THE ECONOMIC COST OF U.S. OIL CONSERVATION

This article examines the costs of U.S. oil conservation by using parameters of five world oil models from a recent Energy Modeling Forum study. Variation in the estimated cost of oil conservation across the models suggests that achieving oil conservation through flexible policies that adjust to market conditions would better serve economic efficiency than would setting government-mandated levels of oil consumption. Additionally, net world oil conservation is likely to be somewhat less than gross U.S. conservation. U.S. oil conservation lowers the world oil price and stimulates non-U.S. oil consumption. Including the gains in non-U.S. oil consumption raises the estimated costs of achieving a given conservation level .     

U.S. OIL DEMAND AND CONSERVATION

Recent history has lent casual support to three popular theories about U.S. oil demand: (i) U.S. oil consumption is very insensitive to changing oil prices, (ii) non-price conservation has reduced U.S. oil demand, and (Hi) U.S. oil consumption falls more when oil prices rise than it rises when oil prices fall. Together, these theories suggest that one could hold oil consumption constant without much economic sacrifice. The authors' econometric evidence does not support these theories. This evidence indicates that U.S. oil consumption is fairly responsive to price changes over the long run, but with a considerable lag. Sharp oil price increases—or an equivalent policy action—would be needed to hold oil consumption constant during the 1990s.     

NEW ESTIMATES OF THE U.S. ECONOMY'S POTENTIAL GROWTH RATE

Using an Okun's law framework, the analysis here estimates potential growth for the 1990s as measured by both fixed- and chain-weighted GDP. It then decomposes estimated potential growth rates into labor productivity growth (LPG) and labor input growth (LIG) using a regression analysis to separate secular from cyclical changes. It compares estimates of potential output and trend productivity growth for the 1990s with estimates from earlier periods. Results indicate that eliminating the substitution bias associated with fixed-weight measures of real GDP raises estimated potential GDP growth in the 1980s but lowers it in the 1990s. A slowdown in labor force growth, with little or no change in long-term productivity growth, largely accounts for the implied slowdown in potential growth.     

THE COST OF THE U.S. SUGAR PROGRAM REVISITED

The article analyzes the welfare cost of the U.S. sugar program using a multimarket model of U.S. sweetener markets. The latter includes raw crops, sugar extraction and refining, and sweetener users (food-processing industries and final consumers). The authors address the industrial organization of food industries using sweeteners and treat the United States as a large importer. With the removal of the program, this article estimates (all figures in 1999 dollars) that in 1998 cane growers, sugar beet growers, and processors would have lost $307, $650, and $89 million, respectively; sweetener users would have gained $1.9 billion. World prices would have increased by 13.2%. The deadweight loss of the program is estimated at $532 million.     

OIL PRICE VOLATILITY AND U.S. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

This study uses a model with explicit energy sector linkages to estimate the macroeconomic impacts of the 1986 collapse in energy prices. The model combines features of neoclassical macroeconomics to estimate final demand spending and of general equilibrium analysis to estimate substitution possibilities. The model allows price and wage rigidities yet permits interfuel and input substitutions. The simulation results suggest three conclusions. First, the most significant macroeconomic impact of the 1986 oil price reduction is the sharp drop in inflation. Second, output and employment gains are relatively small due to the sharp drop in energy sector output. Finally, the estimated gain in real output due to lower energy prices is close to the output loss resulting from the trade deficit increase during 1986. This may be one reason why no substantial increase in economic growth occurred following the 1986 collapse in energy prices.     

THE VALUE O F NONMARKET HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION: OPPORTUNITY COST VERSUS MARKET COST ESTIMATES

This paper discusses the problem of valuing the time spent on household production and presents estimates of that production for the United States in 1960 and 1970. The estimates are derived by using both opportunity cost and market cost valuations of household time. A comparative analysis of these estimates concludes first that opportunity cost estimates exceeded market cost estimates by 1.0 to 3.0 percent of the GNP. Second, the ratio of household production to the GNP, although declining slightly between 1960 and 1970, may in the long run tend to be relatively stable. These conclusions do not support the popular views that over time household production will decline in relative magnitude, or that the opportunity cost method of valuing household time, relative to the market cost method, is significantly upward biased.     

