中国房地产市场价格制度的经济分析——以市场需求增长为背景

基于有限次可重复的囚徒困境模型分析在市场需求增长的前提下地产商如何选择价格策略,结果显示:(1)如果竞争对手是机会冲动(以牙还牙)型房地产商的概率很高,那么竞争对手采取先发制人策略的时间就会很早(迟);(2)巨大的市场需求的增长率,使得房地产商之间采取合作策略的概率增加;(3)在需求高增长率的市场中,机会冲动型的地产商将无法获得进化利润;(4)如果信息成本或探测成本足够大,那么机会冲动型的地产商就无法获得理性的进化利润;(5)随着时间变量的增加,机会冲动型地产商的进化利润将会减少。     

从单点到并行:聚焦战略的分化趋势与实现路径

随着经济技术社会的进步和企业间竞争的加剧,消费者内在的求异偏好得到持续强化,市场需求因之不断分化,而现有的专注于单个细分市场的聚焦战略理论无法应对。本文从案例事实的观察入手,提出了并行聚焦战略的概念,论证了聚焦战略从单点聚焦向并行聚焦发展的动因,探讨了并行聚焦战略"并行不悖、和而不同"的理想境界及其达成途径。     

Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views

We provide a new interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria that incorporates both von Neumann and Morgenstern's classical concealment role of mixing, as well as the more recent Bayesian view originating with Harsanyi. For any two-person game, G, we consider an incomplete information game, in which each player's type is the probability he assigns to the event that his mixed strategy in G is “found out” by his opponent. We show that, generically, any regular equilibrium of G can be approximated by an equilibrium of in which almost every type of each player is strictly optimizing. This leads us to interpret i's equilibrium mixed strategy in G as a combination of deliberate randomization by i together with uncertainty on j's part about which randomization i will employ. We also show that such randomization is not unusual: for example, i's randomization is nondegenerate whenever the support of an equilibrium contains cyclic best replies.     

Admissibility and common belief

The concept of ‘fully permissible sets’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel–Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.     

Globally evolutionarily stable portfolio rules

The paper examines a dynamic model of a financial market with endogenous asset prices determined by short-run equilibrium of supply and demand. Assets pay dividends that are partially consumed and partially reinvested. The traders use fixed-mix investment strategies (portfolio rules), distributing their wealth between assets in fixed proportions. Our main goal is to identify globally evolutionarily stable strategies, allowing an investor to “survive,” i.e., to accumulate in the long run a positive share of market wealth, regardless of the initial state of the market. It is shown that there is a unique portfolio rule with this property—an analogue of the famous Kelly rule of “betting your beliefs.” A game theoretic interpretation of this result is given.     

Credit quality, the intensity of regulation and the segmentation of debt markets

Some debt markets have a “competitive advantage” over others due to easier regulatory requirements. Our model explains changes in the market shares of different debt markets. In particular, borrowers may choose between highly regulated and relatively unregulated placement of debt so as to minimize borrowing costs. Borrowers in the highly regulated market incur higher regulatory cost, but are also able to signal accurately their true risk class. In unregulated markets there is an asymmetric information problem. This results in an equilibrium where the debt market is segmented between less regulated and other, more strictly regulated, placements. Raising regulatory costs will lead to an expansion of the market share of unregulated debt. It will also lead to an increase in the overall default rate on corporate debt.     

基于资源观的中国新创企业早期成长影响因子与战略绩效分析——基于深圳中小企业板的研究证据

本研究在资源基础观理论基础上建立了一个新创企业资源一成长战略～绩效的研究模型,并以深圳中小企业板2007年之前上市的102家上市新创企业为研究对象进行了相关实证研究。其主要研究结论为：（1）中国新创企业的资源差异对企业绩效有直接影响。其中,实物资源与企业盈利性、成长性呈正相关;财务资源与企业成长性呈正相关;声誉资源与企业盈利性呈正相关：人力资源与企业盈利性、成长性呈正相关。（2）新创企业的资源差异对其选择的成长战略有显著影响。有形资源和人力资源丰富的新创企业倾向于采用市场拉动战略．而无形资源丰富的新创企业则倾向于采用创新推动战略。（3）处于不同行业的新创企业,在成长战略方面存在显著差异,高科技行业的企业更多采用创新推动战略,而非高科技行业的企业则更多采用市场拉动战略。但不同行业的企业在企业绩效的盈利性和成长性方面并不存在显著差异。     

Learning with bounded memory in games

We study learning with bounded memory in zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The uninformed player has only a fixed number of memory states available. His strategy is to choose a transition rule from state to state, and an action rule, which is a map from each memory state to the set of actions. We show that the equilibrium transition rule involves randomization only in the intermediate memory states. Such randomization, or less frequent updating, is interpreted as a way of testing the opponent, which generates inertia in the player's behavior and is the main short-run bias in information processing exhibited by the bounded memory player.     

