The Effects of Competition on Banks’ Risk Taking

We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when bank risk is unobservable to depositors. It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the structure and side of the market in which competition takes place. If the bank is a monopoly or banks are competing only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking. Banks in this situation tend to take risk, although extreme risk taking is avoided. In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks are competing for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high, thereby forcing banks to take extreme risks.     

Tracing the causes of the banking crisis

We add the Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist model to a modified version of the Smets–Wouters model of the U.S. in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. The innovation of this article is estimating the model using unfiltered data allowing for non-stationary shocks in order to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. We find that ‘traditional shocks’ account for most of the fluctuations in macroeconomic variables; the non-stationarity of the productivity shock plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a ‘run’ of bad shocks; based on this sample they occur on average once every 64 years and when they occur around 10% are accompanied by financial crisis. Financial shocks on their own, even when extreme, do not cause crises – provided the government acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as happened in this sample.     

Pre-recession efficiencies and input allocation decisions of agricultural and critically insolvent banks

The late 2000s’ economic recession is considered the longest economic downturn since the 1930s Great Depression. Declining real estate values ignited an increase in loan defaults and mortgage foreclosures that led to a surge of bank failures at a rate not experienced by the U.S. banking industry since the 1980s. A total of 509 bank failures were recorded by the FDIC from January 2007–December 2014, with nearly 60% of these failures occurring in 2009 and 2010. In contrast, there were only 24 bank failures in the U.S. during the 7-year period prior to 2007. This study analyzed certain components of operating decisions made by banks that either survived or became critically insolvent during the late 2000s financial crisis using an Input Distance Stochastic Frontier function to estimate the technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) between agricultural banks and non-agricultural banks. This efficiency analysis was applied to a 7-year pre-recession period and is designed to final out any early warning signals that decrease the efficiency level of banks. Results suggest that survival banks were more technically efficient than critically insolvent banks, and banks’ tendency to utilize cheaper inputs were more likely to stand the economic crisis.     

If the Banks are Doing So Well,Why Can't I Get a Loan? Regulatory Constraints to Financial Inclusion in Indonesia

Indonesia's financial sector has two paradoxes: (i) Indonesia has been a global leader in microfinance for the past 25 years, but access to microfinance services is declining; and (ii) Indonesia's commercial banks are liquid, solvent, and profitable, and the Indonesian economy has been doing well over the past decade, but small and medium enterprises are facing a credit crunch. Although Indonesia is underbanked, most commercial banks have been unresponsive to unmet effective demand. The behavior of banks has been in their own short‐term best interests, primarily because of the unintended consequences of Indonesia's financial sector reregulation after the East Asian crisis and contradictory monetary policies, which have produced a prudentially sound but inefficient, narrow, and homogenized banking oligopoly. Indonesia should not respond to financial exclusion by artificially pumping out and administratively allocating more credit. Instead, it should promulgate smart regulation so that banks maintain their sound risk management without pursuing noncompetitive and noninclusive business practices.     

中国农村非正规金融履约机制的实证研究

中国农村非正规金融的履约机制包括信息和信任机制、重复博弈和信誉机制、严厉的惩罚机制、灵活的担保机制、女性市场定位机制等.以湖北农村非正规金融为例,对它的履约情况进行了实证分析,得出结论:农村非正规金融具有极强的自生能力和可持续性.结论的政策含义是:压制、取缔非正规金融的行为不可取,强制性地将非正规金融正规化的行为同样不可取,正确的做法应是放松管制,引导正规金融与非正规金融的联接,促成农村一体化金融市场的形成.     

金融投资中介化、噪声交易与金融危机模型的微观建构

随着金融市场的发展,投资者更多地通过金融中介间接参与金融市场投资。然而,金融中介的风险转移倾向容易导致风险资产的均衡价格偏离其基础价值,形成价格泡沫。长期存在的噪声交易者与金融投资中介化引发的资产泡沫相互推动,最终形成金融危机。即使在经济稳定的环境下,同样会由于金融市场本身发展的内在矛盾而导致危机的发生。     

The IMF as just One Creditor: Who’s in Charge When a Country Can’t Pay?

ABSTRACT

The international community’s management of the 2010 financial crisis in Greece revealed a major gap in the international financial system. No single institution is any longer unambiguously in charge. Consequently, the path is open for narrow interests to predominate over global interests. An examination of postwar history shows that this problem has been growing gradually since the 1970s and has become much greater since the mid-1990s. To alleviate the problem, the International Monetary Fund needs to develop an effective strategy for reducing the opportunities for creditor countries to intervene in decisions on how crises should be resolved.     

European Banking Distress and EMU: Institutional and Macroeconomic Risks

Financial stability in Europe has received renewed attention with the advent of EMU. This paper examines whether EU country banking systems are particularly vulnerable to systemic risk. Our approach is to explore episodes of banking sector distress for a large sample of countries, highlighting the experience of the EU. We estimate multivariate probit models linking the likelihood of banking problems to a set of macroeconomic variables and institutional characteristics such as aspects of bank supervision and regulation, restrictions on bank portfolios, and development of the banking system. Given these characteristics, the model predicts a low probability of banking sector distress in EMU countries.
JEL classification : G 21; E 44; F 41     

Analysis of the volatility’s dependency structure during the subprime crisis

In this article, we test the hypothesis of contagion amongst sectors within the United States’ economy during the subprime crisis. The econometric methodology applied here is based on the dynamic conditional correlation model proposed by Engle (2002). Further, we applied several Lagrange multiplier (LM)-robust tests to test whether there were structural breaks in series’ dependency structures during the period of interest. Events theoretically classified as relevant to the crisis upshots as well as the interactions between the moments of the series were used as indicator functions to the referred structural breaks. The main conclusion of this study is that one can indeed observe contagion within almost all pairs of sectors’ indices. Thus, we conclude that the dependency structure of the sectors of interest has faced structural changes during the years of 2007 and 2008. Hence, diversification strategies as well as the risk analysis inherent to the portfolios’ management may have been drastically affected.     

