Bridging the Information Gap: Quarterly Conference Calls as a Medium for Voluntary Disclosure

This paper uses the quarterly conference call as a disclosure metric to examine whether firms with less informative financial statements are more likely to respond by providing additional voluntary disclosure. After controlling for other characteristics of a firm's information environment, I find a significant inverse relation between measures of the informativeness of a firm's financial statements and the likelihood that the firm will use a quarterly conference call. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis in Verrecchia (1990) that the probability of disclosure of management's private information is negatively related to the precision of prior public information on firm value.     

Effects of prior voluntary disclosure on earnings announcements in an environment with low information and regulation

This study examines the association between levels of annual report voluntary disclosure and the market reaction to the next interim earnings announcement in a market with both low regulation and analyst following. We examine the first order effects of voluntary disclosure by using direct measures for both the level of voluntary disclosure, and the market effects of such disclosure. The results show that preannouncement voluntary disclosure significantly reduces the price and volume reactions in the earnings announcement period, and is consistent with the Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) framework and the Atiase and Bamber (1994) empirical findings. We extend the analysis to investigate trading behavior during the earnings announcement period, and observe the trading behavior predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994). We conclude that voluntary disclosure in annual reports can be regarded as an important determinant of preannouncement information precision in markets with low regulation and analyst following, and observe the expected trading behavior as modeled in Kim and Verrecchia (1991a), and extended in Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994).     

Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark

This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects information asymmetry for industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Economic theory suggests that disclosing more information should lower the information asymmetry component of a firm's cost of capital [Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000)]. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry. The results are robust even after controlling for various firm characteristics introduced in related literature. Despite differences in institutional settings the findings in our paper are similar to the ones based on US data.     

董事会秘书与信息披露质量

2006年实施的新《公司法》从法律意义上第一次确认了董事会秘书的高管地位,董秘能否提高上市公司的信息披露质量值得深入研究。本文运用Kim和Verrecchia(2001)度量信息披露质量的方法,通过对沪深300指数成份股公司进行实证分析发现:新《公司法》实施后我国上市公司的信息披露质量得到了显著提高;董秘持股会降低信息披露质量,而董秘的年龄、任职时间、教育水平、兼任情况和相关经验等对信息披露质量没有显著影响,这说明董秘的个人特征还没有很好地发挥作用,董秘制度的实施还有待进一步完善。     

A simple structural estimator of disclosure costs

Review of Accounting Studies - This study recovers a simple firm-level measure of disclosure costs implied by the voluntary disclosure theory of Verrecchia (Journal of Accounting and Economics...     

Voluntary Disclosure of Bad News

Abstract:   This paper shows that in a voluntary disclosure environment entailing both a fixed disclosure cost and a variable proprietary cost, partial disclosure equilibria may arise in which firms voluntarily disclose bad private information to the public. Furthermore, it is shown that such equilibria may arise more frequently as the threat of incuring proprietary cost increases and/or the proprietary cost itself increases.     

Competitive Effects of Disclosure in a Strategic Entry Model

We investigate the welfare consequences of incumbent firms' mutual disclosure of cost information when there is a threat of entry from a firm not required to disclose its private cost information. New effects of disclosure are observed relative to no-entry models, with the result that incumbents' expected output is a decreasing function of the disclosure level. However, further analysis shows that increased disclosure usually increases incumbent expected profits and decreases expected consumer surplus, despite the additional entry effect of disclosure. Such analytical derivations provide objective input to the FASB as they attempt to predict the competitive effects of changing mandated disclosure requirements.     

Information disclosure,firm growth,and the cost of capital

We study how information disclosure affects the cost of equity capital and investor welfare in a dynamic setting. We show that a firm’s cost of capital decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) a certain threshold. The threshold growth rate is higher when the firm’s cash flows are more persistent, or when other firms in the economy are growing at low rates. While current shareholders always prefer maximum public disclosure, future shareholders’ welfare decreases (increases) in the precision of public disclosure if the firm’s growth rate is below (above) the threshold.     

Competitive intelligence and disclosure

Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand competitor with customer information. Only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival.     

