Fixed-Term Contracts and Labor Market Duality in France

The French labor market is segmented between permanent and temporary workers. The second category has difficulty in getting an open-ended contract. This paper aims at depicting workers on short-term contracts and shows the consequences on their professional career are negative and significant. A large part of the wage gap between permanent and temporary workers remains unexplained by observable characteristics. They receive less on-the-job training and their likelihood of obtaining a stable job is lower than 30% after 1 year and a half. They have also a higher probability of being the adjustment variable in case of an economic negative shock. These different findings show the importance of using public policies to encourage transitions from fixed-term to permanent employment and reducing labor-market duality.     

Employee Attitudes,Earnings and Fixed-Term Contracts: International Evidence

We explore the relationship between employee attitudes, earnings and fixed-term contracts using data from the British Social Attitudes Survey and International Social Survey Programme. We find that workers employed under such contracts receive significantly lower earnings than their permanent contract counterparts, even after controlling for a plethora of personal and job characteristics. This may be indicative of wage discrimination against fixed-term contract employees. Our results also allude to possible asymmetries in the role of education across this two-tier system, with educational attainment playing a more prominent signaling role in the case of ‘permanent’ contract employees. We also find significant evidence of attitudinal effects, with workers employed on permanent contracts more likely to be both satisfied and secure with their job, but also more likely to find work stressful and exhausting and, perhaps as a consequence, to engage in absence. JEL no. J24, J31, J33     

Employees who do not know their labour contract term and the implications for working conditions: Evidence from Japanese and Spanish microdata

In this paper, we analyse the relationship between employees who do not know the length of their labour contract (hereafter, DNK employees) and working conditions. In developed countries, labour standards regulations generally require employers to provide a labour contract with a clearly defined duration to protect the fundamental rights of workers. However, the data reveal that in the developed countries on which we focus, Japan and Spain, non-negligible proportions of employees, 8% and 11%, respectively, do not know the duration of their labour contracts. Utilizing 2012 data from the Employment Status Survey for Japan and the Economically Active Population Survey for Spain, we find that whether workers are ignorant of their contract term commonly depends on their human capital level. Women, single people, younger and older workers and less-educated workers are more likely not to know their labour contract duration. Compared with other employees, DNK employees are more dissatisfied with their current job, more likely to search for other jobs and less likely to seek more work in their current jobs. We find that DNK employees suffer from a wage penalty for non-standard status and have less access to job training, as occurs in Japan, and that specific attributes, such as immigrant status, tend to be closely related to DNK status, as occurs in Spain. Overall, DNK employment is related to poor working conditions, which indicates the importance of educating workers about labour laws to maintain the welfare of disadvantaged workers.     

The impact of firm-provided training on productivity,wages, and transition to regular employment for workers in flexible arrangements

This paper examines the incidence and density of firm-provided training for workers in flexible work arrangements – i.e., non-regular employees who are working part-time or with fixed-term employment contracts – and analyzes the effect of this training on skills, productivity, and wage growth, using a unique survey of Japanese workers. Among non-regular employees, those who work on a full-time basis are found to receive a higher density of both on-the-job training (OJT) and off-the-job training (Off-JT). Participation in firm-provided training is shown to improve job skills and productivity, but does not appear to impact the wage growth of non-regular workers. However, training participation is shown to make the transition from non-regular to regular employment in the current occupation more likely, enhancing the probability of future wage increases.     

Non-standard Employment in Sweden

In Sweden, as in many other countries, marginal groups tend to be overrepresented in non-standard employment. A decomposition of the employment rate of full-time workers on permanent contracts reveals that non-standard employment contributes to a substantially weaker labour market attachment for females and the foreign born than suggested by conventional employment figures alone. Our econometric analysis shows that the negative wage premia associated with fixed-term employment are considerably smaller in Sweden, both for natives and foreign born, than those that have been found for other countries. This may be due to a highly compressed wage structure and extensive coverage of collective bargaining in Sweden. On the whole, the type of fixed-term contract seems not to matter for the estimated wage premia.     

