SILICON VALLEY'S HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET

The remarkable growth of Silicon Valley has often been linked to its high-velocity labor market, as characterized by short-term hiring and frequent employee departures to competitors or start-ups. Such employee mobility is said to contribute to economic growth by facilitating rapid diffusion of information among firms. Law, nearly everywhere, is a potential obstacle to Silicon Valley-style growth. In nearly all European countries, the problem is labor laws that discourage the creation of short-term employment relations and saddle employers with significant obligations when jobs are eliminated. In America, the legal obstacle to the creation of high-velocity labor markets is the law of covenants not to compete and trade secrets. California law, however, does not permit effective enforcement of either covenants not to compete or trade secret agreements. California companies that have sued departing employees have usually lost the suits, suffered damage to their reputations in their industry, and had difficulty recruiting employees. After showing how this result has been achieved by the California legal system, this article goes on to explain why a labor market in which employees have information that is valuable to employers, and in which long-term contracting is not feasible, may be economically efficient (in spite of a potentially dampening effect on corporate R & D). A high-velocity labor market functions more like an information market than like the traditional labor markets analyzed by economists; by spreading information more rapidly, it eliminates much wasteful duplication of effort and achieves more rapid “convergence” on solutions to technological problems—which in turn creates more growth opportunities and start-ups. In making this argument, the author draws on Paul Romer's model of economic growth in which growth rests on “increasing returns” to information. Following Romer, the author suggests that the economic benefits of information diffusion achieved by labor mobility are likely to outweigh the risks that companies will underinvest in research because of their reduced ability to protect trade secrets.     

The Tax Exemption to Subchapter S Banks: Who Gets the Benefit?

The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 allows U.S. banks to adopt the Subchapter S status. We investigate if the Subchapter S banks use tax benefits for the intended purposes of “protecting jobs,” “creating opportunities” and “increasing take home pay of workers.” We find that the tax benefits: (a) are not used in expenses related to protection of jobs, (b) do not lead to greater employment opportunities within the Subchapter S banks, and (c) do not benefit the employees in the form of increased salaries and benefits. Our results indicate that bank owners are sole beneficiaries of the tax exemption benefits.     

Session Ii: Capitalism and Social Insurance

In what Jeff Gordon describes as “the great risk shift,” large U.S. companies have responded during the last 50 years to the forces of globalization and increased pressure from investors by transferring the risks associated with product and worker obsolescence from their shareholders to their employees. Layoffs have generally meant very large, if not complete, losses of “firm‐specific investments” by displaced employees. And the problem is especially troubling in the U.S., where the employees of large companies lose not only their jobs and income streams, but also often their connection to their social network, to the entire system of social welfare and insurance that tends to be provided by large companies and the workplace. While applauding corporate retraining programs, Gordon suggests that individual company efforts are likely to be overwhelmed by the demand for such services. The solution accordingly lies in the form of government‐provided social insurance—in programs that, whether orchestrated and funded at the state or federal level, provide the most cost‐effective government “match” designed to ensure the preservation of human potential and lifetime earnings power of employees.     

Value Maximization,Stakeholder Theory,and the Corporate Objective Function

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in increasing corporate productivity, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. Because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a “single-valued” objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy aims to maximize its total market value. The main contender to value maximization is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should attempt to balance the interests of all corporate stakeholders, including not only financial claimants, but employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. By refusing to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, the advocates of stakeholder theory leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors.     

Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control

If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a “shark repellent” through long‐term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as “white squires” for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.     

Optimal Capital Structure,Endogenous Bankruptcy,and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads

This article examines the optimal capital structure of a firm that can choose both the amount and maturity of its debt. Bankruptcy is determined endogenously rather than by the imposition of a positive net worth condition or by a cash flow constraint. The results extend Leland's (1994a) closed-form results to a much richer class of possible debt structures and permit study of the optimal maturity of debt as well as the optimal amount of debt. The model predicts leverage, credit spreads, default rates, and writedowns, which accord quite closely with historical averages. While short term debt does not exploit tax benefits as completely as long term debt, it is more likely to provide incentive compatibility between debt holders and equity holders. Short term debt reduces or eliminates “asset substitution” agency costs. The tax advantage of debt must be balanced against bankruptcy and agency costs in determining the optimal maturity of the capital structure. The model predicts differently shaped term structures of credit spreads for different levels of risk. These term structures are similar to those found empirically by Sarig and Warga (1989). Our results have important implications for bond portfolio management. In general, Macaulay duration dramatically overstates true duration of risky debt, which may be negative for “junk” bonds. Furthermore, the “convexity” of bond prices can become “concavity.”     

