Evaluating the sustainability of Italian public finances

Are Italy’s primary-surplus policies compatible with the sustainability of government debt? We address the question by examining historical budget data in post-unification Italy, from 1861 to 2016. Controlling for temporary output, temporary spending and world war-time periods in assessing whether primary surpluses significantly reacted to changes in debt, we find the following results: (i) the hypothesis of nonlinearity in the surplus-debt relationship significantly outperforms the hypothesis of linearity; (ii) there exists a threshold level in the debt-GDP ratio, approximately equal to 105 percent, above which Italian fiscal policy makers are concerned with corrective actions to avoid insolvency; (iii) the robustly positive reaction of primary surpluses to debt beyond the trigger point ensures fiscal sustainability.     

Sovereign default risk,debt uncertainty and fiscal credibility: The case of Brazil

Since Credit Default Swaps spreads reflect the sovereign risk and, thus, the uncertainties related to government solvency, the goal of this study is to examine the relation between sovereign risk and debt uncertainty (measured by the disagreement in expectations about public debt) in an important developing country – Brazil. Furthermore, the paper analyzes whether fiscal credibility plays a key role in mitigating the effect of debt uncertainty on sovereign risk. The results suggest the disagreement in expectations about public debt affects the sovereign risk, and fiscal credibility plays a twofold role, it reduces sovereign risk, and it mitigates the effect of debt uncertainty on sovereign risk. Besides, quantile regression estimates reveal that fiscal credibility improvements are even more important when sovereign risk levels are higher.     

欧洲主权债务危机的根源、影响及警示意义

自2009年以来,欧洲国家的主权债务问题一直被全球资本市场所关注,以PIIGS五国（希腊、西班牙、葡萄牙、爱尔兰、意大利）为代表的南欧多个国家的债务问题浮出水面,不仅引发了全球金融市场的剧烈波动,同时危及到整个欧元区乃至全球经济的稳定。本篇文章深入分析了欧洲主权债务危机的形成根源及影响,并揭示债务危机对各国的警示意义     

Sovereign credit rating: Evidence of bias against poor countries

We assess whether credit rating agencies limit poor countries’ sovereign credit ratings. Consistent with prior studies, our heterogeneous middle-inflated ordered probit model indicates a statistical bias stacked against poor countries whenever their fundamentals change. This is important, as second-generation crisis models suggest that such biases can have self-fulfilling consequences.     

Myopic governments and welfare-enhancing debt limits

This paper studies welfare effects of a soft borrowing constraint on sovereign debt. The constraint is modeled as a proportional fine per unit of debt in excess of a specified reference value, resembling features of the Stability and Growth Pact. Sovereign debt is the result of myopic fiscal policy. It reduces welfare in the absence of lump-sum taxes. The paper shows that the borrowing constraint enhances welfare by reducing long run debt. In an economy calibrated to a generic OECD country, the maximum attainable welfare gain of debt consolidation, which is induced by imposing the optimally parameterized constraint, amounts to 0.5% in terms of consumption. The short run welfare costs of the constraint, which arise from restricting the use of debt to smooth taxes, are quantitatively negligible.     

Financial stability indicators and public debt developments

This paper investigates the inter-linkages between financial stability and fiscal policy. It analyzes the effect of selected financial stability indicators on the probability of future debt deterioration, controlling for several macroeconomic variables. We find significant evidence that a fragile banking system can put at risk public finances. Weak bank profitability, low asset quality and a weak capital base increase the fragility of the banking system, thus, raising the probability of future fiscal troubles.     

Public debt management and private financial development

In several developing countries, high and rising public debt is an important source of vulnerability. Strengthening debt management is a priority, but its effects on domestic economies have been hardly analyzed. This paper asks whether better public debt management could have spillover effects on the private sector, leading to more (and more stable) private capital flows and domestic credit. This is a relevant question in a context of financial deepening and increasing private capital inflows, which could be prone to episodes of bonanza, sudden stops and crises. Our results, based on a sample of developing countries, show positive spillover effects from better public debt management to private capital inflows and domestic financial deepening.     

