The performance of female hedge fund managers

Using data for the period 1994–2013, we examine the return and risk-taking behavior of hedge funds having at least one female portfolio manager and funds that have all female portfolio managers. Funds with all female managers perform no differently than all male-managed funds and have similar risk profiles. For single-style funds, those with mixed teams of both genders underperform male-only funds on both a raw and risk-adjusted basis, although mixed funds incur less risk and their Sharpe ratios do not differ. For funds of funds, both all-female and mixed funds have similar performance to male-managed funds. We then consider the failure rate across all fund styles. Funds with at least one female manager fail at higher rates, driven by difficulty in raising capital—these funds are smaller and are less likely to be closed to new investment. Surviving funds with at least one female manager have better performance than male-managed surviving funds, consistent with the idea that female managers need to perform better for their funds to survive. Yet, female-managed surviving funds have fewer assets under management than surviving male-managed funds. Using media mentions as a proxy for investor interest, female-managed funds receive proportionately less attention. Our results suggest that there are no inherent differences in skill between female and male managers, but that only the best performing female managers manage to survive.     

Recession managers and mutual fund performance

We find that fund managers who began their careers during recessions produce superior returns. This superior performance is not unconditional, as they exhibit better market timing than their non-recession counterparts in recessions, but do not demonstrate better stock picking in booms. Exploring managers' portfolio choices across years, we find that recession managers tilt their investments towards defensive, rather than cyclical, industries during and before recession periods. Overall, our findings support the argument that the economic conditions under which an individual initially entered the labour market exert a long-term impact on her career outcomes and decision-making.     

Unskilled fund managers: Replicating active fund performance with few ETFs

This paper uses Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) instead of risk factors as benchmarks to examine active mutual fund performance distribution. While transaction costs are included in the ETF returns, that is not true regarding risk factors, making it more challenging to characterize extraordinary performances via alphas. Assessments are based on the estimation of the skilled funds proportion defined by Barras et al. (2010). After evaluating several ETF combinations, we conclude that sets of 3 to 5 ETFs replicate most levels of active fund performance. Finally, we propose specific ETF selection algorithms, whereby we estimate that 95% of active management funds fail to generate value for their investors. Alphas calculated with ETFs are higher than those using risk factors, and the difference is similar to the transaction costs required for investing in risk factor portfolios (Frazzini et al. (2012)).     

The impact of prior performance on the risk-taking of mutual fund managers

We analyze the impact of prior performance on the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers. We contribute to the existing literature by using different measures of risks, a larger data set, and an econometric approach capturing non-linear effects and assigning exact probabilities to the mutual fund managers’ adjustment of behavior. We find that prior performance in the first half of the year has, in general, a positive impact on the choice of the risk level in the second half of the year. Successful fund managers increase the volatility, the beta, and assign a higher proportion of their portfolio to value stocks, small firms, and momentum stocks in comparison to unsuccessful fund managers. Unsuccessful fund manager increase, on average, only the tracking error. We thank an anonymous referee, Bernd Brommundt, Alexander Ising, Stephan Kessler, Axel Kind, Angelika Noll, Jennifer Noll, Ralf Seiz, Stephan Süss, Rico von Wyss, and Andreas Zingg for valuable comments. We acknowledge helpful comments of the participants from the Joint Research Workshop of the University of St. Gallen and the University of Ulm in 2005.     

When active fund managers deviate from their peers: Implications for fund performance

This paper proposes that the extent to which mutual fund managers’ beliefs deviate from the ex ante unobservable representative beliefs of their peers contains information about their skill. A new measure based on portfolio allocations, peer deviation, is used to capture a fund manager’s divergence from the contemporaneously unobservable beliefs of her peers. The portfolio based on representative beliefs of a group of managers investing in similar assets outperforms passive benchmarks, indicating that they reflect informed beliefs. Fund managers who simultaneously arrive at portfolio selections which, in hindsight, are close to those implied by representative beliefs possess ex ante more skill and exhibit future outperformance. Copycat strategies replicating lagged portfolio holdings implied by representative beliefs outperform the actual portfolio holdings of funds that deviate most, but the outperformance dissipates after two quarters.     

