双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择

城市公用事业通常是自然垄断行业,在我国从计划经济向市场经济转轨的过程中,它还具有较强的行政垄断性。我国对自然垄断与行政垄断并存的公用事业的规制改革与西方国家有所不同,应区别两种垄断的不同性质,有针对性地确定改革目标。本文阐述了我国城市公用事业的自然垄断特性,分析了其行政垄断的根源及表现,对双重垄断下的城市公用事业规制目标选择提出了一些建议。     

The Cost Structure of Australian Telecommunications

Since 1991 Australian telecommunications has undergone substantial reform. To a large extent, the economic correctness of pro-competitive policy depends on the non-existence of natural monopoly technology. This paper provides estimates of the Australian telecommunications system cost structure, and tests for subadditivity from 1943 to 1991. Additivity of the cost function after 1945 rejects the natural monopoly hypothesis and supports recent government policy. Diminished natural monopoly characteristics suggest that co-ordination between firms through networking can achieve similar economies as internal co-ordination within a monopoly. This finding is important, given the trend towards network unbundling, and service provision through interconnection.     

Supportable cost functions for the multiproduct firm

A subadditive cost function is one in which a single firm can produce at lower cost than two or more firms and is taken to be a definition of natural monopoly. A supportable cost function is one in which prices exist which cover total costs and make entry unattractive to any rival firm. This paper studies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a natural monopoly to have a supportable cost function.     

Cost-Padding in Profit-Regulated Firms*

When entry into an industry is restricted, economic regulation of that industry is often directed at preventing existing firms from monopoly pricing behaviour. One form of such regulation is to set prices so as to control the level of profits earned by these firms. This paper briefly reviews the relevant economic literature and presents a model of the regulated firm in which such price-setting procedures provide an incentive to inflate costs above minimum levels. The welfare cost of this form of regulation can then exceed that occurring at the unconstrained monopoly outcome. The setting of air fares under the Two-Airline Policy and the regulation of natural gas in NSW are discussed in the context of this analysis.     

Organization, Management and Delegation in the French Water Industry

The water industry is largely a natural monopoly. Water distribution and sewerage services are characterized by networks and its natural monopoly derives from the established local networks of drinking water and sewers: they are capital intensive with sunk costs and increasing returns to scale. In France, local communities have a local requirement of providing public services under optimum conditions in terms of techniques and cost-effectiveness, and subject to respect different kind of standards in terms of water quality and level of services. They are responsible for producing and distributing drinking water, and collecting and treating wastewater. Furthermore, the French water utilities are required to be financially self-sufficient. Rate-setting varies across regions and local territories due to a variety of organizational features of services and availability of water resources. The management of these local public services can be public or private: local governments have the right, by the constitution, to delegate water service management to private companies which operate under the oversight of local municipal authorities. Today, nearly 80 per cent of the French population receive private distributed water. Different reasons are responsible for the poor performance and low productivity of most French public water utilities: technical and operational, commercial and financial, human and institutional, and environmental. Thus, many water public utilities have looked for alternative ways to provide water and sanitation services more efficiently, to improve both operational and investment efficiency, and to attract private finance. The purpose of this paper is to present the French organizational system of providing drinking water services, and collecting and treating wastewater services: legal aspects, contracts of delegation, and competition.     

网络产业收入监管激励问题研究

对具有自然垄断特性的网络产业,各国都对其收入实施严格的监管。而如何采取具有激励作用的收入监管,历来是经济学家研究的重点。对该方面进行的综述性研究表明,在不对称信息存在的情况下,采取基于成本的收入监管机制,监管机构不得不对低效率企业的产出进行扭曲,同时高效率企业获得信息租金;而采取基于价格的收入监管机制,在考虑了企业的努力程度时,低效率企业的努力程度将受到向下的扭曲,同时高效率企业获得信息租金。分析还表明,在基于价格的收入监管机制下,价格机制的选取和激励问题可以分开考虑。     

Moral hazard,Bertrand competition and natural monopoly

In the traditional model of Bertrand price competition among symmetric firms, there is no restriction on the number of firms that are active in equilibrium. A symmetric equilibrium exists with the different firms sharing the market. I show that this does not hold if we preserve the symmetry between firms but introduce moral hazard with a customer-sensitive probability of exposure; competition necessarily results in a natural monopoly with only one active firm. Sequential price announcements and early adoption are some equilibrium selection mechanisms that help to pin down the identity of the natural monopolist. The insights of the basic model are robust to many extensions.     

美英对公用事业的管制

本文简要地介绍了美国和英国对公用事业实行管制的由来、做法和经验。作者指出．由于生用事业的自然垄断性质及其与公共福利密切相关的缘故，使得美英两国在公用事业各部门建立了管制体系。实践表明，管制既有利于保障公众福利，又有利于改善公用事业的经营管理。他们的经验可为中国改革公用事业的管理体制提供有益的参考。     

强自然垄断定价理论与中国电价规制制度分析

强自然垄断行业由于其定价方面的两难困境 ,需要规制者对其产品定价进行规制以在厂商利润与社会福利之间进行权衡。边际成本定价原则并不适合于自然垄断厂商。本文在规制定价理论以及激励规制理论的基础上 ,对中国电力定价问题进行了分析 ,认为电价改革的第一步应在发电环节中引入竞争的基础上 ,对不同效率类型的电力厂商设计不同激励强度的定价机制 ,另外本文尝试着对不同技术效率的电力厂商列出了不同激励强度的价格规制方案菜单     

Is big better? On scale and scope economies in the Portuguese water sector

The ‘big is better’ idea has recently been challenged in network industries. Scale economies are considered finite so that for the individual utility an optimal scale of operations arises. A similar observation yields for scope economies as joint production is not predicted univocally anymore. In the water sector, scale economies and joint production are preferred. Nevertheless, several countries are restructuring the sector in order to improve the scale and scope of operations. This article intends to provide some insights into this matter. We analyze the Portuguese water market structure using non-parametric techniques with data from the year 2005. After surveying the literature on scale and scope economies, we discuss the peculiarities of the Portuguese water sector. The paper confirms the natural monopoly features. Although scope economies are absent, it highlights scale economies. The optimal scale of the utilities is located between 160,000 and 180,000 inhabitants. As such, the Portuguese water sector optimally counts 60 water utilities.     

