Credit rationing, interest rates and capital accumulation

A simple endogenous growth model is developed to characterize credit rationing through the capital accumulation process. The model shows that credit rationing on investment loans decreases as capital accumulates and the enforcement cost decreases. We find that the evolution of the interest rate factor (lending interest rate/depositing interest rate) has a similar pattern to the credit rationing probability. However, simulations show that the evolution of the interest rate spread through the capital accumulation process depends on the degree of the enforcement cost. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider fifty-two countries, at different stages of development, over the period 1995–2005. We confirm the theoretical findings relative to the evolution of the interest rate spread and interest rate factor with capital accumulation. These results suggest that, for economies endowed with costly contract enforcement, the interest rate factor could be a better proxy of credit rationing than the interest rate spread.     

Unemployment, credit rationing, and capital accumulation: a tale of two frictions

Summary. This paper develops a model in which two information frictions are embedded into an otherwise conventional neoclassical growth model; an adverse selection problem in the labor market and a costly state verification problem in the credit market. The former allows equilibrium unemployment to arise endogenously while the latter is responsible for equilibrium credit rationing. This structure is used to investigate a theoretical link between the level of unemployment and the extent of credit rationing (and capital formation). The presence of the labor market friction is enough to generate scope for multiple steady state equilibria. The model also generates a large class of endogenous cyclical and chaotic dynamical equilibria. Development trap phenomena may also appear. Received: April 10, 1998; revised version: May 20, 1998     

Credit market imperfections, income distribution, and capital accumulation

Summary. This paper builds a model in which the distribution of income matters for capital formation, and uses it to analyze the effects of a simple policy intended to create a more equal distribution of income on the severity of certain credit market imperfections and, through this channel, capital accumulation. A neoclassical growth model is developed in which some capital investment must be externally financed, and external finance is subject to a standard costly state verification (CSV) problem. In particular, some fraction of the population is capitalists, who have access to risky but high return capital production technologies. Successful capitalists leave bequests to their offspring, thereby permitting them to internally finance some fraction of their own investment projects. However some external finance is also required. This is provided by workers who save out of labor income. As is well known, the greater the capability of capitalists to provide internal finance, the less severe is the CSV problem. Thus bequests mitigate credit market frictions and, in that sense, promote financial market efficiency and capital accumulation. However, they also perpetrate income inequality. The structure is used to show that a policy that taxes the bequests of capitalists, and transfers the proceeds to workers, necessarily reduces the steady state capital stock. Indeed, when this effect is sufficiently strong, these redistributive tax/transfer schemes can reduce the total (wage plus transfer) incomes of workers, as well as their welfare. Thus some simple policies intended to redistribute income can be highly counterproductive.Received: June 3, 1996; revised version: February 4, 1997This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Credit quantity and credit quality: Bank competition and capital accumulation

In this paper we show that bank competition has an intrinsically ambiguous impact on capital accumulation. We further show that it is also responsible for the emergence of development traps in economies that otherwise would be characterized by unique equilibria. These results explain the conflicting evidence emerging from the recent empirical studies of the effects of bank competition on economic growth. We obtain them developing a dynamic, general equilibrium model of capital accumulation where banks operate in a Cournot oligopoly. More banks lead to a higher quantity of credit available to entrepreneurs, but also to diminished incentives to offer relationship services that improve the likelihood of success of investment projects. We also show that conditioning on one key parameter resolves the theoretical ambiguity: in economies where intrinsic market uncertainty is high (low), less (more) competition leads to higher capital accumulation.     

Credit constraint and human capital investment: an empirical analysis using Brazilian household budget survey

This article is a first step towards understanding the relationship between credit market imperfections and inequality of opportunity in skill formation. The main goal is to investigate the effects of the credit constraint on the optimal human capital decision, in terms of degree of schooling, taking into account the household preferences for education. Our starting point is a theoretical model of human capital investment decision with credit constraint. Following a previous model in the literature, we propose a reduced-form approach that estimates the relation between education decision and initial wealth in Brazil. Our empirical analysis is conducted using data from a Brazilian Household Budget Survey (Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares), for years 2002–2003 and 2008–2009. Our results point out that education decision is in fact credit constrained. The empirical results show a strong and highly significant effect of wealth on educational level of children, teenagers and adults, even controlling by education expenditures. But we find no evidence of credit constraint on high level education decision, like undergraduate and graduate levels.     

