Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

The dark side of institutional intermediaries: Junior stock exchanges and entrepreneurship

Research Summary : Our study shows how institutional intermediaries established to foster the creation of new firms might hinder new firm growth instead. We show that intermediaries can reduce new firm growth rates due to institutional conflict. To analyze this idea, we examine the setting of junior stock exchanges, which are commonly formed to facilitate entrepreneurial growth. The introduction of these exchanges focused investment into new technology firms, reduced investment in other sectors, and led to diminishing new firm growth. Our findings demonstrate how institutional conflict causes unintended effects and reveals the complexity of influencing entrepreneurship with institutional intermediaries. Managerial Summary : Investors and entrepreneurs face uncertainty when deciding what firms to start and fund. We show that an intermediation effort to make entry easier for entrepreneurs increases the uncertainty that entrepreneurs and investors face. For investors, the enthusiasm for technology firms engendered by the new exchange can motivate investment in marginal firms to maintain as desired deal flow. However, lower firm growth and less liquidity in the future is likely. For entrepreneurs, our results indicate that it is more challenging to manage technology firm growth as well as there is potential opportunity to investigate other industries. Finally, for policy‐makers and supporters of the new exchanges, our results imply that investment flows are altered as intended, but unless listing standards remain high, the virtuous cycle of investment upon which a healthy entrepreneurial climate rests may be disrupted, muting the intended effects of the new exchange.     

R&D investment dynamics in agglomerations under weak appropriability regimes: Evidence from Indian R&D labs

What are the dynamics of R&D investment when firms agglomerate in environments with weak intellectual property rights protection? Specifically, do foreign and domestic firms present equal opportunities for free riding by domestic firms in such environments? We examine the impact on local firms' R&D investment from knowledge spillovers originating from co‐located foreign and domestic firms within and across industries. Building on fieldwork in India, we predict free riding by local firms on nearby foreign and local firms. Furthermore, we expect local firms to free ride more from other local firms within their industry and from foreign firms across industries. Analyzing a sample of 3,475 R&D lab investment decisions during 2003–2010 in India, we find that local firms free ride from other local firms both within and across industries. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political capabilities,policy risk,and international investment strategy: evidence from the global electric power generation industry

Whereas conventional wisdom holds that multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest less in host countries that pose greater policy risk—the risk that a government will opportunistically alter policies to expropriate an investing firm's profits or assets—we argue that MNEs vary in their response to host‐country policy risk as a result of differences in organizational capabilities for assessing such risk and managing the policy‐making process. We hypothesize that firms from home countries characterized by weaker institutional constraints on policy makers or greater redistributive pressures associated with political rent seeking will be less sensitive to host‐country policy risk in their international expansion strategies. Moreover, firms from home countries characterized by sufficiently weak institutional constraints or sufficiently strong redistributive pressures will seek out riskier host countries for their international investments to leverage their political capabilities, which permit them to attain and defend attractive positions or industry structures. We find support for our hypotheses in a statistical analysis of the foreign direct investment location choices of MNEs in the electric power generation industry during the period 1990–1999, the industry's first decade of internationalization. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time compression (dis)economies: An empirical analysis

Research Summary: To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time–cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997–2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks 1 month faster. About 88% of the projects exhibit negative time–cost elasticities with over 39% of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12% of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development, and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency. Managerial Summary: How fast should firms invest? The conventional view is that acceleration increases market revenues but also inflates costs. However, there is no recent empirical evidence of this tradeoff. Our article systematically investigates the costs of compressing time in investment projects. Results show that most firms in the oil and gas industry are significantly time inefficient in their operations. Specifically, by accelerating investments, firms would also substantially decrease costs. We estimate the magnitude of these time inefficiencies for specific oil and gas industries and firms and study which strategies might mitigate this problem. This fine‐grained analysis should help firms assess their financial incentives to accelerate projects and prove informative to stock market analysts’ valuations of firm investment timing.     