Unintended consequences of China's new labor contract law on unemployment and welfare loss of the workers

China's new Labor Contract Law, which intended to strengthen the labor protection for workers, went into effect on January 1, 2008. The law stipulated that the maximum cumulative duration of successive fixed-term (temporary) labor contracts is 10 years, and employees working for the same employer for more than 10 consecutive years are able to secure an open-ended (permanent) labor contract under the new law, which is highly desirable to employees. However, in order to circumvent the new Labor Contract Law, some employers may have dismissed workers, after the passage of the new law, who had worked in the same firm for more than 10 years. Using data from the 2008 China General Social Survey, we find strong evidence that firms did in fact dismiss their formal-contract employees who have been employed for more than 10 years. Additionally, using a regression discontinuity design based on this exogenous change in unemployment status for this particular group of workers, we show that the dismissed workers suffered significant welfare loss in terms of happiness. Our results are robust to various specifications and placebo tests.     

Why Do Foreign-Owned Firms Pay More? The Role of On-the-Job Training

While foreign-owned firms have consistently been found to pay higher wages than domestic firms to what appear to be equally productive workers, the causes of this remain unresolved. In a two-period bargaining framework we show that if training is more productive and specific in foreign firms, foreign firm workers will have a steeper wage profile and thus acquire a premium over time. Using a rich employer-employee matched data set we verify that the foreign wage premium is only acquired by workers over time spent in the firm and only by those that receive on-the-job training, thus providing empirical support for a firm-specific human capital acquisition explanation. JEL no. F23, J24     

The Surge in Short-Duration Contracts in Spain

Until the outbreak of the recent economic and financial crisis, Spain was leading the ranking of countries with the largest share of temporary employees. During the crisis this share has fallen to its lowest level in decades, but this does not mean that working conditions in Spain have improved. The flow of new temporary contracts is larger than ever before. A particularly striking feature is the steep growth in the volume of fixed-duration contracts lasting less than a week or a month. We document these trends and analyse how this phenomenon has affected the transition from temporary to permanent employment.     

Dual Labour Market Intermediaries in Italy: How to Lay off “Lemons”—Thereby Creating a Problem of Adverse Selection

Using longitudinal data from the Bank of Italy that cover the period from 2004 to 2014, this paper investigates the wage- and career implications of temporary jobs across the entire wage profile via unconditional quantile regression models and dynamic panel probit models. Building on Autor’s contributions, we consider temporary jobs to be a Labour Market Intermediary that deals with job-matching problems, such as information asymmetries, search cost reductions, worker-side adverse selection, and pay-productivity gaps. Assuming that wage is a proxy for workers’ productivity, we examine the chances that temporary workers who are located in different quantiles of wage distribution have of making the transition towards a stable employment position in the primary labour market. Results clearly indicate that temporarily employed individuals suffer significant wage- and career penalties. Not only are these individuals overly concentrated in the lowest decile of wage distribution, but the career penalty associated with temporary jobs also remains stable independently of the wage/productivity quantile to which the workers belong. If firms use FTC or TWA at all, they do so to remove less productive workers, whose work contract is not renewed once expired. In light of this evidence, it is clear that the hypothesis—proposed in the economic literature—that temporary employment contracts might serve as a screening tool to identify the most productive workers who would then be offered a stable position in the primary labour market does not hold in the highly dualised labour market of Southern Europe.     

Peasant labour for urban industry: Temporary contract labour,urban-rural balance and class relations in a Chinese county

Urban-rural relations in China have a dual character: while a higher level of urban-rural economic balance than most other countries has been achieved, a sharp structural cleavage between workers and peasants has been maintained, based mainly on strict household registrations. Peasants are prevented from migrating to towns and gaining employment there, except under specially approved contracts arranged to resolve local shortages of industrial labour. Contract labour has complex and important effects on rural and urban industrial development. It also embodies the duality of urban-rural relations in China: at the same time as it redistributes wage funds from urban to rural areas, it reinforces the class cleavage between workers and peasants (including contract workers). It also opens up a complex web of inequalities and cleavages among those peasants with contract work and those without. Contract workers have been placed in a contradictory class position which has been a flashpoint of political conflict. The relationships of contract labour to urban industrial and rural development, urbanization, urban-rural balance and structural cleavage, class structure and political conflict are examined through a study of Shulu County, an ordinary rural area with agrowing industrial centre in which over half of the industrial labour force is comprised of peasant contract workers.     