Finite lifetimes,long-term debt and the fiscal limit

The U.S. faces exponentially rising entitlement obligations. I introduce a fiscal limit—a point where higher taxes are no longer a feasible financing mechanism—into a Perpetual Youth model to examine how intergenerational redistributions of wealth, the average duration of government debt, and entitlement reform impact the consequences of explosive government transfers. Three key findings emerge: (1) Growing government transfers cause more severe and more persistent stagflation than in representative agent models that do not capture intergenerational transfers of wealth; (2) A longer average duration of government debt pushes the financing of government liabilities into the future and reduces the short-run impacts of explosive transfers; (3) The time it takes the economy to rebound from a period of growing transfers increases exponentially with the number of years it takes to pass entitlement reform.     

INDEPENDENT FISCAL AGENCIES

Abstract.  There has been a considerable literature regarding the incentives of policymakers as a prime reason for persistent fiscal deficits and a variety of fiscal rules have been proposed as a remedy. However, the often inadequate flexibility of rules and the success of policy delegation in the monetary realm have motivated a small but growing number of studies that suggest delegating some aspects of fiscal policy to what will here be called 'independent fiscal agencies'. This paper surveys the related literature with a focus on three aspects: the motivation for the establishment of such agencies; their potential design; and the experience with these types of institutions.     

Economic policy uncertainty and cost of debt financing: International evidence

Prior research shows that economic policy uncertainty affects a wide range of corporate financial decisions; however, there is little research on the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and cost of debt financing across countries. In this paper, we argue that economic policy uncertainty affects cost of debt financing through two mechanisms including information asymmetry and default risk. With a sample of 163,243 firm-years across 17 countries from 2003 to 2016, we find that economic policy uncertainty positively affects cost of debt financing and this effect is stronger during the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009. Moreover, our research findings show that large firms’ debt financing cost is less affected by economic policy uncertainty.     

Banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union without central bank intervention

We analyze the conditions of emergence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis within a monetary union in which: (i) the central bank is not allowed to provide direct financial support to stressed member states or to play the role of lender of last resort in sovereign bond markets, and (ii) the responsibility of fighting against large scale bank runs, ascribed to domestic governments, is ensured through the implementation of a financial safety net (banking regulation and government deposit guarantee). We show that this broad institutional architecture, typical of the Eurozone at the onset of the financial crisis, is not always able to prevent the occurrence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis triggered by pessimistic investors’ expectations. Without significant backstop by the central bank, the financial safety net may actually aggravate, instead of improve, the financial situation of banks and of the government.     

Market drivers of sustainability and sustainability learning capabilities: The moderating role of sustainability control systems

This study examines (i) the impact of market drivers of sustainability on the adoption of sustainability learning capabilities and (ii) the moderating role of sustainability control systems (SCS) on the relationship between market drivers of sustainability and sustainability learning capabilities. Drawing on the levers of control framework, stakeholder theory and organisational learning literature, survey data were collected from 175 large scale local and multinational companies operating in Sri Lanka. Findings reveal that market drivers of sustainability have a significant positive impact on sustainability learning capabilities. Whereas the interactive use of SCS shows a positive moderating impact, the diagnostic use of SCS shows a negative impact. The study enhances our understanding of (i) the influence of market drivers of sustainability on the adoption of sustainability learning capabilities and (ii) the use of SCS in enabling sustainability learning capabilities. The study reveals novel insights for managers responding to changing market drivers of sustainability, on how to (re)align different uses of SCS to enable sustainability learning capabilities.     

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Sovereign Bond Risk

Governments around the world are tackling the COVID-19 pandemic with a mix of public health, fiscal, macroprudential, monetary, and/or market-based policies. We assess the impact of the pandemic in Europe on sovereign CDS spreads using an event study methodology. We find that a higher number of cases and deaths and public health containment responses significantly increase the uncertainty among investors in European government bonds. Other governmental policies magnify the effect in the short run as supply chains are disrupted. Moreover, an increased debt-to-GDP ratio significantly boosts the cumulative abnormal change of CDS spreads, which indicates that investors are concerned about countries that are too indebted and thus have a limited capacity to intervene and provide fiscal stimuli and emergency fiscal packages to businesses and households.     