Valuing Stakeholder Governance: Property Rights,Community Mobilization,and Firm Value

Research summary : While research has shown that good stakeholder relations increase the value of a firm, less is known about how specific types of stakeholder governance affect firm value. We examine the value of one such governance mechanism—community benefits agreements (CBAs) signed by firms and local communities—intended to minimize social conflict that disrupts access to valuable resources. We argue that shareholders evaluate more positively CBAs with local communities with strong property rights and histories of institutional action and extra‐institutional mobilization because these communities are more likely to cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. We evaluate these arguments by analyzing the cumulative abnormal returns associated with the unexpected announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada. Managerial summary : With firms across many industries facing escalating costs associated with social conflict, new tools are emerging to help firms mitigate these risks by seeking the support of the local communities in which they operate. Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are contracts in which a community provides consent for a new investment in return for tangible benefits, such as local hiring and revenue sharing. We argue that although CBAs are costly for the firm, they are particularly valuable when communities can cause costly disruptions and delays for a firm. Our study of investor reactions to the announcement of 148 CBAs signed between mining companies and local indigenous communities in Canada shows that investors value more CBAs signed with communities with strong property rights and histories of protest. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of own-firm and other-firm experience on foreign direct investment survival in the United States, 1987–92

We argue that foreign firms operating in a host country generate information spillovers that have potential value for later foreign direct investment. We test two predictions. First, we expect foreign direct investments by firms with experience in a host country to be more likely to survive than investments made by first-time entrants. Second, foreign direct investments will be more likely to survive the greater the foreign presence in the target industry at the time of investment, subject to two contingencies. The first contingency is that the relationship will be weak or nonexistent among firms with no experience in the host country, because these firms have difficulty evaluating and taking advantage of the information spillovers. The second contingency is that the presence of other foreign firms will not affect investment survival among firms that already have a presence in the target industry and undertake expansion. These firms already possess general information about the target industries and are unlikely to gain additional benefit from information spillovers. We find supportive evidence based on the survival to 1992 among 354 U.S. investments undertaken by foreign firms in manufacturing industries during 1987. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investor Reaction to Covert Corporate Political Activity

Research summary : Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and subsequent developments created a covert channel for firms to allocate resources from corporate treasuries to political activity. Through the use of a financial market event study of an accidental disclosure of firms' contributions to a Republican nonprofit organization, I examine investors' reactions to covert investment in independent political expenditures. I find that, on average, contributing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the disclosure event and that these abnormal returns were more positive for firms in heavily regulated industries as well as those previously making campaign contributions to candidates. However, firms that recently faced a shareholder resolution on political spending disclosure experienced negative abnormal returns, suggesting that the controversial nature of covert activity moderated investors' reactions. Managerial summary : The purpose of this study is to examine how investors reacted to an accidental disclosure of firms' investments in “dark money,” a new form of corporate political activity allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Citizens United decision. I find that, on average, investors reacted positively toward firms identified as making these new political investments, especially if the firms previously engaged in electoral politics or operate in heavily regulated industries. However, this reaction turned negative if the firm recently faced a shareholder resolution asking that it voluntarily disclose all of its political investments. An implication for managers is that they should consider their firms' legal and information environments as fully as possible before committing resources to new and potentially controversial political tactics. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are institutional investors myopic? A time-series study of four technology-driven industries

This paper examines the popular myth that managers in high-technology industries are altering their critical R&D investments in response to the short-term profit pressures of large institutional stockholders. The study entails an empirical examination of the relationship between R&D spending and institutional ownership over a 10-year period for 129 firms based in four research-intensive industries. Contrary to the view that institutional investors are having a damaging affect on R&D spending, after controlling for intervening effects the results suggest that higher levels of institutional ownership may be associated with greater R&D expenditures. A number of possible explanations for this finding are developed.     

Strategy,human capital investments,business‐domain capabilities,and performance: a study in the global software services industry

Research summary : In knowledge‐based industries, continuous human capital investments are essential for firms to enhance capabilities and sustain competitive advantage. However, such investments present a dilemma for firms, because human resources are mobile. Using detailed project‐level operational, financial, and human capital data from a leading multinational firm in the global IT services industry, this study finds that deliberate investments in improving general human capital can help firms develop superior capabilities and maintain high profits. This paper identifies two types of capabilities essential for success in this industry—technological and business‐domain capabilities—and provides empirical evidence justifying such investments. Theoretical and practical implications of capability‐seeking general human capital investments are discussed. Managerial summary : The primary managerial implication of this research is that capability‐seeking investments in developing general human capital through strategic learning (training and internal certifications) can enhance firm performance. Although investing in general human capital is risky, the firm considered this a strategic necessity in order to thrive in the fast paced IT services industry. By leveraging general technological skills in combination with business‐domain knowledge to address customer's business problems firms can earn and sustain higher profits. Our study also demonstrates how a developing‐country firm responded to strong competitive challenge from global rivals possessing superior capabilities by upgrading the capabilities of its employees through internal development. In doing so the firm was able to narrow the capability gap vis‐à‐vis its foreign peers and expand its business globally. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

