Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks

Empirical evidence is presented to show that in modern times banks can hedge liquidity shocks but could not do so prior to FDIC insurance. However, the government's limitations in properly pricing FDIC insurance are leading to many current examples of moral hazard. A model is presented to show that if insurance premiums are set to be “actuarially fair,” incentives for banks to take excessive systematic risks remain. Motivated by empirical evidence that money market mutual funds also can hedge liquidity shocks, I consider an alternative government insurance system that mitigates distortions to risk-taking yet preserves liquidity hedging and information synergies.     

Not all bank systemic risks are alike: Deposit insurance and bank risk revisited

This study investigates how deposit insurance, especially in terms of its design features, affects the sources of banking systemic risk. We do so by decomposing a bank's contribution to systemic risk into idiosyncratic tail risk (Alpha), the exposure to fundamental macroeconomic and finance factors (Beta) and bank interconnectedness (Gamma). Our results indicate that while deposit insurance may increase Alpha, there is a U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance coverage and Beta and Gamma, indicating the existence of an optimal coverage level that minimizes systemic risk. We also find that insurance design characteristics significantly affect the U-shaped relationship. Deposit insurance designed to be independently organized, with public administration, additional supervision and risk minimization functions, and private funding, further reduces the systemic risk associated with any given level of coverage. With several robustness checks, including potential endogeneity, heterogeneity, and possible limits in the sample, the results remain valid. Our results should benefit policymakers who design and optimize deposit insurance schemes to ensure that they play a positive role.     

Deposit insurance and bank risk-taking: Evidence from internal loan ratings

We analyze the effect of deposit insurance on the risk-taking behavior of banks in the context of a quasi-natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. Using the case of an emerging economy, Bolivia, which introduced a deposit insurance system during the sample period, we compare the risk-taking behavior of banks before and after the introduction of this system. We find that in the post-deposit insurance period, banks are more likely to initiate riskier loans (i.e., loans with worse internal ratings at origination). These loans carry higher interest rates and are associated with worse ex-post performance (i.e., they have higher default and delinquency rates). Banks do not seem to compensate for the extra risk by increasing collateral requirements or decreasing loan maturities. We also find evidence that the increase in risk-taking is due to the decrease in market discipline from large depositors. Finally, differences between large (too-big-to-fail) and small banks diminished in the post-deposit insurance period.     

Deposit insurance system,risk-adjusted premium and bank systemic risk: Evidence from China

In this paper, we investigate whether and how the Deposit Insurance (DI) system and its Risk-adjusted Premium (RAP) scheme affect the systemic risk of Chinese banks. Based on bank-level panel data from 2007 to 2020 and the difference-in-differences (DID) method, we find that the establishment of the explicit DI system in China increases bank systemic risk, while the implementation of RAP alleviates this negative impact by reducing systemic risk. We further find the mechanism behind this phenomenon that bank profit acts as a mediator. We also find evidence for international heterogeneity using cross-country data and show that, as China has a longstanding implicit government guarantee, the establishment of explicit DI actually reduces the extent to which banks are protected, thus increasing bank systemic risk. Our study highlights the specificity of Chinese DI system, offers important policy implications for the design of financial safety nets in China and worldwide.     

Dynamics of solvency risk in life insurance liabilities

We describe the time dynamics of the solvency level of life insurance contracts by representing the solvency level and the underlying risk sources as the solution of a forward–backward system. This leads to an additive decomposition of the total solvency level with respect to time and different risk sources. The decomposition turns out to be an intuitive tool to study risk sensitivities. We study the forward–backward system and discuss two methods to obtain explicit representations: via linear partial differential equations and via a Monte Carlo method based on Malliavin calculus.     

保险公司负债公允价值的评估

保险公司的资产与负债按照财务报告或风险管理的要求要用公允价值来表示其价值。保险公司负债主要由各种类型的保险合同组成。尽管金融产品的交易非常活跃,市场价格可以相对容易地获得,但像保险合同这样缺乏交易市场,并且风险是非系统化的金融产品的公允价值的计算却十分困难。通过分层次的方法可以有效地评估金融工具的公允价值,其中评估保险公司负债的公允价值最常用的方法是现值法。现值法中包含了直接法与间接法两种本质上等价的方法。本文对这两种方法分别作了分析,并提出了在评估保险公司负债的公允价值时需要考虑的一些现实问题。     

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.     

On accounting standards and fair valuation of life insurance and pension liabilities

The actuarial profession is increasingly teaming up with financial economists for a fruitful cooperation on the proper valuation of life insurance and pension (L&P) liabilities. This has been a natural consequence of a recent sharply increased focus on market values in financial reports of L&P companies from regulators, standard setters, the financial press, stakeholders, and others with an interest in the L&P business.

This article provides a financial economist's point of view on recent developments in relation to the fair valuation of L&P liabilities. The role of accounting standards and the background for the international harmonization in this field are first discussed. We then review and explain the concept of fair value and provide a general view on appropriate techniques for estimating fair values of L&P liabilities in accordance with the definition of the concept. The paper also contains a section which briefly reviews recent and quite innovative regulatory initiatives in relation to market value reporting in the Danish market for life and pension insurance.     

