Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.     

Self-interest and equity in a bargaining tournament with non-linear payoffs

This paper explores whether a bargaining environment with a well-defined institutional structure that compensates rational self-interest for trivial differences in measurable performance will increase self-interest and decrease equitable splits of expected wealth. Employing a face-to-face, first-to-four victories bargaining tournament with non-linearly increasing payoffs, we observe an overall level of 84-percent rational self-interested bargains, and only 4 percent equitable bargains (i.e. a 50/50 split). More self-interest, however, resulted in low efficiency — 42 percent of all bargains were efficient.     

The Market Instinct: The Demise of Social Preferences for Self-Interest

Environmental policy design has much to gain from a better understanding of existing voluntary behaviour and motivations. In laboratory experiments, participants often exhibit social preferences such as altruism, spite, reciprocity and notions of fairness. In contrast, traditional neoclassical theory assumes that people act rationally in a way that maximises their self-interest. In environmental markets, social preferences and self-interest interact. We apply experimental economics to test the hypothesis that social preferences are not maintained in the presence of a competitive market institution. In the initial public goods game, many participants were prepared to make costly voluntary contributions. However the introduction of the market institution triggered a ‘market instinct’ in experimental participants. They abandoned the social preferences they were previously expressing and became self-interested profit maximisers. This self-interested behaviour persisted even after the market institution was discontinued. These findings are important to understanding the role and impact of markets for environmental policy.     

Rethinking the aid–growth relationship: A network approach

Over 40 years of conventional economic analysis has not reached consensus on the effect of foreign aid on recipient country growth. We provide new insight into this relationship by using a network approach to characterize the topological properties of the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) foreign aid network. Viewing the OECD foreign aid community as an interdependent and complex system, we characterize not only the amount of aid but also the position of both donor and recipient within the network. We find that the degree centrality of the recipient, with an edge inclusion threshold that sets a minimum share of a donor’s aid to a particular recipient, is significantly correlated with the growth impact of that donor’s aid. Contrarily, aid is uncorrelated with growth with a recipient‐side filter on the importance of the donor to the recipient. These results suggest that the importance of a recipient within the donor’s network, rather than the volume of aid alone, is associated with the growth impact of bilateral aid. We explore mechanisms for these findings that include the complementarity of aid from multiple attentive donors. Our findings speak to the aid–growth puzzle and suggest that network metrics may illuminate non‐obvious channels of aid impact.     

Reciprocity: theory and facts

The importance of reciprocity is not new in economics. Contractual market exchanges and long-run interactions are both situations based on self-interested reciprocal behaviour. However, reciprocity is not only a behaviour but also a motive that sometimes appears to be inconsistent with self-interest. This fact produces a tension between those who try to explain reciprocal behaviour within the standard framework and those who aim at enlarging it with the introduction of additional behavioural principles. This special issue collects a selection of papers presented at the International Conference “Reciprocity. Theory and facts” were the two perspectives were compared and discussed. In this Introduction note we provide first a broad view of the role of reciprocity in economics and then a quick introduction to each of the contributions enclosed in this special issue.     

On the provision of official and private foreign aid

The provision of official relative to private foreign aid varies considerably between donor countries. We explain the variations in terms of country size, household composition, income distribution, and the government's ability to commit to aid, and derive inter alia the results: (1) official aid crowds out private aid, (2) total aid and official aid collected from each household are lower in more populous countries, (3) total aid is lower if (i) the distribution of income favors the more altruistic households, and (ii) the government can credibly commit to a certain level of aid. Evidences suggest that the theoretical results can explain stylized facts.     

A Model of Inequality and Interest Group Politics

In this paper we examine inequality of process and inequality of outcomes in interest group politics. The model has interest groups that compete for rents in a non-cooperative game. It allows for a self-interested rent-setting political decision-maker, and democratic or popular pressure as a check on that self-interest. We consider differences in the effectiveness and pre-commitment abilities of interest groups. We show that: (i) the costs of influence activities may be highest when groups are relatively equal in their effectiveness; (ii) if social welfare incorporates enough concern for equity of outcomes, that ranking is reversed; (iii) depending on voter responsiveness to rent-setting, the political decision-maker may set rents to be higher or lower, when increases in inequality of effectiveness lower the unit costs of rent-seeking.     

主流经济学中的“经济人”:内涵演变及其缺陷审视

经济人概念经历了一个逐渐演变的过程:早期是内含特定社会伦理关系的自利人,后来由抽象原子化的经济人所取代,接着演变为更中性的理性人;理性的原意也仅仅体现为实现特定目的的有效手段选择,后来却蜕变为行为的一致性问题.正因为理性内涵的不断演变及其外延的不断扩大过程,以致经济人概念成了一个同义反复;结果,经济人假设在强化经济学分析框架的同时,也使得经济理论与现实之间越来越相脱节.     

