Market Power in Laboratory Emission Permit Markets

Many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive. When markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics, however, shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches? This paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits. Results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms,strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models,undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer. Whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm, marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets. Final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy, indicating that policy-makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances.     

Promotion of Market Access for Renewable Energy in the Nordic Power Markets

This study investigates how renewable targets for the Nordic power market might be achieved at the lowest costs. The instruments investigated are fixed Feed-In Tariff, economically sound premium based Feed-In Tariff and shadow-prices for CO₂ emissions. We utilize a Real-Time Price based simulation model in the analysis. We show that even with strong assumptions regarding the Emission Permit Price the targeted level of wind power is not reached without Feed-In Tariffs. Emission Trading produces the lowest total emissions but with the highest total costs. From the studied instruments the most cost-efficient way to reach the targets for wind energy market shares is the premium based Feed-In Tariff. This tariff is also the most cost-efficient way to reduce CO₂ emissions.     

Market Power,Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets

Market power in permit markets has been examined in some detail following the seminal work of Hahn (Q J Econ 99(4):753–765, 1984), but the effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both product and permit market has not been fully addressed. I show that in this case, the threshold of free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market, and that overall efficiency cannot be achieved by means of permit allocation alone. In addition to being of general economic interest, this issue is relevant in the context of the EU ETS. I find that the largest German, UK and Nordpool power generators received free allowances in excess of the derived threshold. Conditional on having price-setting power in both the electricity and permit markets, these firms would have found it profitable to manipulate the permit price upwards despite being net permit buyers.     

Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.     

On the Endogeneity of the Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier

The endogeneity of the efficient frontier in the mean-variance model of portfolio selection is commonly obscured in the portfolio selection literature and in widely used textbooks. The authors demonstrate this endogeneity and discuss the impact of parameter changes on the mean-variance efficient frontier and on the beta coefficients of individual assets.     

The Zonal and Seasonal CO2 Marginal Emissions Factors for the Italian Power Market

Environmental and Resource Economics - This paper estimates the seasonal and zonal $${\mathrm{CO}}_{2}$$ marginal emissions factors (MEFs) from electricity production in the Italian electricity...     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.     

Aggregation and the Endogeneity Problem

This paper investigates the combined effects of the aggregation and endogeneity problems when there exists a correlation between explanatory variables and the error term in the micro equation. Comparing OLS estimates on the basis of an asymptotic-square-bias criterion, the analysis indicates that aggregate equations are in general subject to less endogeneity due to the synchronization effect. The trade-off between aggregation and endogeneity biases is examined and the conditions under which the aggregate equation is superior to the micro equation are derived in terms of the relative sizes of parameters. [210]     

Low-Wage Labor Markets and the Power of Suggestion

The paper argues that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a focal point which facilities tacit collusion by low-wage employers, effectively pulling down wages of the lowest-paid workers. This can explain the puzzle as to why the minimum wage does not reduce employment, as predicted by the traditional economic theory. A simple game-theoretic argument explains when collusion emerges. The hypothesis is tested using the 1990–2002 CPS data on service occupation workers. The results suggest that during this period, on average 19.3%, and as much as 31% of service occupation workers, who earned minimum wage or less, could had been affected by collusive wage-setting.     

电力行业管制改革与市场风险防范

为了提高电力行业的生产效率，许多国家对电力行业进行管制改革和重组，以引入市场和竞争机制，然而由于电力生产的特殊性，电力市场化改革蕴藏着巨大的风险。本文以2000-2001年加州电力危机为例，对电力管制改革所引发的市场风险进行分析，并就我国的电力改革提出了风险防范建议。     

An Experimental Investigation of Hard and Soft Price Ceilings in Emissions Permit Markets

Tradable emissions permits have been implemented to control pollution levels in various markets and represent a major component of legislative efforts to control greenhouse gas emissions. Because permits are supplied for a fixed level of pollution, allowing the market for permits to determine the price, price control mechanisms may be needed to protect firms from price spikes caused by fluctuations in the demand for permits. We test permit markets in an experimental laboratory setting to determine the effectiveness of several price control mechanisms, with special attention on the soft price ceiling. We focus on a static setting similar to some of the earliest experimental work focused on price ceilings. Results indicate that both permit supply adjustments and price ceilings (hard ceilings) effectively limit elevated prices in this setting. By contrast, reserve auctions to implement soft ceilings do not consistently control prices, especially when a minimum reserve permit price is applied. Furthermore, the grandfathering of permits allows permit sellers to realize significant welfare gains at the expense of buyers under a soft ceiling policy. Our results thus highlight several advantages of hard ceilings for controlling short term price increases.     