企业社会责任信息披露与资本成本的互动关系——基于信息不对称视角的一个分析框架

信息不对称是增加企业资本成本的一个重要因素,企业社会责任信息披露有助于降低信息不对称,从而降低资本成本,但该作用的发挥受制于企业是否真实、适当地进行了社会责任信息披露;而基于较低的资本成本约束,企业社会责任信息披露动机、水平和质量也会受到影响,企业社会责任信息披露与资本成本之间存在互动关系。     

The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks

This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the failed bank's assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to participate in the bidding for the failed bank. The paper provides new insights into the relation between disclosure and the reorganization of a banking system when the regulators' preferred plan of action is to promote the acquisition of undercapitalized banks by healthy ones. The results suggest that disclosure regulation policy influences the cost of resolution of a bank and, as a result, could be an important factor in the definition of the optimal resolution strategy during a banking crisis event.     

信息不对称对中小企业融资决策的影响研究——以东莞市中小企业为例

本文以信息不对称理论所强调的代理成本和资本市场层次理论所强调的信息披露成本为理论出发点,以东莞中小企业为案例,研究表明,我国创业板市场建立的意义不在于它能够彻底地解决中小企业融资过程中的代理成本问题,而在于它使中小企业能够通过融资渠道的选择,降低其融资过程中的代理成本,并且通过衡量不同资本市场层级的融资收益与信息披露成本之间的差额,实现企业价值最大化。     

Optimal Disclosure Policy in Oligopoly Markets

This paper examines the private and social optimality of full disclosure of private information in a two-period oligopoly model. An incumbent firm is privately informed about the market demand and its production cost after operating as a monopolist in the first period, and then competes against an entrant in the second period. Two main results are derived. First, it is shown that the incumbent is best off by pre-committing to disclose both the demand and cost information. By disclosing full information, the incumbent nullifies its self-defeating intertemporal incentives, which arise whenever it has private information about the market demand, its cost efficiency, or both. In addition, the equilibrium output variance is the largest under full disclosure, which benefits the incumbent ex ante. Second, the paper shows that the incumbent's full disclosure of the demand and cost information may or may not be desirable from a social efficiency standpoint. In particular, the correlation between the firms' production costs is crucial to the rank of disclosure policies in terms of their impact on social efficiency.     

Accounting for Infrastructure Service Delivery by Government: Generational Issues

Infrastructure service provision by government creates huge distributional issues about service availability and performance over time and the relative funding burdens borne by successive generations of consumers across time. But providing financial disclosure on these issues through inter-generational accounting pre-supposes that accounting measurement is both generationally neutral (temporal neutrality) and does not legitimate any particular pattern of distribution. At the very least, accounting measurements of service provision costs should possess the attribute of distributional fairness. They should not bias the inter-generational allocation of cost or funding burdens. We argue that the forced application of inappropriate commercial accounting concepts of asset valuation, depreciation and capital maintenance does produce significant generational bias. More flexibility is required to produce the necessary accounting measurement attributes for financial disclosure on whether government has discharged its continuing accountability for inter-generational equity in burden sharing. We discuss three conceptual issues and illustrate the need for flexibility by proposing an alternative 'flow of obligations' approach which does not require reference to valuations of community service resources or arbitrary cost allocations under depreciation.     

Short-sale constraints: Reductions in costs of capital or overvaluation? Evidence from Hong Kong

We examine the effects of short-sale constraints in Hong Kong where stocks can be shorted only if they are included on an official short-sale list. Using revisions to the list, we test two hypotheses — 1) that short-sale constraints lead to overvaluation and 2) that they lead to lower costs of capital. We find weak support for the Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) version of the overvaluation hypothesis, but more compelling evidence supporting the Xu (2007) version of the overvaluation hypothesis and the cost of capital hypothesis. We argue that in the context of our tests the Xu overvaluation hypothesis is actually a reformulation of the cost of capital hypothesis and that the bulk of our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that short-sale constraints reduce capital costs.     

Management forecasts and the cost of equity capital: international evidence

We examine international differences in the effect of management forecasts (which we use to proxy for voluntary disclosure) on the cost of equity capital (COC) across 31 countries. We find that the issuance of management forecasts is associated with a lower COC worldwide but that the effect of management forecasts on the COC depends on country-level institutional factors. Specifically, management forecasts have a stronger effect on the COC in countries with stronger investor protection and better information dissemination and a weaker effect in countries with higher mandatory disclosure requirements. Further analyses reveal that these relations are more pronounced when management forecasts are more frequent, more precise, and more disaggregated. Overall, our findings suggest that the ability of management forecasts to reduce firms’ COC derives not only from country-level factors that enhance the credibility of their forecasts but also from factors that reflect the quality of the information environment in terms of the distribution of news and the availability and quality of alternative information. Thus, investor protection, media penetration, and mandatory disclosure requirements have an important effect on the ability of management forecasts to lower the COC.     

