The information content of trading halts

We investigate the impact of trading halts of NYSE-listed stocks on informationally related securities that continue to trade during the period of the halt. Informational relationships are established for companies in the same four-digit SIC industry based on the correlation of returns, volume, volatility, and the adverse selection components of spreads. We find a significant liquidity impact on informationally related securities with spreads and price impact of trades having substantial increases. However, we also find that quoted depths, the number of trades, and trade volume significantly increase. Our results are consistent with the trading halt model of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam [2000. Asymmetric information and news disclosure rules. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 363–403] and with the informed trading model of Tookes [2008. Information, trading, and product market interactions: cross-sectional implications of informed trading. Journal of Finance 63, 379–413]. In addition, our results indicate that there is a common liquidity response of informationally related securities to firm-specific trading halts.     

Market Structure and Transaction Costs of Index CDSs

Despite regulatory efforts to promote all-to-all trading, the post–Dodd-Frank index credit default swap market remains two-tiered. Transaction costs are higher for dealer-to-client than interdealer trades, but the difference is explained by the higher, largely permanent, price impact of client trades. Most interdealer trades are liquidity motivated and executed via low-cost, low-immediacy trading protocols. Dealer-to-client trades are nonanonymous; they almost always improve upon contemporaneous executable interdealer quotes, and dealers appear to price discriminate based on the perceived price impact of trades. Our results suggest that the market structure is a consequence of the characteristics of client trades: relatively infrequent, large, and differentially informed.     

Mutual Fund Stock‐Picking Skill: New Evidence from Valuation‐ versus Liquidity‐Motivated Trading

We propose a novel Trade Motivation Matrix that allows differentiating funds’ valuation‐motivated (VM) and liquidity‐motivated (LM) trades on single trade level. It thus enables analyses of stock‐picking skill on three levels: trade, stock, and fund. On trade level, we find significant outperformance of VM buys and significant underperformance of VM sells, indicating manager stock‐picking skills, especially during illiquid market periods. VM trades outperform LM trades, confirming negative performance effects due to flow risk, especially when market liquidity is low. On stock level, collective VM buying explains high future stock returns while collective VM selling is related to future losses, indicating wisdom of the crowd. On fund level, higher trading discretion, measured by a higher degree of VM trading, is observed for smaller, older funds holding higher cash buffers. Finally, higher trading discretion is related to higher future fund alpha, especially during illiquid times.     

The securitization of gold and its potential impact on gold stocks

We study the market impact of a very successful financial innovation – the SPDR Gold Trust exchange-traded fund (GLD). GLD holds physical gold, and provides traders with a convenient and cost-effective way to gain exposure to gold. We find that after the introduction of GLD, the liquidity of gold company stocks declined, and their adverse-selection risk increased. Over the two-month period after GLD’s introduction, the stocks’ relative effective bid-ask spreads increased by over 15%, while their adverse-selection cost, as measured by the price impact of trades, went up by more than 30%. Gold stocks also experienced significant negative abnormal returns (−12% on average) in the month after GLD started trading. Our findings suggest that GLD attracted traders, especially uninformed traders, away from gold company stocks, and that the resulting negative demand shocks and decrease in the stocks’ liquidity caused their prices to decline. Our results show that existing securities can be seriously adversely affected when a new security enters the market.     

Did CDS trading improve the market for corporate bonds?

Financial innovation through the creation of new markets and securities impacts related markets as well, changing their efficiency, quality (pricing error), and liquidity. The credit default swap (CDS) market was undoubtedly one of the salient new markets of the past decade. In this paper we examine whether the advent of CDS trading was beneficial to the underlying secondary market for corporate bonds. We employ econometric specifications that account for information across CDS, bond, equity, and volatility markets. We also develop a novel methodology to utilize all observations in our data set even when continuous daily trading is not evidenced, because bonds trade much less frequently than equities. Using an extensive sample of CDS and bond trades over 2002–2008, we find that the advent of CDS was largely detrimental. Bond markets became less efficient, evidenced no reduction in pricing errors, and experienced no improvement in liquidity. These findings are robust to various slices of the data set and specifications of our tests.     

