Education,Innovation and Long‐Run Growth

We extend a second‐generation Schumpeterian growth model to incorporate human capital accumulation to clarify the general equilibrium effects of subsidy policies on human capital accumulation and R&D activities in a unified framework. Despite the conventional argument that subsidies always stimulate these growth‐promoting activities, we find that subsidies asymmetrically affect human capital accumulation and R&D activities. Our theoretical results suggest that research using standard models of human capital might find false negative relationships between education subsidies and economic growth.     

R&D Subsidies Under Asymmetric Duopoly: A Note

This paper analyses the question of optimum R&D subsidies in the context of a two-stage asymmetric Cournot duopoly model with endogenous R&D. For the special case of symmetric duopoly, whether the firms should be subsidized or taxed in their R&D activities crucially depends on the concavity/convexity property of the demand function. It is also shown that a firm with some initial cost advantage should be subsidized in its R&D activities and a firm without should be taxed. In this way, we obtain policy implications that cast doubts on the universal applicability of competition policies.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L52, H25.     

The effectiveness of R&D subsidies

In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (or partner) is being subsidized or not may play a key role in explaining whether subsidies are effective or not in increasing R&D investments. In particular, it is shown that if the existence of the subsidy is made public (e.g. because strict information release regulation about R&D subsidies is enforced) and depending on the strategic relationship between the firms’ R&D efforts, an R&D subsidy could even hurt the subsidized firm.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.     

Public R&D subsidies,outside private support,and employment growth

In the aftermath of the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the employment effects of public subsidies have been scrutinized because of new emphasis on public accountability and transparency. In this paper, we investigate conditions in which public subsidies of research and development (R&D) in small firms stimulate employment growth. We find, based on an empirical analysis of employment growth induced by US Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research program awards, that the stimulated employment growth is greater under two conditions: one, the presence of outside investors providing additional funding for the R&D and, two, when an exceptional amount of intellectual property is created by the publicly subsidized R&D. In addition to outside investors, other firms that make commercial agreements with the subsidized firm appear important for the employment growth of the subsidized firm. Cooperation between the small business doing the R&D and other firms is an important determinant of the commercial success of the technologies created with the support of public funds.     

International Trade Policy towards Monopoly and Oligopoly*

This paper highlights the importance of product differentiation and endogenous R&D in determining the optimal R&D policy, in a model where investment in cost‐reducing R&D is committed before firms compete in a differentiated‐goods third‐country export market. R&D is always taxed in oligopolies for high degrees of product differentiation. For lower degrees of product differentiation the duopoly is subsidized or the government remains inactive. In contrast, the monopoly is always subsidized. The government with a duopoly may be active or inactive depending on the degree of product differentiation. Thus, we may observe a reversal in the sign of the optimal R&D policy if the degree of product differentiation changes or, alternatively, if there is a change in the number of firms. Similar qualitative results hold if trade policy uses output subsidies, instead of R&D promotion.     

How to promote R&D-based growth? Public education expenditure on scientists and engineers versus R&D subsidies

This paper compares the positive and normative implications of two alternative measures to promote R&D-based growth: R&D subsidies to firms and publicly provided education targeted to the development of science and engineering (S&E) skills. The model accounts for the specificity of S&E skills, where individuals with heterogeneous ability choose their type of education. Although intertemporal knowledge spillovers are the only R&D externality, the analysis suggests that R&D subsidies may be detrimental to both productivity growth and welfare. Moreover, they raise earnings inequality. In contrast to R&D subsidies, publicly provided education targeted to S&E skills are found to be unambiguously growth-promoting and neutral with respect to the earnings distribution.     

On the impact of public policies and wage formation on business investment in research and development

Against the backdrop of mediocre growth prospects in many countries, governments should do more to promote private investment in research and development (R&D). Public fiscal policies and the characteristics of wage formation are key as they affect both the incentives that firms face and their resources. This paper studies their impact at the macro level in a panel of 14 OECD countries since 1981, while we also account for the impact of unobserved common factors like the world level of knowledge. Tax incentives, government intramural expenditures on R&D, public R&D subsidies (if they are not too low nor too high) and especially investment in tertiary education, encourage business R&D investment. Wage moderation may also contribute to innovation, but only in fairly closed economies and in economies with flexible labour markets. In highly open economies with rigid labour markets, high wage pressure promotes investment in R&D. Innovation may then be the only competitive strategy for firms.     

