我国大宗商品出口需求价格弹性与最优出口关税——以稀土为例

出口税作为最常用的一种出口限制措施近来在各国贸易政策中屡见不鲜。现有文献对依据"勒纳对称定理"得到的最优关税结论存有异议。文章首先研究了大国作为唯一出口国情况下最优出口关税的决定,认为已有文献关于最优出口税结果不同的根源在于假设差异所致,然后,分析了非唯一出口国情况下大国最优出口关税的决定,最优出口关税和出口商品的需求价格弹性、本国出口所占世界市场份额和其他出口国的供给弹性有关,最后,以稀土为例,采用面板数据模型测算了我国稀土出口的需求价格弹性和需求收入弹性,并得到了我国稀土出口的最优关税。     

我国出口退税政策的贸易与经济效应研究——基于局部均衡模型的分析

通过将出口退税政策变量纳入局部均衡COMPAS模型,从产业层面上分析出口退税政策如何影响进出口行业的产出、贸易、收益等经济指标,并利用中国纺织服装品对美国出口贸易的有关数据,实证模拟中国出口退税政策变化对中美两国纺织业的生产、贸易和收入的影响。结果表明:平均而言,出口退税率每提高1个百分点,中国纺织品出口美国的价格将大约下降0.93%,而中国纺织品对美国出口量将增加2.86%左右,全行业收入大约增加1.83%;而美国纺织行业的产出减少1.9%,全行业收入减少2.2%。     

再议我国对美出口与美国GDP增长的相关性——基于协整分析和Granger因果检验

针对高运胜(2004)的病态计量模型,本文通过协整分析认为:我国对美出口与美国GDP增长率之间不存在长期均衡关系,但是我国对美出口与美国GDP之间存在一个正相关的长期均衡关系,美国经济发展有利于我国扩大出口。另一个结论是:美国GDP每增加1美元,我国对美出口增加量是减少的,我国对美出口收入弹性大于0小于1。后面的结论支持了高运胜的分析:我国对美出口产品中劳动密集型产品占有较大比重,需求弹性相对较低。Granger因果关系检验表明:美国GDP是我国对美出口的Granger原因,我国对美出口却不是美国GDP的Granger原因,我国对美出口对美国经济产生不了威胁。通过进一步分析,提出了几个政策建议。     

US–Brazilian cotton policies

Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three-country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.     

出口退税政策的节能减排效应研究

调整出口退税已成为遏制高能耗、高排放产品出口的重要措施,研究首先从理论上分析了出口退税的节能减排效应,提出下调出口退税率,将降低单位产值能耗成本的假设,接下来又通过我国钢铁行业出口能源强度与出口退税率的协整分析来实证验证,结果表明:出口额能耗与出口退税率间存在长期协整关系,且出口退税率是出口额能耗变化的格兰杰原因;出口退税率调整对出口额能耗影响的长期弹性为0.47,短期弹性为0.07,即出口退税率的变化对出口额能耗的影响在短期内不明显,但具有长期深远的影响;变结构协整分析还表明,差别退税政策下,当退税率下调时,出口退税率变化对出口额能耗的影响更大。     

Habit,prisoner's dilemma and Americans’ welfare cost of working much more than Europeans

Europeans work much less than Americans. Some studies claim this is due to Europe's high taxes and that Europeans would gain by adopting US tax rates and work time. I argue that Americans would gain by reducing work time to Europe's level. Due to historical experience, Europe is able to internalise work‐time‐related negative externalities by enacting restrictive work‐time policies, while the United States is not, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma equilibrium and “overworking trap.” A simple model and work‐time data are used to derive the US welfare gain from reducing work time to Europe's level. Findings are as follows: (i) parameter values are consistent with experimental results on own vs. other people's income value; (ii) the welfare gain's present value is between 80 and 120% of annual welfare; and (iii) a European policy that reduces work time excessively remains beneficial if the reduction is less than twice the optimal one.     

