Hayek,Mach, and the re-ordering of mind

This paper argues that Friedrich A. v. Hayek's theory of mind and the relation between mental and physical events, most systematically presented in his 1952 book, The Sensory Order, is indebted to Ernst Mach's theory, and, in particular, to his Analysis of Sensations, above and beyond what Hayek himself along with multiple admirers of his work ever cared to admit. By highlighting a number of important similarities between Mach's and Hayek's theories of the psychical/phenomenal and physical world/order, the paper aims to show that key aspects of Hayek's theory of mind can be traced to Mach's theoretical foundations. The paper further argues that some of the criticisms Hayek levels against Mach concern nonessential points, arise from the uncritical acceptance of common misinterpretations of Mach's theory, or are plainly wrong.     

The Road to Serfdom and the world economy: 60 years later

We consider Friedrich Hayek's Road to Serfdom in light of global ideological and economic developments during the 60 years since its publication. Specific problems considered include socialism and planning, whether national socialism was really socialism, whether Hayek's views could be labeled as social democratic and whether his critique of social democracy was too strong, and his discussion of the prospects for international economic order. While often right and enormously influential, Hayek himself agreed that some of his predictions did not become true.     

Knowledge Questions: Hayek,Keynes and Beyond

This paper discusses the knowledge problem in terms of both the use and generation of knowledge. This is analyzed in the context of Hayek's failure to respond to the Keynes Challenge—the claim that markets fail to produce relevant knowledge—by suggesting that in the aftermath of The General Theory he was not well-positioned to address that problem. Ironically, his post-World War II work in cognitive psychology, The Sensory Order, offers a theory of the generation of knowledge which can provide a useful analogy for understanding the generation of market-level knowledge.     

Ecological economics and the politics of knowledge: the debate between Hayek and Neurath

Hayek's epistemic arguments against planning were aimed notjust against socialism but also the tradition of ecologicaleconomics. The concern with the physical preconditions of economicactivity and defence of non-monetary measures in economic choicewere expressions of the same rationalist illusion about thescope of human knowledge that underpinned the socialist project.Neurath's commitment to physicalism, in natura calculation andplanning typified these errors. Neurath responded to these criticismsin unpublished notes and correspondence with Hayek. These highlightedthe epistemological premises his work shared with Hayek's, representinga response to Hayek from Hayek's own assumptions. This paperexamines the cogency and continuing relevance of the argumentsin this debate.     

From The Sensory Order to the Liberal Order: Hayek's Non-rationalist Liberalism

Hayek's arguments for a constitutionally constrainted government are consistent with, and to some extent rest upon, his work in theoretical psychology. By exploring his view of the mind in The Sensory Order, we can see the psychological and epistemological underpinnings of Hayek's belief in the mind's limits and the indispensibility of spontaneously emergent social institutions. The Austrian view of microeconomic coordination is a logical outgrowth of Hayek's theory of mind. Constraints on government are necessary not because self-interest leads rational government actors into temptation, but because even altruistically-motivated actors are epistemically unable to intervene effectively in spontaneously emergent institutions.     

The Emergence of Hayek's Ideas on Cultural Evolution

F. A. Hayek's writings on cultural evolution are an essential part of his work, and some aspects of these writings (e.g., his defense of group selection) have generated considerable controversy. This historical paper traces the circumstances that led Hayek to introduce cultural evolution and related ideas into his work.     

Normative judgments and spontaneous order: The contractarian element in Hayek's thought

This paper explores the apparent tension between Hayek's moral skepticism and his role as a defender of liberal institutions. It looks at Hayek's concept of spontaneous order, and asks whether there are any grounds for claiming that spontaneous orders have moral value. The argument from group selection is considered but rejected. Hayek is interpreted as putting most weight on arguments which show, for specific orders (such as the market and common law) that their rules assist each individual in the pursuit of his or her ends, whatever those ends may be. It is suggested that this form of argument is contractarian in character. However, Hayek's contractarianism is distinctive in that it looks for agreement among individuals within an ongoing social order, rather than among rational agents who stand outside any particular society. This paper was written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State University; I am very grateful for the Center's support. An early version was presented at the Friedrich August von Hayek Memorial Symposium in Freiburg, in June 1993. In revising the paper, I have benefited from the comments of the participants at that symposium.     

Economics as mechanism: The mind as machine in Hayek's sensory order

InThe Sensory Order, Friedrich A. Hayek describes the human mind as an apparatus of classification that evolves through experience and that reaches decisions by modeling the alternative courses of action that are available to it. Hayek's mechanistic conception of mind argues aginst the possibility of central planning and against the cogency of any rule that denigrates subjective decision making by employers or other economic agents. As implied by Gödel's proof, no brain, human or mechanical, can ever be sufficiently complex to explain itself. There will therefore always be certain knowledge and rules that cannot be articulated to the satisfaction of a central planner or tribunal.     

Cognition,competition, and catallaxy in memory of Friedrich August von Hayek

The paper focuses on central elements of the scientific work of Friedrich A. v. Hayek since the 1930s. In a first part, his epistemological position and its implications for his understanding of the tasks of the social sciences are presented as he set them out particularly in theSensory Order (1952). Then, it is shown how his findings in economic theory as well as in the analysis of economic and societal systems are formed by these foundations. His emphasis on the subjectivity and the constitutional limitations of human knowledge is identified as a precondition for the outstanding analytical insights which he gained with regard to the functioning of a market order and the role of institutions in societal development. Furthermore, it is argued that Hayek's enduring campaign for freedom and against the socialist tendencies in welfare states was not simply a matter of personal conviction. It was also the result of his analysis in constitutional political economy which revealed to him that freedom as a normative basis of economic and societal institutions is the key to the explanation of European cultural evolution.     