Risk preferences,production contracts and technology adoption by broiler farmers in China

This study expands on existing research on farmers' risk preferences and technology adoption, with novel analysis of the relationship between risk preferences, production contract participation, and technology investment levels and adoption time. Our analysis uses farm-level data from 345 Chinese broiler growers, and used an instrumental variables strategy and endogenous switching models to address the potential endogeneity of the contracting decision. Both the distance of the farm to the nearest broiler business and the distance of the farm to the nearest market for broiler sale are used as instrumental variables for the contracting decision. Results indicate that farmers with higher risk aversion are more likely to participate in production contracts, less likely to adopt new technology, adopt technology later, and invest less in technology. In the subsample of contract farmers, production contracts with longer terms, lower upfront deposit requirements and higher cost sharing with enterprises for technology adoption may make farmers more likely to adopt technology, to adopt technology early and to invest more. These findings jointly suggest that contract terms that help alleviate credit constraints may be more effective at promoting technology adoption in developing countries.     

Why Do Recent Graduates Enter into Flexible Jobs?

Flexible jobs make up a larger share of the Dutch labour market than in almost any other Western country. Recent graduates in the Netherlands are particularly likely to take flexible jobs. In this study we examine why recent graduates enter into temporary contracts and whether flexible jobs offer a poorer match for graduates’ qualifications than permanent jobs. We find that recent graduates that enter into flexible jobs face large wage penalties, a worse job match and less training participation than graduates who take permanent jobs, even after correcting for differences in ability. When the labour market situation for a particular field of education deteriorates, more recent graduates are forced into flexible jobs, threatening their position on the labour market in the long run. Flexible work among recent graduates is unrelated to their willingness to take risks. Only for university graduates is there any indication that flexible jobs may provide a stepping stone to permanent employment.     

合约理论的多重境界与现实演绎:粤省个案

通过东进公司的土地承租案例,说明一项不稳定的合约是如何得以存在并延续的。为什么选择了一项不稳定的合约;为什么不改变合约本身,而是选择了维护原有合约的治理方式?东进公司的创新性试验就是:以合约匹配合约、以合约治理合约。文章发现以"边缘合约"维护"核心合约"的两种形式;厘清了要素合约与商品合约的关系;并进一步说明了东进案例对我国农业的组织化创新及其农业现代化的实现机制所具有的宏观含义。     

Flexibility versus Commitment in Personnel Management

This paper compares human resources (HR) policies embedded in the Japanese and U.S. management systems. We adapt a model from the literature on irreversible investment and use it to examine the trade-off between flexibility to adjust the labor force and higher productivity stemming from the greater commitment of the firm to its employees. In the model, two types of contracts with otherwise identical workers can coexist. One possibility is for firms to commit to a permanent employment contract that precludes dismissal at will. The alternative is a temporary employment contract that allows flexibility to adjust the firm's labor force during demand downturns, but involves higher labor cost per unit of output. Using an example, we illustrate the possible magnitude of the value of flexibility and suggest that adopting long-term contracts in the wrong environment can significantly reduce firm value. The model yields predictions for the optimal labor force composition and its relation to the characteristics of the firm's market. We also consider practices that develop to complement permanent employment. The predictions are then examined in light of evidence on the HR practices in Japan and the United States in the past 50 years and are found to be consistent with the stylized facts in the literature. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2001, 15(4), pp. 515–556. Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J31, J33, J41, J64.     

Three Perspectives on the Dutch Growth of Flexible Employment

The growth in flexible work arrangements has been more pronounced in the Netherlands than in most other western economies. Own account work, fixed-term contracts and contracts with variable hours all have become more prevalent since the early 2000’s. This paper describes the growth of flexible work arrangements from three perspectives. The institutional perspective reveals that the Dutch institutions provide incentives and possibilities for employers to circumvent institution-based risks and costs, and for workers to avoid taxes and social security contributions. The individual perspective shows that most workers nevertheless prefer an open-ended employment contract, which some groups manage to obtain more often than others. Over the life cycle the share of flexible employment contracts decreases among all cohorts and all social groups, but more so among the higher educated and men. Own account work, which is mostly a positive choice, increases over the life cycle. The job perspective shows that flexible work arrangements have grown in all sectors of the economy. In some sectors the increase is predominantly in own account work, in other sectors predominantly in flexible employment contracts, without a clear relation to sector characteristics.     

