Pricing Network Interconnection: Advantages Held by Integrated Telecom Carriers

A recurring telecommunications policy debate centers on whether incumbent, vertically integrated local exchange carriers have an incentive to discriminate in price against down-stage service rivals who interconnect to their network (a price squeeze). The concern is typically voiced in one of two claims: (1) there is an incentive for an incumbent to use a price squeeze when access prices are set above long-run incremental cost; or (2) prices set at that cost are preferred for interconnection because they eliminate incentives for a price squeeze. In principle, form (1) is generally true (Proposition 1), but form (2) is generally not (Proposition 2), The proof of these Propositions reveals why pricing access at long-run incremental cost coupled with appropriate price floors in the down-stage market does eliminate the incentive to squeeze.     

ENDOGENOUS COSTS AND PRICE‐COST MARGINS: AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.     

Collusion through Coordination of Announcements

A theory is developed to explain how sellers can effectively collude by coordinating on list prices (or surcharges), while leaving sellers to set their final prices. List prices are interpreted to be cheap talk announcements about cost information unknown to buyers. Buyers use those announcements to decide whom to invite to their procurement auction and the reserve price to set. By coordinating on a high list price to signal high cost, sellers produce supracompetitive prices by inducing buyers to be less aggressive, as reflected in a higher reserve price. We show that collusion can raise social welfare.     

The tribal digital divide: Extent and Explanations

This paper documents home Internet access, types of Internet access, connection speeds, and prices for basic home Internet in tribal areas of the United States. We find that the share of households with Internet access is 21 percentage points lower in tribal areas than in neighboring non-tribal areas. When compared to these non-tribal areas, download speeds, whether measured using fixed or mobile broadband networks, are approximately 75% slower in tribal areas, while the lowest price for basic Internet services in tribal areas is 11% higher. Regression techniques reveal that traditional cost factors such as terrain and population density fully explain the price gap but account for only a fraction of the tribal differences in Internet access and connection speeds. Income differences are strong predictors of Internet access but do not affect connection speeds. A sizable amount of the variation in the access and home connection gap between tribal and non-tribal is left unexplained. We conclude with a discussion of how federal broadband programs have penetrated Indian Country, how tribal-specific factors are related to the variation in Internet access within Indian Country, and the potential policy implications of our findings.     

Equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers

Firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous-product market where uninformed consumers search for price information. Some uninformed consumers are “local” searchers who visit only one seller, whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price. Equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero-density gap. When the (exogenous) reservation price of local searchers depart from that of the optimizing sequential searchers by a relatively small amount, the presence of local searchers either has no effect on market outcomes or benefits all consumers. A reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices.     

Non-parametric production analysis in non-competitive environments

We extend the non-parametric methodology for empirical production analysis to deal with endogenous prices. As price endogeneity is often complemented by price uncertainty, we consider both the case of certain prices and the case of uncertain prices. The extensions are fully compatible with existing tools for eliciting and representing technology and price information, and preserves the tractable mathematical programming structure of the original methodology. An empirical application to the Dutch electricity distribution sector illustrates our extension.     

Fuly Distributed Cost Pricing,Ramsey Pricing,and Shapley Value Pricing: A Simulated Welfare Analysis for the Telephone Exchange

Economic theory has long been concerned with determining the optimal pricing scheme for a multiproduct monopoly, but it has been quite difficult to make use of developments in practice. Using LECOM, the Local Exchange Cost Optimization Model, over three stylized city maps, and assuming price elasticity values taken from the literature for four standard outputs of the local exchange, we demonstrate how fully distributed cost prices, Ramsey-optimal prices, Shapley prices, and standalone prices can be computed for a variety of baseline output levels. Analysis of consumer surplus changes relative to the marginal cost baseline shows that while Ramsey pricing maximizes social welfare over the set of schemes considered, only the Shapley approach results in subsidy-free prices.     

Housing Attributes Associated with Capital Gain

Housing units are heterogeneous goods. Rates of change in housing prices are typically modelled as if they arise from factors unrelated to the housing unit itself. For example, housing price increases in the latter part of the 1970s and early 1980s are argued to have arisen primarily from demographic factors and the differential effects of inflation on the effective rate of taxation on income from corporate capital and on owner-occupied housing. Cross-sectional variation in price inflation is not addressed. Consumers who purchased housing units are not indifferent to their attributes. To the extent that expectations vary within regional housing markets as a consequence of variation in housing attributes, standard linear hedonic price regression may generate biased estimates of implicit prices. This paper identifies sufficient conditions for the estimates of implicit prices in linear hedonic price regressions to be unbiased and generate unbiased estimates of implied price changes. Finally, this paper identifies living space (house size) as a significant attribute related positively to the increase in individual housing prices in a regional market.     

Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection

This paper characterizes collusive pricing patterns when buyers may detect the presence of a cartel. Buyers are assumed to become suspicious when observed prices are anomalous. We find that the cartel price path is comprised of two phases. During the transitional phase, price is generally rising and relatively unresponsive to cost shocks. During the stationary phase, price responds to cost but is much less sensitive than under non-collusion or simple monopoly; a low price variance may then be a collusive marker. Compared to when firms do not collude, cost shocks take a longer time to pass-through to price.     

The rising disparity in the price of healthful foods: 2004–2008

Nutrient-dense foods that are associated with better health outcomes tend to cost more per kilocalorie (kcal) than do refined grains, sweets and fats. The price disparity between healthful and less healthful foods appears to be growing.This study demonstrates a new method for linking longitudinal retail price data with objective, nutrient-based ratings of the nutritional quality of foods and beverages. Retail prices for 378 foods and beverages were obtained from major supermarket chains in the Seattle, WA for 2004–2008. Nutritional quality was based on energy density (kcal/g) and two measures of nutrient density, calculated using the Naturally Nutrient Rich (NNR) score and the Nutrient Rich Foods index (NRF_9.3). Food prices were expressed as $/100 g edible portion and as $/1000 kcal. Foods were stratified by quintiles of energy and nutrient density for analyses.Both measures of nutrient density were negatively associated with energy density and positively associated with cost per 1000 kcal. The mean cost of foods in the top quintile of nutrient density was $27.20/1000 kcal and the 4-year price increase was 29.2%. Foods in the bottom quintile cost a mean of $3.32/1000 kcal and the 4-year price increase was 16.1%.There is a growing price disparity between nutrient-dense foods and less nutritious options. Cost may pose a barrier to the adoption of healthier diets and so limit the impact of dietary guidance. Nutrient profiling methods provide objective criteria for tracking retail prices of foods in relation to their nutritional quality and for guiding food and nutrition policy.     

Rational Expectations, Market Fundamentals and Housing Price Volatility

This paper derives a forward-looking rational expectations house price model and empirically tests its ability to explain short-run fluctuations in real house prices. A novel approach to proxying the imputed rents of owner-occupied housing, as a function of observable housing market fundamentals, is combined with a housing market arbitrage relation to derive a present value model for real house prices. Tests of the rational expectations, nonlinear cross-equation restrictions reject the joint null hypothesis of rational expectations and the asset-based housing price model for quarterly, single-detached house prices in the city of Vancouver, British Columbia from 1979–1991. The model fails to fully capture observed house price dynamics in two real estate booms but tracks real house prices well in less volatile times, suggesting that prices may temporarily deviate from fundamental values in real estate price cycles.     

Stackelberg price leadership in spatial competition

This paper examines Stackelberg price leadership in a spatially competitive model with infinitely many stores on an infinite line. A Stackelberg price leader charges significantly more than the pure Nash equilibrium price, induces its neighbors to charge somewhat more than the pure Nash equilibrium price, and increases its profits. Under Nash equilibrium, collusion of two stores makes a difference to prices only if the colluding stores are nearest neighbors. Under Stackelberg price leadership, collusion makes a difference to prices even if the stores are not nearest neighbors.     

An empirical investigation of the determinants of asymmetric pricing

This article empirically investigates the cause of asymmetric pricing: retail prices responding faster to cost increases than decreases. Using daily price data for over 11,000 retail gasoline stations, I find that prices fall more slowly than they rise as a consequence of firms extracting informational rents from consumers with positive search costs. Premium gasoline prices are shown to fall more slowly than regular fuel prices, which supports theories based upon competition with consumer search. Further testing also rejects focal price collusion as an important determinant of asymmetric pricing.     