Hayek contra Pangloss on Evolutionary Systems

Some analysts have criticized Friedrich Hayek's theory of cultural evolution for implying that the rules, customs, norms, and institutions that emerge from the evolutionary process are necessarily efficient or desirable in all cases. This charge is unfounded. The present article defends Hayek versus his critics in two ways: First, it restates Hayek's own objections to the idea that cultural evolution produces optimal outcomes. Second, it shows, through an analogy with biological evolution, that Hayek's theory need not imply any such conclusion. Contrary to a widely held misconception, biological evolution does not produce organisms that are perfectly adapted to their habitats; insofar as cultural evolution shares common features with biological evolution, cultural evolution may be expected to display similar types of suboptimality or mal-adaptation. Insights from the theory of biological evolution also help to illuminate some areas of controversy with regard to Hayek's theory of cultural evolution, including: Hayek's advocacy of gradual change; the question of what selective forces drive the process of cultural evolution; and the alleged conflict between group selectionism and methodological individualism.     

Hodgson on Hayek: a critique

In his book Economics and Evolution, Geoffrey Hodgson offersa detailed critique of F. A. Hayek's writings on cultural evolution.Certain aspects of Hodgson's treatment appear to be inaccurate.This paper criticises Hodgson's critique.     

From contract to mental model: Constitutional culture as a fact of the social sciences

This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism. This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives, as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world, that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness, constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics.     

Listen Libertarians!: A Review of John Tomasi’s “Free Market Fairness”

John Tomasi’s 2012 book, Free Market Fairness, has been well received. On the dust jacket, Tyler Cowen proclaims it “one of the very best philosophical treatments of libertarian thought, ever” and Deirdre McCloskey calls it a “long and friendly conversation between Friedrich Hayek and John Rawls — a conversation which, astonishingly, reaches agreement.” The book does present an authoritative state of the debate across the spectrum from right libertarianism, on one end, to high liberalism (that shares some ideas with democratic socialism), on the other end. My point is not to question Tomasi’s own version of “market democracy” as a remix of Hayek and Rawls, but to use his sympathetic restatements of views across the liberal spectrum in order to show the basic misframings and common misunderstandings that cut across the liberal-libertarian viewpoints surveyed in the book. The heart of the debate is not in the answers to carefully framed questions, but in the framing itself.     

On Political Competition: Democracy, Opinion and Responsibility

In this paper, I consider the influence of political competition on opinion. After reflecting on the notion opinion as a concept in the economic analysis of politics, I turn to Hayek's Constitution of Liberty and consider his argument for democracy on the grounds that it is the form of government which best promotes progress in opinion. Yet Hayek's claim that democratically formed opinion improves is unsubstantiated. I turn to accounts of expressive voting thereafter to show why opinions which are realised in the form of votes may be anything other than propitious to democratic culture. I then return to Hayek and consider what becomes of opinion in Law, Legislation and Liberty. His claim that opinion improves under democratic institutions is no longer of great significance to him. Indeed, his account of the rise of bargaining politics provides evidence against the claim that opinion improves. I conclude by asking how democracy can be shielded from opinion, that is, how opinion might be improved in ways which go beyond Hayek's model of political competition outlined in Constitution of Liberty. To this end, I look to accounts of deliberative democracy and expressive politics for support.     

F. A. Hayek: The Liberal as Communitarian

At the heart of Friedrich A. Hayek's social philosophy is a regard for the socially-constituted nature of man: the individual is not taken to be asocial or pre-social, but rather it is recognized that society defines the individual. The neglect of this aspect of Hayek's work by both liberal and communitarian, as well as libertarian, writers within political philosophy has led to his position being misrepresented, for Hayek's brand of liberalism is more akin to one variant of modern communitarianism than it is to the libertarian strain of liberal thought.     

Bringing Social Structure Back into Economics: On Critical Realism and Hayek's Scientism Essay

This paper offers a critique of the critical realist (CR) interpretation of Friedrich Hayek's famous essay Scientism and the Study of Society presented in Tony Lawson's recent Economics and Reality. It is argued, contrary to Lawson's reading, that Hayek's social structures (1) do have an existence over and above the conceptions of the individual actors and (2) serve as a precondition for human action on the lines proposed by CR. Some links are made between Hayek's essay and the theory of social reality recently proposed by John Searle, and some comparisons drawn with CR.     

Hayekian evolution reconsidered: a reply to Hodgson

This is a reply to Geoffrey Hodgson's Comment on an earlierpaper by Caldwell (Hodgson on Hayek: a critique). Though certainareas of agreement are noted, differences in interpretationconcerning Hayek's views on the Malthus–Darwin relationship,on cultural evolution, on the extent to which Hayek may be characterisedas an ontogenist, and on methodological individualism remain.     

On reading Hayek: Choice, consequences and The Road to Serfdom

The basic thesis in The Road to Serfdom is that the lure of socialist ideology has the unintended and undesirable consequence of economic depravation and political tyranny when countries follow its policy agenda. Socialist planning requires economic planners to assume a level of responsibility for economic life in a country which is both cumbersome to the point of impossible, and powerful beyond any reasonable limit that could be safely trusted to any one individual or group of individuals. The papers in this symposium provide a critical reading of the Hayek's thesis on socialism. While many strong points are made in the discussion, the critical reading of Hayek offered must ultimately be judged unsatisfactory. The issues of choice and consequences are not addressed, and as a result the basic argument presented in The Road to Serfdom is never adequately engaged.