Short-horizon incentives and stock price inflation

Do managerial incentive horizons have capital market consequences? We find that they do when short-sale constraints are more binding. Firms experience significant stock price inflation when their CEOs have short horizon incentives. The short-horizon CEOs sell more shares at inflated prices and generate greater abnormal trading profits. The stock price inflation is partly explained by greater earnings surprises and more positive investor reaction to the surprises. To inflate stock prices, short-horizon firms are more likely to employ income-increasing discretionary accruals. Consistent with theoretical predictions, all these effects are attenuated or statistically insignificant when short-sale constraints are less binding.     

Deductio’ ad absurdum: CEOs donating their own stock to their own family foundations

I study large charitable stock gifts by Chairmen and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of public companies. These gifts, which are not subject to insider trading law, often occur just before sharp declines in their companies’ share prices. This timing is more pronounced when executives donate their own shares to their own family foundations. Evidence related to reporting delays and seasonal patterns suggests that some CEOs fraudulently backdate stock gifts to increase personal income tax benefits. CEOs’ family foundations hold donated stock for long periods rather than diversifying, permitting CEOs to continue voting the shares.     

Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options

We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.     

CEO's managerial power,board committee memberships and idiosyncratic volatility

Based on Upper Echelons Theory and Agency Theory, we explore the effect of CEOs' power through their tenure, board committee membership and other corporate governance factors on idiosyncratic volatility. Our study addresses the gap in the literature to find the direct link between the source of corporate governance practices and idiosyncratic volatility in stock price. We use a generalised method of moments in a panel analysis of Australian firms for 2004–2013 and a robust model that controls for firm size, firm age, trading volume, market-to-book ratio, dividend payout, the global financial crisis, product market competition and financial intermediaries. We find that CEOs who have stronger managerial power are associated with lower idiosyncratic volatility. This determining factor remains significant with the inclusion of widely-researched firm characteristics and external factors on idiosyncratic volatility in our robust analysis.     

A note on assessing the relation between CEO characteristics and stock performance: Alpha Above Replacement

Many studies examine the relation between stock performance and CEO characteristics. We approach the topic in a different way, using the alphas generated by the Fama‐French three‐factor model as the dependent variable in a CEO characteristic model. We find several traits are significantly related to alpha. CEOs who are younger, own a larger fraction of firm equity and hold a graduate degree provide greater alphas. CEOs who are also the founder of the firm deliver larger alphas. Our results provide useful information for boards assessing the performance of CEOs and considering CEO succession.     

Do younger CEOs really increase firm risk? Evidence from sudden CEO deaths

This study uses sudden deaths of CEOs to provide causal evidence on the relation between CEO age and firm risk. I find that CEO age negatively influences firm risk, measured by stock return volatility, but has no effect on policy choices related to risk taking. These findings contrast prior studies, and suggest that the higher volatility is caused by uncertainty about the younger replacement CEOs' contribution to firm value, rather than changes to risk-related corporate policies.     

Discussion of “CEO discretionary power,unconstrained stock ownership,and stock trading: Theory and evidence”

Hong (2023) provides both an analytical model and empirical archival evidence to explain why CEOs hold vested own-firm shares when doing so comes at the cost of reduced CEO portfolio wealth diversification. I discuss Hong (2023) in terms of the intuition provided by its analytical model and the inferences one can draw from its empirical results. Moreover, I briefly discuss (the lack of) multi-methods research in accounting and consider how accounting scholars can add insight to the cross-disciplinary literature on executive power and contracting.     

Outside options and CEO turnover: The network effect

Most studies consider chief executive officer (CEO) turnover from the firm's perspective. In this paper, I suggest that the labor market conditions for CEOs affect turnover outcomes. I use CEOs' positions on corporate executive and director networks to assess their employment options. Controlling for performance, firm characteristics, and personal traits, I find that CEO connectedness significantly increases turnover probability, especially for poor performers. I also show that connectedness increases the likelihood of CEOs leaving for other full-time positions, or their retiring and taking part-time positions elsewhere, but does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that they will step down and remain with the firm in other capacities. The evidence supports the idea that a CEO's connectedness expands outside options and thus increases turnover probability.     

Share Repurchases and Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts

I show that share repurchases increase pay-performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.     

Feeling right at home: Hometown CEOs and firm innovation

Extending the theories of social and place identity, we predict that CEO hometown identity has a positive and significant influence on firm innovation. Our empirical evidence, from publicly traded firms in China during 2002–2016, suggests that a firm whose CEO's hometown is in the same province or city as the firm's headquarters tends to invest more in R&D and generate more patent applications. Our results are robust to the firm fixed effects and we use difference-in-differences analysis and instrument variable regressions to mitigate endogeneity concerns. CEOs' hometown identity still has a strong and positive impact on innovation after we control for measures of social capital of CEOs. We identify the mechanisms behind the positive relation between firm innovation and CEO hometown identity: hometown CEOs enjoy more support from the board of directors, they are more willing to take risks, and they are more likely to have long-term visions.     

Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements

This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.     

How female directors help firms to attain optimal cash holdings

Is female board representation helpful for firms attaining optimal cash holdings? We address this question using data on 1163 US-listed firms for 2000‐–2017. We show that if there are more female directors on firm boards, ceteris paribus, there is no effect on excess cash holdings implying that female directors are not inclined to be particularly cautious or optimistic. However, in the presence of overly confident CEOs, having more female directors on the board counteracts the tendency of such CEOs to reduce cash holding below an optimal level. Thus, female board representation enhances corporate decision making through effective monitoring and thus, taming CEOs' biased behavior.     

