The economics of online television: Industry development,aggregation, and “TV Everywhere”

Although still dominated by standard television, the online TV industry is growing rapidly. Entrants employ a range of business models, and we identify a prevalent tendency for leading providers to aggregate programming from a variety of different content owners. We focus on one form of content aggregation by multi-channel programming distributors (MPVDs) widely known as “TV Everywhere (TVE).” Following a brief taxonomy of TVE systems, we develop an economic model to show how this “free-with-authentication” (of MVPD subscribership) bundling practice can be explained as a price discrimination device intended to slow MVPD disconnections. We show that TVE bundling could also deter entry into the online TV market. We discuss the potential roles of horizontal and vertical integration of MVPDs and ISPs in online TV industry development, again focusing on TVE, and conclude with policy implications.     

Is your netflix a substitute for your telefunken? Evidence on the dynamics of traditional pay TV and OTT in Latin America

Are audiovisual over the top (OTT) services in Latin America substitutes for the traditional Pay TV services (cable or satellite), complementary or independent? To respond to this question, we develop a simple theoretical model based on a CES utility function and estimate simultaneously, using non-linear least squares, demand functions for both audiovisual services. Our results, based on original database covering 17 Latin American countries from 2011 to 2020, suggest no substitution of Pay TV for OTT. However, during the more recent period (2015–2020), we find evidence of gross substitution (i.e., similar enough, although not completely equivalent for consumers) between these audiovisual services. This confirms, although only partially, the existence of the so-called cord-cutting and cord-saving phenomena, due to the expansion of fast internet and the richer OTT offers, and their relatively lower prices. These results suggest regulators should include OTT services in their scope and produce in-depth analysis on the country level to update and optimize regulations, as well as implement regulatory sandboxes to advance towards smart regulation, as shown in the financial industry.     

The momentum for network separation: A guide for regulators

Next Generation Access Networks (NGAs) are a challenge to regulators and operators insofar as they require large investments, there is a significant uncertainty about the ability to recover costs, and the choice of the appropriate regulatory regime is far from consensual. Regulatory authorities might want to seize the moment and reconsider mandatory vertical separation of telecommunication firms, without jeopardizing incentives to innovation and investment. This paper discusses the main elements of a possible test for the adequacy of network separation as a regulatory remedy. A sequential decision tree procedure with three questions is proposed: (1) “Is there significant market power in the provision of access under NGAs?”; (2) “Are there little vertical complementarities between services along the supply chain?”; and (3) “Is network separation a better regulatory tool than any other alternative?”. A positive answer to all the questions implies that the regulator should consider network separation as a regulatory remedy.     

Cloud TV: Toward the next generation of network policy debates

We are entering the 4th generation of TV, based on the online transmission of video. This article explores the emerging media system, its policy issues, and a way to resolve them. It analyzes the beginning of a new version of the traditional telecom interconnection problem. The TV system will be diverse in the provision of technology, standards, devices, and content elements. For reasons of interoperation, financial settlements, etc., this diversity will be held together by intermediaries that are today called cloud providers, and through whom much of media content will flow. Based on their fundamental economic characteristics, the cloud operators will form a concentrated market structure. To protect pluralism and competition among clouds and of providers of specialized elements requires the protection of interoperation. This can be accomplished by a basic rule: by the principle of an a la carte offering of service elements.     

Testing for Competitiveness of Markets for Long Distance Telephone Services: Competition Finally?

Telecommunications regulatory policy is driven by rhetoric and myth concerning the competitiveness of long-distance service. Relying on behavioral tests for competitiveness, this review brings up to date analytical work establishing the pattern of competition or the lack of competition since the 1984 AT & T divestiture. Through mid 1997, the three large long-distance carriers in setting their price-cost margins have managed to carry through on a previously established strategy of tacit collusion in both message toll services and WATS-type business services. The remarkable results have been that price-cost margins increased while sales concentration declined. This general pattern is not contradicted by the most recent offering of 15-cent per minute one price on new discount plans since that too implies an increase in carriers' price cost margins as concentration continued to decline.     

Economic and policy implications of spectrum license fee payment methods

This paper argues that “Do auctions raise consumer prices?” is a misleading question. License fee payment methods, rather than spectrum assignment methods, are key factors that bring forth different market outcomes in the wireless telecommunication industry. This paper analyzes and discusses the effects of three spectrum license fee payment methods—upfront lump-sum fees, royalties, and profit sharing—on economic efficiency, spectrum supply, and government revenue. Royalties create distortions in product and factor markets but can induce the government to increase spectrum supply and encourage firms’ investments. A caveat is that the analyses are based on the model assuming monopoly market and information certainty.     

