Municipal Debt and Marginal Tax Rates: Is There a Tax Premium in Asset Prices?

We study the marginal tax rate incorporated into short‐term municipal rates using municipal swap market data. Using an affine model, we identify the marginal tax rate and the credit/liquidity spread in 1‐week tax‐exempt rates, as well as their associated risk premia. The marginal tax rate averages 38.0% and is related to stock, bond, and commodity returns. The tax risk premium is negative, consistent with the strong countercyclical nature of after‐tax fixed‐income cash flows. These results demonstrate that tax risk is a systematic asset pricing factor and help resolve the muni‐bond puzzle.     

Is There a Difference Between Solicited and Unsolicited Bank Ratings and, If So, Why?

This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the actual outcome of bank ratings. Using two sample banks (one rated by Fitch and one rated by S&P), I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observable bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information and are therefore dependent on the quantity of public information disclosed by the banks. As a result, unsolicited ratings tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information. While the latter result is also consistent with the fact that credit rating agencies may blackmail low-disclosure firms, the findings suggest that blackmailing—if it is actually used—is ineffective in making these firms start to pay for a rating.     

Is There a Replication Crisis in Finance?

Several papers argue that financial economics faces a replication crisis because the majority of studies cannot be replicated or are the result of multiple testing of too many factors. We develop and estimate a Bayesian model of factor replication that leads to different conclusions. The majority of asset pricing factors (i) can be replicated; (ii) can be clustered into 13 themes, the majority of which are significant parts of the tangency portfolio; (iii) work out-of-sample in a new large data set covering 93 countries; and (iv) have evidence that is strengthened (not weakened) by the large number of observed factors.     

Is the Risk Comparison Made by the Public Between EMF and Smoking or Asbestos a Valid One?

The possibility of adverse health effects from exposure to extremely low frequency (ELF) electric and magnetic fields (EMF) has caused considerable controversy in the scientific community and has received great attention in the media and among the general public with many comparing ELF EMF with tobacco smoking and asbestos. Although both smoking and asbestos are now classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) as Group 1 or “established” carcinogens, this was not always the case. In this paper the evidence for the carcinogenicity of ELF EMF is compared with that for smoking and asbestos using the Bradford Hill model for establishing causality between exposure and disease. Application of the model shows that present data are insufficient to demonstrate that exposure to ELF EMF poses a definite human health hazard. However, while the bulk of the evidence is weak, there are several epidemiological studies which have reported an association between prolonged exposure to magnetic fields at levels above what is normally encountered and an increased risk in childhood leukaemia. On this basis IARC has classified ELF magnetic fields as a Group 2B or “possible” carcinogen.     

Promotion Incentives and Corporate Performance: Is There a Bright Side to “Overpaying” the CEO?

Earlier studies have shown that stronger equity-based incentives for CEOs are generally associated with better corporate performance and higher values. In this article, the authors report the findings of their recent study of the effects of promotion-based "tournament" incentives for non-CEO executives (or "VPs") on corporate performance for a large sample of companies during the 12-year period from 1993-2004.
The study's main finding is that such tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, were associated with better corporate operating performance and higher corporate stock returns. Moreover, tournament incentives, as one would expect, appeared to be more effective when CEOs were nearing retirement—but less effective when the firm had a new CEO (and even weaker when the new CEO was an outsider).     

Is There a Better Way to Examine Income Inequality?

Dividing U.S. tax returns into half‐millionaires (those reporting adjusted gross income (AGI) of $500,000 or more in a given year) and their complement allows greater use of IRS data on income sources than is possible with an analysis that examines a fixed percentage of returns, such as the top one percent. Contrary to popular perception and media rhetoric, the inflation‐adjusted difference between the reported AGI of half‐millionaires and the rest actually declined by 25 percent from 1993 to 2011. The income gap between half‐millionaires and other filers reflects differences in kinds of income, with half‐millionaires deriving a much larger fraction of their income from capital investments whose varying returns make that component of income—and thus the income of half‐millionaires—more volatile. The percentage of total tax returns filed by half‐millionaires in a given year and the percentage of their income derived from taxable gains reported on Schedule D account for virtually all of the variation in the half‐millionaire percentage of aggregate AGI. As this finding suggests, the expanding income share for half‐millionaires does not signify that some collection of privileged rich have become richer. The significant net growth in the percentage of filers who are half‐millionaires has been uneven because a significant proportion of their income derives from volatile Schedule D gains, which are higher during economic expansions and lower during recessions. The incomes of half‐millionaires—and especially millionaires—are anything but recession proof. But even with that volatile component of income included, when their percentage of returns doubles, their percentage of income less than doubles, consistent with declining income inequality.     

