Innovation killers: how financial tools destroy your capacity to do new things

Most companies aren't half as innovative as their senior executives want them to be (or as their marketing claims suggest they are). What's stifling innovation? There are plenty of usual suspects, but the authors finger three financial tools as key accomplices. Discounted cash flow and net present value, as commonly used, underestimate the real returns and benefits of proceeding with an investment. Most executives compare the cash flows from innovation against the default scenario of doing nothing, assuming--incorrectly--that the present health of the company will persist indefinitely if the investment is not made. In most situations, however, competitors' sustaining and disruptive investments over time result in deterioration of financial performance. Fixed- and sunk-cost conventional wisdom confers an unfair advantage on challengers and shackles incumbent firms that attempt to respond to an attack. Executives in established companies, bemoaning the expense of building new brands and developing new sales and distribution channels, seek instead to leverage their existing brands and structures. Entrants, in contrast, simply create new ones. The problem for the incumbent isn't that the challenger can spend more; it's that the challenger is spared the dilemma of having to choose between full-cost and marginal-cost options. The emphasis on short-term earnings per share as the primary driver of share price, and hence shareholder value creation, acts to restrict investments in innovative long-term growth opportunities. These are not bad tools and concepts in and of themselves, but the way they are used to evaluate investments creates a systematic bias against successful innovation. The authors recommend alternative methods that can help managers innovate with a much more astute eye for future value.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

Managing in the whitespace

The assumption today is that new value in a company can be created only when people shed their suits, don khakis and Hawaiian shirts, and think and act like the most passionate entrepreneurs. The problem is, they're rarely told when it makes sense to do those things--or how to do them. With help from a team of ethnographers and senior organization specialists, authors Mark Maletz and Nitin Nohria recently conducted a unique research project that attempted to full those gaps. Their project focused on whitespace: the large but mostly unoccupied territory in every company where rules are vague, authority is fuzzy, budgets are nonexistent, and strategy is unclear--and where entrepreneurial activity that helps reinvent and renew an organization most often takes place. The researchers shadowed entrepreneurial managers operating in the whitespace and met with top managers about their efforts to oversee whitespace activities. Using examples from the financial services, computer, and e-commerce industries, the authors explain when it's imperative to operate in the whitespace--and when it's wiser to stay in the traditional blackspace. They describe how effective whitespace managers subtly and resourcefully lead successful efforts, and how senior executives nurture whitespace projects by putting aside their traditional planning, organizing, and controlling techniques. Finally, they examine the ultimate issue for any successful whitespace project: should it be moved into the blackspace, kept in the whitespace indefinitely--or, despite its apparent success, killed off? If companies leave this valuable territory to the scattershot whims and talents of individual managers, the authors say, they are likely to miss out on many of the opportunities that come from exploring the next frontier.     

A new game plan for C players

It's a big driver of business success, but one that executives are loath to talk about: upgrading the talent pool by weeding out "C" players from management. These aren't the incompetent or unethical managers whom organizations dismiss without a backward glance; C performers deliver results that are acceptable--barely--but they fail to innovate or to inspire the people they lead. The authors of The War for Talent have studied what it takes to upgrade an organization's talent pool. In this article, they explore the hidden costs of tolerating under-performance and acknowledge the reasons why executives may shy away from dealing decisively with C players. They recommend that organizations take an "iron hand in a velvet glove" approach to managing subpar performers. That is, companies should establish rigorous, disciplined processes for assessing and dealing with low-performing managers but still treat them with respect. The authors outline three ironhanded steps. First, executives must identify C players by evaluating their talents and distributing employee performances along an assessment curve. Second, executives must agree on explicit action plans that articulate the improvements or changes that C performers must achieve within six to 12 months. And third, executives should hold managers accountable for carrying out the action plans. Without such discipline, procrastination, rationalization, and inaction will prevail. The authors also emphasize the need for the "velvet glove." Executives must ensure that low performers are treated with dignity, so they should offer candid feedback, instructive coaching, and generous severance packages and outplacement support. The authors' approach isn't about being tough on people; it's about being relentlessly focused on performance.     