闪电指令之争及思考

本文介绍了闪电指令及与之相关的暗池与高频交易,以及交易技术创新对证券市场的巨大影响,并扼要讨论了闪电交易对市场交易的利弊以及由此而引发的争议。本文从交易信息获取的公平性、证券市场的价格发现机制、交易指令成交的最优执行以及交易信息泄露四个方面,对闪电指令交易对证券市场公平与效率的影响进行了分析和评价。关于闪电指令的争议对我国证券市场的启示,本文指出,国内证券市场在近期不会出现闪电交易之类的交易方式,但是我们不应忽视对此问题的研究,应当根据我国资本市场的特点在风险可测、可控、可承受的前提下积极推进场内市场的创新。     

Liquidity commonality and high frequency trading: Evidence from the French stock market

High frequency trading (HFT) depends on sophisticated algorithms to closely monitor price changes across securities. Theory predicts this technological advantage should translate into market-wide liquidity co-variation, by transmitting information-based liquidity shocks. Using a dataset of orders and trades from the French stock market, we investigate whether HFT algorithms constitute a source of systematic liquidity risk. We demonstrate that, across securities, the liquidity offered by high frequency traders is significantly less diverse than that of traditional traders; this finding is in line with the cross-asset learning hypothesis. The excessive co-movement in liquidity is also partly explained by common market making rules. In periods of increased market stress, we find HFT, designated market making, and order size to be important sources of liquidity commonality. Our results have policy implications for market regulators in Paris, suggesting the inclusion of maximum spread-limit rules in market making contracts will reduce the possibility of liquidity drying up when markets are in turmoil.     

Liquidity in a Market for Unique Assets: Specified Pool and To‐Be‐Announced Trading in the Mortgage‐Backed Securities Market

Agency mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) trade simultaneously in a market for specified pools (SPs) and in the to‐be‐announced (TBA) forward market. TBA trading creates liquidity by allowing thousands of different MBS to be traded in a handful of TBA contracts. SPs that are eligible to be traded as TBAs have significantly lower trading costs than other SPs. We present evidence that TBA eligibility, in addition to characteristics of TBA‐eligible SPs, lowers trading costs. We show that dealers hedge SP inventory with TBA trades, and they are more likely to prearrange trades in SPs that are difficult to hedge.     

Futures Manipulation with “Cash Settlement”

This paper investigates the susceptibility of futures markets to price manipulation in a two-period model with asymmetric information and “cash settlement” futures contracts. Without “physical delivery,” strategies based on “corners” or “squeezes” are infeasible. However, uninformed investors still earn positive expected profits by establishing a futures position and then trading in the spot market to manipulate the spot price used to compute the cash settlement at delivery. We also show that as the number of manipulators grows, profits from manipulation fall to zero. However, even in the limit, manipulation still has a nontrivial impact on market liquidity. More broadly, we interpret manipulation as a form of endogenous “noise trading” which can arise in multiperiod security markets.     

Strategic trading and learning about liquidity

Many practitioners point out that the speculative profits of institutional traders are eroded by the difficulty in gauging the price impact of their trades. In this paper, we develop a model of strategic trading where speculators face such a dilemma because of incomplete information about time-varying market liquidity. Unlike the competitive market makers that they trade against, informed traders do not know the distribution of liquidity (“noise”) trades. Instead, they have to learn about liquidity from past prices and trading volume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes. Our paper also has normative implications for practitioners.     

Further analysis of the liquidity and information components of institutional orders: Active versus passive funds

Previous research examining the price impact of institutional trading concludes that index funds incur higher liquidity costs due to the higher demand for trading immediacy. However, this conclusion has only been inferred by comparing the total price impact of active and index funds. This study extends the literature by decomposing the price impact of both active and index funds' trades into liquidity (temporary) and information (permanent) components. Index fund trades incur higher liquidity costs and generate lower returns than active funds' trades. Indeed, the evidence presented in this study reveals the execution costs of index funds' trades are entirely liquidity-driven.     

The contribution of market makers to liquidity and efficiency of options trading in electronic markets

This paper examines the contribution of market makers to the liquidity and the efficiency of the options market in a unique setup of an order-driven computerized trading system, in which market makers and other participants operate under equitable conditions. The main findings are: (1) liquidity increased – a 60% increase in trading volume and a 35% decrease of bid–ask spreads; (2) the efficiency of shekel–euro options trading improved – deviations from put–call parity decreased significantly by 12%, and skewness decreased by about 30%. We also find that the net cost to the exchange is out weighted by the benefit to the trading public and that the presence of market makers encouraged trading between other participants far beyond their own trading.     