Rational asset pricing bubbles and debt constraints

Rational price bubble arises when the price of an asset exceeds the asset’s fundamental value, that is, the present value of future dividend payments. The important result of Santos and Woodford (1997) says that price bubbles cannot exist in equilibrium in the standard dynamic asset pricing model with rational agents facing borrowing constraints as long as assets are in strictly positive supply and the present value of total future resources is finite. This paper explores the possibility of asset price bubbles under endogenous debt constraints induced by limited enforcement of debt repayment. Equilibria with endogenous debt constraints are prone to have infinite present value of total resources. We show that asset price bubbles are likely to exist in such equilibria. Further, we demonstrate that there always exist equilibria with price bubbles on assets in zero supply.     

On predictive distributions of public net liabilities

The analysis of the sustainability of public sector finances requires an accounting of all future revenues and all future spending that we would expect, under current tax laws and current entitlements. The classical calculation does not acknowledge the inherent uncertainty of the future economic and demographic developments, so the results can be misleading. Our aim is to produce a more robust summary of the sustainability of the public sector than the one currently available. By taking a forecasting point of view, our formulation takes into account the uncertainty of future productivity, stock and bond markets, and demography. Methodological complications that arise in the stochastic setting are discussed. Estimates of the relative roles of economics and demographics in the uncertainty of public net liabilities are presented.     

Credit default swaps and sovereign debt markets

This study investigates the link between the price discovery dynamics in sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) and bond markets and the degree of financial integration of emerging markets. Using CDS and sovereign bond spreads, the price discovery mechanism was tested using a vector error correction model. Financial integration is measured using news-based methods. We find that sovereign CDS and bond markets are co-integrated. In five out of seven sovereigns (71%), the bond market leads in price discovery by adjusting to new information regarding credit risk before CDS. In 29% of times, CDS markets are the source of price discovery. We also find a positive correlation of 0.67 between the degree of financial integration and the bond market information share. The evidence suggests that changes in sovereign credit risk and bond yields are significantly influenced by common external (global) factors, while country-specific factors play an insignificant role.     

The effects of formal and informal CEO power on debt policy persistence

We explore the general trends of debt policy persistence and how formal and informal CEO power may influence the persistence based on four dimensions of debt policy. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2008–2018, we clearly identify, for the first time, that the general trends of debt policy persistence include an initial downward trend phase (of 4–5 years) and a subsequent stable trend phase. We divide CEO power into formal and informal CEO power and find that CEOs’ formal power can help to increase debt policy persistence, while the role of informal power is the opposite, providing evidence that CEO power has a double-edged effect on debt policy persistence. Further, our results show that the most important dimensions through which formal and informal CEO power have their respective effects are ownership power and financial expert power. Lastly, it is CEOs’ formal power rather than their informal power that plays a dominant role in promoting the persistence of debt policy.     

The euro and developing country finance: A survey

More than eight years after the introduction of the euro, impacts on developing countries have been relatively modest. Overall, the euro has become much more important in debt issuance than in official foreign exchange reserve holdings. The former has benefited from the creation of a large set of investors for which the euro is the home currency, while demand for euro reserves has been held back by the dominance of the dollar as a vehicle and intervention currency, and the greater liquidity of the market for US treasury securities. Fears of further dollar decline may fuel some shifts out of dollars into euros, however, with the potential for a period of financial instability.     

Moral hazard,debt overhang and capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of managerial moral hazard on the debt overhang of a firm by constructing a contingent claims model in which the manager faces costly effort. Using a calibrated capital structure model, we show that the costs of debt overhang become more serious in the presence of managerial moral hazard. Such costs even account for more than half of the total agency costs at a high level of cash flow. Moreover, in contrast to the results of Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the leverage ratio and investment opportunities of a firm, which is caused by managers’ moral hazard. Finally, by considering this moral hazard, we also show the coexistence of low leverage ratios and high credit spreads, which explains the phenomenon of “low debt levels and high credit spreads” observed in practice.     

Excessive risk taking and the maturity structure of debt

This paper analyses the effect of short term debt on equityholders' risk taking decisions. We show that if short term debt limits the expropriation of debtholders, it also implies a lower leverage, which prevents the firm from increasing tax shields. We then examine the incentive of equityholders to increase the firm risk when debtholders hold the option to swap a perpetual coupon bond with short term debt. We find that this option mitigates equityholders' risk shifting incentives. Compared to standard short term debt, this restructuring option deters debtholders expropriation, it increases leverage and it reduces the loss in tax shields due to asset substitution.