Outsourcing induced by strategic competition

We show that intermediate goods can be sourced to firms on the “outside” (that do not compete in the final product market), even when there are no economies of scale or cost advantages for these firms. What drives the phenomenon is that “inside” firms, by accepting such orders, incur the disadvantage of becoming Stackelberg followers in the ensuing competition to sell the final product. Thus they have incentive to quote high provider prices to ward off future competitors, driving the latter to source outside.     

Walking the tight rope of coopetition: Impact of competition and cooperation intensities and balance on firm innovation performance

This study empirically investigates an important question in the coopetition literature: to what extent does coopetition impact a firm's innovation performance? With a focus on the intensity of competition and intensity of cooperation of a focal firm with its alliance partners, our theory proposes that a moderate level of competition with alliance partners is more beneficial than a very high or a very low level of competition. We further develop the concept of “balance” in coopetition and examine how the interplay of competition and cooperation and the balance between the two matter for innovation performance. Results from our empirical study using data from the semiconductor industry show that competition and cooperation intensities have non-monotonic positive relationship with firm's coopetition-based innovation performance. Further, balanced coopetition (i.e., when competition is moderately high and cooperation is high) has a positive effect on innovation performance. A key contribution of this paper is the conceptualization and empirical demonstration of the effects of various aspects of coopetition such as competition dominant, cooperation dominant, and balanced coopetition on innovation performance.     

Regulation and efficiency in transition: The case of telecommunications in Italy

In regulating the telecommunications industry, the separation between network and retail functions, which is designed to countervail the market power of incumbent operators, is a relevant issue. Despite its importance, little empirical research has addressed the effects of such a separation. Accordingly, this paper provides insights into the consequences of the Italian communications regulatory authority's (AgCom) decision to impose this type of separation on the incumbent telecommunications operator, Telecom Italia. In particular, the studied separation is between the firm's network-related functions, and those used for provision of its communication services. The present research finds that the type of separation implemented by AgCom allows a provider to maintain the advantages of operational scale in its network structure without dampening competition in the existing market for communications services. The study also offers further empirical evidence on the advantages of a composite vs. translog function in analyzing the multiproduct cost structure of a telecommunications operator.     

Triple play: How do we secure future benefits?

Recent technological developments make it possible to provide all telecommunications services (TV, telephony and internet) via the TV cable and fixed telephony network. Moreover, a new infrastructure based on optical fibre (to the home) is emerging in some places, which may in the future replace both existing networks. Making use of the available economic literature, the paper analyzes some of the consequences of the emergence of one electronic communications market. It focuses on two policy issues: the consequences of convergence of technologies and competition between networks for regulation in the short and medium runs, and the role of public investment in the rollout of optical fibre. It concludes that the present state of regulation may have some undesirable effects in the face of convergence and that public investment in a new general purpose infrastructure may have important advantages.     

Telecommunications companies: One meeting with any competitor is enough to violate the EU's competition laws and result in fines

This commentary's purpose is to review how Telfort, T-Mobile, Vodafone, and others discovered that one “meeting” of any type with any telecommunications competitor could result in fines up to 10 percent of total “turnover” under EU competition law Regulation no. 1/2003, Article 23(2)(a), and to provide planning tips on how to eliminate the potential for those adverse consequences. While competition laws do not apply solely to the telecommunications industry, they do seem to affect it disproportionately. Telecommunications companies have global reach, and some of the most stringent competition law exists in Europe. Thus, all should review the most recent telecommunications ruling from the European Court of Justice, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van der Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit C-8/08 (2009). ¹ The ruling deals with whether the one meeting was “concerted activity” in violation of Article 81(1) EC.     

Reducing the level of switching costs in mobile communications: The case of Mobile Number Portability

Switching costs are one of the most important economic forces that affect market competition in mobile communications. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that switching costs reduce market competition leading to higher prices, lower product and service quality, and lower customer welfare. Given their negative consequences, national regulatory authorities have designed policies aimed at reducing switching costs and fostering competition. One of the most important of these, in the mobile communications industry, is mobile number portability (MNP). The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of MNP on switching costs in mobile phone services. First, a hierarchical Bayes model is proposed to measure switching costs at the customer level and to investigate the impact of MNP on them. Second, this study examines the drivers of MNP adoption by customers using a binary logit specification. The results reveal that this regulatory policy has significantly reduced the cost of switching and that MNP adoption partially depends on customer-related variables.     

Applying “Merger Guidelines” market definition to (de)regulatory policy: Pros and cons

Since initially presented in the 1982 Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines, market definition has been adopted nearly worldwide as a framework to see if a merger would substantially lessen competition. This framework is useful for addressing the similarly counterfactual question of whether forbearance from regulation would lead to an increase in prices. In this context, however, the usefulness of a merger-based market definition is limited. Because the alternative to forbearance is regulation, and since some regulated rates may be below competitive levels, finding that deregulation would lead to market power as defined for mergers need not justify continued regulation. Forbearance in telecommunications highlights market definition questions regarding gross vs. marginal substitutes, dynamic efficiencies, and service bundling. It also reveals ambiguities in the meaning of “geographic market.” Market definition also has limited applicability if regulation exists not to prevent high prices but the abuse of dominance through predatory pricing.     

