ENTREPRENEURSHIP OVER THE LIFE CYCLE: WHERE ARE THE YOUNG ENTREPRENEURS?

Most individuals do not start a business and, if they do, they start well into their 30s. To explain these stylized facts, I estimate a dynamic Roy model with experience accumulation, risk aversion, and imperfect information about ability using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Information frictions and income risk reduce entrepreneurship by up to 40% and 35%, respectively. Entry costs and information frictions explain most of the delayed entry. Results from counterfactual policies targeting delayed entry suggest that entrepreneurship education can yield higher returns than subsidies. Fostering young entrepreneurship yields higher returns than fostering old entrepreneurship.     

A Calibrated Trade Model of Agglomeration

This paper explores just how good the idea of international agglomeration of industry can be at explaining observed economic differences between countries. An international trade model with industrial agglomeration is outlined and calibrated to real data from the world's 10 largest countries by population, in order to assess how well it can explain the gap between rich and poor countries, observed trade volumes, price differences, and other types of data. The model is revealing in showing that, given the existing location of labor, an asymmetric exogenous distribution of firms is enough to generate income disparity and other stylized facts.     

Reciprocity and matching frictions

The ability of search and matching models to replicate stylized facts—such as volatilities and correlations—has been a center of attraction over the last couple of years. This paper introduces the Akerlof (Q J Econ 97:543–569, 1982) fair wage approach into an endogenous separation search and matching model. Within a RBC general equilibrium context, we show that the efficiency wage model outperforms its benchmark Nash bargaining pendant. In particular, the model generates the empirically observed volatilities in response to a productivity shock and replicates a strong Beveridge curve. Furthermore, we derive the Solow condition in a search environment and discuss the interactions of search and efficiency wage frictions. We show that search frictions create a wedge between the optimal wage/effort solution in the search and the competitive equilibrium. The efficiency wage consideration adds an additional margin to the firm's decision problem. As effort varies over the cycle, it changes the firm's optimal response to exogenous disturbances and amplifies the response to shocks.     

ENDOGENOUS PROCYCLICAL LIQUIDITY,CAPITAL REALLOCATION,AND q

Capital reallocation is procyclical and an economic boom has a cleansing effect by shifting the distribution of firms from low quality to high quality. We explain these facts by modeling search frictions for used capital in the business cycle. The article characterizes the stochastic equilibrium analytically to prove that the liquidity and the price of reallocated capital are procyclical endogenously. We calibrate the model and construct proxies in the data for the unemployment rate of capital and the time on the market. These two variables have a strong positive relationship in both the model and the data.     

Decentralized international exchange

Abstract.  We utilize a random‐matching model to examine the relationships between market frictions and international trade. In our setting, an individual may choose to search abroad where she may have a cost advantage, but is less likely to meet potential trading partners, owing to higher market frictions. Interestingly, we find that international trade may be associated with lower welfare than autarky. We show how this is due to price distortions resulting from bargaining when there are opportunities for exchange across countries. JEL classification F10, C78, D83     

Trade-related Job Loss and Wage Insurance: a Synthetic Review

The paper seeks to promote further integration of empirical and theoretical discussions of trade and worker adjustment. From the author's recent studies of the costs of job loss, she develops a set of stylized facts of trade‐related job loss, with a focus on worker characteristics and labor market consequences. These stylized facts are relevant to any (credible) model of trade liberalization and adjustment costs. The author discusses the basic ideas of wage insurance and summarizes the few data known about how a program might work if implemented in the United States. A final section provides a list of issues for a model of trade that will be consistent with the empirical stylized facts, and sets out questions for future research.     

COMMITMENT AND COSTLY SIGNALING IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS

I propose a search model of a decentralized market with asymmetric information in which sellers are unable to commit to asking prices announced ex ante. Relaxing the commitment assumption prevents sellers from using price posting as a signaling device to direct buyers' search. Private information about the gains from trade and inefficient entry on the demand side then contribute to market illiquidity. Endogenous sorting among costly marketing platforms can facilitate the search process by segmenting the market to alleviate information frictions. Seemingly irrelevant but incentive compatible listing fees are implementable provided that the market is not already sufficiently active.     

CAN FINANCING CONSTRAINTS EXPLAIN THE ASSET PRICING PUZZLES IN PRODUCTION ECONOMIES?*

General Equilibrium asset pricing models have a difficult time simultaneously delivering a sizable equity premium, a low and counter cyclical real risk free rate, and cyclical variation in return volatility. To explain these stylized facts, this article introduces occasionally binding financing constraints that impede producers’ ability to invest. The financial frictions drive a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and firms’ internal stochastic discount factors so that the shadow value of capital is not tied to the average price of capital. The model delivers higher and more volatile asset returns during recessions as well as a counter cyclical equity premium.     

A GENERALIZED GIBRAT'S LAW*

Many economic and non‐economic variables such as income, wealth, firm size, or city size often distribute Pareto in the upper tail. It is well established that Gibrat's law can explain this phenomenon, but Gibrat's law often does not hold. This note characterizes a class of processes, one that includes Gibrat's law as a special case, that can explain Pareto distributions. Of particular importance is a parsimonious generalization of Gibrat's law that allows size to affect the variance of the growth process but not its mean. This note also shows that under plausible conditions Zipf's law is equivalent to Gibrat's law.     

CONSUMER SEARCH,PRICE DISPERSION,AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIVE PRICE FLUCTUATIONS*

This article develops a model of consumer search consistent with the evidence of substantial price dispersion and time spent shopping within countries to study international deviations from the law of one price (LOP) and relative price fluctuations. Search frictions lead firms to price discriminate across markets based on the opportunity cost of search, which depends on the local wage. With productivity and taste shocks estimated from the data, deviations from the LOP are as volatile and persistent as in the data. Fluctuations in relative wages, real exchange rates, and the terms of trade are also consistent with the data.     