Corporate planning and capital investment

Based on interviews with corporate managers and reviews of corporate planning documents, corporate planning and implementation processes related to capital investment are examined in four large corporations. From the examination, models are developed and estimated on corporate plans and actual outcomes to explain corporate forecasts of capital investment, forecasts of changes in debt, and actual capital investment. The results of both the qualitative and quantitative data analyses are summarized and a new conceptual framework for the determinants of corporate capital investment is proposed.     

Human capital investment with competitive labor search

We study human capital accumulation in the presence of labor search frictions. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too low employment, underinvestment by the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency, and it would also reduce wage inequality.     

Extent and intensity of investment with multiple capital goods

Overall investment is the product of the number of capital goods for which triggering has occurred (the extensive or reductive margin) and the depth of investment per capital good (intensive margin). Based on a longitudinal plant-level data and using dynamic panel techniques we investigated the validity of the hypothesis that the intensity of investment increases as its extent increases. Our results indicate a strong linkage between the extent and intensity of investment decisions, finding which holds both for positive and negative investment decisions. This linkage suggests that the decision on how many capital types to initiate investment is closely connected to the decision regarding the depth of investment expenditures. Moreover, the intensity–extent derivative remains positive but its magnitude decreases with plant size, providing indirect evidence for higher complementarity between capital types for smaller plants.     

Human capital investment and debt constraints

When young individuals face binding debt constraints, their human capital investments will be insufficiently financed by private creditors. If generations overlap, then a well-designed fiscal policy may be able to improve human capital investments by replacing missing capital markets with an intergenerational transfer scheme. The optimal (balanced budget) fiscal policy in this context entails the joint provision of an education subsidy for the young and a pension program for the old, financed with a tax on those in their peak earning years. We demonstrate, however, that the desirability of such a cradle-to-grave policy depends crucially on the assumption of an exogenous debt constraint. If debt constraints arise endogenously for reasons of limited commitment, then the optimal (balanced budget) fiscal policy looks radically different. Furthermore, we find that cradle-to-grave type policy interventions may actually lead to lower levels of human capital investment as altered default incentives induce private creditors to contract the supply of student loans by an amount greater than the subsidy. In some cases, the constrained-optimal policy entails zero intervention. These results highlight the importance of taking seriously the reasons for why debt constraints exist.     

Endogenous population with human and physical capital accumulation

This paper proposes an economic growth model with population growth and physical and human capital accumulation. The physical capital accumulation is built on the Solow growth model (Solow in Q J Econ 70:65–94, 1956). The education and human capital accumulation is influenced by the Uzawa–Lucas model (Uzawa in Int Econ Rev 6:18–31, 1965; Lucas in J Monet Econ 22:3–42, 1988). The population dynamics are influenced by the Haavelmo population model (Haavelmo in a study in the theory of economic evolution. Haavelmo, Amsterdam, 1954) and the Barro–Becker fertility choice model (Barro and Becker in Econometrica 57:481–501, 1989). We synthesize these dynamic forces in a compact framework, applying an alternative utility function proposed by Zhang (Econ Lett 42:105–110, 1993). The model describes a dynamic interdependence between population change, wealth accumulation, human capital accumulation, and division of labor. We simulate the model to demonstrate the existence of equilibrium points and to plot the motion of the dynamic system. We also examine the effects of changes in the propensity to have children, the mortality rate parameter, the propensity to receive education, the human capital utilization efficiency, and the mortality rate elasticity of human capital upon dynamic paths of the system.     

Credit rationing as a (temporary) suboptimal equilibrium with imperfect information

Jaffee and Russell (1976) characterized partial rationing as a contract rate and contract size below those of the no-rationing equilibrium. Their non-price rationing here obtains as a suboptimal equilibrium for a risk-averse rate-setting intermediary with marginal increasing cost and a monopolistically competitive loan demand. The temporary (dis)equilibrium corresponds to a dominated strategy, and the wider class of models of which J-R's solution is but a singular case is touched upon.     

