Political Economy of Industrial Development in Vietnam’s Telecommunications Industry: A Rent Management Analysis

This article contributes to the current debate in economics on the uses and benefits of rents and rent seeking. On the one hand, public choice and neoliberal scholars highlight the redistributive and damaging aspects of rent seeking, thus rendering the policy suggestion to completely eradicate rents and rent seeking in an economy. On the other hand, institutional and development economists point out the inherent theoretical inconsistencies shown in the earlier models, and suggest that certain types of rent and rent seeking could be growth-enhancing. Using the Developmental Rent Management Analysis, this article assesses the industrial development of the telecommunications industry in Vietnam using two case studies. Qualitative research points out a number of rent management factors contributing both to the industry’s failure before the early 2000s and its subsequent success thereafter. The successful development of the telecommunications industry was fundamentally based on (i) favorable political support for rent creation, (ii) an effective structure of rent allocation and implementation, and (iii) credible incentives and pressures that encouraged local firms’ industrial upgrading. The Vietnamese experience suggests that rents can be developmental, conceivably side-by-side with rent seeking, cronyism and corruption.     

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff‐rate Import Quotas**

This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays.     

Enduring rents

Rent seeking is often studied with reference to a contemporaneous rent evaluated at a point in time. We study the social cost of rent seeking when rents endure over time, but may have to be re-contested because of imperfect rent protection, or may disappear because of deregulation. The present value of a contested rent measures the social cost of rent seeking, irrespective of imperfect rent protection and the prospect of deregulation. Rent seeking is discouraged by the inability of governments to commit to protect rents and by their inability to commit to rent-generating regulations and policies. Moreover, lasting deregulation can preempt a substantial fraction of the potential rent seeking cost.     

RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

Public officials often have little incentive to spend time and effort proposing policies that benefit others. When, however, some public policies generate rents to these officials, rent seeking in politics can motivate them to provide public goods. We consider the motivational effects of rent seeking on (i) policy, (ii) the the role of agenda-setting in social choice theory, (iii) the effects of graft and corruption in government, and (iv) the validity of cost-benefit analysis.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY PRICES AND RENTS

This paper develops a theoretical model of price and rent determination in the commercial property market. Prices and rents are assumed to adjust to ensure market clearing. A series of theoretical relationships are derived between prices and rents and a number of exogenous variables. These are then subjected to empirical testing for three types of property: industrial property, shops and offices. The results indicate employment is an important influence on price, especially for industrial property. In most cases, price and rent are also found to be sensitive to interest rates and residential property values.     

Bargaining with Rent Seekers

Consider a rent‐seeking game, which has government bargain with firms over dividing the rents. In period 1, each firm can invest to increase the probability that the rent will appear. In period 2, the parties bargain. In equilibrium, though firms will invest more than the socially optimal level, rent‐seeking expenditures may be low. Firms that collude to restrict investment maximize joint profits by investing at a positive, non‐infinitesimal level, and restrict investment even if the cost of rent‐seeking effort is zero.     

Regime switching and the (in)stability of the price–rent relationship: evidence from the US

Present value models of house prices assert that in the absence of self-fulfilling bubbles, a house price is equal to the present discount value of all future rents, which implies a linear relationship between house price and rent, and hence a stable price-to-rent ratio. Using a Markov switching error correction model, we re-examine this relationship in the US housing market and find two distinctive regimes: one with a long-run relation between house price and rent predicted by the present value models and the other in which the relation is nonlinear. Furthermore, we find evidence that deviations of house prices from the present value models’ predictions are caused by the overreaction of house prices to movements in rents rather than speculative bubbles attributable to extraneous factors.     

Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization

Popular uprisings in autocracies seldom lead to democratic regimes. We propose a model that helps explain how rents from power encourage popular revolts. We study why citizens would follow a dissident group seeking regime change, if rents from change accrue only to the group. Our model predicts that higher rents may increase the incidence of public mobilization because rents facilitate coordination. The results suggest that cohesive dissident groups may spur seemingly spontaneous mass mobilizations, even when the mass public know that the dissident group is driven by greed rather than a genuine desire to halt incumbent’s rent‐seeking activities.     

