The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America,Sub‐Saharan Africa,and Transition Countries*

Most of the empirical studies that analyze the impact of corruption on investment have three common features: they employ country‐level data on investment, corruption is measured at the country level, and data for countries from several regions are pooled together. This paper uses firm‐level data on investment and measures corruption at the firm and country level, and allows the effect of corruption to vary by region. Our dependent variable is firms' investment growth and we employ six measures of corruption from four different sources—two firm‐level measures and four country‐level measures. We find that the effect of corruption on investments varies significantly across regions: corruption has a negative and significant effect on investment growth for firms in Transition countries but has no significant impact for firms in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa. Furthermore, for Transition countries, corruption is the most important determinant of investment.     

Intervention, Corruption and Capture: The Nexus between Enterprises and the State

We study the nexus between enterprises and the state in transition countries, using new enterprise survey data. We examine the quality of governance, state intervention in enterprise decision-making, state benefits to firms, and corruption payments. The quality of governance varies both across countries and across different dimensions of governance within countries. Economic reform improves governance in countries with a low degree of 'state capture' by vested interests, but not in high-capture countries. Despite reform, state intervention in firm decisions continues, but it varies substantially across firms. At the micro level (within a country), there is clear substitution between the degree of state intervention, state benefits to firms, and corruption payments, which is consistent with a bargaining model of politicians and firms. But at the macro level (across countries) these elements are complementary, suggesting that politicians, perhaps under pressure from captor firms, have some control over the scope of regulation and intervention.     

Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence

Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth. Using industry-location averages to circumvent potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that of taxation. This provides some validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than taxation.     

Entry of foreign firms and the R&D behaviour: a panel data study of domestic and foreign firms in China's manufacturing sector

Rapid globalization has resulted in increased competitive pressures. The entry of foreign firms in a host economy increases the level of competition faced by not only the domestic firms but also the existing foreign firms. We argue that domestic firms, especially in developing countries, respond to this situation by increasing their research and development (R&D) spending, whereas the foreign firms decrease their R&D spending. By making use of firm-level panel data from China's manufacturing sector, over the period 2005–2007, this paper investigates the impact of the entry of foreign firms on R&D behaviour of domestic and foreign firms. Empirical analysis, based on Tobit and Instrumental Variables Tobit regression, reveals that foreign entry increases the R&D intensity of domestic firms but its impact on R&D intensity of foreign firms is negative. The estimated results are found to be robust across balanced and unbalanced panels.     

The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the currents of trade

This paper examines how criminalizing the act of bribing a foreign public official affects international trade flows using a watershed global anti-corruption initiative — the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. I exploit variation in the timing of implementation by exporting countries and in the level of corruption of importing countries to quantify the Convention's effects on bilateral exports. I use a large panel of country pairs to control for confounding global and national trends and shocks. I find that, on average, the Convention caused a reduction in exports from signatory countries to high corruption importers relative to low corruption importers. In particular, we observe a 5.7% relative decline in bilateral exports to importers that lie one standard deviation lower on the Worldwide Governance Indicators corruption index. This suggests that by creating large penalties for foreign bribery, the Convention indirectly increased transaction costs between signatory countries and high corruption importers. The Convention may have induced OECD firms to divert their exports to less corrupt countries; while non-OECD firms not bound by the Convention may have increased their exports to corrupt countries. I also find evidence that the Convention's effects differed across product categories.     

The role of corruption and risk aversion in entrepreneurial intentions

The literature on entrepreneurship has suggested that an individual’s entrepreneurial intention depends on three types of factor: personal characteristics, the individual’s expertise and professional background, and external factors. Our study investigates how corruption, an external factor, and risk aversion, a personal characteristic, may simultaneously affect individuals’ entrepreneurial intentions. With data on 76 203 individuals in 53 countries, our estimation results indicate that risk aversion decreases the individual’s probability of having an entrepreneurial intention by 6.67 percentage points. In addition, an increase in 1 SD in the perceived level of corruption in a country decreases the individual’s probability of having an entrepreneurial intention by 0.96 percentage points.     