国际贸易中出口关税政策调整的效应分析——以俄罗斯提高原木出口关税为例

贸易大国出口关税政策的调整具有福利效应、收入效应和需求弹性效应。本文以俄罗斯原木出口关税政策调整为例,利用经济学理论分析了国际贸易中的准垄断效应和需求弯曲效应,拓展了对国际贸易中效应问题的认识。     

Time consistent export quotas in an oligopolistic world market

We investigate the strategic behavior between exporting countries that face endogenous terms of trade on the world market. In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal export quota is not time consistent as the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign import demand curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity. However, we show that the exporters’ inability to irrevocably commit to their quota may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution. If exporters can sell forward a proportion of their exports before production decisions are made, they will do so even though, in equilibrium, it may decrease welfare compared to a situation in which forward markets do not exist. Moreover, the equilibrium with forward markets is welfare inferior to the commitment equilibrium for exporters.     

我国纺织服装出口限制政策选择悖论及经济学解释

本文首先从理论上分析比较了三类纺织品出口限制政策——出口关税、出口配额和出口行业生产税的福利效应。在此基础上,结合我国纺织品出口限制政策的选择,可以发现我国政府放弃的是总体福利损失相对较小的出口关税措施;最终采用的是对社会整体福利损失可能最大的出口配额政策,而仅对生产有扭曲作用、且福利损失最小的出口行业生产税措施并没有出台。本文对我国这一政策选择"悖论"给出了初步的经济学解释。     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.     

Political economy of the US–Mexican tomato trade agreement

We develop a political economy model to analyse the US–Mexican tomato trade agreement by treating the minimum import price as a negotiated settlement. We incorporate the special characteristics of the US–Mexican tomato dispute, namely trade among large countries, the role of competing fresh and processed tomato lobbies, quota revenues accruing to Mexican producers, bargaining for a minimum import price rather than a tariff, and the role of the Canadian tomato market. We show the importance of the size of the lobby group's supply, the weight elected officials' place on national welfare, and the elasticities of export supply and import demand in determining the optimal price wedge. For the United States, larger fresh tomato or cherry–grape tomato supply intensifies the degree of protection awarded to US growers, while US processors work to mitigate this effect. From Mexico's perspective, larger Mexican fresh or cherry–grape output induces a push towards free trade due to the agreement's depressing effect on Mexican prices, while Mexican processors and quota revenues exacerbate the price wedge.     

Welfare and trade elasticity with multinational production

We explore welfare properties in a firm heterogeneity model with multinational production and export. The presence of multinational production plays a crucial role in delivering a partial trade elasticity of total sales by exporters and affiliates that is no longer constant, and depends on both supply and demand parameters. We then analyse counterfactual scenarios. Multinational production with intra-firm trade increases welfare gains by up to 4% with respect to a model with only export and no truncation. Multinational production à la Helpman et al. (American Economic Review, 2004, 94 , 300) generates the largest welfare gains from liberalisation.     

Trade policy under firm-level heterogeneity in a small economy

We explore the effect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model of firm-level heterogeneity and product differentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and the demand schedules for its exports (a “small economy”). We first establish that welfare can be decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tariff allows our small economy to deal with two distortions that we identify and thereby reach its first-best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint effect on the other three terms (terms of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tariff improves welfare in spite of the fact that productivity falls.     

Impact of Trade on Canada's Employment,Skill and Wage Structure

Using newly constructed data for 88 Canadian industries (including primary, manufacturing and services), for 15 years (1992–2007), we analyse the impact of trade and technological change on labour demand, skill structure, wage premiums and welfare in Canada. Results show that export growth has no impact, whereas import growth reduces employment growth. But contrary to popular belief, Canada's job loss due to imports has been very small, only about 6,000 persons annually. China's negative impacts are more pronounced in industries where the share of information and communication technology (ICT) capital is rising fast and among low R&D intensive industries. In terms of skill change, ICT use and real exchange rate appreciation are biased towards high skill workers. Imports from the United States and China are skill‐neutral, whereas imports from Mexico are skill‐upgrading. Overall, neither export nor import growth has an impact on the wage rate. However, had there been no imports from China, the annual wage growth rate of high skill manufacturing workers would have been 0.6 per cent higher. Between 1992 and 2007, there was an annual net gain from the rise in imports at about 0.4 per cent of GDP, in addition to the gains obtained from 1992 import levels vis‐à‐vis autarky.     