The role of diminishing returns in neo-Schumpeterian growth theory

Summary. This paper generalizes Segerstrom [5], a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth through quality improvements in which innovation and imitation are modeled as the outcomes of research and development (R&D) races. Specific factors introduced into the technologies of both R&D activities achieve diminishing returns to scale in R&D. The comparative-static results of subsidies to R&D activities depend on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D. When there is (is not) a sufficient degree of diminishing returns to R&D, a subsidy to innovative activity increases (decreases) innovative activity. Received: July 8, 1994; revised version: June 9, 1997     

Occupational choice and entrepreneurship: effects of R&D subsidies on economic growth

Most R&D-based growth models fail to explicitly account for the role of entrepreneurs in economic growth. By contrast, this study accounts for this factor and constructs an overlapping-generations model that includes entrepreneurial innovation and the occupational choice of becoming an entrepreneur or a worker. For the role of entrepreneurs, even a policy intended to encourage innovation can negatively affect economic growth. For the effect of such policies, I focus on the role of R&D subsidies. I show that while R&D subsidies promote entrepreneurs’ R&D activities, they increase workers’ wages by boosting labor demand. Thus, it is more attractive to be a worker, which reduces the number of entrepreneurs. Subsidies can have both a negative and positive effect on growth, which results in an inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D subsidies and growth. In addition, a growth-maximizing R&D subsidy rate exists, although this rate is too high to maximize the welfare level of any one generation. When individuals are heterogeneous in their abilities, R&D subsidies reduce intra-generational inequalities.     

Knowledge spillovers and R&D subsidies to new,emerging technologies

Is knowledge spillover a rationale for supporting R&D on new, emerging technologies more than R&D on other technologies? In this paper, I analyze whether innovation externalities caused only by knowledge spillovers differ between technologies of different maturity. I show that R&D should not be subsidized equally across industries when the knowledge stocks differ. This is because knowledge spillovers depend on the size of the knowledge stock and the elasticity of scale in R&D production. R&D in the emerging technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is smaller than one. However, R&D in the mature technology should be subsidized more when the elasticity is larger than one.     

Does Firm Size make a Difference? Analysing the Effectiveness of R&D Subsidies in East Germany

We analyse the impact of public subsidies on private sector research and development (R&D) activity for a sample of East German firms. Using propensity score matching, our empirical results indicate that subsidized firms indeed show a higher level of R&D intensity (R&D expenditures relative to total turnover) and a higher probability for patent application compared with non‐subsidized firms. We find that, on average, the R&D intensity increases from 1.5% to 3.9%. The probability of patent application rises from 20% to 40%. These results closely match earlier empirical findings for East Germany. Given the fact that the East German innovation system is particularly driven by small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we draw special attention to the effectiveness of R&D subsidies for this latter subgroup. Here, no specific empirical evidence is available so far. Our findings indicate that policy effectiveness also holds for private R&D activity of SMEs, with the highest increase in terms of R&D intensity being estimated for microbusinesses with up to ten employees.     

Testing a model of UK growth: A role for R&D subsidies

R&D is a main driver of growth, whether by generating new ideas for production or increasing technological transfer. However, R&D itself is risky and faces numerous barriers which may reduce its marginal return. Direct R&D subsides are intended to counteract such barriers, but whether they lead empirically to increased economic growth is unclear. In our structural model of the UK, subsidies offset the frictional costs associated with R&D, incentivising innovation and so stimulating productivity growth. We estimate and test this structural model by indirect inference, a method not previously used in work on R&D. We find that even temporary cuts to R&D funding have long-lasting impacts on UK economic growth. The power of the test allows us to calculate tight accuracy bounds for our results and for policy reform impacts calculated using the model. These findings are of high relevance to the ongoing debate around the future UK innovation environment.     