Climate,diseases, and the origins of corruption

It has been commonly observed that tropical countries tend to suffer from intense corruption and underdevelopment. This study provides an explanation for this long-standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central hypothesis is that UV-R is positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This helps shape the worldwide distribution of corruption by affecting the incumbents' window of opportunity. Using data for up to 139 countries, I consistently find empirical support for the positive relationship between UV-R and corruption. The main findings withstand accounting for numerous alternative explanations for international differences in corruption levels. Employing individual-level data from the World Values Survey, I document suggestive evidence that exposure to UV-R is linked to surveyed respondents' tolerance towards corrupt activities. Furthermore, a subnational analysis for China lends credence to the cross-country evidence.     

Country governance,corruption, and the likelihood of firms’ innovation

Using a sample of firms from the World Bank Enterprise Survey for the period 2006–2016 in emerging and developing countries, we find that corruption has a negative impact on the likelihood of innovations, thus supporting the “sanding-the-wheels” hypothesis. Our empirical results also show that corruption at the firm level, in the manufacturing industry, and in regions with the worst governance or that are more corrupt has a significant negative effect on innovation. In addition, country governance plays a particularly important role in innovative activity for corrupt firms. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and control of corruption in order to improve firms’ innovation within an environment of corruption.     

Exporting to fragile states in Africa: Firm‐level evidence

This study analyses the effect of fragility in destination markets on firm export behavior and the role of firm size in mediating adverse outcomes. The analysis is conducted using firm transaction data on Kenyan exports to Africa over the period 2004–2013. The analysis reveals that fragility negatively affects a firm's decision to enter a given destination market, reducing Kenya's bilateral trade flows to African countries. Larger firms are more resilient to destination shocks in fragility and are less likely to exit. These results are robust to alternative measures of destination fragility, and the exclusion of bordering countries and the East African Community partner states. Our analysis reveals that the effect of business fragility (regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and control of corruption) dominates that of political fragility (voice and accountability, rule of law, and political stability), although both effects are negative and significant.     

The impact of electricity prices on foreign direct investment: evidence from the European Union

We examine the impact of electricity price variation on net FDI (%GDP) inflows in countries of the European Union. We use panel data of 27 EU countries for a period of 2003 – 2013. We show that electricity prices of south-western and north-eastern EU countries did not converge to one price until now. Dynamic panel data analysis using system GMM shows that besides unit labour costs, tax rates and competitive disadvantage in secondary education, also higher electricity prices reduce countries’ ability to attract FDI. The immediate effects are statistically significant across both sub-regions analysed: in the short run, a 10% increase in electricity prices leads to a decrease in net FDI inflows as a share of GDP by 0.4 percentage points for the south-western and 0.33 for the north-eastern region. In the long run, the response is 0.60 percentage points for south-western and 0.48 for north-eastern regions. Policies should aim at reducing electricity market price differences on the European level through investment in transborder transmission capacity; reductions in FDI, when environmental policy increases after-tax electricity prices, should be countered by other tax reductions as well as harmonization of property rights, absence of corruption and labour market regulations at best-practice level.     

Governance during Social Transformations: Challenges for Africa

The governance advice that is offered to Africa usually identifies a list of ‘good governance’ goals like stable property rights, a rule of law, low corruption and government accountability as preconditions for development. These goals are difficult to implement not only because they are expensive public goods but in addition their enforcement is typically at variance with powerful interests in the political settlements of developing countries. The historical evidence and much institutional theory suggests that during their social transformations successful developing countries had a different set of ‘developmental’ or ‘growth-enhancing’ governance capabilities that enabled their states to support critical property rights transformations and assist firms in acquiring and learning to use new technology. The institutions and policies they used differed because their political and institutional starting points were different. There are therefore no blueprints for Africa or anywhere else, but certainly the good governance menu is unrealistic. Rather African countries have to experiment and develop institutional and policy solutions that work in their context and which are appropriate for transforming property rights and accelerating technology adoption.     

Are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth?

While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their interaction has not. We develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects, but act as substitutes in doing so. The substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent; conversely, financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it. We test this substitutability by predicting growth, of countries and industries, using measures of financial development, lack of corruption, and a key interaction term. Both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor, as well as to a substitutability between them. The growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0.63–1.68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th. The results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers, omitted variables, or other theories of growth and convergence.     

Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities

We investigate the determinants of the efficiency of firms with a focus on the role of corruption. We construct a simple theoretical model where corruption increases the factor requirements of firms because it diverts managerial effort away from factor coordination. We then exploit a unique dataset comprising firm-level information on 80 electricity distribution firms from 13 Latin American countries for the years 1994 to 2001. As predicted by the model, we find that more corruption in the country is strongly associated with more inefficient firms, in the sense that they employ more inputs to produce a given level of output. The economic magnitude of the effects is large. The results hold both in models with country and firm fixed effects. The results survive several robustness checks, including different measures of output and efficiency, and instrumenting for corruption. Other elements associated with inefficiency are public ownership, inflation, and lack of law and order, but corruption appears to play a separate and more robust role.     

Effects of regulatory burden and corruption on firm performance: Evidence from Moldova

Firms in Moldova face a high level of regulatory burden, as proxied by the number of inspections by public authorities. At the same time, they face high levels of corruption. We examine the effect of frequent inspections on four measures of firm performance: labour and total factor productivity, and levels of tangible and intangible assets. We also investigate how corruption affects the relationship between inspections and firm performance. We perform panel data analysis using firm-level administrative data and survey data from Moldova in 2005–2015. The results show that inspections and corruption each affect firm productivity negatively, but corruption moderates the negative effect of inspections. We also find that inspections and intangible assets are positively correlated, but this correlation is weaker for higher levels of corruption. Finally we examine whether these results differ by industry, firm size and ownership types. Inspections and corruption affect medium and large firms, and state-owned enterprises differently from micro and small firms and private firms respectively.     

中国地区腐败对民营企业国有化的影响

本文使用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。     

How Bad is Corruption? Cross‐country Evidence of the Impact of Corruption on Economic Prosperity

Most people today would argue that corruption is bad for countries' economic development. Yet, we still lack a reliable empirical estimate of the effect. This study addresses the econometric shortcomings of the literature and provides an estimate of the causal impact of corruption on gross domestic product per capita across countries. Certain dimensions of a country's culture are used as instruments for corruption. These instruments stay strong when the other deep determinants of economic development, geography, and the remaining dimensions of institutions and culture are controlled for. In the process of choosing controls, however, the entire set of variables available in the Quality of Governance online database (QOG) that includes all central variables from the literature on institutions and culture are included. It is found that corruption does exert a significant and negative impact on countries' productivity levels.     

Determinants of firms’ investment behaviour: a multilevel approach

This article investigates the determinants of firms’ investment behaviour using firm data from 101 developing and emerging economies. A substantial number of firms does not invest in fixed capital or invests little relative to sales revenue. Using a multilevel probit model we study what factors trigger investment, and using a multilevel Heckman selection model we study what factors influence a firm’s investment-to-sales ratio. We find that firms’ investment behaviour has relatively little dependency on a country’s macroeconomic setting. Additionally, we find that, on average, firms that are completely foreign-owned have a relatively lower investment-to-sales ratio. Finally, we find evidence which suggests that the probability of investing is higher for firms located in countries with more control of corruption and we find some evidence which suggests that partially foreign-owned firms located in countries with relatively less corruption have a relatively higher investment-to-sales ratio.     

Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption? : Cross-country quantile regression estimates

We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.     

Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption?: Cross-country quantile regression estimates

We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.     

LEGAL CORRUPTION

We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the elite does not face any binding incentives to limit corruption; one centered around legal corruption, where the elite must incur a cost to legally protect corruption; and finally a no‐corruption outcome, where the population is able to effectively react to corruption. Testable implications from the model are derived based on country‐wide parameters. Crucially, we use a rich corporate survey, including 8,279 firms in 104 countries, tailored for this research, and featuring measures of legal corruption that are novel to the literature. The microdimension of the database enables improving on familiar shortcomings associated with the use of endogeneity‐prone, country‐wide indices of perceived corruption. The empirical results, making use of a broad range of proxies and sources, generally validate the model's explanations.