The young and the clueless

It's natural to promote your best and brightest, especially when you think they may leave for greener pastures if you don't continually offer them new challenges and rewards. But promoting smart, ambitious young managers too quickly often robs them of the chance to develop the emotional competencies that come with time and experience--competencies like the ability to negotiate with peers, regulate emotions in times of crisis, and win support for change. Indeed, at some point in a manager's career--usually at the vice president level--raw talent and ambition become less important than the ability to influence and persuade, and that's the point at which the emotionally immature manager will lose his effectiveness. This article argues that delaying a promotion can sometimes be the best thing a senior executive can do for a junior manager. The inexperienced manager who is given time to develop his emotional competencies may be better prepared for the interpersonal demands of top-level leadership. The authors recommend that senior executives employ these strategies to help boost their protégés' people skills: sharpen the 360-degree feedback process, give managers cross-functional assignments to improve their negotiation skills, make the development of emotional competencies mandatory, make emotional competencies a performance measure, and encourage managers to develop informal learning partnerships with peers and mentors. Delaying a promotion can be difficult given the steadfast ambitions of many junior executives and the hectic pace of organizational life. It may mean going against the norm of promoting people almost exclusively on smarts and business results. It may also mean contending with the disappointment of an esteemed subordinate. But taking the time to build people's emotional competencies isn't an extravagance; it's critical to developing effective leaders.     

Unobserved ties between corporate executives and mutual fund managers

After corporate executives relocate from origin firms to destination firms, only 3.6 percent of mutual fund managers follow the departing executives: they divest from origin firms while initiating investments in destination firms. This phenomenon is more pronounced for those funds that earned superior returns from investments in the origin firms, and that demand more information regarding the destination firms. Further, comigration funds’ holding changes in destination firms more accurately predict cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements than do their investments in other stocks and non‐comigration funds’ new investments. Hiring the migrating executives does not improve the destination firms’ operating performance.     

The people who make organizations go--or stop

Managers invariably use their personal contacts when they need to, say, meet an impossible deadline or learn the truth about a new boss. Increasingly, it's through these informal networks--not just through traditional organizational hierarchies--that information is found and work gets done. But to many senior executives, informal networks are unobservable and ungovernable--and, therefore, not amenable to the tools of management. As a result, executives tend to work around informal networks or, worse, try to ignore them. When they do acknowledge the networks' existence, executives fall back on intuition--scarcely a dependable tool--to guide them in nurturing this social capital. It doesn't have to be that way. It is entirely possible to develop and manage informal networks systematically, say management experts Cross and Prusak. Specifically, senior executives need to focus their attention on four key role-players in informal networks: Central connectors link most employees in an informal network with one another; they provide the critical information or expertise that the entire network draws on to get work done. Boundary spanners connect an informal network with other parts of the company or with similar networks in other organizations. Information brokers link different subgroups in an informal network; if they didn't, the network would splinter into smaller, less effective segments. And finally, there are peripheral specialists, who anyone in an informal network can turn to for specialized expertise but who work apart from most people in the network. The authors describe the four roles in detail, discuss the use of a well-established tool called social network analysis for determining who these role-players are in the network, and suggest ways that executives can transform ineffective informal networks into productive ones.     

Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

The post-capitalist executive. Interview by T George Harris

For half a century, Peter F. Drucker has influenced senior executives across the globe with his rare insight into socioeconomic forces and practical advice for navigating often turbulent managerial waters. In his latest contribution to HBR, Drucker discusses the impact of the ideas in his latest work, Post-Capitalist Society, on the day-to-day lives and careers of managers. Drucker argues that managers must learn to negotiate a new environment with a different set of work rules and career expectations. Companies currently face downsizing and turmoil with increasing regularity. Once built to last like pyramids, corporations are now more like tents. In addition, businesses in the post-capitalist society grow through many and varied complicated alliances often baffling to the traditional manager. Confronted by these changes, managers must relearn how to manage. In the new world of business, information is replacing authority as the primary tool of the executive. And, Drucker advises, one embarks on the road toward information literacy not by buying the latest technological gadget but by identifying gaps in knowledge. As companies increasingly become temporary institutions, the manager also must begin to take individual responsibility for himself or herself. To that end, the executive must explore what Drucker calls competencies: a person's abilities, likes, dislikes, and goals, both professional and personal. If executives rise to these challenges, a new organizational foundation will be built. While a combination of rank and power supported the traditional organization, the internal structure of the emerging organization will be mutual understanding and trust.     

The existential necessity of midlife change

As life expectancy in the West increases and companies can no longer promise lifelong security, many businesspeople will need to make major changes during middle age, embarking on a second life and a second career. They must start by getting beyond two pervasive and opposing myths. The first is that midlife marks the onset of decline. Problems do arise during middle age--concerns about health and finances, for instance--but one's life force does not expire at 65, nor do possibilities vanish. In fact, by middle age, most executives have gained a freedom that only self-knowledge can impart, and they relish unprecedented opportunities for personal growth. Midlife transitions, however, must be rooted in realism, not driven by the second myth, which paints middle age as a time of magical transformation. Contrary to what self-help books and inspirational speakers proclaim, such transformations do not happen. A 50-year-old with little musical training, for instance, will not suddenly become a concert pianist. People who buy into this myth find that their inevitable disappointment can be debilitating. Paradoxically, the doctrine that aims to encourage change actually stifles it. To make successful transitions, executives must stay open to the possibilities their experience qualifies them for but remain realistic about what they can achieve. For companies, employees' midlife transitions represent both a challenge (senior managers seemingly on track to become CEO may instead leave) and an opportunity (other midlife executives, with different perspectives and experiences, may knock on the door). Organizations must help middle-aged executives through this difficult period, not just by offering a workshop or two but by providing ongoing coaching and opportunities for personal and professional development.     

