公共品供给的政府效率解及其条件分析

传统经济理论认为,在任何一个集体中,因任何一种公共品的成本分摊与收益分享,都普遍存在着\"搭便车\"者的个人理性行为以及由此导致的集体非理性的结局———人人都无\"车\"可搭的\"公共\"悲剧,断言公共品供给是市场失败的领域,必须由政府替代。用斯密的市场秩序概念来处理所有的私人品,用霍布斯的主权国家概念来处理所有的公共品,也是市场经济国家资源配置制度安排的普遍选择。我认为,\"搭便车\"或经济人理性行为是合乎公理的经济学假设,但\"搭便车\"问题并不一定非由政府强制来解决不可。从理论上说,公共品的供给存在政府效率解,但政府效率解有严格的约束条件,公共品供给中的政府职能与政府失灵也都是相对于其效率条件以及满足这些条件的程度而言的。     

Cognition and Extended (NSNX) Rational Choice: Some Early Results

The paper sketches a neoDarwinian model of cooperation, which is then used to analyze archived data from two prominent series of public goods experiments. Each of three tests supports a conjecture drawn from the model, but also reveals a cognitive complication. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

We compare a partners condition , where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game, to a strangers condition , where subjects play this game in changing group formations. From the first period onward, subjects in the partners condition contribute significantly more to the public good than subjects in the strangers condition. Strangers' contributions show continual decay, while partners' contributions fluctuate on a high level prior to decreasing in the final periods. We interpret subjects' behaviour in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future-oriented and reactive behaviour.
JEL classifications: C 91; C 92; H 41     

Is it Harmful to Allow Partial Cooperation?

In economics, politics and society, examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e., they can collude with a subset of agents. Several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no-cooperation situation. Our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results. We find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad. Our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods.
JEL classification: C 72; E 62; J 5     

中国公共品供给制度的缺陷分析

中国公共品供给制度的显特征是政府调节是其公共部门的过度垄断,市场机制及私人部门和第三部门在公共品供给中的参与程度较低。因公共品供给过程中垄断代替了竞争,单一的政府调节和公共生产,导致公共部门规模膨胀,财政负担过重,公共咨询配置效率低下,公共品供给不足以及寻租行为猖獗,腐败现象蔓延等诸多积重难解的问题。本在简要回顾中国公共品供给制度变迁的历史过程的基础上,着重分析中国现行公共品供给制度的缺陷及其成因,理出中国公共品供给制度创新的基本思路。     

On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.JEL Classification: C91, C92     

国际合作、外部性与全球性公共品融资

全球性公共品存在供给不足,而融资是其中的一个重要环节。从全球性公共品融资的特点与存在的问题、国际合作的视角、外部性观点出发,分析了全球性公共品融资的相关机制,对目前的融资状况作了简要评论。     

农村社区公共物品的农户自愿供给——基于声誉理论的分析

农户的声誉不仅能给农户带来直接效用,它还具备信息效应与资本效应,对农户参与农村社区公共物品供给博弈的均衡路径产生重要影响。在独立博弈下,声誉的直接效用能使农户采取合作行动;在关联博弈和重复博弈中,声誉的信息及资本效应对农户的偷懒行为有很强的约束,将导致博弈进入合作均衡。因此基于声誉损益的考虑,由农户自愿供给农村社区内的公共物品会是一个有效的结果。     

Feminist economics as a Postmodern Moment

Wicksell saw economics as a way to effect social change. In addition to academic writings, he produced a steady stream of pamphlets, newspaper editorials, and public lectures that brought theoretical economics to bear on social policy. In this paper, consideration is given to this wider variety of Wicksell's writings, and his unanimity rule for public goods decision making is examined within the context of his social philosophy. We argue that the unanimity rule, rather than being narrowly focused on efficiency concerns, operated as a practical mechanism to achieve Wicksell's larger goal of social justice. This stands in contrast to the interpretation of Wicksell commonly presented in the public choice literature.     

农村公共品供给主体重构研究

伴随着农村综合配套改革过程中的基层政权职能转换,我国农村公共品供给中出现主体缺失、公共服务出现真空等现象,农村基层组织不适应新阶段新体制的矛盾凸现。应科学界定农村公共品的供给范围,结合目前农村的组织创新,建立政府、农村合作经济组织、农村公益组织、农村自治组织等主体在内的分工明晰、有效合作的农村公共品和公共服务供给体系。     

试探公共产品最优供给规模及效率的模型与方法——在测度政府层级条件下

借用分级条件下政府供给公共产品最优规模的模型和政府供给公共产品的数据包络分析（DEA）模型,为量化政府供给公共产品的效率提供理论依据;同时,根据IMD测度政府效率的指标体系和国内相关的研究和实践,政府供给公共产品效率分析应采用DEA的方法。     

加强城市公共物品供给的对策探讨

在我国城市化加速发展的今天,切实加强对于城市公共物品的供给,必将对国民经济发生重要的拉动作用。在此,笔者从对城市公共物品的理论界定、供给主体的选择、城市公共物品的效应等方面进行论述的基础上,提出了加强城市公共物品供给的对策     

全球公共物品理论研究

全球公共物品理论为全球化问题的解决提供了新思路。然而,中国的学术界对于全球公共物品理论的理解,还存在莫衷一是的现象,并倾向于把全球公共物品理论与国际公共物品理论混为一谈。这不仅制约了全球公共物品理论运用的效果,也影响了该理论的发展。为此,本文通过对全球公共物品理论和国际公共物品理论的辨析,提出了应该从三个维度来理解和认识全球公共物品理论的观点,进而对全球公共物品理论对传统公共物品理论的拓展问题进行了研究,旨在为全球化问题的解决提供正确的理论基础。     

军事化训练可以促进团队合作吗?——来自公共物品实验的证据

本文采用实验经济学的方法,选取军校及普通高校大一和大四的学生作为研究对象,通过单轮公共物品实验,考察军事化训练对团队合作的影响。结果显示,军事化训练显著提高团队的初始合作态度。军校大四学员的合作水平显著高于军校大一学员,而地方高校大一与大四学生的合作水平没有显著差别。同时,地方高校大一学生与军校大一学员的合作水平没有显著差异,排除了军校学员的自我选择因素。     

公共物品自发供给与个体的偏好异质性效应分析

考察一期同时行动时,个体的偏好差异对公共物品自发供给的影响。模型在对数柯布-道格拉斯效用函数的基础上,设定了反映偏好(偏好差异量)程度的参数,分析个体们的总收入在未达到和越过公共物品生产的最小捐赠水平两种均衡状态下,个体的最佳决策及偏好异质性效应。研究结果表明:个体的偏好差异对公共物品产出的作用依赖于成员们的收入预算开支与公共物品固定成本的比较,“U”型曲线之说不合适。