An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices

In several major deregulated electricity generation markets, the market operator uses an “automatic mitigation procedure” (AMP) to attempt to suppress the exercise of market power. A leading type of AMP compares the offer price from each generation unit with a recent historical average of accepted offer prices from that same unit during periods when there was no transmission-system congestion to impede competition. If one or more units' offer prices exceed the recent historical average by more than a specified margin, and if these offer prices raise the market-clearing price by more than a specified margin, the market operator replaces the offending offer prices with lower ones. In an experiment, we test an AMP of this type. We find that it keeps market prices close to marginal cost if generation owners have low market power in uncongested periods. However, with high market power in uncongested periods, a condition that may apply in many parts of the world, the generation owners are able to gradually raise the market price well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the AMP. We also test the effect of the AMP on the frequency with which high-variable-cost units are used, inefficiently, in place of low-variable-cost units.     

Demand for coffee in Sweden: The role of prices, preferences and market power

There is a widespread belief that consumer coffee prices are high relative to bean prices and that lower consumer prices would lead to substantial increases in bean exports from Third-World countries. This issue is evaluated by analysing how retail prices, preferences and market power influence coffee demand in Sweden. A demand function is estimated for the period 1968–2002 and used, together with information on import prices of coffee beans, to simulate an oligopoly model. This approach gives estimates of the maximum average degree of market power and shows how coffee demand would react to reductions in marginal cost to its minimum level. The maximum level of market power is found to be low, but it generates large spreads between consumer and bean prices because the price elasticity has low absolute values. Moreover, the impact of a price decrease would be small because long-run coffee demand is dominated by changes in the population structure in combination with different preferences across age groups. Hence, a change to perfect competition would only have a negligible effect on bean imports.     

ESTIMATING MARK‐UPS FROM PLANT‐LEVEL DATA*

Typical plant‐level data sets do not report quantities. This paper shows that estimating mark‐ups (price‐cost ratio) in product‐differentiated industries using deflated sales to proxy quantity is not appropriate due to unobserved price heterogeneity. This paper presents an econometric model for estimating mark‐ups that controls for unobserved prices. The model shows that ignoring price heterogeneity results in mark‐up estimates that converge to one, whatever the value of the true price‐cost ratio. Estimates obtained using real data are consistent with this result, as they reveal that ignoring price heterogeneity leads to spurious evidence of firms with little or no market power.     

Local impacts of a global crisis: Food price transmission,consumer welfare and poverty in Ghana

This paper takes a local perspective on global food price shocks by analyzing food price transmission between regional markets in Ghana. It also assesses the impacts of food price increases on various household groups. Taking the 2007–2008 global food crisis as an example, we show that prices for domestic grain products are highly correlated with world market prices. This is true both for products for which Ghana is highly import-dependent (e.g., rice) and the products for which Ghana is self-sufficient (e.g., maize). The econometric results also show that price transmission is high between regional producer markets and markets located in the country’s largest cities, and the distance between producer and consumer markets and the size of consumer markets matter in explaining the price transmission. The welfare analysis for households as consumers shows that the effect of world food prices appears relatively modest for the country as a whole due to relatively diverse consumption patterns within country. However, the national average hides important regional differences, both between regions and within different income groups. We find that the poorest of the poor—particularly those living in the urban areas—are hardest hit by high food prices. The negative effect of the food crisis is particularly strong in northern Ghana. The main explanations for this regional variation in the price effect is the different consumption patterns and much lower per capita income levels in the North of Ghana compared to other regions in the country.     

Opportunity Cost Pass‐Through from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers

This paper investigates the transmission of fossil fuel commodity spot market price changes to procurement costs of U.S. power producers. We measure and compare the speed and magnitude with which spot prices predict procurement costs using restricted access fuel price data. Natural gas spot prices are quickly reflected in procurement costs. Coal spot prices offer very little predictive power to coal procurement costs. Although not causal, the empirical results also show differences across regulatory status. These findings may have implications for the electricity market deregulation literature that creates marginal cost curves as a competitive benchmark.     

Opportunity cost of spectrum for mobile communications: Evaluation of spectrum prices in Bangladesh

The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the choice of the reserve price made by the telecom regulator to explain the under-performance of spectrum auctions in Bangladesh. The overestimation of the reserve prices for several auctions in Bangladesh including the auction of the 3G – 2100 MHz band in 2013, the 2G - 1800 MHz band in 2015, and the 4G – 1800 and 2100 MHz bands in 2018 is established by comparing the reserve prices to the economic value of spectrum, determined by using the engineering valuation and production function approaches. Possible reasons for the inflation of the reserve price are discussed.