The Employer's Role in Reforming the U.S. Health Care System

In 2005 large U.S. employers spent an average of almost $7,400 per head on health care benefits, a 73% increase in the last five years. If the current trend continues, American companies may find it difficult to compete in a global marketplace where international competitors provide labor with heath care at a fraction of U.S. costs. This article argues that effective reform of the U.S. health care system will require major efforts from all major “stakeholders,” starting with the federal government and state and local governments and including insurance companies and the “consumers” of health care services. By far the important role, however, is reserved for private‐sector employers, which have been the incubator for recent innovations in American health care and are in the best position to coordinate and drive health care reform. But incremental steps in cost‐sharing, small‐scale pilot projects of consumer‐based designs, and employee awareness campaigns will not be enough. Employers need to take radical steps to break through the inertia that has built up among all stakeholders over the past 50 years. Chief among the author's proposals for employers are the following:

• ? In choosing a health care plan for employees, use value‐based purchasing criteria that consider more than just the price and access to services.
• ? Help consumers by demanding information from providers and insurers about the cost and efficacy of health care services, and of alternative treatments, before the choices are made.
• ? Encourage “consumerism” by setting up benefit plans that have a Health Reimbursement Arrangement (HRA) or a Health Savings Account (HSA) component.

As the author states in closing, “Let these reforms begin with employers as the organizing force to drive needed change across the system. That may very well be the only way to save our employment‐based model.”     

Private Equity,Corporate Governance,and the Reinvention of the Market for Corporate Control

In the early 1980s, during the first U.S. wave of debt‐financed hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, finance professors Michael Jensen and Richard Ruback introduced the concept of the “market for corporate control” and defined it as “the market in which alternative management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources.” Since then, the dramatic expansion of the private equity market, and the resulting competition between corporate (or “strategic”) and “financial” buyers for deals, have both reinforced and revealed the limitations of this old definition. This article explains how, over the past 25 years, the private equity market has helped reinvent the market for corporate control, particularly in the U.S. What's more, the author argues that the effects of private equity on the behavior of companies both public and private have been important enough to warrant a new definition of the market for corporate control—one that, as presented in this article, emphasizes corporate governance and the benefits of the competition for deals between private equity firms and public acquirers. Along with their more effective governance systems, top private equity firms have developed a distinctive approach to reorganizing companies for efficiency and value. The author's research on private equity, comprising over 20 years of interviews and case studies as well as large‐sample analysis, has led her to identify four principles of reorganization that help explain the success of these buyout firms. Besides providing a source of competitive advantage to private equity firms, the management practices that derive from these four principles are now being adopted by many public companies. And, in the author's words, “private equity's most important and lasting contribution to the global economy may well be its effect on the world's public corporations—those companies that will continue to carry out the lion's share of the world's growth opportunities.”     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

Risikomanagement bei der Professionalisierung des Frauenfußballs

Out of economic view sports are products, which compete with other leisure activities for different stakeholders (sportsmen, spectators, media and sponsor). To professionalize one kind of sport it is important to create a high (individual) utility for these four groups. It is shown, how with the help of a chronological model – called “chain of success” – by developing of the relations, network architectures can be established, which can help a kind of sport “to the break-through”. The risks arising with the professionalization are analyzed and the management of these risks is discussed. At the end we derive from the analysis a risk-management-manual for the professionalization of one kind of sport, which is applied to women's soccer in Germany, which wants to be established after large successes of the soccer clubs and national teams on a more professional level.     

Confucian culture and the external pay gap

We examine the impact of Confucian philosophy on external pay gaps, and find that a Confucianist atmosphere is negatively associated with firms’ external pay gaps for both executives and employees. Mechanistically, the Confucian concept of “righteousness” reduces the self-interested motivation of management, in turn reducing executives’ external pay gap; “humaneness” causes management to focus on protecting employees’ rights and interests, benefiting employees’ compensation; and “honesty” improves information disclosure, reducing the external compensation gap for both executives and general employees. The inhibitory effect of Confucian culture on the external pay gap is greater in regions with weak formal institutions and non-state-owned firms, while foreign cultural shocks attenuate the Confucian influence. Finally, the Confucian culture-driven reduction of the external pay gap improves enterprises’ economic efficiency.     

The Wall Street Walk when Blockholders Compete for Flows

Effective monitoring by equity blockholders is important for good corporate governance. A prominent theoretical literature argues that the threat of block sale (“exit”) can be an effective governance mechanism. Many blockholders are money managers. We show that, when money managers compete for investor capital, the threat of exit loses credibility, weakening its governance role. Money managers with more skin in the game will govern more successfully using exit. Allowing funds to engage in activist measures (“voice”) does not alter our qualitative results. Our results link widely prevalent incentives in the ever‐expanding money management industry to the nature of corporate governance.     

