供应商管理库存中的道德风险分析与契约设计

分析了供应商管理库存环境下,除双重边际效应以外另一个导致供应链分散决策时零售商订购量下降的因素,即道德风险问题。针对道德风险,采用求解完全且完美信息动态博弈中子博弈完美纳什均衡的一般方法,即逆推归纳法设计了一个数量折扣契约。当参数满足一定关系时,该契约不仅可以有效消除供应商管理库存中的道德风险,而且也使供销双方期望利润实现了帕累托改进,因此该契约不仅是有效的,而且也是可执行的。     

和谐劳动关系的内核与模式

劳动关系是雇佣双方在一定的社会经济背景下形成的契约关系,这种社会经济利益关系中兼具冲突性和合作性特征.本文通过对劳动关系内在冲突和合作动因的探讨,分析其心理契约内核,认为劳动关系的和谐关键在于社会交换关系的外在和内在平衡,并提出了和谐劳动关系的合作伙伴关系模式,指出支持性人力资源管理策略在其中的棱心作用.     

道德风险模型下提高财政支出绩效的建议

1.设计合理的契约,完善对代理人的约束机制和激励机制。根据委托代理理论,委托人和代理人双方的交易关系实质上是订立契约的行为。为了确保交易前后双方的利益均衡,降低乃至避免道德风险,设计合理的契约的核心是使委托人与代理人的效用目标尽可能兼容。一是参与约束方面,加大对代理人违反合约和提供低水平努力的惩处力度。委托人在私人部门里有较大的余地选择代理人,可以通过     

黑龙江省私营企业劳动关系的模式构建

在实践中,黑龙江省私营企业劳动关系的运行调节模式由于行业不同而不同。黑龙江省私营企业现行的劳动关系模式具有劳动力的商品属性显著、心理契约的分歧性、劳动关系的特殊性和部分雇主心理认知现实性的特点。通过企业文化氛围的营造,啮合双方的心理契约;在传统的中低端制造行业和建筑行业中,建立算计合作式的劳动关系模式;在知识和技术密集型企业中,建立合作伙伴式的劳动关系调节模式。     

基于委托代理理论的信用违约互换最优契约模型分析

本文阐述了信用风险互换及其委托代理关系．分析了信息不对称下引起信用违约互换道德风险问题,运用委托代理理论建立了相应的信用违约互换契约分析模型．对道德风险下的最优信用违约契约性质进行研究．并提出了解决道德风险、优化信用违约互换的激励机制．确保信用违约互换在我国的健康发展。     

专利法利益平衡机制的法经济学解析——基于社会契约论的观点

现有文献对专利法中具体权利限制制度的研究,难以使我们从整体上把握专利法利益平衡原则的作用机制.而从社会契约论的视角着眼,专利法利益平衡机制可归结为信息公开-权利专有的对价关系.运用法经济学原理进行的分析表明,契约对价通过专利长度和专利宽度两个法律变量的变化协调双方的利益关系.分析结果进一步指出专利契约在实践中面临价值缺失的危险,提出在契约订立过程中引入博弈机制是重构专利契约的关键.     

农产品质量安全的契约选择:基于关系契约理论的分析框架

已有文献较多地从信息不对称角度入手研究农产品质量安全问题,认为信息不对称下的逆向选择和道德风险是农产品质量安全的主要风险,而对于契约不完全和专用性投资不平衡导致的敲竹杠问题未给予充分的重视。文章结合信息不对称和契约不完全理论,具体区分了农产品质量安全供给中的三种机会主义类型,即逆向选择、道德风险和敲竹杠。从关系契约治理的视角对现行农业契约的主要模式进行了效果评价,提出农业契约模式的选择依据,并为农业合作社的发展提供了理论佐证。     

委托代理条件下规避风险投资家道德风险的激励机制探析

委托代理条件下规避风险投资家道德风险一直是学界研究的热点和难点问题之一.由于风险投资家和风险资本家之问的信息不对称,特别是风险投资家难以察觉的私人信息使风险投资契约达成后风险资本家面临道德风险.本文以激励理论为指导,从中国风险投资实践的客观现实出发,初步探析了一个有关规避风险投资家道德风险的激励机制,作为风险投资契约不完备性的补充与完善.     

委托代理中风险偏好对契约安排的影响分析

委托代理关系主体的风险偏好对于双方签订的契约有着重要影响.本文在简要介绍委托代理理论、明晰风险偏好函数的基础上,透彻分析了不同风险偏好组合对契约安排的影响.     