CURRENCY AREAS AND MONETARY COORDINATION*

We integrate a monetary search model into open‐economy macro to analyze the gains from coordinating on inflation. Search frictions and local congestion lead to a determinate exchange rate between two currencies. Relative prices deviate from the law of one price. Because the deviations depend on the cross‐country differential in money growth, each country is tempted to inflate to exploit the deviations. Policy coordination reduces inflation and improves welfare for all countries. In contrast to traditional models, the gains from coordination continue to exist even after each country optimally sets a direct tax on the foreign use of the country's currency.     

The impact of trade agreements on world export prices

This paper uncovers new stylized facts on the relation between economic integration and world trade prices. Using free on board export price data for the universe of manufacturing products, we show that a country's membership in the WTO (World Trade Organization) or in a PTA (Preferential Trade Agreement) is associated with an increase in export prices of differentiated goods. For the WTO, this effect is captured by the countries that were subject to rigorous WTO accession procedures. We also exploit the importance of the depth of a PTA and of its different provisions. Whereas the effect of the depth per se is not significant, individual provisions evoke distinct effects on prices. In particular, we find that PTAs with provisions on investments are associated with higher export prices. The results are consistent with theoretical models that relate competition to the innovation behavior of firms.     

In search of welfare-improving gifts

Gift giving is thought to decrease welfare. Recipients are sometimes stuck with gifts they would not have purchased because the giver does not perfectly know the recipient's preferences and in-kind gifts cannot be costlessly refunded. Such gifts are welfare reducing compared to giving cash if, in addition, recipients possess full information as to which stores carry their desired goods and the ability to reach these stores costlessly. We replace these two latter assumptions with the more realistic assumptions of uncertainty about the location of goods and search costs. In contrast to existing economic models, gifts in our model enhance expected welfare. Moreover, gift giving cannot be replaced by a profit-maximizing trader nor the introduction of nearby specialty stores carrying gift goods. We use our model to explain a number of stylized facts about gift giving, the organization of retail trade and in-kind government transfers.     

Money and Price Dispersion

We relax restrictions on the storage technology in a prototypical monetary search model to study price dispersion. In this case, buyers and sellers enter matches with potentially different willingness to trade. Across the distribution of possible bilateral matches, prices generally will differ even though agents have identical preferences and technologies. We provide existence conditions for a particularly simple equilibrium pattern of exchange. We prove that in the limiting case where search frictions are eliminated, equilibrium prices are uniform. We also show that a higher initial money stock can raise the average price level and increase price dispersion.     

Services,innovation and the new economy

Several distinctive stylized facts form the new economy, an information technology service sector organized in network forms of organization, an inflation rate below its fundamentals, an increase in stock market volatility, high rates of economic growth, but apart from a small information technology manufacturing sector low productivity rates. This paper presents a model where the innovation of new service varieties can explain all of these facts. First, productivity gains are no longer realized within but between firms, as the increase in variety increases value-added per employee. Whilst service innovators, such as the information technology manufacturers, get ever more productive, individual service firms will exhibit low productivity. It is this unmeasured sectoral productivity gain, which is the key element in understanding the intrinsic inertia in the price index. Finally, the paper shows that variety in the service sector enables service providers to realize rents, where fluctuations of these rents are the basis of more than proportional changes in the firms' stock market value.     

Hangovers

This paper analyzes a process by which a market boom brought on by a temporary increase in the flow of buyers, can subsequently lead to a collapse of liquidity (speed of sale), prices and production to levels lower than before the onset of the boom. I consider a general model of markets subject to search frictions in the matching of buyers and sellers, where the entry of buyers and sellers (through production) are subject to adjustment costs. The resulting co-movement between unemployment, inventories and sales with the production cycle matches the stylized facts.     

Rational dictators and the killing of innocents: Data from Stalin’s archives

We posit a rational choice model of dictatorship to explain the tendency of dictators to repress innocent citizens. This model demonstrates that, when the quality of information about regime enemies is low, a rational dictator will knowingly kill and imprison citizens who are not real enemies. We use the formerly secret Stalin archives to test this proposition against the stylized facts of Stalin’s three major repressions.     

Identifying foreign suppliers in U.S. import data

Relationships between firms and their foreign suppliers are the foundation of international trade, but data limitations and reliability concerns make studying such relationships challenging. We evaluate and enhance supplier information in U.S. import data and present new facts about importer–exporter relationships. Count of foreign exporters from U.S. import data tends to exceed those from source country data, especially from China. The pattern of U.S. imports from origin countries changes substantially by tracing trade back to the supplier's location instead. Related‐party relationships trade more, while larger countries have more relationships.     

Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: An inversion result

I consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. If the seller observes the buyer?s valuation (symmetric information), bilateral trade is trivially efficient. If the seller cannot observe the valuation (asymmetric information), bilateral trade is inefficient. This bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market. In the steady-state equilibrium of the market game, the relation between the informational regime and efficiency is inverted: With small frictions efficiency obtains if information is asymmetric. If information is symmetric, however, the trading outcome can be very inefficient—even if frictions vanish.     

Temporary and permanent migrant selection: Theory and evidence of ability‐search cost dynamics

We integrate two workhorses of the labor literature, the Roy and search models, to illustrate the implications of migration duration—specifically, whether it is temporary or permanent—for patterns of selection. Consistent with our stylized model, we show that temporary migrants are intermediately selected on education, with weaker selection on cognitive ability. In contrast, permanent migration is associated with strong positive selection on both education and ability, as it involves finer employee–employer matching and offers greater returns to experience. Networks are also more valuable for permanent migration, where search costs are higher. Labor market frictions explain observed network–skill interactions.