Duration of poor performance and risk shifting by hedge fund managers

A typical hedge fund manager receives greater compensation after strong performance but does not lose compensation after weak performance, and therefore might take on more risk for the second half of the year after poor returns in the first half. We refer to this as “risk shifting.” However, continual risk shifting over a long period would likely make the fund too volatile to attract investors. We find that hedge funds with poor first-half-year performance do tend to increase risk during the second half-year. The effect is larger for funds that began the year “under water” and for smaller funds. The effect is smaller, however, if the poor performance lasts long.     

The timing ability and global performance of Tunisian mutual fund managers: A multivariate GARCH approach

It is well-established in the financial literature that the global performance of mutual fund managers is the result of two skills: selectivity and market timing. This paper examines whether the multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) approach improves our perception of the global performance of fund managers compared with the unconditional approach and the conditional approach based on instruments. We find strong evidence that the multivariate GARCH method makes mutual fund performance looks better relative to the existent approaches, but this improvement in the global performance does not mean necessarily that mutual funds outperform traditional benchmarks. Indeed, mixed mutual funds yield neutral performance relative to benchmarks, whereas bond mutual funds generate significant positive global coefficients. The strong performance of bond fund managers comes from their ability to pick profitable bonds, not from their ability to time the market. Also, the empirical tests highlight that the best (worst) bond funds in the past remain at the top (bottom) of the ranking in the following years. These findings suggest that the Tunisian bond market presents strong opportunities for sophisticated investors.     

Performance persistence of experienced mutual fund managers

This study examines the performance of 93 fund managers over the 10 year period 1986 through 1995 using relative percentile ranks based on quarterly compounded, annual total returns measured against funds with the same investment objective. On average, managers with 10-year track records at the same fund do not perform better than managers with shorter track records. Also, for these experienced managers, superior performance in one five-year period is not predictive of superior performance over the next five years. However, inferior performance persists, particularly for funds with above average expense ratios.     

Dynamic portfolio strategy by loss-averse fund managers facing performance-induced fund flows

In a continuous-time framework, we establish an optimal dynamic portfolio strategy for a loss-averse fund manager facing performance-induced fund flows. Using the martingale approach, we derive closed-form solutions to both the optimal terminal value and optimal dynamic strategy of the fund under management. The model shows that the loss-averse manager strives to earn high returns in good market conditions at the risk of losing all investments at the terminal date in bad market conditions. The prospect of higher fund inflows induced by superior performance motivates fund managers to take more aggressive investment strategies, increasing the fund's risk exposure, whereas the prospect of fund outflows due to underperformance has no impact on the fund manager's investment decision. While the prospect of higher fund inflows increases dynamic optimal wealth as well as optimal terminal wealth in good market conditions, in bad market conditions, it reduces dynamic optimal wealth and results in a higher chance of a complete loss at the terminal date. Finally, a manager with a higher degree of loss aversion tends to take a conservative investment strategy with a lower risk exposure especially in bad market conditions, leading to a lower dynamic and terminal wealth in good market conditions and also a lower chance of a complete loss in bad market conditions.     

The use of technical analysis by fund managers: International evidence

The use of technical analysis by financial market professionals is not well understood. This paper thus analyzes survey evidence from 692 fund managers in five countries, the vast majority of whom rely on technical analysis. At a forecasting horizon of weeks, technical analysis is the most important form of analysis and up to this horizon it is thus more important than fundamental analysis. Technicians are as experienced, as educated, as successful in their career and largely just as overconfident in decision-making as others. However, technical analysis is somewhat more popular in smaller asset management firms. What we find most significant is the relation of technical analysis with the view that prices are heavily determined by psychological influences. Consequently, technicians apply trend-following behavior.     

Investment dynamics of fund managers under evolutionary games

We investigate the investment behavior of fund managers in financial markets according to evolutionary dynamics. We consider both the absolute and relative portfolio returns in the payoff gradient, to which the fund managers respond, and find the equilibrium proportion of risky investment. Compared to the case where only relative performance affects the payoff gradient, we find that, as the absolute performance affects the managers’ belief, the equilibrium of long and short positions increases. If short sales are not allowed, negative excess returns will force the managers to stay out of the market until the excess return becomes positive. Furthermore, we use a quadratic function to depict the relative performance. The quadratic setting captures the exaggerated sentiments of winners and losers arising from certain behavioral biases, and leads to a lower speed of convergence, which implies that herding decelerates and the managers are likely to adhere longer to their own strategies.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Timing is money: The factor timing ability of hedge fund managers

This paper studies the level, determinants, and implications of the factor timing ability of hedge fund managers. We find that approximately 34% of hedge funds display factor timing ability on at least one factor over the full sample, concentrated especially at the market, size, and bond factors. Better factor timing skills are on average related to funds that are more experienced and more flexible, but the cross-factor heterogeneity is considerable. Factor timing is associated with outperformance; the top factor timing funds outperform the bottom factor timing funds with a significant 4.32% per annum. Timing skills, though, do not directly lead to higher net flow.     

