寻租问题的政治经济学研究综述

寻租理论是20世纪后半叶政治经济学最为关注的领域之一。寻租理论研究包括寻租的性质研究、寻租的成本研究、寻租原因和治理理论以及由此产生的公共选择学派和新制度学派的不同寻租理论体系研究。     

从布坎南的寻租理论看中国的利益集团问题

1986年度诺贝尔经济学奖获得者詹姆斯．布坎南与主流经济学家不同，当市场失灵时。他反对过多的国家干预，因为他对利益集团和寻租进行了深入的分析，得出政府失灵的结论：寻租因为政治活动中的经济人动机而不可避免，而公共决策因为利益集团的集体行动会产生扭曲。对策只能是改革公共决策机制，实现公共决策的科学化、民主化。     

寻租理论的新发展

寻租理论把租金的范围定义在政治领域。政府拥有某些政治特权,可以创造和保护租金,从而增加人们的决策选择。出于利益最大化的考虑,人们会选择＂寻租＂方式来增加收益。正是由于＂寻租＂,遏制了市场经济发挥作用。同时,寻租活动也浪费了本应用于从事生产性活动的资源。在上述思想的指引下,寻租理论的发展出现两大分支：一是规范寻租理论,试图说明和估算寻租活动给经济带来的成本;二是实证寻租理论,试图解释社会中人为制造的租金来源。寻租被应用于很多研究领域,但是也许是由于寻租理论本身存有缺陷,或者其他原因,寻租理论在中国并没有很好地发展起来。     

义务教育寻租经济学分析——基于择校问题的考虑

义务教育阶段的择校现象是社会普遍关注的热点问题,根据公共选择理论,由于政府垄断而出现寻租活动在教育领域非常普遍,应用经济学的寻租理论,对我国目前义务教育中择校问题产生的原因进行了剖析.     

寻租理论产生的理论背景与现实契机

寻租理论分别由塔洛克和克鲁格独立在公共选择领域和国际贸易领域独立提出。本通过分析他们“重复”发现的原因，揭示寻租产生的理论背景和现实契机，并在此基础上对塔洛克与克鲁格的论提供一个比较。     

国有企业外部人控制：—个寻租视角

国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络。政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生。可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生。"外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统。国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化。解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象。     

国有企业外部人控制:一个寻租视角

国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络.政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生.可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生."外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统.国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化.解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象.     

寻租行为的经济学分析

自８０ 年代中期以来， 我国经济学家日益重视现代经济学的寻租理论， 并用这一理论分析我国的腐败现象， 从而在寻租的基本性质、社会条件、社会后果形成许多共识。本文拟从人们普遍认同的理论基础概念， 用现代经济学的观点分析寻租形成的经济基础， 寻求遏制寻租的有效途径。     

对我国寻租问题的探讨

所谓“寻租”（ren-seeking）,是指人们凭借政府保护进行的寻求财富转移而造成的浪费资源的活动。人们在寻租过程中所做的使价值最大化的努力所产生的不是社会剩余而是资源浪费（布坎南）。换句话说,寻租是在分配领域中进行的非生产性活动。在现实社会中,寻租多以贪污、腐败、贿赂等形式出现。     

正视寻租现象

眼下在我国，寻租已成了腐败的代名词。但是，寻租不完全等同于腐败，寻租在未成为腐败前的一个较长过程中，它给社会秩序带来的负面影响不能忽视。因此，不为国人广泛知晓的寻租，不能只是在经济学者们的嘴上笔下说来道去，必须把它纳入党政领导的视线，重视它，研究它，运用博奔论，制定有效策略，防患于未然。本文试从三个方面谈论这个问题。 一、寻租作为一种经济和社会现象将长期存在 安·Ｏ·克鲁格创立于七十年代的“寻租”理论，其界定是：寻求直接的非生产性利润，通过政府影响收入和财富分配，竭力改变法律规定的权利来实现某个人…     

A tax discrepancy coefficient resulting from tax evasion or tax expenditures

Tax evasion and tax expenditures introduce discrepancies between taxpayers. In this paper, a tax discrepancy coefficient has been worked out in order to establish, given a constant tax yield, what bigger or smaller amounts taxpayers would have to pay if tax evasion or tax expenditures were completely eliminated. After the definition of the coefficients these are calculated for individual income tax returns in Belgium. Similar coefficients can be established for other types of taxation, such as inheritance tax, corporate income tax or even sales tax (e.g. V.A.T.).     