The adjustment of security returns to the disclosure of replacement cost accounting information

In March 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated Accounting Series Release No. 190 (ASR 190) requiring the disclosure of certain replacement cost (RC) accounting data by its registrants. The purpose of this study is to assess whether the RC disclosure rule had any effect on common stock returns for firms affected by the new rule. Distinguishing the effect of compliance costs from the effect of information in the RC data, we found no sign of a cost effect and no strong evidence of an information effect. This result appears to imply (a) that the burden of the ASR 190 compliance costs was not large enough to induce downward adjustments of the firms' security returns; and (b) that the RC data did not provide new information useful to investors as asserted by the SEC.     

When knowledge is power: Evidence from the municipal bond market

I investigate whether access to fundamental information enhances retail investors’ bargaining power, reducing the premium that small municipal bond investors pay over large investors. I find a reduction in this small trade premium after the introduction of an online disclosure repository that lowers retail investors’ information acquisition costs. This finding is limited to issuers whose disclosures are disseminated through the repository. The finding is pronounced for issuers that impose high information acquisition costs on investors ex-ante and those that exhibit high disclosure quality ex-post. These results suggest that as investors’ information sets align, so does their bargaining power with dealers.     

An Experimental Market's Investigation of Discretionary Financial Disclosure

The extent to which market forces can induce full financial disclosure by managers has long been an issue of interest to regulators. Investigating this phenomenon with naturally occurring data produces a major obstacle: since managers' private information sets are unknown, it is necessary to make assumptions about them in order to interpret the nature (e.g., favourable or unfavourable, income increasing or income decreasing) of the information that is disclosed. The validity of the inferences relies critically on the validity of these assumptions. The present study uses a laboratory experiment to test three hypotheses derived from prior analytical and empirical research: (H1) When disclosure costs are zero, managers voluntarily disclose all (good and bad) news; (H2) When disclosure costs are positive. managers only disclose news which exceeds some threshold: and (H3) The mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information induces an increase in the disclosure of correlated. proprietary information. One hundred and fifty-six subjects participated in markets with one firm manager and three investors. Over thirteen independent periods, the managers decided whether to truthfully disclose the liquidation value of the asset under their stewardship, and the investors submitted competing bids for the asset. With costless disclosure. investors price-protected themselves when managers withheld information, but the price penalty that they imposed was insufficient to induce full disclosure. With positive disclosure cost, investors reduced the price penalty that they imposed for non-disclosure, and managers disclosed proportionally fewer of the less extreme good news. Finally, mandatory disclosure of information had no significant impact on the voluntary disclosure of correlated proprietary information. Discussion centres on our failure to support the (equilibrium) prediction from analytical research that full disclosure should obtain when disclosures are costless. Several limitations of the study are examined. and it remains an open question whether additional trials (periods) in the present study might have provided full disclosure.     

The effect of small audit firms’ failure to remediate the PCAOB’s quality control criticisms on audit market segmentation

This paper examines the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) quality control inspection program on market segmentation of small firms’ audit services. Specifically, we investigate how non-remediation of quality control criticisms (QCCs) affects the supply and demand of low-quality audits. We find that remediation of QCCs improves audit quality for small accounting firms. However, some small accounting firms do not remediate QCCs (NR firms) and continue to provide low audit quality. We investigate how NR clients react to the disclosure of non-remediation of QCCs. We find that NR clients with low agency costs are more likely to retain NR firms after the disclosure of non-remediation. This finding is consistent with our expectation that voluntary QCC remediation creates a low-quality audit market segment for NR firms. Our findings suggest that the public disclosure of QCCs is not sufficient to remove low-quality auditors. Instead, NR clients use the disclosure of non-remediation of QCCs as a signal to sort themselves into segments based on their demand for audit quality. We are the first to study and find that PCAOB inspections, and specifically the voluntary nature of remediation and public disclosure of lack of remediation, create market segmentation.