Strategic technology choice in regulated markets with demand uncertainty

This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulation to ensure that the price is not set at excessive level. When choosing their technology, firms take into account not only the effects of this choice on the opponent(s) but also the effect on the regulated price. In this framework, and because of regulation, firms have an incentive to strategically manipulate their cost (cost padding). This causes monopoly regulation aiming at improving allocative efficiency to be ineffective. In fact, by “tying its hand” to a low level of capacity, the monopolistic firm is able to get round the constraint imposed by the regulator. Increasing the number of firms in the market may restore regulation effectiveness. The reason is that if demand is sufficiently volatile, then firms strategically choose flexible techniques and this effect dominates over the incentive to manipulate costs in order to escape regulation. In this case, regulation is effective precisely because cost padding is hampered by firms’ non-cooperative behaviour.

Increasing returns and the share economy

Under imperfect competition, profit maximization by firms results in the market price exceeding the marginal cost of production; Weitzman terms this “excess supply” Weitzman wishes to replicate in the cost function (in terms of labor) the properties of the revenue function (in terms of output), thus generating “excess demand” for labor. A revenue-sharing scheme will achieve this if and only if there are decreasing returns to scale. Hence increasing returns apparently play no role in Weitzman's analysis.     

Arms Races and Negotiations

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will). There is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons. We find conditions under which the unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. However, if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero.     

Conditional Universal Consistency

Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a randomized variation on fictitious play within each category are studied. These procedures are “conditionally consistent:” they yield almost as high a time-average payoff as if the player knew the conditional distributions of actions given categories. Moreover, given any alternative procedure, there is a conditionally consistent procedure whose performance is no more than epsilon worse regardless of the discount factor. We also discuss cycles, and argue that the time-average of play should resemble a correlated equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, C63, D83.     

Economic strategies of firms facing asymptotic demand: a case study

This paper is an attempt to determine the relationship between the pattern of growth of demand for consumer goods and the market behaviour of the firms selling them, particularly their advertising expenditures. The demand for many consumer goods may not witness a steady growth over time. Firms selling such products will have a market behaviour that differs in character and path from that of those selling in expending markets. In this article, I intend to analyse the market behaviour of firms producing toilet soap in the Australian economy.     

Duopoly signal jamming

Summary This paper examines a repeated duopoly market with heterogeneous outputs. Firms have (common) prior beliefs over the values of an unknown parameter of each firm's demand curve. Firms cannot observe rivals' quantities, but can observe market prices, which are subject to random disturbances and hence provide noisy information that firms use to update their beliefs concerning the unknown parameters' values. Each firm can potentially signal jam, or strategically vary its output level in order to manipulate the distribution of likely market prices and hence the likely inferences drawn by the opponent. We find that the opportunity to signal-jam introduces two conflicting effects, arising out of the desire to manipulate expectations concerning each of the two demand curves. Depending upon the relative magnitudes of these two effects, signal-jamming may lead firms to either increase or decrease period-one quantities. If the firms are symmetric, then the opportunity to signal jam induces both firms to increase output in order to induce their rival to conclude that demand is unfavorable. However, if the firms believe almost surely that one of the possible parameter values is true for firm 2's demand curve (for example), then firm 1 may signal-jam by producing less output.We thank two anonymous referees, an associate editor and Pieter Kop Jansen for helpful comments that corrected some errors. Larry Samuelson is grateful to the Center for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the Department of Economics at the University of Bonn for support. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through Sonderforschungsbereich 303 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Alternative Energy Strategies for the United Kingdom Revisited: Market Competition and Sustainability