Local versus International Crises and Bank Stability: does bank foreign expansion make a difference?

We investigate the impact of global and local crises on bank stability in the MENA region and examine the effect of owning bank subsidiaries in other countries. We consider banks that experienced both types of crises during our sample period. Our findings highlight a negative impact of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008 on bank stability but, on the whole, no negative impact of the local crisis. A deeper investigation shows that owning bank subsidiaries outside the home country is a source of increased fragility during normal times, yet a source of higher stability during the local crisis but not during the international crisis. Moreover, owning foreign subsidiaries in one or two world regions is insufficient to neutralize both types of crises, while being present in three or more regions is more stabilizing during a local crisis but also more destabilizing during an international crisis. Our findings contribute to the literature examining bank stability and have several policy implications.     

The legal theory of finance and the financial instability hypothesis: Convergences and possible integration

This article presents the legal theory of finance (LTF) and compares it with the financial instability hypothesis (FIH), identifying points of convergence and divergence. The study aims to contribute to the literature by connecting these theories and provides the following main conclusions. First, the LTF incorporates aspects of the FIH, as the theories share several key elements, particularly the presence of fundamental uncertainty, the constraint of liquidity, and the necessity for governments to act as lenders of last resort. Second, the liquidity concept used in the LTF can be better comprehended with the use of Keynesian and post Keynesian literature on the topic. Third, the LTF aims to advance and update certain aspects of Minsky’s theory, particularly with regard to the globalization of markets, power relations, and the interdependencies of the political economy of finance. The study concludes that the theories are more complementary than divergent and future studies should create an analytical framework that integrates the theories’ most insightful aspects.     

Competition and risk in South East Asian commercial banking

This article investigates the effects of competition on bank risk taking behaviour in four South East Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam). Our main finding is that competition does not increase bank risk-taking behaviour and the results appear robust to different model specifications, estimation approaches and variable construction. We also find that concentration is inversely related to bank risk whereas regulatory restrictions positively influence bank risk-taking.     

How do mega-bank merger policy and regulations contribute to financial stability? Evidence from Australia and Canada

Although the role of financial regulatory failures in the global financial crisis (GFC) has been explored extensively in the post-GFC literature, our knowledge of the role of bank merger and takeover policy and regulation in reinforcing financial stability is limited. Based on an exploratory case study of Australia, which is examined in comparison to Canada, this article argues that competition policy and regulation contributed to financial stability by insulating the largest Australian and Canadian banks from domestic or foreign hostile takeover threats, and by limiting their asset size, and thus their internationalization and interconnections with the global banking community.     

Does competition influence bank failures?

There has been a notable debate in the banking literature on the impact of bank competition on financial stability. The aim of this article is to provide the first investigation of the role of bank competition on the occurrence of bank failures. We analyse this issue on a large sample of Russian banks for the period 2001–2007, as the Russian banking industry is a unique example of an emerging market which has undergone a large number of bank failures during the last decade. Our findings support the view that tighter bank competition enhances the occurrence of bank failures. Thus, measures that increase bank competition could undermine financial stability.     

Macroeconomic Theorizing and the Instability of Post-Keynesian Capitalism

Financial innovations are associated with market crises. Hyman Minsky singles out financial innovations as particularly prone to instability so as to necessitate governmental intervention. Processes of innovation and diffusion in new products and in new financial instruments have commonalities as well as differences. This paper focuses on the differences with a view to better understand why financial innovations are more likely to generate significant negative repercussions. Differences that distinguish financial innovations include the role of intermediaries, variability in quality, and the extent of externalities. This paper further discusses the implications of these differences.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

双重委托-代理视角下的金融中介、金融加速器与经济波动的研究

本文在BGG模型基础上,建立了包含企业、金融中介、投资者的双重委托一代理模型,将金融中介纳入信贷市场摩擦的分析框架内。分析了金融中介自身受信贷约束时,其资产净值变化对经济产生的金融加速器效应。得出在双重委托代理的信用契约下,企业外部融资溢价不但受自身资产净值的影响,还受金融中介资产净值的影响。各种外部冲击通过信贷市场中金融中介的传导对经济波动造成进一步放大的效应,经济波动的金融加速器效应在考虑金融中介资产净值的影响后得到了增强。     

Sequential Equilibrium and Competition in a Diamond–Dybvig Banking Model

Within the framework of a Diamond–Dybvig model [J. Polit. Econ.91(1983), 401–419], but with explicitly modelling the autarky choice during the planning period, we demonstrate that a mixed strategy bank run equilibrium that does not rely on sunspots may coexist with the sunspot run equilibrium previously studied in the literature. In a version of the model with multiple banks, there exist sequential equilibria that imply positive profits. However, the zero-profit contract in which runs never occur can be supported as the unique equilibrium outcome if the agents play pure strategies only and their beliefs are restricted to be consistennt with a forward induction argument.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, G21