An antitrust analysis of non-profit hospital mergers

This paper considers such issues involved in non-profit hospital mergers as relevant product and geographic markets and the impacts of mergers on competition. The roles of non-price competition, entry barriers, and merger-generated efficiencies are considered. Close attention is given to the relevance of the Justice Department Merger guideline to the hospital industry. Through detailed examination of four litigated or challenged cases, the geographic market is shown to depend upon particular medical services. Outpatient services are found to comprise a separate market from inpatient hospital services, and non-profit status is determined to warrant the usual antitrust merger treatment.     

Economic analysis of the introduction of the MVNO system and its major implications for optimal policy decisions in Korea

This study analyzes the anticipated economic effects arising from the introduction of the mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) system in the mobile communications service market. For the analysis, actual data (or estimated data)—such as price elasticity, the number of subscribers, traffic volume, rate, and access charge—were combined with an assumption about a competition scenario in the future market. Based on this analysis, consumer surplus, and change in the service provider's profits were estimated according to the type of policy that may be adopted for the MVNO system by the regulator. The results of the analysis indicate that consumer surplus appears to increase largely because of the reduction of the mobile service rate by the promotion of “service-based competition,” which occurs upon adoption of an MVNO policy in the mobile communication service market. Moreover, the introduction of an MVNO system into the mobile communication market seems to be socially beneficial regardless of policy type if access charges are set reasonably by a cost-plus or retail-minus method. In particular, in order to make sense of the introduction of a special MVNO, whether by the cost-plus method or the retail-minus method, the correct discount rate must be used in setting an access charge between the special MVNO and the significant market power (SMP) mobile network operator (MNO).     

Incumbents in a dynamic Internet related services market: Does customer and competitive orientation hinder or help performance?

The Internet challenges many incumbent firms to adapt their marketing strategies by developing and offering new products involving Internet technology. Existing literature on market orientation and performance of services suggests that market orientation, and its components, are likely to facilitate effective adaptation. In contrast, the marketing innovation literature suggests market orientation may be too reactive and inhibit effective adaptation. Our results suggest some merit to both perspectives. Client orientation hindered performance of Internet advertising services, while competitive orientation facilitated performance. In addition, limited support was found that suggested superior performance occurs in an environment with a diverse client base and clients possessing in-house capabilities that “compete” with agencies for Internet advertising services. Implications for incumbents pursuing product growth strategies via new, technology related services in dynamic environments are discussed.     

Necessity as the mother of ‘green’ inventions: Institutional pressures and environmental innovations

Drawing on institutional theory and innovation literature, we argue that greater regulatory and normative pressures concerning environmental issues positively influence companies' propensity to engage in environmental innovation. Analysis of environment‐related patents of 326 publicly traded firms from polluting industries in the United States suggests that institutional pressures can trigger such innovation, especially in those firms displaying a greater deficiency gap (i.e., firms polluting relatively more than their industry peers). Moreover, we find that this effect is stronger when asset specificity is high, and that the availability of resources plays different roles depending on the type of pressures (regulatory vs. normative).Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chemical market research: Passive and dynamic functions

In this article Mr. A. L. Waddams, Chairman of the EVAF European Chemical Marketing Research Association, presents his thoughts on the different ways in which market research can be utilized to advance a complex project. Two main interactions, between market research and the project, are considered: the first where the findings of the market researchers are “fed-in” and the project then proceeds without further collaboration from the market research team; and a second where market researchers carry some responsibility for furthering a project, in the light of the understanding they have gained from carrying out the research. Mr. Waddams coins the phrases “passive function” and “dynamic function”, respectively, for these different rôles of market research.     

Strategic Responses to Regulatory Policies: What Lessons Can Be Learned from the U.K. Contract Gas Market?

The gas industry was first privatisedin 1986, and the regulator, Ofgas, identified thecontract gas market as a possibility for introducinginitial competition into the industry. Nevertheless,competing shippers were slow in entering the market.Subsequently, Ofgas introduced a series ofpro-competitive policies. It, however, invoked aseries of strategic behaviour by the incumbentshipper, British Gas. The effectiveness of thesemeasures are analysed here with respect to theevolving competitive process. The issues it raised,especially when formulating future regulatory policiesand theories, are also considered.     

The deployment and penetration of high-speed fiber networks and services: Why are EU member states lagging behind?

One of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether the emerging next-generation access (NGA) infrastructure should be subjected to cost-based access regulation or whether at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations (“regulatory holidays”) should be granted. Likewise, the role of NGA-specific state aid policies is increasingly capturing the attention of policy makers and the academic literature.