演化经济学视角下的产业集群演化机制研究

产业集群的演化机制是产业集群发展的核心问题.科学的机制是产业集群得以持续、健康发展的保证.本文从演化经济学的视角对产业集群演化的异质性、多层次性和路径依赖特征进行了分析,并对其三大演化机制进行了阐述:"动态循环累进"自组织模式,制度演化机制,技术与环境协同进化机制.     

制度演化分析的两种范式比较--新制度经济学与演化经济学评析

新制度经济学和演化经济学是制度演化分析的两种范式，本文对分别对新制度经济学和演化经济学在制度演化方面的现有研究做出概要性的述评的基础上，对两者做了详细的比较，在制度研究方面，尽管两种范式从前提假设，研究方法，分析框架等方面存在着差异，但是两者之间还是存在一定的互补关系。为了全面深入地理解制度演化，本文提出发展一个包括两者在内的“新范式”。     

制度经济学和演化经济学不能代替马克思主义经济学

制度经济学与演化经济学在研究对象、研究方法和研究目标方面与马克思主义经济学有所重合,被研究者视为马克思主义经济学发展的希望和可借鉴的对象。但是,马克思主义经济学对制度的理解和对制度演进的研究方法都与制度经济学和演化经济学不同。马克思主义经济学的目标是要揭示资本主义制度的消亡而不是完善,这些差异说明制度经济学和演化经济学难以替代马克思主义经济学。     

以演化经济学的视角探讨项目管理

项目是为完成某种特定的目标，而将一些人力、材料、机械、资金、信息、技术、管理等多元素组合起来的一类特殊的工作任务。项目作为一个系统工作，不是各种子工作的简单加和，组成项目的这些多要素之间也不是一种简单的线性关系，而是相互作用，复杂的、动态的关系。鉴于项目的这种特性与生物的演化存在着一定的相似性，所以，本文借助了一门新兴的学科——演化经济学，以一种新的思路和方法，从演化的视角对项目管理的一些理论进行了探讨。     

产业集群创新演化研究——基于演化经济学的视角

文章从演化经济学的视角思考产业集群创新演化的内在机理,将企业能力理论、创新动力机制理论和区域创新系统理论有机地应用于分析产业集群的创新演化中.从三个维度综合分析产业集群创新演化的逻辑:从微观维度的企业能力理论研究产业集群内企业创新演化的能力,从中观维度研究集群内企业间互动的创新动力机制.从宏观维度研究促进产业集群创新演化的公共政策和社会资本.     

产业集群风险:一个演化经济学的视角

产业集群加速了地方经济的发展,增强了地方竞争力,但是产业集群存在的一些风险也不容忽视,文章从演化经济学的视角分析了产业集群风险产生的原因,并试着提出一些对策措施。     

经济学演化动力的系统论视角

经济系统的复杂性和可持续发展决定了系统演化方法在经济学研究中的应用。经济学并不只是静态的理论和学科,而是经济认识系统、经济社会系统和经济知识系统相互联系、相互作用而成的自组织演化系统。经济学的发展演化受当代系统论揭示出的自组织动力学原理支配,具有系统的社会目的性和内在目的性、确定性、随机性四维一体的动力机制。具体表现为:社会经济需求对经济学系统的选择、指引与调控,经济学系统为稳定存在与发展而寻求的系统优化目标,经济学系统要素间的竞争和协同,以及经济学系统演化中不确定性因素的关键作用。     

行为经济学视角下的制度演化理论

为了探索经济绩效的源泉，诺思（Noah）后期（1990）转向了认知科学，重点考察了个体认知心理和行为与制度间的关系，及其对制度变迁的轨迹和经济绩效的影响，逐步提炼出了一套完整的制度演化理论，其理论成果集中体现在诺思（2005）《理解经济变迁的过程》新著中。在他的启发下，青木昌彦（Aoki，2001）等人通过一个演进博弈模型把诺思的框架形式化，更明确地解释和证明了诺思所提出的问题；施米德（Schmid，2004）则进一步发展了诺思关于制度演化过程中当事人的认知心理的观点.     

法国调节学派制度与演化经济学概述

自20世纪70年代中期以来,法国的一些经济学家通过对马克思、凯恩斯和卡尔多经济理论的独特结合,并从布罗代尔等人的法国年鉴学派和波拉尼、熊彼特的理论中汲取灵感,发展了一种研究资本主义经济长期演化的独特方法,在制度与演化经济学的发展中,形成了法国的“调节”学派。与制度与     

The Narrow and Broad Approaches to Evolutionary Modeling in Economics

Some models in evolutionary economics rely on direct analogies to genetic evolution, assuming a population of firms with routines, technologies, and strategies on which forces of diversity generation and selection act. This narrow conception can build upon previous findings from evolutionary biology. Broader concepts of evolution allow many or just one adaptive entity, instead of necessarily requiring a population. Thus, an institution or a society can also be understood as an evolutionary entity. Both the narrow and broad approaches have been extensively used in the literature, albeit in different literature traditions. I provide an overview of the conception and development of both approaches to evolutionary modeling, and argue that a generalization is needed to realize the full potential of evolutionary modeling.     

Evolution-Based Approaches in Economics and Evolutionary Loss of Information

Evolutionary economics provides a self-organizing, stabilizing mechanism without relying on mechanic equilibria. However, there are substantial differences between the genetic evolutionary biology and the evolution of institutions, firms, routines, or strategies in economics. Most importantly, there is no genetic codification and no sexual reproduction in economic evolution, and the involved agents can interfere consciously and purposefully. This entails a general lack of fixation and a quick loss of information through a Muller’s ratchet-like mechanism. The present contribution discusses the analogy of evolution in biology and economics, and considers potential problems resulting in evolutionary models in economics.     