道德风险条件下高校产学研合作中价格契约研究

利用技术许可中价格契约的基本理论,对高校产学研合作中存在于企业的道德风险问题的价格契约治理机制进行了分析。分析结果表明,在产学研合作中,当企业存在道德风险问题时,一个次优产学研合作的价格契约是一个纯固定费用的价格契约;同时,高校为了对企业进行有效激励,将对企业进行一定的信息租的转移。     

非对称信息条件下最优承包合同的研究

承发包双方在合同变更中的机会主义和信息的非对称性,产生了“敲竹杠”和投资过小现象以及隐藏信息的道德风险问题。运用委托-代理理论建立了非对称信息条件下的最优承包合同模型,对上述问题进行了研究。证明在承包商隐藏信息务件下,最优承包合同将使承包商的专用投资水平下降、工程项目工期延长、业主效用降低。     

基于供应商道德风险的劳工标准移植研究*

越来越多的发展中国家企业通过劳工认证获取较多的市场份额,劳工标准移植的问题也受到较多关注。本文选择从供应商道德风险视角研究发展中国家的劳工标准移植的特征。研究发现,风险规避供应商的存在促使采购商必须在道德风险和努力水平之间选择一个次优均衡。尤其是考虑到最低标准等有限责任信息租的存在,使得采购商必须额外支付一定的代理成本以满足委托代理过程,最后的均衡劳工标准比仅考虑逆向选择更加扭曲。     

Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard

This article investigates managerial compensation and its incentive effects. Our econometric framework is derived from a multiperiod principal-agent model with moral hazard. Longitudinal data on returns to firms and managerial compensation are used to estimate the model. We find that firms would incur large losses from ignoring moral hazard, whereas managers only require moderate additional compensation for accepting a contract that ties their wealth to the value of the firm. Thus the costs of aligning hidden managerial actions to shareholder goals through the compensation schedule are much less than the benefits from the resulting managerial performance.     

Incentive contracts in delegated portfolio management under VaR constraint

This paper studies the incentive effect of linear performance-adjusted contracts in delegated portfolio management under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. It is shown that a linear performance-based contract can provide incentives for the portfolio manager to work at acquiring private information under a VaR risk constraint. The expected utility and optimal effort of a risk-averse manager are increasing functions of the return sharing ratio in the contract. However, a risk constraint causes the portfolio manager to reduce effort in gathering private information, suggesting that the VaR constraint increases the moral hazard between the investor and the manager.     

Workers' compensation: Determining a feasible payment structure in a regulatory environment

Moral hazard complicates the design of an optimal benefit structure in a regulated social insurance program such as workers' compensation. We discuss the type of empirical information necessary to set optimal benefit levels in the presence of moral hazard. Since we present trends in indemnity and medical expenditures that indicate the presence of claims rate moral hazard, we develop and estimate a model of this type of moral hazard. We find evidence of moral hazard effects that are roughly consistent with those found elsewhere in the literature. We also present the first direct estimates of the impact of benefits on the output of the firm. We find that an increase in real benefits significantly decreases the output of the firm. This is consistent with notion that higher benefits induce more jobless spells and increase production costs using skilled labor. We close by illustrating how these estimates can be used to provide information on the feasible benefit schedule, given the presence of moral hazard.     

The effects of pay regulation when agents are loss averse

This article analyses the effects of a regulatory cap on executive pay when the agent is loss averse. I use a principal–agent model with moral hazard in which a principal and an agent bargain over an incentive contract. I show that even a non-binding cap on the agent’s payments can have consequences for the bargained outcome and consequently for the effort the agent exerts.     

INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*

I study the effects of firing costs in an equilibrium model of the labor market with moral hazard. Layoff is an incentive device, modeled as termination of the optimal long‐term contract. When the economy’s stock of firms is fixed, firing costs could reduce layoffs and increase worker welfare. In the long run when firms are free to enter and exit the market, firing costs generate not only lower employment, longer unemployment durations, and lower aggregate output, but also lower welfare for both employed workers and new labor market entrants.     

Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models

Settings are considered in which optimal multiperiod contracts can have no memory, i.e., where second period payments do not need to depend on first period outcomes. If contracts have no memory, a repeated agency game can be played myopically; there are no gains to long-term relationships. Conditions on preferences for a no memory contract are presented. In an agency game with moral hazard on the act selection, preference separability and domain additivity imply the existence of a no memory contract. In a setting without moral hazard but with asymmetric information on the outcome, domain additivity implies no memory.