Crises and human capital accumulation

Abstract.  This paper studies the effects of crises on human capital formation. Theoretically, a crisis undermines total factor productivity, which reduces the return to working and to accumulating physical capital. If the crisis is temporary, young agents will study now and work later. Human capital rises. To test our model we rely on inflation crises as our main empirical proxy. Using GMM panel procedures, our analysis for 86 countries in 1970–2000 confirms the positive effects of crises on human capital. Our main findings survive several robustness tests. JEL classification: E31, D90     

Demographic structure and capital accumulation

This paper develops an overlapping-generations (OLG) model to analyze the consequences of demographic structure changes induced by an exogenous shift in the birth rate. We first show that a finite growth rate of the population that maximizes long-run capital per capita exists. Then, we examine the theoretical properties of this growth rate by showing that: (i) it corresponds to the demographic structure such that the average ages of capital holders and workers are equal; (ii) it is associated to an efficient steady state; (iii) it increases with compulsory transfers from younger to older generations. Finally, we explain why standard OLG models do not exhibit such a growth rate.     

Numerical solution of dynamic oligopoly games with capital investment

Summary. This paper discusses how numerical techniques may be used to solve the simultaneous functional equations that arise in general dynamic stochastic games. Unlike the conventional linear-quadratic approach, our methods may be used to address general model specifications that may include non-quadratic objective functions, non-linear equations of motion, and constraints on decision variables. As an illustration, we apply our methods to a dynamic duopoly game in which competing firms play short-run quantity game subject to production cost that can be lowered through investment in capital stock in the long run. Received: June 1, 2000; revised version: December 27, 2000     

Optimal investment and consumption with return predictability and execution costs

We provide a closed-form solution to an optimal investment and consumption problem for a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) agent, who faces execution costs when trading correlated risky assets with return predictability. The optimal investment strategy indicates that the agent should trade gradually toward a dynamic aim portfolio, which is an adjusted Merton portfolio with modifications to account for the persistence of the return-predicting signals and the execution costs. The optimal consumption strategy is quadratic in the return-predicting signals and linear in the agent's wealth. Our numerical studies show that the execution costs diminish the importance of asset return predictability on the agent's optimal investment strategy, thereby confirming the conjecture raised by Liu (2004). In addition, the presence of the intermediate consumption leads to a more aggressive aim portfolio than the case without consumption.     

Imperfect capital markets and life-cycle consumption

This paper develops a long-range consumption planning model which, unlike conventional life-cycle theory, admits a disparity between borrowing and lending rates of interest. It is shown that, when capital markets are imperfect, optimal consumption depends not only upon an arithmetic average of the household's intertemporal income distribution, the traditional life-cycle income variable, but also upon current income and higher-order moments of that income distribution. The consumption function is estimated using the 1967–1968 CEDE budget survey of four major Colombian cities. A test is made to determine whether the assumption of perfect capital markets is acceptable for empirical approximation. The results strongly indicate that, for households in middle and lower income classes, the explanatory power of the consumption function can be raised by introducing a more flexible life- time budget constraint. The model is then estimated and used to compute the marginal consumption responses of Colombian households to transitory and permanent income changes.     

Undiscounted optimal growth with consumable capital and labor-intensive consumption goods

This paper presents a complete characterization of the optimal policy in a two sector undiscounted growth model. The model is an extension of the Leontief two sector model, which analyzes the optimal allocation of capital and labor to a consumption good sector and an investment good sector. The paper extends this framework to include consumable capital. Thus, the planner has preferences over the consumption good and the consumable capital. Future welfare levels are treated equally as current ones. Geometric techniques are applied to characterize the optimal policy if the consumption good is labor-intensive. The results suggest that if the initial capital stock is above a threshold level, that depends upon the consumption of capital, every optimal program is monotonic, converges to the golden rule stock in a finite number of periods, and undergoes either unemployment or excess capacity of capital.