Deposit insurance and credit union lending

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.     

发挥劳动模范作用 建设国际一流银行

劳动模范是时代的楷模，员工的旗帜，是先进生产力和先进生产关系的代表，是国家、民族和企业的宝贵财富。劳动模范代表的不是一种个人行为，是一种品牌，一种文化，一个时代的记录；劳模精神是企业文化的核心和精髓，是一种能够代表社会大多数具有拼搏与创新精神的力量。     

Deposit insurance and money market freezes

In the presence of deposit insurance, a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets. We show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank-based retail financial markets, in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions. Counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings-rich regions, which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits, and in savings-poor regions, which have to pay large spreads in money markets. This asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and, in the presence of demand externalities, can cause large output losses.     

Incentives in an international bank

Margins in international banking have fallen dramatically during the last years. Therefore, banks face the pressing need to develop more suitable forms of organization and more efficient incentive schemes. In a principal agent framework this paper develops four fundamental rules. The marginal benefits from additional risk taking should be equal to its marginal cost. The top management should set position limits to the local branch managers. Competition across local branches should be used to improve incentives. If the local branch manager can engage in different activities, incentives should be balanced.     

Fair valuation of insurance liabilities via mean-variance hedging in a multi-period setting

A general class of fair valuations which are both market-consistent (mark-to-market for any hedgeable part of a claim) and actuarial (mark-to-model for any claim that is independent of financial market evolutions) was introduced in Dhaene et al. [Insurance: Mathematics & Economics, 76, 14–27 (2017)] in a single period framework. In particular, the authors considered mean-variance hedge-based (MVHB) valuations where fair valuations of insurance liabilities are expressed in terms of mean-variance hedges and actuarial valuations. In this paper, we generalize this MVHB approach to a multi-period dynamic investment setting. We show that the classes of fair valuations and MVHB valuations are equivalent in this generalized setting. We derive tractable formulas for the fair valuation of equity-linked contracts and show how the actuarial part of their MVHB valuation decomposes into a diversifiable and a non-diversifiable component.     

寿险公司负债价值计量研究

有效的资产负债管理以寿险公司资产和负债价值的正确计量为基础。寿险负债的长期性和多种嵌入期权的特性使寿险公司资产负债管理更具复杂性。寿险负债价值计量的精算方法注重于它的死亡率风险测定的技术秘诀和期限的长期性,但该方法使期权的效应无从体现,也使在利率和被保险人行为的静态假设不成立的前提下,负债价值被低估的情况发生。因此,必须辅之于财务方法来测量期权在寿险合约中的价值。本文对寿险合约中期权价值的测量及其对ALM的作用也做了探讨。     

Cost efficiency of international insurance firms

This article examines the cost efficiency of insurance firms located in 11 countries over a five-year period, 1988–1992. Two X-inefficiency measures are derived, one from the stochastic cost frontier model and the other from the distribution-free model. The results show that X-inefficiencies not only vary by country but by size and specialization. Firms in Finland and France have the lowest X-inefficiency, while firms in the United Kingdom have the highest. On average, small firms are more cost efficient than large firms worldwide. Firms grouped into those offering single or specialized services also operate more cost efficiently than those offering a combination of life and nonlife services (combined firms). The results also indicate that the X-inefficiency estimates derived from the stochastic cost frontier model are more suitable for this sample of data than those derived from the distribution-free model.     

Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management

Despite the growing importance of institutional investors in global capital markets and the link between bank earnings management and financial crash risk, little is known about the role of institutional investors in mitigating bank earnings management. We conduct the first international analysis of this issue using a broad sample of banks and institutional investors. We find a negative relation between institutional ownership and bank earnings management, after controlling for the stringency of a country's bank regulations and other relevant bank and country characteristics. Additionally, institutional ownership is more negatively related to earnings management in countries with more-stringent bank disclosure requirements or when ownership is held by domestic rather than foreign institutional investors. Institutional ownership is also more negatively related to earnings management in countries in which insiders extract more private benefits or when ownership is held by institutional blockholders. Our findings have important policy implications regarding institutional investors' engagement with banks.     

国际大投行的人才计谋

目前,所有外资投行都将中国视为其全球战略布局中的"特区".不管大投行还是小投行,大家对大的股权项目的努力从来没有放弃过.在这种背景下,呈现出怎样的人才布局     

对农业政策性银行开展代理保险业务的探讨

伴随着农业政策性银行的改革与深化 ,农业政策性银行开展保险业务代理 ,已成为农业发展银行经营目标的重要内容。如何拓展农业发展银行的代理保险业务 ,使其做强做大 ,并成为农业发展银行新的业务发展的增长点 ,是摆在农发行面前一个极其重要的课题。本文拟就现阶段农业政策性银行开展代理保险业务作一些探讨。