ESTIMATES OF THE AGGREGATE QUARTERLY CAPITAL STOCK FOR THE POST-WAR U.S. ECONOMY

We construct quarterly aggregate gross and net capital stock series for the post-war U.S. economy using annual capital stock, capital depreciation, and capital discard figures along with quarterly investment series. We construct nominal and real measures of all three categories in the aggregate capital stock: consumer durable goods, producer durable goods, and business structures. In constructing the nominal series we take into account the changes in capital goods' prices. The series are constructed using four different methods. Using time- and frequency-domain techniques, we compare the constructed series and characterize their short-run, business cycle, and long-run cyclical properties. We find that the constructed series exhibit very different cyclical and shock persistence dynamics. Practial implications are discussed.     

美国购油策略分析及对中国的启示

美国页岩油革命改变了美国原油贸易格局,使得美国进口原油品质趋于重质化,且地域来源趋于集中化。本文通过挖掘页岩油革命后美国原油进口策略转变的内在原因,提出美国国内页岩油需求与对加拿大原油进口之间存在互补效应,而与对欧佩克原油进口之间存在替代效应,并通过协整检验和格兰杰因果关系检验,分析了美国页岩油需求和对各国原油进口的互动关系。本文的研究结果对中国的页岩油战略和中美原油贸易关系均有重要的政策启示。     

MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF A COMMUNIST COMMAND ECONOMY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CIA ESTIMATES FOR THE U.S.S.R.

There are major methodological and practical problems in comparing the performance of capitalist and communist economies. They have been most carefully analysed for the former Soviet Union, for which there was a huge research input, mainly by the CIA. The CIA effort had considerable merit, particularly in assessing Soviet rates of growth. Unfortunately, it was terminated in 1991, partly because it suffered from unduly harsh criticism, partly because its political relevance waned. However, the CIA archives remain an important source for the study of comparative economic growth. It would be extremely useful if they were opened to scholars, a serious loss if they were destroyed.     

ESTIMATES OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE U.S., 1962–1983

The study has two major objectives. The first is to determine time trends in household wealth inequality in the U.S. over the 1962–83 period. Four concepts of wealth are analyzed: (i) total household wealth, defined as total household assets less liabilities; (ii) fungible wealth, defined as total household wealth less consumer durables and household inventories; (iii) financial wealth, defined as fungible wealth less equity in owner-occupied housing; and (iv) capital wealth, defined as financial wealth less currency, checking accounts, and time deposits. Relying on a variety of data sources, I find that wealth inequality remained relatively constant from about 1962 to 1973, fell sharply from about 1973 to about 1979, and then rose sharply between 1979 and 1983. Concentration in 1983 was greater than that in 1962 for financial and capital wealth but of similar magnitude for total and fungible wealth. The second, methodological in nature, is to analyze the effect on measured inequality of the alignment of raw survey data to national balance sheet totals. I find that the alignment process can significantly affect point estimates of household wealth distribution but does not generally affect the direction of inequality trends.     

THE IMPACT OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS ON THE U.S. STOCK MARKET*

It is shown that the reaction of U.S. real stock returns to an oil price shock differs greatly depending on whether the change in the price of oil is driven by demand or supply shocks in the oil market. The demand and supply shocks driving the global crude oil market jointly account for 22% of the long‐run variation in U.S. real stock returns. The responses of industry‐specific U.S. stock returns to demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market are consistent with accounts of the transmission of oil price shocks that emphasize the reduction in domestic final demand.     

