The choice of exchange rate regime: An empirical analysis for transition economies*

We analyze the choice of exchange rate regimes of the 25 transition economies in Europe and the CIS after 1990. The empirical results show that the traditional Optimum Currency Area considerations provide relevant guidance for the regime choices in these countries. Moreover, regime choices are influenced by inflation rates, cumulative inflation differentials, and international reserves sufficiency. That is, macroeconomic stabilization and the ability to commit to exchange rate pegs also play important roles. Large government deficits have ambiguous effects; they increase the likelihood of moving from flexible to intermediate regimes as well as that of moving from fixed to intermediate ones.     

Prices vs. Quantities: The Irrelevance of Irreversibility*

We explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls in a dynamic setup in which the decisions of some agents are irreversible. The assumption of irreversibility is shown to improve the performance of a tax relative to that of a system of tradable quotas and significantly alter the equilibrium behavior of agents. We nevertheless conclude that taking into account the fact that agents’ decisions may be irreversible does not lead to policy implications significantly different from those reached in a simpler model in which irreversibility is ignored.     

The conspicuous absence of examination questions concerning the Great Irish Famine: political economy as science and ideology *

To advance our general understanding about the development of nine-teenth-century Irish political economy in the wake of the Great Irish Famine (1846–51), this article analyses the Famine's impact on a previously unstudied, yet uniquely authoritative, element of the displine: the questions given to candidates for the Whately Professorship of Political Economy at Trinity College, Dublin from 1832 to 1882. This article concludes, contrary to previous arguments, that the Famine did not fundamentaly influence the discipline's development, and relates this conclusion to debates over whether and how political economy functioned as an ideology in shaping policy responses to the Famine.     

Semicollusion vs. Full Collusion: The Role of Demand Uncertainty and Product Substitutability

We examine the profitability of two different cartel organizational forms: full collusion, under which firms collude on both price and quality, and semicollusion, under which firms collude on price only. We show that, in the presence of demand uncertainty that cannot be contracted upon in the cartel agreement, firms may be better off limiting their collusive agreement to price only. However, a positive relationship between demand uncertainty and the relative profitability of semicollusion exists only for low levels of demand substitutability. The converse is true for high levels of demand substitutability. Therefore, if demand substitutability is sufficiently high, no level of demand uncertainty will make semicollusion the optimal organizational form. In contrast, semicollusion is guaranteed to be optimal for a sufficiently low level of demand substitutability. The market structure described is motivated by and closely parallels that of shipping cartels. Received September 29, 2000; revised version received December 10, 2001 Published online: November 11, 2002     

The impact of political institutions on U.S. state bond yields during crises: evidence from the 2008 credit market seizure

This study examines how political institutions mediate bond market reactions to severe economic crisis, based on U.S. states’ experience of the 2008 credit market seizure. Following severe fiscal shocks, political institutions assume greater importance in assessing risk characteristics of state bonds. The bond market reacts most strongly to two factors: public sector union strength in a state and the proportion of Democrats in the state legislature. We suggest that the identity of political institutions becomes increasingly important, during periods of economic crises, when credit markets might expect that political systems can no longer delay stabilisations and must deliver policy.     

The Role of Ethnic Nepotism vs. Economic Pragmatism in Inter-group Conflict: Data on the Yugoslavian Civil War*

Neo-Darwinian concepts such as van den Berghe's ethnic nepotism infer that the origin of inter-group conflict resides primarily in ethnocentrism, defined as the extension of inclusive fitness to extra-familial interactions. Silverman, however, has proposed an alternative view, based on the presumption that natural selection favors pragmatism and plasticity in the formation of group alliances. Silverman's theory holds that the motives for inter-group oppression and warfare, including so-called ethnic cleansing movements, are economic, whereby out-group prejudices represent rationalizations rather than root causes. The present paper reviews Silverman's and Silverman and Case's evidence for this theory and provides further supporting data in terms of relationships between changes in economic conditions and ethnocentric attitudes during the years immediately preceding the recent Yugoslavian hostilities. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.