The revolving door and worker flows in banking regulation

This paper traces career transitions of federal and state U.S. banking regulators from a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae, and provides basic facts on worker flows between the regulatory and private sector resulting from the revolving door. We find strong countercyclical net worker flows into regulatory jobs, driven largely by higher gross outflows into the private sector during booms. These worker flows are also driven by state-specific banking conditions as measured by local banks’ profitability, asset quality and failure rates. The regulatory sector seems to experience a retention challenge over time, with shorter regulatory spells for workers, and especially those with higher education. Evidence from cross-state enforcement actions of regulators shows gross inflows into regulation and gross outflows from regulation are both higher during periods of intense enforcement, though gross outflows are significantly smaller in magnitude. These results appear inconsistent with a “quid-pro-quo” explanation of the revolving door, but consistent with a “regulatory schooling” hypothesis.     

Wall Street Occupations

Many finance jobs entail the risk of large losses, and hard‐to‐monitor effort. We analyze the equilibrium consequences of these features in a model with optimal dynamic contracting. We show that finance jobs feature high compensation, up‐or‐out promotion, and long work hours, and are more attractive than other jobs. Moral hazard problems are exacerbated in booms, even though pay increases. Employees whose talent would be more valuable elsewhere can be lured into finance jobs, while the most talented employees might be unable to land these jobs because they are “too hard to manage.”     

Save the Buyback,Save Jobs

In response to a recent New York Times op‐ed by Senators Schumer and Sanders deploring the effects of stock buybacks on workers and the economy, the authors explain the role of buybacks in increasing corporate productivity and in recycling “excess capital” from mature companies with limited growth and employment opportunities to the next generation of Apples and Amazons. Some companies, as Schumer and Sanders charge, are guilty of repurchasing shares in the name of “shareholder value maximization” instead of pursuing job‐creating investments. But as the authors argue, well‐run companies increase shareholder value not by boosting EPS through buybacks, but mainly by earning competitive returns on capital and investing in their long‐run “earnings power.” And by paying out capital they have no productive uses for, such companies give their own shareholders the opportunity to reinvest in other companies with promising prospects for growth and jobs. But the authors go on to note the tendency of companies to buy back shares not when their stock prices are low, but instead when the companies are flush with cash and nearer the top than the bottom of the business cycle. The result of this tendency, as research by Fortuna Advisors (the authors' firm) shows, is that fully three quarters of companies doing large buybacks during the period 2013‐2017 failed to produce an adequate “Buyback ROI,” a metric developed by Fortuna that indicates management's effectiveness in “timing” its stock repurchases. Given the usefulness of buybacks in recycling capital, the authors conclude that the most reliable solution to the corporate short termism and underinvestment problem is for companies to adopt better financial performance measures—including Buyback ROI—to guide their capital allocation. And when management determines that it has significantly more capital than value‐adding investments, but wants to avoid committing to unsustainable dividend increases, it should consider buybacks—but only if management is convinced that its stock price has not outpaced performance.     

失业保险与公司财务杠杆

我国劳动力市场化程度日益加深导致劳动者职业转换愈加频繁,失业保险的作用日益突出。本文探究了失业保险金水平对企业财务杠杆的影响。运用2009—2019年上市公司数据进行实证分析,结果发现失业保险金上升会导致公司财务杠杆下降。渠道检验显示,提高失业保险金可以降低员工失业风险溢酬,公司劳动力成本下降,公司有更多自由现金流和盈利进行内源融资和偿还债务,公司财务杠杆下降。进一步分析发现,失业保险金的作用在失业率高的地区更加显著。主要结果在分别运用《社会保险法》和《关于调整失业保险金标准的指导意见》构造双重差分模型和工具变量解决内生性问题、更改模型设置、排除投资水平影响、删除特殊省份、更换样本期间后,依然成立。本文结果说明加大失业保险保障力度有助于降低企业财务风险。     

进口与企业员工收入——以中国制造业企业为例

进口企业的职工工资直接关系到企业员工的民生福祉和劳动力市场的就业稳定性。本文基于中国制造业微观企业数据,就进口贸易对企业职工收入的影响进行深入考察,结果表明:(1)进口有利于提高企业职工的平均工资水平,不过这种正向的“工资提升”效应在长期不具有持续性。(2)中介效应检验表明,进口通过竞争效应和激励效应作用于企业的工资水平。进一步使用倍差法、工具变量法等的估计结果也证实了上述结论的稳健性。(3)进口对企业工资水平的影响因企业所有制、是否出口、进口产品类型以及进口来源国的不同而具有显著的异质性。(4)引入劳动收入份额的分析表明,进口显著降低了企业的劳动收入份额。具体地,进口的“生产率提升效应”影响超过了“工资提升效应”影响。     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。