Is There a Favoritism Strategy in Taiwan Mutual-Fund Companies?

This paper investigates whether Taiwan mutual-fund companies actively pursue a corporate-level strategy of enhancing the performance of "high-value" funds (i.e., high fee-ratio funds or high past performers) at the expense of other "low-value" funds belonging to the same companies. The results show a significant difference between high- and low-value funds within the same fund families and that this difference favors the high past-perorming funds. The future incremental cash inflows from these high-value funds indicate that fund companies indeed benefit from the subsidized strategy. Our findings highlight the potential for agency problems and the importance of corporate and fund governance in the Taiwan asset-management industry.     

Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?

This paper analyzes the incentives of large shareholders to monitor public corporations. We investigate the hypothesis that a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders' incentives to monitor because it allows them to sell their stocks more easily. Even though this is true, a liquid market also makes it less costly to hold larger stakes and easier to purchase additional shares. We show that this fact is important if monitoring is costly: market liquidity mitigates the problem that small shareholders free ride on the effort of the large shareholder. We find that liquid stock markets are beneficial because they make corporate governance more effective.     

Is There a Case for Industrial Policy? A Critical Survey

What are the underlying rationales for industrial policy? Doesempirical evidence support the use of industrial policy forcorrecting market failures that plague the process of industrialization?This article addresses these questions through a critical surveyof the analytical literature on industrial policy. It also reviewssome recent industry successes and argues that public interventionshave played only a limited role. Moreover, the recent ascendanceand dominance of international production networks in the sectorsin which developing countries once had considerable successimplies a further limitation on the potential role of industrialpolicies as traditionally understood. Overall, there appearsto be little empirical support for an activist government policyeven though market failures exist that can, in principle, justifythe use of industrial policy.      

Is the Renminbi a safe haven?

We investigate the relationship between market uncertainty and the relative value of the Renminbi in the offshore market against currencies that the safe haven literature typically considers as the traditional safe haven currency candidates. Our sample spans the February 2011 to May 2017 period. Band spectral regression models enable us to capture that the relationship between market uncertainty and the relative value of the Renminbi is frequency dependent. While we find evidence of some degree of safe haven currency behavior of the Renminbi during the early part of our sample, our findings do not support the suggestion that the Renminbi is currently a safe haven currency or that the Renminbi is progressing towards safe haven currency status.     

Lease Maturity and Initial Rent: Is There a Term Structure for UK Commercial Property Leases?

Seminal work by Grenadier (J. Financ. Econ. 38:297–331, 1995) derived a set of hypotheses about the pricing of different lease lengths in different market conditions. Whilst there is a compelling theoretical case for and a strong intuitive expectation of differential pricing of different lease maturities, to date the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Drawing upon a substantial database of commercial lettings in central London (West End and City of London) over the last decade, we investigate the relationship between rent and lease maturity. In particular, we test whether building quality, credit risk and micro-location variables omitted in previous studies provide empirical results that are more consistent with the theoretical and intuitive a priori expectations. It is found that initial leases rates are upward sloping with the lease term and that this relationship is constant over time.