The social cost of rent seeking in Europe

Direct measurement of the social cost of rent seeking is impeded by non-observable and non-reported activities. We use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to compute the social cost of rent seeking in Europe. Our estimate is based on competition among interest groups for privileges provided by governments, including income transfers, subsidies, and preferential tax treatment. The model, which is calibrated to the euro area as a whole and also to individual euro member countries for 1980–2003, performs well vis-à-vis the data. We find that significant proportions of GDP are extracted as rents available to be sought by rent seekers.     

Democracy,rent seeking,public spending and growth

Does democratization imply faster growth, less corruption and less inefficiency? Past studies yield ambiguous results on the effects of democracy on economic performance and growth. We develop a simple two-sector endogenous growth model that shows both very young and mature democracies grow faster than countries in mid stages of democratization, producing a ‘U’ effect. This effect results from the pattern of rent seeking as it diverts from the provision of public goods. Rent-seekers act as monopolistic competitors. Initially, more democracy increases their number, raising aggregate rents. However, rents per rent-seeker fall with the number of rent seekers. Due to this crowding effect and the increased competition among rent seekers, aggregate rents fall in mature democracies. Thus, rents show an ‘inverted-U’ effect in relation to democracy. We find fairly robust supportive evidence for the latter.     

Where are the rent seekers?

In a remarkably simple and yet one of the most original and insightful observations of 20th century economics, Gordon Tullock pointed out that there are efficiency losses when public policies and political behavior create contestable rents. Tullock also observed that social losses from contesting rents appeared smaller than might be expected, so raising the question ‘where are the rent seekers?’ Tullock proposed that political accountability and ‘free-riding’ incentives in interest groups limit social losses from rent seeking. We affirm Tullock’s explanations, which apply differently under different political institutions. We compare Tullock with Gary Becker, who focused on deadweight losses from redistribution and concluded, in contrast to Tullock, that political redistribution is efficient. The comparison with Becker highlights the significance of the recognition of Tullock’s concept of rent seeking. By excluding rent-seeking losses from the social costs of redistribution, Becker could arrive at a conclusion more favorable than Tullock to an ideology that sees merit in extensive redistribution. Tullock’s model, although more encompassing of actual social costs of redistribution, would have been less welcome in the social democratic welfare state.     

瑞士个人产权住宅房屋低拥有率形成机制的深入研究

瑞士作为一个人均收入较高的发达国家,但国民购房的意识却非常淡漠,大部分人宁愿选择以租赁的方式解决居住问题。瑞士人拥有产权房屋的比例在西欧发达国家中所占比例最少,只占所有国民的34%,其中美国为62.5%,法国45%,本文通过对分布在瑞士5个州的1998户居民的抽样调查数据分析来探求该现象的合理解释。通过对众多相关要素的分析来对个人住房拥有率进行剖析,其中,特别对拥有和租赁的相对成本进行了重点研究,因为它与房屋售价、租赁价格与拥有后的使用成本密切相关,在上述影响因素中,产权人的使用成本与所得税政策、预期房屋价格上涨息息相关。本文也综合权衡了按揭贷款现行标准、租赁控制和各种政策对租赁房屋供给量所产生的影响,通过对税收、按揭标准、价格水平等因素进行一系列分析,估算出这些变量对房产拥有率的影响程度。本文得出以下结论:高房价——相对于租金对家庭收入来说是导致瑞士国民拥有住房比例较低的最重要影响因素。     

PUBLIC GOODS,RENT DISSIPATION,AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION*

The early literature on rent seeking presumed that total expenditures in the rent-seeking process would equal the value of a contested prize. Subsequent analysis has shown, however, that a number of circumstances give rise to underdissipation of the contested rent—imperfectly discriminating contests, risk-aversion, or where individuals' valuations of the prize are not identical. This paper shows how underdissipation is associated with the public-good character of contested rents. In particular, total rent dissipation is demonstrated to be less than the average stake of the individual contenders. In addition to assessing rent dissipation in contests for public-good allocations, the paper also endogenizes the value of the prize by placing the rent-seeking contest in a setting of candidate competition.     