Still searching

This paper investigates whether search behaviour is (1) sensitive to the existence of a monetary reward, (2) sensitive to the availability of recall and (3) sensitive to the availability of information. Our results suggested that optimal behaviour increases with information, decreases with recall but (at least for modest amounts of money) is insensitive to the payment structure.     

Value-added tax and the theory of tax incidence

A value-added tax is examined in a general-equilibrium model of tax-incidence incorporating primary factors and intermediate goods. Production coefficients are variable and demand is elastic. The principal result is that under assumptions of fixed coefficients and inelastic demand which have been commonly employed in the literature, VAT as well as the corporation income tax will be neutral. In the more general setting of this paper, only VAT, applied to every industry at equal rates, will not affect relative factor and commodity prices. Incidence and other economic effects of a partial VAT are also discussed.     

Measuring tax efficiency: A tax optimality index

This paper introduces an index of tax optimality that measures the distance of some current tax structure from the optimal tax structure in the presence of public goods. This index is defined on the [0, 1] interval and measures the proportion of the optimal tax rates that will achieve the same welfare outcome as some arbitrarily given initial tax structure. We call this number the Tax Optimality Index. We also show how the basic methodology can be altered to derive a revenue equivalent uniform tax, which measures the tax burden implied by the public sector. A numerical example is used to illustrate the method developed, and extensions of the analysis to handle models with multiple households and nonlinear taxation structures are undertaken.     

Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence

Although a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals optimize fully with respect to the introduction of a tax, a growing body of research is proving that several heuristics are in place when people take decisions. We re‐examine the well known liability side equivalence principle in the light of the concept of salience. While these two topics have been extensively investigated in isolation, this paper innovates on the previous literature in that it focuses on their joint effects. Is tax incidence dependent on whether the subjects face a salient rather than a nonsalient tax? Does the salience of a tax exert a different effect depending on who is legally committed to bear the tax burden? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is being traded through a double‐auction market institution. Based on a panel data analysis, our contribution shows that point of collection matters and determines the economic incidence of tax. Additionally, we find that the joint effect of salience and statutory incidence does not alter the informative efficiency, but has a positive effect on buyers’ allocational efficiency when the tax is levied on sellers.     

Consumption tax revenue and personal income tax: analytical elasticities under non-standard tax structures

This article models the elasticity of consumption taxation faced with changes in disposable income. Its calculation makes clear the importance of the design of the personal income tax and of the changes caused to the consumption of taxpayers. The modelling is performed for both individual taxpayers and the population as a whole.     

The excise tax effects of the property tax

This paper constructs a theory of how differences across regions in property tax rates affect product prices and factor prices. For a model where labor and capital are perfectly mobile between regions, it is shown that consumers residing in different regions face the same nontraded good prices, even when property tax rates differ across regions.     

The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale

In this paper we argue that tax enforcement is an additional contextual factor affecting tax morale, one of the most important determinants of tax compliance. By using a unique dataset that merges a representative sample of Italian households with administrative data on tax enforcement, we first find that tax morale is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Second, to deal with possible endogeneity of tax enforcement, we show that results are confirmed in an IV specification using the change in the tax gap at the provincial level as an instrument for tax enforcement. Finally, we provide evidence that the impact of tax enforcement and social environment is stronger at low quantiles of tax morale. Our results show that besides that of lowering the expected value of tax evasion, tax enforcement has an additional and indirect effect on tax compliance through its effect on tax morale.