New product deployment: The moderating influence of economic institutional context

We compare the determinants of new product deployment across transition and nontransition economy environments to show the importance of variance in economic institutional context. We argue that the expected positive relationships of institutional development, resource levels, and competitive pressure to new product deployment all weaken in transition economy contexts. Hypotheses are tested with survey data of over 7,000 firms in 7 industries from 33 countries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Money secrets: How does trade secret legal protection affect firm market value? Evidence from the uniform trade secret act

Research summary : We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm market value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about its value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, but a negative effect in industries with (1) high resource–value uncertainty and (2) high poor‐investment risk. Managerial summary : We argue that an increase in trade secret legal protection might not unequivocally benefit firm owners when selling their business. A stronger trade secret protection increases the market value of firms in industries with high workers' mobility, but it decreases the market value of firms in industries with uncertain resource value and/or high risk of poor‐acquisition investments. Based on the contingent effect of trade secret protection, companies may want to adjust their strategic decisions, including where to locate or relocate, based in part on whether they will derive benefits or suffer losses when trade secrets are better protected. Finally, our study should help policymakers understand more fully the economic impact of government policies associated with trade secrets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Toward a behavioral theory of real options: Noisy signals,bias, and learning

Research Summary: We develop a behavioral theory of real options that relaxes the informational and behavioral assumptions underlying applications of financial options theory to real assets. To do so, we augment real option theory's focus on uncertain future asset values (prospective uncertainty) with feedback learning theory that considers uncertain current asset values (contemporaneous uncertainty). This enables us to incorporate behavioral bias in the feedback learning process underlying the option execution/termination decision. The resulting computational model suggests that firms that inappropriately account for contemporaneous uncertainty and are subject to learning biases may experience substantial downside risk in undertaking real options. Moreover, contrary to the standard option result, greater uncertainty may decrease option value, making commitment to an investment path more effective than remaining flexible. Managerial Summary: Executives recognize the need to make uncertain investments to grow their business while mitigating downside risk. The analogy between financial options and real corporate investments provides an appealing method to consider the practical challenge of such investment decisions. Unfortunately, the “real options” analogy seems to break down in practice. We identify how a second form of uncertainty confounds real options intuition, leading managers to overestimate the value of uncertain investments. We present a behavioral real options model that accounts for both forms of uncertainty and suggest how uncertainty interacts with behavioral bias in the option execution/termination decision. Our model facilitates assessment of the conditions under which investments in uncertain opportunities are usefully considered as real options, and provides a means to evaluate their attractiveness.     

Takeover defenses,innovation, and value creation: Evidence from acquisition decisions

The desirability of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) is a contentious issue. ATPs might enable managerial empire building by insulating managers from disciplinary takeovers. However, some companies, such as “hard‐to‐value” (HTV) companies, might trade at a discount due to valuation difficulties, thereby exposing HTV companies to opportunistic takeovers and creating agency conflicts of managerial risk aversion. ATPs might ameliorate such managerial risk aversion by inhibiting opportunistic takeovers. This paper analyzes acquisitions made by HTV firms, focusing on whether the acquirer (not the target) is entrenched in order to examine the impact of entrenchment managerial decision making. The results show that HTV firms that are entrenched make acquisitions that generate more shareholder wealth and are more likely to increase corporate innovation, suggesting that ATPs can be beneficial in some firms. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry into Nascent Industries: Disentangling a Firm's Capability Portfolio at the Time of Investment Versus Market Entry

Research summary : This article examines the capability antecedents of firm entry into nascent industries. Because a firm's technological investments in nascent industries typically occur before market entry, this study makes a distinction between firm capabilities at the time of market entry and at the time of initial investment. At the time of market entry, core technical capabilities and complementary assets influence the likelihood of entry. However, at the time of investment, a firm's integrative capabilities as well as the initial stocks of related technical capabilities and complementary assets become critical, as they enable endogenous development of core technical capabilities and complementary assets by the time of entry. The empirical sample consists of firms involved in field experiments in agricultural biotechnology during the period 1980–2010. Managerial summary : New product commercialization in a nascent industry typically requires access to not only core technologies of the focal industry, but also supporting commercialization assets. However, firms may not possess these critical capabilities when they first invest in the industry. Instead, empirical evidence from the context of agricultural biotechnology shows that at the time of first investment, a firm's integrative capabilities partly explain their likelihood of entry. Integrative capabilities encompass a set of practices that enable effective coordination and communication, and in turn put firms in an advantageous position to develop the needed capabilities by the time of entry. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does having women on boards create value? The impact of societal perceptions and corporate governance in emerging markets