Quality of service,efficiency and scale in network industries: an analysis of European electricity distribution

Quality of service (QoS) is of major economic significance in natural monopoly infrastructure industries. In this article, we present an efficiency analysis of electricity distribution networks from seven European countries. We apply the stochastic frontier analysis method to multi-output translog input distance function models to estimate cost efficiency and scale economies. We show that introducing the quality dimension into the analysis affects estimated efficiency significantly, especially that smaller utilities’ efficiency seems to decrease. Our results emphasize that QoS should be an integrated part of efficiency and economic analysis of regulated natural monopolies.     

Privatization and Utility Regulation in Developing Countries: the Lessons So Far

The privatization of utilities has grown in developing countries in recent years. Privatization transactions for the utilities sector have accounted for over a third of all sales in developing countries since 1988. The introduction of privatization has not necessarily meant more competition. Consequently, utility privatization has led in many cases to the creation of regulatory structures that aim to protect consumers from monopoly abuse and to provide incentives to firms to maintain efficiency. Case studies drawing on examples from the telecommunications, electricity and water sectors indicate that creating effective regulation and a competitive environment is a difficult and slow process. The cases have shown that regulation rather than privatization achieved the largest gains. Similarly, although the variety of regulatory measures that have been introduced have made a difference, the most tangible benefits, particularly to consumers, result from the establishment of competition. The case studies have shown that privatization has preceded the development of effective regulation and competition. The development of regulatory structures is constrained by the capacity of governments to enforce regulatory rules and monitor contracts. Fostering conditions that encourage competition and lessen anti-competitive behaviour by incumbents is a beneficial but slow process.     

中国城市公共事业外部制度创新研究

中国城市公共事业无论是在理论上还是在外部制度安排上,都仍游离于市场经济体制之外.如何通过理论创新与制度创新,打破政府及公共部门对城市公共事业的行政性垄断,将城市公共事业真正融入到市场经济体制之中,改善城市公共事业投资及生产经营的外部制度环境,提高城市公共事业经营效率,仍是理论研究和制度实践亟待解决的重要课题.     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

Entry, Prices, and Investment in Regulated Industries

The paper studies how the optimal regulatory policy is affected by the possibility of unregulated firms entering the market. In such cases, the regulator may prefer to limit price and cost reductions in the regulated incumbent. The extent to which this happens is shown to depend on the extent of the regulator's commitment: if it commits to a chosen policy, then the market outcome following entry is less competitive than it would be without commitment: price and production costs are both higher. We also show that, unlike the natural monopoly case, incentives for cost reducing investment are stronger when the regulatory policy has a short regulatory interval.     

Electric power distribution: economies of scale,mergers, and restructuring

Electricity distribution is generally viewed as a natural monopoly and therefore as having the least potential for the kinds of reforms that have swept the electric power sector in many countries. Mergers among distribution companies and efforts at retail competition have nonetheless altered the operation of the distribution stage. This research into US electric utilities uses a much larger and less selective data base than previously available to examine the scale properties of distribution with respect to output, distance, and customer numbers, and for different functions within distribution. It finds significant economies at low output levels, holding system size and customer density constant, but the cost gradient is otherwise modest. It also finds that geographic size and customer numbers are quite important and that economies are significantly stronger for the infrastructure or ‘wires’ business than for the marketing function performed by distribution utilities. These results lend credence to efforts at retail competition that separates these functions, but cast doubt on the benefits of mergers between distribution systems.     

管制范围的经济分析——基于自然垄断性维度的思考

经济学理论认为自然垄断性是政府管制的重要原因,从新制度经济学角度上看,规模经济和资产专用性才是自然垄断性的深层次原因。而现代经济学理论进一步发展了自然垄断性的概念,认为自然垄断性的决定因素是成本弱增性,从而改变了对自然垄断边界的认识,同时也带来了对管制范围和管制方式认识上的变化。     

寡占市场下的广告成因探究

依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。     

Why governments sell public firms: The Spanish case

This paper compares the goals that the successive Spanish governments have actually pursued (as deduced from the set of privatizations carried out over the last fifteen years) with the standard hypotheses used in economic literature to explain privatization in general. The results show that the cash-collecting goal appears as the relevant explanatory hypotheses for most of the privatizations carried out. Also, all of the state-owned firms that operated under monopoly conditions have actually been privatized but retain, at least partially, their monopoly position (they involve activities where natural monopoly features are present). This has led to establishing new regulatory rules (reregulation) and that privatization, per se, has not resulted in substantial improvements in competition.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 1999, Montreal, Canada.     

传统自然垄断理论与现代自然垄断理论的比较及其启示

自然垄断产业具有特殊性质,在国民经济中具有举足轻重的作用。传统自然垄断理论和现代自然垄断理论对自然垄断产业有着不同的看法,两者判断自然垄断的标准分别是规模经济和成本弱增性。自然垄断理论的演进过程表明自然垄断产业的运作方式已经发生了改变。为了适应中国自然垄断产业的进一步发展,政府必须转变职能并实行政企分开,积极引入民间资本以推动自然垄断行业发展。