R&D Policies and Endogenous Growth: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Analysis of the Case for Canada*

This paper utilizes a general equilibrium R&D model of endogenous growth via increasing capital variety to examine the impact of alternative policies on productivity and economic growth. The model is calibrated using data from the Canadian economy. Findings reveal that direct incentives such as subsidies to R&D activities would have the highest productivity impact on the Canadian economy, that an increase in subsidies to the users of R&D capital (output) would have a positive but smaller impact, and trade liberalization would have minimal effects on productivity growth via its impact on international R&D spillovers.     

Animal spirits and the composition of innovation

This paper shows that the Schumpeterian model with both vertical and horizontal innovative research admits many more equilibria than the unique symmetric balanced growth path (BGP) usually highlighted in the literature. Each of a continuum of BGPs is characterized by a different composition of aggregate R&D (vertical versus horizontal).This appears if firms expect self-fulfilling “waves of enthusiasm” in the newly introduced sectors, as is very common in the real world. Pioneers are challenged by more outsiders and the first monopoly of every new good is likely to last less than in more mature industries: By expecting this horizontal innovation is depressed while vertical innovation is more intense. Such “waves of enthusiasm” have a positive effect on growth rates and a negative effect on consumption levels.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.     

Endogenous technological change: a note on stability

Summary. This paper demonstrates that the steady-state solution of the optimal-growth problem in Romer's (1990) model of endogenous technological change is globally saddle-point stable. Surprisingly, the proof of this result is trivial. Interest in the optimal growth path is justified by the fact that there is a (unique) combination of production and R&D subsidies by means of which the optimal growth path is attained as a market equilibrium. Received: October 6, 1998; revised version: April 19, 1999     

Multiplicity and stagnation under the Romer model with increasing returns of R&D

This study develops a simple growth model to explain stagnation and non-simple growth patterns by using increasing returns of R&D efficiency. The study adopts a type of the lab-equipment model, namely, the Romer model, where goods are used as R&D input. Here, we assume capital, or durable goods, as the R&D input factor, and R&D efficiency is assumed to be variable. This arrangement yields three steady states, namely: no-growth, low-growth, and high-growth steady states. These trajectories are jumpable. Accordingly, global indeterminacy is obtained. By uniting the numerical analysis, we obtain that all steady states are saddle stable. However, when the increasing R&D efficiency is small, the path converging to a high-growth-rate steady state shows local indeterminacy.     

Quantitative growth effects of subsidies in a search theoretic R&D model

Should government subsidize R&D and does it matter how these subsidies are allocated? We examine these questions in a dynamic model where R&D is described as sequential sampling from a distribution of new ideas. Successful discoveries affect future available resources and incentives for further R&D. Consequently, there may be under-investment in R&D. We study the effect of government interventions aimed at fostering growth through R&D. Calibrating the model with aggregate data from the Israeli business sector allows us to quantitatively compare two forms of support resembling those actually used to encourage R&D in the Israeli business sector: (i) an unrestricted subsidy that may be used at the recipients' discretion to finance R&D or other investments, (ii) a subsidy earmarked by the government for R&D activities only. While there is no theoretical way to determine which of the two subsidies will have a greater impact on search for new ideas and growth, we find that in the calibrated economy both subsidies have a significant but similar impact on the economy's output and TFP growth rates. Accordingly, in the case of the Israeli business sector, the incentives to conduct R&D were sufficiently strong, and no R&D-specific encouragement was needed. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that for economies characterized by other parameter values this result may not be true. Correspondence to: B. Bental     

Effects of subsidies on growth and welfare in a quality-ladder model with elastic labor

This paper develops a quality-ladder growth model with elastic labor supply and distortionary taxes to analyze the effects of different subsidy instruments: subsidies to the production of final goods, subsidies to the purchase of intermediate goods, and subsidies to research and development (R&D). Moreover, the model is calibrated to the US data to compare the growth and welfare implications of these subsidies. The main results are as follows. First, we analytically show that an optimal coordination of all instruments attains the first-best outcome. Second, in the calibrated economy, we numerically find that for the use of a single instrument, R&D subsidy is less growth-enhancing and welfare-improving than the other subsidies, whereas for the use of a mix of two instruments, subsidizing the production of final goods and the purchase of intermediate goods is most effective in promoting growth but least effective in raising welfare.