演化经济学的本体论假设及其实践指导价值

经济学的哲学基础不仅限定了更为具体的经济理论的构造,而且对实际的经济活动也产生了直接的影响。为了使演化经济学动态的、有机的、系统的和开放的世界观具体化,借助正面启示法进一步推动经济演化理论的发展,并在哲学与经济学之间进行富有成效的对话,文章较为系统地论述了演化经济学的六大本体论假设,并说明了这种本体论假设对宏微观经济学体系的建构、我国经济体制改革、创新型国家建设以及脉络主义经济政策均具有实践指导价值。     

演化经济学中的社会合作的起源问题

人类是我们能够观察到的,在没有血缘关系的个体之间,进行广泛而密切的合作的唯一物种,合作在某种意义上,成就了这一生物物种于自然界中的生存和发展.从演化经济学的视角,将制度演化理解为在一般生物演化中获得生物特征的同时获得社会特征的演化过程,进而寻求合作的社会起源.     

超越契约理论--演化论视角的企业理论研究

企业的契约理论围绕交易成本概念解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织,但严重忽视了企业的技术和生产功能,演化经济学的企业理论通过研究企业内知识的产生、传播和利用过程,以及组织与个人的交互学习,不仅重新解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织问题,还研究了契约理论未触及的企业异质性、竞争优势和企业家等问题.     

经济金融化行为的政治经济学分析--一个演化博弈框架

自2008年美国金融危机发生以来,经济金融化成为国内外学界关注的焦点。文章从政治经济学的角度指出了金融化的本质在于资本积累演变为资本脱离剩余价值的生产与交换而通过金融系统实现增殖的过程,进而通过构建一个包含异质性主体的非对称演化博弈模型,揭示了非金融主体与金融主体之间从普通经济关系到金融关系的动态演变过程及其作用机制。研究表明：(1)经济主体之间的动态关系演变表现为非金融企业主要通过金融活动获取利润,金融企业则关注中间业务和表外业务并将普通家庭纳入其体系使之成为新的利润源泉,而普通家庭则被迫接受强势经济主体的二次分利,这些关系的变化将导致一国经济的金融化乃至金融危机。(2)经济发展状态取决于金融主体与非金融主体之间的相互关系,其中,非金融主体行为起主导性作用。在既定假设下,当非金融主体仅通过其资源保护行为影响金融主体的分利技术时,既可以促使一国经济走向新的稳定状态也可促使其走向崩溃;当非金融主体通过其资源保护行为和分利技术影响金融主体的分利技术时,经济可以实现演化稳定状态。(3)经济主体的金融化行为有三个层面的影响：一是经济主体的金融化行为促进经济主体自身在短期内实现高额资本积累;二是金融主体的分利行为与非金融主体的生产行为经常呈现对立的经济关系并容易被激化;三是没有政府介入的自由市场必然导致矛盾激化而陷入危机。因此,深入理解经济金融化问题的本质及其对经济的影响机制,对当前中国的经济转型和金融改革都具有重要意义。     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Learning

The major premise of this paper is that social and individual well-being depends significantly on people's capacity to learn and unlearn in communication with each other. This paper builds on social economic traditions that see communication and conversation as evolutionary generative and adaptive mechanisms through which individual and social learning occurs. Drawing on educational psychology and organizational behavior scholarship, five dynamic processes of conversational learning are introduced with the contention that they can help social economists understand at a micro level more deeply and more concretely how learning happens in the give-and-take of conversation. The paper explores the role of the state, organizations, and communities in fostering individual freedom and dignity, human rights, and economic democracy and concludes that the investment of value in people and their capability for purposeful action as social economic stakeholders can be enhanced through conversation as learning.     

The Rate of Change in Evolutionary Systems and Evolutionary Economic Modeling

Evolutionary economics seeks to model socio-economic reality as an evolutionary system. This powerful approach entails the implication of the continuous loss of information through the evolutionary process. The implication corresponds to evolutionary biology, although the systems in evolutionary economics are different from those in evolutionary biology. The issue of the loss of information has not been extensively studied in economics. Many open questions remain: Which knowledge is lost under what circumstances? Can loss of information be harmful to the socio-economic system as a whole in the presence of runaway dynamics caused by, for example, network externalities? How can the development of knowledge in economic systems be studied? The present article examines these questions and more.     

Undergraduate Coursework in Economics: A Survey Perspective

Survey results from a large sample of economics departments describe offerings for principles courses, coursework requirements for economics majors, and program augmentations such as capstone courses, senior seminars, and honors programs. Findings are reported for all institutions, and institutions are subdivided into six different categories based on public or private control and the highest economics degree offered. The coursework required for the economics major typically consists of ten courses, five in a required core and five electives. The most conspicuous curriculum change over the past 30 years is the rise of econometrics as a required course, now mandatory at about half of major programs. The authors estimate that about 40 percent of students who matriculate as first-year undergraduates take at least one economics course before they leave.     

The 2016 Veblen-Commons Award Recipient: Daniel W. Bromley: Institutional Economics

Institutional economics remains impaired by a lack of agreement as to the meaning of the concept “institution.” At the practical level, this conceptual muddle prevents progress in the crucial task of helping problematic states in Africa, parts of South Asia, and the Middle East. Thousands of refugees seeking to enter Europe are a reminder of the tragic consequences of dysfunctional states. Standard international development programs — emphasizing economic growth and fighting poverty — are counter-productive because they fail to address the underlying institutional incoherence in fragile states. They are flawed because they focus on symptoms rather than reasons. A focus on the reasons for current dysfunctional states would bring attention to the defective institutional architecture — legal relations — that prevents the emergence of economic coherence where dysfunction now reigns. We must help countries craft economic institutions that will improve livelihoods. But conceptual coherence about institutions must first emerge from the academy.