Many governments seek to impose gender equality on boards, but the consequences of doing so are not clear and could harm firms and economies. We shed light on this topic by conceptualizing the relationships as firm‐ and board‐specific and embedded within specific contexts. The theory is developed with reference to emerging markets, and tested on Malaysian firms. We find that female directors create value for some firms and decrease it for others. The impact varies across different performance indicators, firms' ownership, and boards' structure. The findings call for nuanced responses in relation to women's nominations from both governments and firms. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bribery and investment: Firm‐level evidence from Africa and Latin America

Research summary : Using a unique database that measures firm‐level bribery in Africa and Latin America, we corroborate extant results in the literature that paying bribes deters firm investments in fixed assets. Our contribution is to explore four mechanisms. By adopting a reverse causality approach (Gelman and Imbens, 2013), we find evidence consistent with one of them: short‐term oriented firms prefer to bribe rather than invest in fixed assets, while the opposite is true for firms with a long‐term orientation. We rule out that bribe payments drain financial resources for investment, that firms that invest do not bribe because fixed assets make them less flexible and more vulnerable to future bribes, and that less efficient firms bribe rather than invest. Managerial summary : We ask whether, along with ethical issues, bribing affects the behavior and performance of firms in Africa and Latin America. Our statistical analysis shows that bribe payments do not reduce the short‐term performance of firms, but frustrate investments in fixed assets, which is the foundation of firms' long‐term growth. It is like seeking a job via nepotism or education. Nepotism makes it likely to find a job in the short term. However, the solid skills generated by education raise the odds of finding better jobs in the future. We rule out some common explanations for the trade‐off between bribing and investment (e.g., bribes drain resources to invest or that less efficient firms bribe and do not invest). Our analysis suggests that firms with short‐term orientations are more likely to bribe and firms with long‐term orientation are more likely to invest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How family influence,socioemotional wealth,and competitive conditions shape new technology adoption

Research summary : In family businesses, investment decisions often involve both socioemotional wealth and economic considerations. Focusing on new technology adoption, we argue that multiple dimensions of socioemotional wealth contribute to complex effects within different types of family firms—depending on the level of family control—as well as in contrast to non‐family firms. Results based on cable TV operators from 1983 to 1987 confirm that family ownership correlates negatively with technology adoption, especially when family owners hold a minority rather than majority position. We also show contingencies based on performance improvements and competitive threats. Our arguments contribute new insights about the tensions between economic and socioemotional factors within minority family ownership that are absent from non‐family firms and more pronounced than in majority family firms. Managerial summary : We find evidence of greater reluctance toward new technology adoption among firms with minority family influence than majority family influence. This suggests that goals related to socioemotional wealth only partly explain the cautious decision‐making observed in family firms, with further caution arising from conflicting priorities between family and non‐family owners. Recent performance improvements help offset the reluctance to adopt new technology, albeit to a lesser degree among firms with minority family ownership. High levels of competitive threats also offset the reduction in new technology adoption, and contrary to expectations, to a greater extent among minority family firms. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incubation of an industry: Heterogeneous knowledge bases and modes of value capture

Research summary : We examine firms' technological investments during an industry's incubation stage—the period between a technological breakthrough and the first instance of its commercialization. Using the agricultural biotechnology context, we develop stylized findings regarding the understudied knowledge evolution preceding product evolution in an industry's life cycle, the trend and diversity of firms undertaking technological investments in anticipation of industry emergence, their leverage of markets for technology and corporate control, and their use of alternative modes of value capture. We juxtapose these stylized findings with existing literature to identify new theoretical insights, and set the stage for future scholarly work to develop and test new theories for the incubation period, examine its existence in other industries, and study its impact on subsequent firm and industry evolution. M anagerial summary : New technological breakthroughs present managers of existing firms and aspiring entrepreneurs with opportunities to create altogether new industries. During the vibrant incubation period, we find that multiple firms capitalize on diverse knowledge bases to shape the industry's knowledge evolution and also capture economic value in diverse ways. Existing firms in the obsolescing industry are more likely to become targets in acquisitions given their complementary knowledge. Science‐based start‐ups are more likely to engage in acquisitions and collaborations with established firms. Diversifying firms are more likely to commercialize products after leveraging of internal development, acquisitions, and alliances. Our study highlights the importance for managers to think about “success” and “failure” across multiple yardsticks of performance, rather than only as product commercialization as the sole goal. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.