Energy and electricity demand forecasts for Britain made in the late 1970s by a research team from the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), under the leadership of Gerald Leach, are assessed with the benefit of hindsight. These researchers broke the energy market down into some 400 end-use, fuel, and appliance categories. They then assessed the potential for energy saving in physical terms, using available technical fixes, for each category. The resulting “bottom-up” projecitons of energy consumption departed from the historic correlation with economic growth, or “top-down” approach. It enabled the IIED team to postulate an alternative, low energy strategy for the United Kingdom to 2025. This study subsequently had a great influence on energy planning elsewhere in the industrialized world, although it was not without its detractors.The IIED energy demand projections are reviewed in the context of both the greatly increased market competition in the UK from 1979 onward, and the need to achieve sustainable development. It is shown that, although total primary energy consumption in the mid-1990s was much in line with the forecasts in the Leach report, the reasons for this and the structure of the newly competitive energy market are quite different from that originally postulated. However, the critics of the IIED team did little better. Long-term energy projections (25–50 years) as one-off, static exercises appear to be of little value for energy planning purposes. They can, as in the case of the Leach report, be a great source of data and ideas, as well as stimulating debate about new strategies. It is argued that rolling projections using a rather broad, sectoral approach that is continuously updated at not greater than five-year intervals, in a similar manner to econometric forecasts, are more useful for energy planning purposes.     

Learning in asymmetric duopoly markets: competition in information and market correlation

This paper explores experimentation and learning in asymmetric duopoly markets with product differentiation and demand uncertainty. We define the concepts of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity in information and we show how both the mode of information competition and the transmission of information across markets affect duopoly experimentation. We relate information competition with market competition and we find that, when goods are substitutes and the correlation between market shocks is negative, firms will have a higher incentive to experiment in asymmetric markets than in symmetric ones. The opposite result follows when such correlation is positive. Also, when goods are complements the above findings are reversed.JEL Classification: D83, C72The authors thank partial financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology under project B2000-1429, from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science under project SEJ2004-07554 and from the “Generalitat Valénciana” under project GRUPOS04/13.     

The fading 1990s in Japan: Driving forces behind the unemployment upsurge

This paper sheds new light on the causes of the unemployment upsurge in Japan during the “fading 1990s”, an unprecedented period of structural crisis. We estimate a labor market model and identify the main macroeconomic determinants of labor demand and labor supply decisions in the last decades. We then conduct dynamic simulations and assess the relative contribution of these determinants to the evolution of unemployment from 1990 to 2002. Beyond the leading role exerted by the decline in productivity growth, we find the active and expansionary measures undertaken by the government had an overall negative effect on the labor market.     

Government incentive strategies and private capital participation in China’s Shale gas development

Shale gas development investments are uncertain and irreversible in the initial stage in China. Flexible incentive strategy is needed for governments to guide private capital participation at different development stages. This study aims to provide analysis governments can use to encourage private investment in shale gas projects according to its plans in an extended real options framework. A social benefits variable is introduced to determine the threshold of social benefits that determine whether the government will choose a deferred or instant incentives strategy. By considering the efficiency factor, we show the optimal arrangements of two kinds of incentives: tax cuts and production subsidies, to implement incentive targets. The results indicate that current market demand and social benefits are the key factors that affect the government’s choice of incentive strategy. We also find that the optimal level of incentives, either tax cuts or production subsidies, are independent of current market demand and future market uncertainty under the delayed incentive strategy, but which affect the optimal level of incentives under the instant motivation strategy, and ignoring the negative influence of unpredictable random events on future market demand might lead to insufficient government incentives in this case.     

Tariff and Quota Equivalence in Vertically Related Markets

This paper re‐examines the issue of tariff and quota equivalence by introducing an upstream market into the Hwang and Mai (1988 ) model, and then allowing the two downstream firms to cross‐haul within each other's market. We assume the upstream monopolist can select either a two‐part or a one‐part tariff pricing strategy. It is found that if the upstream firm adopts a two‐part (one‐part) tariff pricing strategy, then the market price of the final good under a tariff will be higher (lower) than that under an equivalent quota; that is, the quota is set at the import level under the tariff regime. This result stands in stark contrast to the prior findings of both Hwang and Mai (1988 ) and Fung (1989 ). Moreover, if the quota rent is set as being equal to the tariff revenue, the social welfare under a tariff will necessarily be lower than that under an equivalent quota.     

服务型企业国际市场进入模式及其影响因素探析

服务型企业国际市场进入模式选择是企业国际化战略的核心组成部分。服务型企业经营的内部环境因素和外部环境因素对企业选择国际市场进入模式有很大影响。通过企业国际市场进入模式决策的理论分析模型，我国服务型企业开拓国际市场要考虑诸多影响因素，同时要采取有针对性的有效策略和灵活的进入模式。