WELFARE COST OF AN OIL IMPORT FEE

This paper examines the impacts on the US. oil market of a $5-per-barrel tariff on imported crude oil. The analysis shows that the United States currently is a price taker in the world oil market. This means that "optimal tariff" arguments for an oil import fee have no validity. The author also argues that any economic losses that oil supply disruptions generate are better addressed with alternative policy tools. To forecast the effects of the tariff on US. production, the author uses a domestic oil supply model that she developed elsewhere. She calculates the resulting gains in producer surplus and then combines them with an estimate of consumer surplus losses and government revenues so as to yield an estimate of the tariff's welfare cost. This welfare cost amounts to approximately $17 billion (in present-value terms) over the 1988–1998 period.     

美元本位制、美元霸权与美国金融危机

美元本位制下,美元霸权表现为中心一外围框架体系.在该体系下,中心国美国与外围国家的权益和义务不对称,地位不对等,而且框架体系本身具有内在的不相容性,这些特征决定了美元本位制的内在脆弱性,由此也使美国落入美元本位制的陷阱,造成美国国内利率下降、消费信用过度扩张、制造业陷入衰退等经济失衡,最后当信用泡沫破灭时,金融危机爆发.     

COMPARING PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES OF THE WELFARE COST OF INFLATION

Reserve banks worldwide have been moving towards zero inflation policies. Confusion clouds the welfare cost of maintaining such inflation policies despite the best attempts at clarification. Monetary theory research has shifted from partial to general equilibrium economies. This shift has left the partial equilibrium estimates of the welfare cost of inflation below most of the general equilibrium estimates. Put on a comparable basis, partial equilibrium estimates compare more closely with the general equilibrium estimates. Furthermore, evidence suggests that integration under the money demand function appears applicable in general equilibrium economies. Finally, the estimates depend on the elasticities of money demand and the underlying structural parameters.     

APPRAISING THE U.S. OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES FOR GOVERNMENT–WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Output and productivity estimates for U.S. government organizations are a useful management tool, and are of potential value for improving national income accounts. Real gross government product is currently estimated on the basis of labor input data. However, this imparts a downward bias to real GNP estimates since labor productivity of federal civilian employees has risen, according to Labor Department estimates begun in 1972, at an average annual rate of 1; percent since 1967. The estimates now cover almost 70 percent of the employees. The chief avenue for further improvement lies in refinement of the output indicators. Coverage of state and local government employees is spotty and needs to be expanded. The author also recommends a major effort to estimate public capital stocks in current and constant prices as a basis for measuring rental values, capital inputs, and productivity.     

Measuring technological trends: A comparison between U.S. and U.S.S.R./Russian jet fighter aircraft

Measuring and forecasting technological change is a crucial issue from various points of view. This is particularly important in the case of weapon systems as this would enable technological performance and operational capabilities to be assessed in relation to potential threats. This paper measures and compares technological trends in U.S. and Soviet Union/Russian jet fighter aircraft by estimating the relationship between the first flight date and a set of performance and technical characteristics of these aircraft. From the point of view of technological advantage, we find that U.S. jet fighters were, on average, approximately 2 years ahead of the former Soviet Union/Russian jet fighters during the entire jet fighter era. Nevertheless, the technological advantage has swung from one side to the other during specific periods as particular models have been introduced. Finally, the development of 5th-generation jet fighters, in particular the development of the F-22 Raptor, has placed American technology about 20 years ahead of Russian technology, a difference that has never occurred before. This finding casts doubt on the ability of Russia, as the inheritor of the former Soviet Union aircraft industry, to match American technological progress in jet fighter aircraft.     

U.S. farm dynamics and the distribution of U.S. agricultural subsidies

The persistent instability of the agricultural sector is the fundamental premise of most agricultural policy. Yet no research has ever quantified the aggregate dynamics of individual farms in the US. This article is the first to combine the US Census of Agriculture with the Agricultural Resource Management Survey to observe the dynamics of nearly 1.5 million farms. The data reveal substantial variation in farm size expansion and contraction. Most of this variation is unobservable in the sector totals reported by the US Department of Agriculture each year. The distribution of agricultural subsidies suggests that subsidies become more important as farms get smaller and may play a role in slowing farm size contraction.