Rent‐Sharing and Workers' Bargaining Power: An Empirical Cross‐Country/ Cross‐Industry Panel Analysis

In this paper, we study how rents are shared between capital and labour, using industry‐level panel data for 19 OECD countries from 1988 through to 2007. The first step is an explanation of the rent‐creation process. We provide evidence of a significant impact of regulation on value‐added prices at the industry level relative to the value‐added price for the overall economy (rent). In the second step, we dissect the value‐added sharing process. By running ordinary least‐squares and instrumental variables estimations, we obtain results that confirm the Blanchard–Giavazzi prediction: the impact of rents on the capital share depends on workers' bargaining power.     

Housing rent dynamics in Italy

In this paper we focus on tenant rents in Italy and compare results from several methods for the rent dynamic estimation. We first document the sources of data available and then introduce quality adjusted techniques, which enable us to separate the price variation due to qualitative changes in housing attributes from pure price changes. Finally, we compare these measures with unconditional and matched-type price indices derived from microdata. Over the period 1998–2006, we estimate a cumulative rent increase ranging between 40 and 80%. The upper bound refers to the average dynamic for a subset of flats entering the market in a given period. Our hedonic estimates point to an average rent increase of approximately 40%, almost 20 percentage points above the one recorded by the rent component of the Italian consumer price index. A simple calibration model suggests that only part of the difference between our estimates and the official ones is due to survey non-response.     

Principles and Practice of Resource Rent Taxation

The Henry Review placed the taxation of rents from mines back on the national policy agenda. Mineral rent is potentially a source of neutral taxation. However, the various means of taxing resource rents in practice either fall short of the ideal of neutrality or collect for the revenue only a small proportion of the mineral rent. This article discusses the six principle instruments for taxing resource projects. It evaluates these forms of taxation in relation to stability, neutrality and government revenue maximisation. It suggests a combination of instruments that is likely to establish a good balance among objectives.     

Policies to Reduce Rent Seeking in Controlled Markets

Abstract

We analyze the effects of various policies to reduce rent seeking in the controlled market in which buyers have heterogeneous valuation regarding the coveted good. The good is allocated according to the buyer-specific signal (‘test score’), which is determined by the quantity of wasteful ‘rent seeking’ exerted by the buyer. We consider three common forms of market control: minimum qualification score, quota, and price ceiling. The potential buyers with higher valuations are more likely to receive the good in equilibrium, while they exert more rent-seeking efforts. Marginally relaxing market control does not necessarily decrease the aggregated amount of rent-seeking activities, and the effectiveness of policy measures usually depends on the current degree of competitiveness in the market.     

Regulatory Entry Barriers,Rent Shifting and the Home Market Effect

This paper introduces regulatory entry barriers in a model of the home market effect. The entry barriers generate local rents that have unexpected but significant implications. First, the home market effect is magnified. Second, when countries are sufficiently unequal in size and rents are sufficiently large, symmetric reductions in trade costs reduce welfare in the small country. Third, entry barriers increase the large country's market size and, surprisingly, can increase its welfare. Fourth, a unilateral increase in trade protection shifts foreign rents to the home country. This rent‐shifting effect amplifies the standard production relocation motive for trade policy intervention.     

DO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent‐seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent‐seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. (JEL D31, G30, H21)     

Regional Impact of the German Rent Brake

New rental contracts have risen dramatically in many German places in recent years due to strong influxes and sluggish construction activity. The rent brake should put a stop to this development so that housing in prospering cities remains affordable for people on normal and low incomes. Although initial successes were attested to the rent brake, empirical findings are increasing, according to which the rent brake is not having the desired effect. This also applies to the findings determined here: the results of a difference‐in‐difference estimation show that the rent brake has reduced rents on offer in Hamburg, Berlin and Munich by up to 5%, while no effects are observed in Cologne and Düsseldorf. Nevertheless, the effects are lagging behind the expected effects almost everywhere. The results illustrate once again an implementation deficit and show that no general statements on the effectiveness of the rent brake are currently permissible. However, the rent brake is certainly having a price effect in some regions, even if not to the intended extent.