CEOs' market sentiment and corporate innovation: The role of financial uncertainty,competition and capital intensity

Using panel data of 2225 firms headquartered in the US, we examine the effects of CEOs' market sentiment on corporate innovation capacity. We also examine the extent to which sentiment-innovation relation is moderated by: (i) financial uncertainty/vulnerability; (ii) competition; (iii) firm size and growth prospects; (iv) capital intensity; and (v) operational complexity. The results indicate that, both across and within firms, innovation declines when CEOs perceive market conditions to be good (high sentiment periods). In addition, the negative sentiment-innovation relation observed during high sentiment periods is enhanced when firms are large, and have high growth prospects and greater operational complexities. Nevertheless, firm innovation increases significantly during high sentiment periods when firms anticipate uncertainties about future cash flows, when competition is intense, and when capital intensity creates extreme entry barriers. Our core explanations hold even after accounting for endogeneity and using alternative measures of firm innovation.     

CEO marital status and dividend policy

We investigate whether and how CEO marital status is related to dividend policy. We find that firms run by single CEOs are less likely to pay dividends. Further analyses reveal that the aforementioned relation is stronger for single CEOs who are more risk-seeking, have compensation packages with lower pay-performance sensitivity, are less conservative, or are less engaged in corporate social responsibility activities. Our results hold in multiple robustness and endogeneity tests, including propensity score matching, difference-in-differences estimation, and an instrumental variable regression. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature highlighting the importance of CEOs' personal attributes for corporate decisions.     

CEO happiness and forecasting

We utilize the IBM Watson Tone Analyzer to measure chief executive officers' (CEOs') levels of joy (happiness) in year-end conference calls, and empirically test how CEOs' happiness affects the properties of their own and analysts' forecasts. We find that joyful CEOs are more likely to issue forecasts, less likely to miss their forecast targets, and exhibit lower optimistic bias in their forecasts. When joyful CEOs issue earnings forecasts, analysts revise their forecasts upwards and produce forecasts that are less dispersed and more accurate. Our results demonstrate that inherent CEO happiness significantly impacts the forecast properties of both managers and analysts, thus supporting upper echelons theory.     

Liquidity and firm investment: Evidence for Latin America

This paper explores the relationship between firms' investment and stock market liquidity. Using a panel of Latin American firms, I find evidence that a higher trading volume and a higher industry-adjusted trading volume are associated with higher firm investment (PPE, Total Assets, and Inventory). This relationship is higher in episodes where the firm decides to issue shares, and it is also greater for firms with tighter financial constraints and better investment opportunities. This evidence is consistent with a mispricing channel, where firms issue and invest the proceeds to take advantage of low cost of capital, or with a cost channel, where liquidity is associated with lower issuance costs. Also, it is less related with an informational channel, where a liquid market helps a manager to take more efficient decisions, since this channel does not necessarily predict an increase in investment, but only more efficient investment.     

Short term real earnings management prior to stock repurchases

This study examines whether firms engage in income-decreasing real earnings management before open market stock repurchases to reduce the cost of stock buybacks. In the short run, managers have the ability to underproduce inventory and increase discretionary expenditures, thus decreasing current period earnings. We find that managers engage in both of these activities before repurchasing their firms’ shares, especially the latter. Also, companies increase their discretionary spending before making repurchases to a greater extent following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as when they are financially healthy and have high marginal tax rates. Finally, we document that firms with the most income-decreasing real earnings management experience the largest positive abnormal returns during the subsequent period. Our findings highlight the importance of considering firms’ use of real operating decisions, as opposed to just opportunistic disclosure practices, around significant corporate events, such as the repurchase of their own stock.     

Short sales,institutional investors and the cross-section of stock returns

Short-sale constraints are most likely to bind among stocks with low institutional ownership. Because of institutional constraints, most professional investors simply never sell short and hence cannot trade against overpricing of stocks they do not own. Furthermore, stock loan supply tends to be sparse and short selling more expensive when institutional ownership is low. Using institutional ownership as a proxy, I find that short-sale constraints help explain cross-sectional stock return anomalies. Specifically, holding size fixed, the under-performance of stocks with high market-to-book, analyst forecast dispersion, turnover, or volatility is most pronounced among stocks with low institutional ownership. Ownership by passive investors with large stock lending programs partly mitigates this under-performance, indicating some impact of stock loan supply. Prices of stocks with low institutional ownership also underreact to bad cash-flow news and overreact to good cash-flow news, consistent with the idea that short-sale constraints hold negative opinions off the market for these stocks.     

Managerial expertise,corporate decisions and firm value: Evidence from corporate refocusing

This paper investigates how managerial expertise—specifically, industry expertise—affects firm value through divestiture. Using CEOs’ managerial experiences in industries throughout their careers as a measure of their industry expertise, I find that CEOs in diversified conglomerates are more likely to divest divisions in industries in which they have less experience. This finding is consistent with CEOs who divest such divisions in order to refocus on those divisions in which they have specialized—that is, to achieve a better match between their expertise and their firms’ retained assets. Firms that divest for a better CEO-firm match experience significant improvements in operating performance, as well as significant abnormal stock returns that persist for an average of three years following a divestiture. Further, among firms that divest for a better match, those firms with more experienced CEOs realize greater gains in firm value. In contrast, divestitures that increase corporate focus, but do not improve the expertise-asset match, do not lead to long-run increases in firm value.     

Options trading activity and firm valuation

Options may have an effect on firm value because they help complete markets and stimulate informed trades. However, these benefits are likely to manifest themselves in active, rather than inactive, options markets. Supporting this observation, we find that firms with more options trading have higher values of Tobin's q, after accounting for other determinants of value. Corporate investment in firms with greater options trading is more sensitive to stock prices. Options trading affects firm valuation more strongly in stocks with greater information asymmetry. These results indicate that options trading is positively associated with firm values as well as information production.