高效化、集约化利用目标相适应。     

Productivity growth and welfare in a model of allocative inefficiency

We develop a model of learning-by-doing in human capital formation in the presence of allocative inefficiencies. The inefficiencies are a result of lobbying by firms to establish, or prevent, barriers to the perfectly competitive allocation of factors of production (labor). It is shown that lobbying may lead to a static welfare loss depending upon the elasticity of substitution between goods, and the relative lobbying power of firms. Further, productivity growth, via learning by doing, changes the relative lobbying power over time. This may magnify or diminish the static welfare loss in the long-run depending on the level of initial misallocation. Therefore, differences in initial lobbying power and rate of productivity growth between sectors determine the long-run effects of lobbying.     

Fiscal policy,government debt,and economic growth in the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution

This article presents the Kaleckian model of growth and distribution that sets a budget deficit ratio as an indicator of fiscal policy and examines the short- and long-run effects of an increase in budget deficits and a rise in income tax rates on the economy. The key short-run outcomes are as follows. First, expanded budget deficits have a positive effect on the rate of capacity utilization. Second, the tax rate for wage income does not affect the rate of capacity utilization, whereas the tax rate for capital income has a favorable impact on it. This result implies that raising the tax rate for capital income can be an important policy instrument for stimulating the economy. Third, we find that the economy exhibits a wage-led aggregate demand in the short run. The main long-run results are as follows. First, the effect of expanded budget deficits on the growth rate is ambiguous, since a higher debt burden negatively influences the rate of capacity utilization and hence economic growth, despite the increase in demand caused by government borrowing. A higher budget deficit ratio thus raises the growth rate only if a certain condition is satisfied. Second, the tax rate for capital income has a positive impact on the growth rate. Third, the economy shows a wage-led growth in the long run.