1-share orders and trades

1-share trades are the most common odd lot trade size, accounting for 9.62% of all odd lot transactions and 3.65% of all trades on NASDAQ in 2012. While 50.41% of 1-share trades result from broken orders, 34.89% of 1-share trades are intentional. We provide substantial evidence that traders use 1-share trades to “ping” for hidden liquidity. In particular, our results indicate that 1-share trades are disproportionately aggressive and also execute against hidden liquidity more than any other odd lot trade size. We also find a relative increase in trading immediately following a 1-share trade. Our results are in line with Clark-Joseph (2014), who suggests that traders may use small, unprofitable trades to detect information from other traders. Specifically, 1-share trades represent the minimum cash outlay necessary to trade, while simultaneously producing the smallest possible effects on a market maker's inventory, and in turn, a security's price.     

The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to Insider Trading

Trading by corporate insiders and their tippees is analyzed in Anheuser-Busch's 1982 tender offer for Campbell Taggart. Court records that identify insider transactions are used to disentangle the individual insider trades from liquidity trades. Consistent with previous studies, insider trading was found to have had a significant impact on the price' of Campbell Taggart. However, the impact of informed trading on the market is complicated. Trading volume net of insider purchases rose. Contrary to the broad implications of adverse selection models, Campbell Taggart's liquidity improved when the insiders were active in the market, and the insiders received superior execution for their orders.     

Insider Trading and Financing Constraints

Insider trading may alleviate financing constraints by conveying value‐relevant information to the market (the information effect) or may exacerbate financing constraints by impairing market liquidity and distorting insiders’ incentives to disclose value‐relevant information (the confidence effect). We examine the significance of these two contrasting effects by investigating the link between insider trading and financing constraints as measured by the investment‐cash flow sensitivity. We find that, overall insider trading exacerbates financing constraints; however the information effect dominates the confidence effect for insider purchases. Only trades by executive directors are significantly related to financing constraints.     

Automation versus Intermediation: Evidence from Treasuries Going Off the Run

This paper examines the choice of trading venue by dealers in U.S. Treasury securities to determine when services provided by human intermediaries are difficult to replicate in fully automated trading systems. When Treasury securities go “off the run” their trading volume drops by more than 90%. This decline in trading volume allows us to test whether intermediaries' knowledge of the market and its participants can uncover hidden liquidity and facilitate better matching of customer orders in less active markets. Consistent with this hypothesis, the market share of electronic intermediaries falls from 81% to 12% when securities go off the run.     

Share price volatility with the introduction of individual share futures on the Sydney Futures Exchange

This paper examines a recent innovation in financial derivative securities—individual share futures contracts traded on the Sydney Futures Exchange. We investigate changes in the volatility of the underlying shares in the cash market using an asymmetric exponential ARCH model. The overall evidence suggests that the introduction of futures trading has had very little impact on cash market volatility. Trade in the futures market has less of an effect on cash market volatility than cash market trading for most shares.     

Program trading and intraday volatility

Program trading and intraday changes in the S&P 500 Indexare correlated. Futures prices and, to a lesser extent, cashprices lead program trades. Index arbitrage trades are followedby an immediate change in the cash index, which ultimately reversesslightly. No reversal follows nonarbitrage trades. The cumulativeindex changes associated with buy-and-sell trades and with arbitrageand nonarbitrage trades all are similar. Price decompositionssuggest that the results are not due to microstructure effects.Program trades in this 1989-1990 sample do not seem to havecreated major short-term liquidity problems. The results arestable within the sample.     

Do uninformed crossed and internalized trades tap into unexpressed liquidity? The case of Nokia

Crossed and internalized upstairs trades are analysed in a dataset in which institutional investors can be identified. Earlier findings that upstairs trading is uninformed, taps into unexpressed liquidity, and does not affect market quality are revisited. The permanent price effect of crossings and internalized upstairs trades is significantly lower than that of limit order book trades due to the fact that the least informed institutional trades are routed upstairs. Crossed and internalized trades affect the depth and transaction costs in the limit order book and a greater reliance is placed on the upstairs market when liquidity is low and volatility is high.     

Market liquidity and institutional trading during the 2007–8 financial crisis

This paper shows that institutional sell-side herding increased bid–ask spreads and liquidity risk during the 2007–8 financial crisis. Such an impact on liquidity is most pronounced in firms with large numbers of institutions that sold the same stocks, that is, have correlated trades. For the same reason, we find institutional investors with a dedicated, buy-and-hold, investment style to be the least likely to herd; their trading activity did not affect stock market liquidity during the crisis. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, different test specifications and consistent with recent theories highlighting the negative impact of institutional trading activity on market liquidity during a crisis.