Kill a brand, keep a customer

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.     

How to identify your enemies before they destroy you

We've all heard the stories about corporate giants who ignored disruptive innovations and paid a steep price: Think what the personal computer did to Digital or Japanese economy cars did to the Big Three automakers. Big companies now spend a lot of time and money trying to make sure they don't get blindsided by their smaller, leaner counterparts. But it's not easy to distinguish genuine threats from also-rans as they emerge. Most of the nascent technologies that typically bombard executives will not amount to competitive threats and deserve to be ignored. As a result, disruptions are usually not taken seriously until they become obvious--when it's often too late. A disruptive innovation is a technology, product, or process that creeps up from below an existing business and threatens to displace it. Usually, the disrupter offers lower performance and less functionality at a much lower price. The product or process is good enough to meet some customers' needs; others welcome the disruption's simplicity. Gradually, it improves to the point where it displaces the incumbent. But, the authors argue, disruption isn't inevitable. They have developed a tool that can help companies detect potential disruptive innovations while management still has time to respond effectively. The tool's decision-making methodology harnesses the organization's collective wisdom to determine how likely it is that a particular innovation will seriously damage an incumbent's business. The methodology has two components: an analytical instrument and an organizational process. There's nothing magical about it--but it gets managers to think systematically about identifying and addressing threats to the core business. And the tool's rigorous approach can spell the difference between flailing around and acting effectively in the face of a serious competitive threat.     

Getting the attention you need

Employees have an enormous amount of business information at their fingertips--more specifically, at their desktops. The floodgates are open; profitable possibilities abound. But having to handle all that information has pushed downsized staffs to the brink of an acute attention deficit disorder. To achieve corporate goals, business leaders need their employees' full attention--and that attention is in short supply. Authors Thomas Davenport and John Beck have studied how companies manage the attention of their employees and their site visitors. In this article, they analyze the components of attention management through three lenses--economic, psychobiological, and technological--and offer guidelines for keeping employees focused on crucial corporate tasks. Their lessons are drawn from the best practices employed by today's stickiest Web sites and by traditional attention industries such as advertising, film, and television. The authors say executives must manage attention knowing that it's a zero-sum game (there's only so much to go around). Managers should also consider capitalizing on the basic survival and competitive instincts we all have that help determine how much attention we pay to certain things. For instance, the threat of corporate demise--and the consequent loss of jobs and livelihoods--undoubtedly focuses workers' attention on the need to change. Likewise, internal competition among business units may give employees added incentive to pay attention to a profit or sales goal. Leaders today need to pay more attention to attention because it's widely misunderstood and widely mismanaged, the authors conclude.     

Reclaim your job

Ask most managers what gets in the way of their success, and you'll hear the familiar litany of complaints: Not enough time. Limited resources. No clear sense of how their work fits into the grand corporate scheme. These are, for the most part, excuses. What really gets in the way of managers' success is fear of making their own decisions and acting accordingly. Managers must overcome the psychological desire to be indispensable. In this article, the authors demonstrate how managers can become more productive by learning to manage demands, generate resources, and recognize and exploit alternatives. To win the support they want, managers must develop a long-term strategy and pursue their goals slowly, steadily, and strategically. To expand the range of opportunities, for their companies and themselves, managers must scan the environment for possible obstacles and search for ways around them. Fully 90% of the executives the authors have studied over the past few years wasted their time and frittered away their productivity, despite having well-defined projects, goals, and the necessary knowledge to get their jobs done. Such managers remain trapped in inefficiency because they assume they do not have enough personal discretion or control. They forget how to take initiative--the most essential quality of any truly successful manager. Effective managers, by contrast, are purposeful corporate entrepreneurs who take charge of their jobs by developing trust in their own judgment and adopting long-term, big-picture views to fulfill personal goals that match those of the organization.     