Asymmetric wage indexation

Models of wage indexation uniformly have been based on the simplifying assumption that nominal wages adjust upward or downwrd symmetrically with unexpected price increases or decreases. Indexation typically is asymmetric in actual contracts, however. Wages are indexed to price increases but not to price reductions. This paper analyzes a macroeconomic model with asymmetric indexation. On the one hand, this paper finds that when stable equilibria supporting use of such asymmetrically indexed contracts exist, the result is an unambiguous downward bias in the base contract wage, because workers must pay a premium for insurance against real wage reductions that unexpected inflation otherwise would induce. On the other hand, the paper concludes that the likelihood of existence of stable equilibria supporting positive wage indexation generally declines as aggregate demand variability rises relative to the variability of aggregate supply. This may help explain why relatively low levels of wage indexation actually are observed in nations with relatively contained aggregate demand volatility.     

Effects of state-sponsored human capital investment on the selection of training type

Since the 1990s, firms in Japan have reduced their human capital investment in the workplace to minimize costs. Moreover, in response to the increase in the number of non-regular employees and turnover rates, workers need to have greater incentive to make the self-motivated investment in themselves for their self-protection. In this study, we first estimate the effects of workers’ self-motivated investment in themselves on wage rates. Next, we explore who is likely to participate in which training type and accordingly estimate the effects of the self-motivated investment on wage rates by training type. Our estimates controlling for individual-level fixed-effects indicate that the return is significantly positive and particularly high for practical training related to workers’ current jobs, and regular workers tend to self-select these higher-returns programs, while non-regular workers are more likely to enroll in lower-returns programs, such as schooling. This trend in investment in oneself could potentially increase the wage inequality between regular and non-regular workers through the self-selection of training types. Our estimates reveal that receiving the training and education benefit raises the likelihood for workers to participate in a high-return training program regardless of whether they are non-regular or regular workers. This suggests that government benefits on self-investment change workers’ self-selection of training type and serve to promote practical trainings that lead to high returns.     

Global Retail Chains and Poor Farmers: Evidence from Madagascar

Global retail companies (“supermarkets”) have an increasing influence on developing countries, through foreign investments and/or through the imposition of their private standards. The impact on developing countries and poverty is often assessed as negative. In this paper we show the opposite, based on an analysis of primary data collected to measure the impact of supermarkets on small contract farmers in Madagascar, one of the poorest countries in the world. Almost 10,000 farmers in the Highlands of Madagascar produce vegetables for supermarkets in Europe. In this global supply chain, small farmers’ micro-contracts are combined with intensive farm assistance and supervision programs to fulfill complex quality requirements and phyto-sanitary standards of supermarkets. Small farmers that participate in these contracts have higher welfare, more income stability and shorter lean periods. We also find significant effects on improved technology adoption, better resource management and spillovers on the productivity of the staple crop rice. The small but emerging modern retail sector in Madagascar does not (yet) deliver these benefits as they do not (yet) request the same high standards for their supplies.     

The Market for Montreal Apprentices: Contract Length and Information

This paper examines the nature of apprenticing arrangements in Montreal around the turn of the nineteenth century, using apprenticeship contracts from a larger body of notarial records found in Quebec. The principal question addressed is what determined apprenticeship length? I find that the characteristics of both masters and their boys were important. For example, older (more productive) boys served shorter terms, as did those training under masons and butchers. There is also evidence that the precision of a master's estimate of a boy's future value was important. Masters often relied on probationary periods to better gauge a boy's worth before signing a contract. Probations, all else equal, were associated with shorter contracts. Because masters anticipated fewer “failures” when they were better informed, matches which began with probations were associated with apprentices of higher expected value.     

Incentive Contracts,Market Risk,and Cost of Capital

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.