On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or decreasing per-firm output; and (ii) increasing industry price (and decreasing per firm output.) In both cases, per-firm profits are decreasing.
The analysis relies crucially on lattice-theoretic methods and yields general, unambiguous and easily interpretable conclusions of a global nature. As a byproduct of independent interest, new insight into the existence of Cournot equilibrium is developed.     

试论证券市场中的企业价值评估

随着企业外部经营环境的变化,企业绩效目标已从单纯的追求利润向关注企业全面发展,提高企业价值的方向转变。在此背景下,企业未来价值的管理能力和创造能力已日益成为吸引投资者(包括战略投资者)参与投资的主要因素。因此,对外部投资者来说,围绕被投资企业的价值创造能力,全面科学地评估被投资企业的真正价值,才能确保投入资金的安全和预期投资收益的实现。资产评估,特别是企业价值评估是企业进行资本运营的重要基础工具,大力发展企业价值评估,是当前资本市场发展的迫切需要,也是我国资产评估行业自我提升的内在需求。资本市场的发展对企业价值评估提出了更高要求,资产评估行业要积极应对资本市场发展的挑战,企业界应在资本运营中用好企业价值评估这一基本工具。鉴于上述的背景,文章对目前企业价值的评估的方法及所存在的问题进行了探讨。     

论市场经济条件下的权力腐败及其治理

市场经济条件下权力腐败现象产生,有其特定的历史条件,认真研究市场经济条件下权力腐败的表现、产生条件,相应地采取反腐倡廉措施,对于惩治权力腐败,保持社会稳定,促进市场经济的健康发展,具有重要意义。一、市场经济条件下权力腐败的特点与表现１、干部任免上的买官卖官。这是权力不正当介入市场的腐败现象,也是破坏最严重、人民群众反映最为强烈的腐败现象。持有“当官不发财,请我都不来;当官不收钱,退了没本钱”的歪论的原福建政和县委书记丁仰宁,任职不到３年,受贿６８起,收受７２人所送的钱物,共计人民币５０万元,美金…     

噪声交易与市场质量

本文通过行业、规模、负债和成长能力的配对,建立起32家上证50成份股上市公司的控制样本,然后运用合理的计量方法,首次估计出符合我国股市微观结构的噪声交易高频时间序列,在此基础上深入分析噪声交易与信息不对称、流动性、波动性和有效性等市场质量指标之间的经验关系,发现:我国股市私人信息具有较高的相关性和持久性;噪声交易提高了交投活跃程度,同时却扩大了执行成本和价格波动幅度;噪声交易与信息不对称的关系不大;噪声交易使实际价差缩小,进而削弱了市场有效性。由此可见,噪声交易是一把"双刃剑",只有继续改革价格形成机制、增强价值投资力量、引导长期资金入市、完善信息披露制度并强化交易监控,才能进一步提高我国股市的质量。     

Do Consumers Purchase Too Much Health Insurance? The Role of Market Power in Health‐Care Markets

Several authors have suggested that consumers purchase too much health insurance in private markets. We readdress this issue within a model that combines excess health‐care demand due to health insurance with market power due to monopolistic production of health‐care services. We evaluate the market equilibrium in terms of consumer welfare and social welfare. The consumer welfare criterion suggests that in the market equilibrium consumers in fact purchase too much health insurance coverage. The social welfare criterion, in contrast, suggests that because profits of the health‐care industry are properly accounted for, consumers should purchase more insurance coverage than they choose to do in the market equilibrium.     

Investor Overconfidence in Experimental Asset Markets across Market States

Abstract

This study explores how individual overconfidence adjusts after receiving extreme feedback that either supports or contradicts previous decision-making when buying or selling stocks. We find that highly contradicting feedback causes overconfidence to vanish as confidence declines sharply while supportive signals cause overconfidence to increase. Further evidence suggests that strong feedback impulses are associated with higher investor disagreement, supporting prior hypotheses that investors interpret such impulses differently. We also find that methodologies that measure overconfidence in prediction tasks systematically overstate confidence scores as respondents tend to fail to internalize stated confidence intervals appropriately.     

On the Benefits From Rigid Labour Markets: Norms, Market Failures, and Social Insurance

The common view that far-reaching labour market deregulation is the only remedy for high European unemployment is too simplistic. First, the evidence suggests that deeply rooted social customs are an important cause of wage rigidity, going beyond the legal constraints emphasised in the political debate. Second, in a second-best setting, a compressed wage structure may generate an efficiency gain. Finally, based on simple plots of the relation between labour market institutions and openness in OECD countries, I conclude that the globalisation of economic activity may lead to increased demand for various labour market rigidities.