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing generalized Nash bargaining. We show that (i) choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms when goods are substitutes (complements), which leads Pareto superior regardless of the nature of goods under the optimal trade policies; (ii) irrespective of rival’s competition mode, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition and an export tax under Bertrand competition; and (iii) trade liberalization may give rise to changes of competition mode and increase of social welfare.     

Strategic trade policy and union-firm bargaining agenda

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between duopolistic firms and unions in an open economy with strategic trade policy. It is shown that, in contrast with the case of the absence of export tax/subsidy, a right-to-manage (RTM) arrangement always emerges endogenously as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in agreement between parties. Moreover, such an arrangement may be also Pareto-optimal in both exporting countries in the sense that profits, workers' welfare (provided that union's power is sufficiently high) and social welfare as a whole are higher than the efficient bargaining (EB) arrangement. Moreover, since the government of the country in which there is EB (while in the other country the alternative agenda RTM is used) levies a tax on export, then the conventional result that under quantity competition it is always optimal for exporting countries to subsidise exports may be reversed.     

China's exports,export tax rebates and exchange rate policy

This paper examines the relationship between China's exports, export tax rebates and exchange rate policy. It offers an explanation for why China's exports continued to rise under RMB real appreciations during the Asian financial crisis. Based on a traditional export demand model, we test our hypothesis that the counteracting effects of China's export tax rebate policy have diminished the effectiveness of real exchange rates in facilitating the resolution of trade imbalances under the current pegged exchange rate regime. We find evidence that RMB real appreciations during the crisis negatively affected China's exports, but the negative effects were mitigated by the positive effects of export tax rebates. We also find evidence of a long‐run relationship between China's exports and the other explanatory variables. The empirical evidence suggests that under the pegged exchange rate regime with limited adjustments, real exchange rate movements alone cannot resolve China's external imbalances. The policy implication of this study is that China needs to redirect its decades‐long export‐oriented development strategy to one that emphasises domestic demand‐oriented development and to replace the current pegged exchange rate regime with a market‐oriented more flexible exchange rate regime.     

Putting Canada in the penalty box: Trade and welfare effects of eliminating North American Free Trade Agreement

Three years ago, very few economists would have imagined that one of the newest and fastest growing research areas in international trade is the use of quantitative trade models to estimate the economic welfare losses from dissolutions of major countries' economic integration agreements (EIAs). In 2016, "Brexit" was passed in a UK referendum. Moreover, in 2019, the existence of the entire North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is at risk if the US withdraws—a threat President Trump has made if the proposed US–Mexico–Canada Agreement is not passed by the US Congress. We use state‐of‐the‐art econometric methodology to estimate the partial (average treatment) effects on international trade flows of the six major types of EIAs. Armed with precise estimates of the average treatment effect for a free trade agreement, we examine the general equilibrium trade and welfare effects of the elimination of NAFTA (and for robustness US withdrawal only). Although all the member countries' standards of living fall, surprisingly the smallest economy, Mexico, is not the biggest loser; Canada is the biggest loser. Canada's welfare (per capita income) loss of 2.11% is nearly two times that of Mexico's loss of 1.15% and is nearly eight times the US' loss of 0.27%. The simulations will illustrate the important influence of trade costs—international and intranational—in contributing to the gains (or losses) from an EIA's formation (or elimination).     

我国转型期GDP的含义:一种新的视角

GDP包括消费、投资、政府支出和净出口四项内容,也可以将其分成私人支出和政府支出,是私人选择和公共选择的总和。政府支出反映了居民总体的意愿选择,因此,也就包含了公众对环境保护和社会公平等方面的要求。对我国转型期经济而言,进一步深化经济体制改革,拓宽居民表达意愿的途径,可以使GDP更好地体现居民的意愿选择,从而提高整体福利水平。