Imperfect Information and Opportunism

Information is a scarce resource. It is inherently available only in a limited form to decision-makers. Limited or imperfect information is caused by uncertainty — both ontologic and epistemic, limitations in cognitive capabilities or bounded rationality, hidden information, and information asymmetries. This has fundamental implications for the manner in which the self-interested behavior of agents will manifest itself. The article argues that in the context of imperfect information, self-interest can function in a manner quite different from what standard approaches assume. This has been demonstrated by the recent financial crisis. However, there has been limited consideration in mainstream models, both of the neoclassical and institutional type, as to what the exact nature of self-interestedness is, and how this affects the market behavior of agents. The nature of self-interest, therefore, needs to be modeled explicitly to improve the explanatory power of economic theories.     

Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance

The Homo economicus of traditional economics is far from being completely self-interested, rational, or as individualistic as he is purported to be; he will haggle to death over price but will not take what he wants by force. Implicitly, he is assumed to behave ruthlessly within a well-defined bubble of sainthood. Based on a simple model, I first examine what occurs when this assumption is relaxed and genuine, amoral Homo economici interact. Productivity can be inversely related to compensation; a longer shadow of the future can intensify conflict; and more competition among providers of protection reduces welfare. The patently inefficient outcomes that follow call for restraining self-interest, for finding ways to govern markets. I then review some of the different ways of creating restraints, from the traditional social contract, to the hierarchical domination of kings and lords, to modern forms of governance. Checks and balances, wider representation, the bureaucratic form of organization, and other ingredients of modern governance can partly be thought of as providing restraints to the dark side of self-interest. Though highly imperfect, these restraints are better than the alternative, which typically involves autocratic, amateurish, and corrupt rule. Then, thinking of most problems in terms of a first-best economic model is practically and scientifically misguided.     

Measuring absorptive capacity constraints to foreign aid

To assist with progress towards the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in developing countries, the international community is scaling-up foreign aid to record levels. Concurrently, there are concerns that additional aid will not be used effectively due to a problem of absorptive capacity in recipient countries. Empirical studies lend support to these concerns with many finding that there are diminishing returns to foreign aid. This paper reviews the extensive aid effectiveness literature to identify the various dimensions of absorptive capacity. It proceeds by devising a composite index of absorptive capacity for individual recipient countries which can assist policymakers in guiding the allocation of their aid. The relevance of the index is confirmed through its employment in a standard empirical model of aid effectiveness. The paper highlights the developing countries that currently receive high levels of aid relative to their estimated level of absorptive capacity.     

Your development or mine? Effects of donor–recipient cultural differences on the aid-growth nexus

Development aid from the West may lead to adverse growth effects in the global South due to the neglected cultural differences between development aid (paradigm) providers and recipients. I test this hypothesis empirically by augmenting an aid-growth model with proxy variables for cultural differences between donors and recipients. First, I use donor–recipient genetic distance, i.e., blood types, to capture the traditional way of cultural transmission. Second, I use western education of recipient country leaders to capture resource-based transmission of culture. Results of the OLS panel estimation in first differences show that a one unit increase in donor–recipient genetic distance reduces the main effect of aid on growth by 0.2 percentage points when aid is increased by one percentage point. In turn, a one percentage point increase in aid yields on average a 0.3 percentage point increase in growth after a decade for countries with western educated leaders.     

Mandatory sick pay provision: A labor market experiment

The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention with student subjects in an experimental laboratory setting rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions. Both wages and replacement rates offered by competing employers are reciprocated by workers. However, replacement rates are only reciprocated as long as no minimum level is mandated. Although we observe adverse selection when workers have different exogenous probabilities for being absent from work, this does not lead to a market breakdown. In our experiment, mandating replacement rates actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of replacement rates by employers.     

Non-nested models of Australia's overseas aid program

After briefly surveying the existing on overseas aid motivations, some empirical results are presented for Australian bilateral aid in terms of the two competing theories in the aid literature, namely the recipient need model and the donor interest model. The empirical results for Austrlia are atypical in that there is support for both hypotheses. This is contrast to the results of previous studies of ‘large’ nation states, the United States, Britain, Germany, France and Japan, which have found support for the donor interst model but not the recipient need model. Given that the empirical results reported here are consistent with both models, this paper then proceeds to apply the relatively new tests of non-nested hypotheses to the models. The results indicate that Australia's aid program has both recipient need and donor interest concerns. I some years the recipient need motive dominates, and in other years, donor interest dominates.     

Foreign Aid and Recurrent Cost: Donor Competition, Aid Proliferation, and Budget Support

Recent empirical studies reveal that effectiveness of aid on growth is ambiguous. The authors consider aid proliferation—excess aid investment relative to recurrent cost—as a potential cause that undermines aid effectiveness, because aid projects can only produce sustainable benefits when sufficient recurrent costs are disbursed. They consider the donor's budget support as a device to supplement the shortage of the recipient's recurrent cost and to alleviate the misallocation of inputs. However, when donors have self-interested preferences for the success of their own projects over those conducted by others, they provide insufficient budget support relative to aid, which results in aid proliferation. Moreover, aid proliferation is shown to be worsened by the presence of more donors.     