The right mind-set for managing information technology

Too many managers in the West are intimidated by the task of managing technology. They tiptoe around it, supposing that it needs special tools, special strategies, and a special mind-set. Well, it doesn't, the authors say. Technology should be managed-controlled, even--like any other competitive weapon in a manager's arsenal. The authors came to this conclusion in a surprising way. Having set out to compare Western and Japanese IT-management practices, they were startled to discover that Japanese companies rarely experience the IT problems so common in the United States and Europe. In fact, their senior executives didn't even recognize the problems that the authors described. When they dug deeper into 20 leading companies that the Japanese themselves consider exemplary IT users, they found that the Japanese see IT as just one competitive lever among many. Its purpose, very simply, is to help the organization achieve its operational goals. The authors recognize that their message is counterintuitive, to say the least. In visits to Japan, Western executives have found anything but a model to copy. But a closer look reveals that the prevailing wisdom is wrong. The authors found five principles of IT management in Japan that, they believe, are not only powerful but also universal. M. Bensaou and Michael Earl contrast these principles against the practices commonly found in Western companies. While acknowledging that Japan has its own weaknesses with technology, particularly in white-collar office settings, they nevertheless urge senior managers in the West to consider the solid foundation on which Japanese IT management rests.     

The ambidextrous organization

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges--it requires executives to explore new opportunities even as they work diligently to exploit existing capabilities--and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives who have the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is by no means easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand. Given the executive will to make it happen, any company can become ambidextrous.     

Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

Avoid the four perils of CRM

Customer relationship management is one of the hottest management tools today. But more than half of all CRM initiatives fail to produce the anticipated results. Why? And what can companies do to reverse that negative trend? The authors--three senior Bain consultants--have spent the past ten years analyzing customer-loyalty initiatives, both successful and unsuccessful, at more than 200 companies in a wide range of industries. They've found that CRM backfires in part because executives don't understand what they are implementing, let alone how much it will cost or how long it will take. The authors' research unveiled four common pitfalls that managers stumble into when trying to implement CRM. Each pitfall is a consequence of a single flawed assumption--that CRM is software that will automatically manage customer relationships. It isn't. Rather, CRM is the creation of customer strategies and processes to build customer loyalty, which are then supported by the technology. This article looks at best practices in CRM at several companies, including the New York Times Company, Square D, GE Capital, Grand Expeditions, and BMC Software. It provides an intellectual framework for any company that wants to start a CRM program or turn around a failing one.     

Strategy as active waiting

Successful executives who cut their teeth in stable industries or in developed countries often stumble when they face more volatile markets. They falter, in part, because they assume they can gaze deep into the future and develop a long-term strategy that will confer a sustainable competitive advantage. But visibility into the future of volatile markets is sharply limited because so many different variables are in play. Factors such as technological innovation, customers' evolving needs, government policy, and changes in the capital markets interact with one another to create unexpected outcomes. Over the past six years, Donald Sull, an associate professor at London Business School, has led a research project examining some of the world's most volatile markets, from national markets like China and Brazil to industries like enterprise software, telecommunications, and airlines. One of the most striking findings from this research is the importance of taking action during comparative lulls in the storm. Huge business opportunities are relatively rare; they come along only once or twice in a decade. And, for the most part, companies can't manufacture those opportunities; changes in the external environment converge to make them happen. What managers can do is prepare for these golden opportunities by managing smart during the comparative calm of business as usual. During these periods of active waiting, leaders must probe the future and remain alert to anomalies that signal potential threats or opportunities; exercise restraint to preserve their war chests; and maintain discipline to keep the troops battle ready. When a golden opportunity or"sudden death"threat emerges, managers must have the courage to declare the main effort and concentrate resources to seize the moment.     

Making strategy: learning by doing

Companies find it difficult to change strategy for many reasons, but one stands out: strategic thinking is not a core managerial competence at most companies. Executives hone their capabilities by tackling problems over and over again. Changing strategy, however, is not usually a task that they face repeatedly. Once companies have found a strategy that works, they want to use it, not change it. Consequently, most managers do not develop a competence in strategic thinking. This Manager's Tool Kit presents a three-stage method executives can use to conceive and implement a creative and coherent strategy themselves. The first stage is to identify and map the driving forces that the company needs to address. The process of mapping provides strategy-making teams with visual representations of team members' assumptions, those pictures, in turn, enable managers to achieve consensus in determining the driving forces. Once a senior management team has formulated a new strategy, it must align the strategy with the company's resource-allocation process to make implementation possible. Senior management teams can translate their strategy into action by using aggregate project planning. And management teams that link strategy and innovation through that planning process will develop a competence in implementing strategic change. The author guides the reader through the three stages of strategy making by examining the case of a manufacturing company that was losing ground to competitors. After mapping the driving forces, the company's senior managers were able to devise a new strategy that allowed the business to maintain a competitive advantage in its industry.