Is There One Best Way to Sell a Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales1

For managements and boards that have decided that the value‐maximizing choice is to sell their companies, the board must then address another important question: what is the best way to sell the company? Should they use a wide‐ranging auction that seeks to attract the largest number of bidders, exclusive negotiation with a single bidder, or a “controlled sale” with a limited group of potential buyers? In a much cited 1996 article in the American Economic Review called “Auctions Versus Negotiations,” economists Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer argued that there is “no merit in arguments that negotiation should be restricted to one or a few bidders to allow the seller to maintain control of the negotiating process.” But in their series of studies of the corporate M&A sales process over the past five years, the authors of this article have come to a very different conclusion. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, wide‐ranging auctions that seek the greatest number of bidders are far from the dominant approach. Roughly half of the large M&A deals investigated by the authors were accomplished through negotiations with single bidders. At the same time, full‐fledged auctions accounted for only about half of the deals involving multiple bidders, while the other half were classified as controlled sales aimed at a small number of carefully selected potential buyers. In their attempt to explain this preference for negotiations and controlled sales over auctions in M&A sales, the authors draw extensive parallels with the market for initial public offerings. As in the “bookbuilding” approach that now dominates the IPO process in virtually all global capital markets, the decision to limit the number of bidders through either negotiations or controlled sales appears to have the advantage of eliciting more aggressive bids from the “most qualified” buyers. Or, to put this another way, auctions appear to have the effect of discouraging such buyers from participating in the process.     

Is There Private Information in the FX Market? The Tokyo Experiment

We provide evidence of private information in the foreign exchange market. The evidence comes from the introduction of trading in Tokyo over the lunch hour. Lunch-return variance doubles with the introduction of trading, which cannot be due to public information since the flow of public information did not change with the trading rules. We then exploit microstructure theory to discriminate between the two alternatives: private information and mispricing. Four key results support the predictions of private-information models. Three of these involve changes in the intraday volatility U-shape. The fourth is that opening trade causes mispricing's share in variance to fall.     

Is the Term Premium a Risk Premium?

This paper explores whether excess holding period returns on long vis-a-vis short-term securities behave in a manner that is consistent with (1) market efficiency, (2) the time-varying-term-premium variant of the expectations hypothesis, and (3) theories of the term premium that view it as a reward for risk bearing. Both traditional and modern theories of the term premium imply that it should evolve fairly slowly over time as attitudes toward risk and/or perceived covariances with wealth or consumption change. This implies that this period's term premium should have some predictive ability for next period's. However, we find that this quarter's ex-post term premium has zero predictive ability. For monthly rates and returns, the evidence is less clear cut, but again the implied term premia do not behave in a manner consistent with existing theories.     

Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans?

Secondary market trading in loans elicits a significant positive stock price response by a borrowing firm's equity investors. We find the major reason for this response is the alleviation of borrowing firms’ financial constraints. We also find that new loan announcements are associated with a positive stock price effect even when prior loans made to the same borrower already trade on the secondary market. We conclude that the special role of banks has changed due to their ability to create an active secondary loan market while simultaneously maintaining their traditional role as information producers.     

Does Labor Power Affect the Likelihood of a Share Repurchase?

This research examines the impact of labor power on the firm's repurchase decisions. Firms facing stronger labor power repurchase fewer shares, suggesting that, on average, repurchases are against the interests of labor. However, the negative effect of labor power on repurchases is significantly reduced when repurchases benefit employees by fending off an unwanted takeover or countering the dilution effects of employee stock options. We also examine the ex post consequences of share repurchases. Repurchases are positively related to the probability of a strike. Repurchase announcement returns and the operating performance of repurchasing firms are negatively related to labor power.     

What Is the Expected Return on a Stock?

We derive a formula for the expected return on a stock in terms of the risk‐neutral variance of the market and the stock's excess risk‐neutral variance relative to that of the average stock. These quantities can be computed from index and stock option prices; the formula has no free parameters. The theory performs well empirically both in and out of sample. Our results suggest that there is considerably more variation in expected returns, over time and across stocks, than has previously been acknowledged.     

Is the Risk of Bankruptcy a Systematic Risk?

Several studies suggest that a firm distress risk factor could be behind the size and the book-to-market effects. A natural proxy for firm distress is bankruptcy risk. If bankruptcy risk is systematic, one would expect a positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent realized returns. However, results demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns. Thus, a distress factor is unlikely to account for the size and book-to-market effects. Surprisingly, firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns since 1980. A risk-based explanation cannot fully explain the anomalous evidence.