Foreign aid preferences and perceptions in donor countries

We present original survey data on preferences for foreign aid in 24 donor countries from 2005 to 2008. On publicly-funded foreign aid (Official Development Assistance, or ODA), we find patterns that are consistent with a standard model of democratic policy formation, in which donations are treated as a pure public good. Controlling for perceptions of current ODA, we show that individual preferences for ODA are (i) negatively correlated with relative income within a country-year; and (ii) positively correlated with inequality at the country level. We extend the analysis to explain variation in the gap between desired aid and actual ODA, arguing that lobbying by high-income special interest groups can divert resources away from the median voter’s preferred level of aid. Consistent with this, we observe that ODA is significantly lower where policymakers are more susceptible to lobbying. Finally, we present a novel test of competing “crowding out” hypotheses. Self-reported private aid donations are negatively correlated with actual ODA, and positively correlated with perceived ODA. This finding is consistent with an emerging argument in the literature, whereby ODA crowds out private aid by enabling charities to forego fundraising activities and crowds in private aid through a signaling channel.     

A comparative assessment of the employment consequences of UK and West German aid

This paper applies standard input-output methodology to estimate the employment affects of aid flows for the UK and the FRG. The conclusion is at variance with what some other economists have claimed earlier in that it shows that aid flows to developing countries do not generate a lot of jobs at home. Indeed, it is estimated that they generate fewer jobs than alternative uses of money at home, hence this paper contends that the argument of ‘self-interest’ for channelling aid to developing countries does not hold water. It is concluded that overseas development aid as a tool of alleviating domestic problems (unemployment, regional problems etc.) is pretty ineffective and aid allocation priorities should be based on grounds other than those of domestic economic considerations.     

Dissertation abstract: Three essays on the determinants of behavior in the commons-experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia

This dissertation presents the results of a series of common pool experiments conducted in three regions of rural Colombia with individuals who face a social dilemma in their everyday lives that is similar to what was presented in the experiment. The research objectives are to develop an empirical characterization of how individual behavior deviates from purely self-interested Nash behavior and to further our understanding of the effects of alternative institutions to promote more conservative choices in common pool experiments.Groups of five subjects participated in a 20-period common pool resource game framed as a harvest decision from a fishery. Every group first played 10 rounds of a baseline limited access common pool resource game and then 10 additional rounds under one of five institutions: face-to-face communication, one of two external regulations, and communication combined with one of the two regulations. The two external regulations consisted of an individual harvest quota that was set at the efficient outcome, but differ with respect to the level of enforcement. A total of 420 individuals participated in the experiments, with individual earnings averaging slightly more than a day’s wages. The results are presented in three essays.The first essay, What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users?, develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by combinations of self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion or conformity. The results suggest that a model which balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies. The data are inconsistent with a model of pure self-interest, as well as models that combine self-interest with individual preferences for altruism, reciprocity and inequity aversion.The second essay, Communication and Regulation to Conserve Common Pool Resources, tests for interaction effects between formal regulations imposed on a community to conserve a local natural resource and non-binding verbal agreements to do the same. The results indicate that formal regulations and informal communication are mutually reinforcing in some instances, but this result is not robust across regions or regulations. Therefore, the hypothesis of a complementary relationship of formal and informal control of local natural resources cannot be supported in general; instead the effects are likely to be community-specific. There is some evidence to suggest that these effects are correlated with the relative importance of formal regulations versus informal community efforts in the community.The third essay, Within and Between Group Variation in Individual Strategies in Common Pools, analyzes the relative effects of groups and individuals within groups in explaining variation in individual harvest decisions for particular institutions, and uses a hierarchical linear model to examine how these sources of variation may vary across institutions. Communication serves to effectively coordinate individual strategies within groups, but these coordinated strategies vary considerably among groups. In contrast, externally-imposed regulatory schemes (as well as unregulated limited access) produce significant variation in the individual strategies within groups, but these strategies are roughly replicated across groups so that there is little between-group variation.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.     

在线购买信任模式的中国实证研究

信任的缺失是使消费者不愿在线购买的主要原因之一。为提供中国在线购买信任问题一个有效的解决方案,基于对Cheung and Lee(2000)和Kit Lui(2003)等在线购买信任模式实证研究结果和局限性的认识,本论文提出一个修正模式并在中国大陆的情境下开展实证研究。研究结果显示,在所有网上购买信任的前置变量中,网上商店的有用性和消费经历与在线购买信任表现出更为强烈的正相关。并且,消费经历与有用性不但通过在线购买信任变量积极影响在线购买意图,并且对在线购买意图的产生也有较强的、直接的积极作用。另外,在线信任等变量在人口统计学特征上和消费习惯上表现出一定的差异,男性、学历较高、上网时间长、网购次数多、每次花费金额多、预测未来两年在线消费比例上升的在线消费者群体,其对在线购买的信任更多地表现在有用性和安全控制的良好认知上。