Stock preferences and derivative activities of Australian fund managers

The present paper examines both the characteristics of stocks that fund managers prefer to hold and their use of derivatives. We find strong evidence that fund managers prefer large, liquid and low volatility stocks. Weak evidence exists that fund managers prefer to hold stocks that are past winners. In relation to derivatives, just over half of the sampled Australian fund managers hold derivatives in the form of exchange traded options. Of those that do trade in derivatives, it is found the level of exposure to stock price movements achieved by options is not significant relative to the total investment portfolio.     

Trades of the living dead: Style differences, style persistence and performance of currency fund managers

We make use of a new database on daily currency fund manager returns over a three-year period, 2005–2008. This higher frequency data allows us to estimate both alpha measures of performance and beta style factors on a yearly basis, which in turn allows us to test for persistence. We find no evidence to support alpha persistence; a manager’s alpha in one year is not significantly related to his alpha in the prior year. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for style persistence; funds that rely on carry, trend or value trading or with a long/short bias toward currency volatility are likely to maintain that style in the following year. In addition, we are able to examine the performance of managers that survive through the entire sample period, versus those that drop out. We find significant differences in both the investment styles of living versus deceased funds, as well as their realized alpha performance measures. We conjecture that both style differences and ineffective market timing, rather than market conditions, have impacted performance outcomes and induced some managers to close their funds.     

The persistence of European mutual fund performance

This paper examines the performance and persistence in performance of style-consistent European equity mutual funds between 1988 and 2010. Using a large survivorship bias-free sample for six European countries, we document strong evidence of persistence in benchmark-adjusted returns over 1-year time periods as well as over longer periods. We find statistically and economically significant performance persistence for time horizons of up to 36 months, although persistence is much more pronounced for the top and bottom performers. Thus, past performance of European mutual funds have explanatory power for future performance and investors can obtain useful evidence from past performance data.     

Mutual fund performance and fund prospectus clarity

We conduct a cross-sectional examination of the writing clarity (readability) of mutual fund prospectuses from 20 major US mutual fund families. We focus on the language in the objective/strategy and principal risks sections, using Flesch scores and word counts to measure writing clarity. There is considerable variation in readability among funds and fund families. Flesch readability scores do not vary across fund objective, but within funds, risk discussions are more clear than are discussions of objective/strategy. Generally, the readability of a fund's risk discussion is lower for load funds than no-load funds, and readability increases with fund size and beta and decreases with raw and risk-adjusted three-year returns.     

Unobserved ties between corporate executives and mutual fund managers

After corporate executives relocate from origin firms to destination firms, only 3.6 percent of mutual fund managers follow the departing executives: they divest from origin firms while initiating investments in destination firms. This phenomenon is more pronounced for those funds that earned superior returns from investments in the origin firms, and that demand more information regarding the destination firms. Further, comigration funds’ holding changes in destination firms more accurately predict cumulative abnormal returns around earnings announcements than do their investments in other stocks and non‐comigration funds’ new investments. Hiring the migrating executives does not improve the destination firms’ operating performance.     

Overseas equity analysis by UK analysts and fund managers

This paper examines how UK-based analysts and fund managers cope with international differences in financial reporting systems when analysing overseas equities. This subject has become increasingly important given the internationalisation and institutionalisation of equity markets. Our results indicate that there is a substantial reliance on sources other than the annual report by both groups when analysing overseas companies. We also find considerable variation in the approach to analysing equities internationally. In particular, we find evidence that there is greater reliance on alternative sources to accounting information (such as other foreign analysts) in countries characterised as having weak equity markets. Finally, we examine the coping mechanisms that analysts and fund managers employ when analysing overseas securities, including reliance on locally based analysts, use of non-accounting information, use of more familiar accounting standards and re-stating accounts to a more familiar basis.     

Implicit incentives and reputational herding by hedge fund managers

Several theories of reputation suggest that managers' incentives affect their propensity to engage in herding behavior. This paper investigates these theories by tracking hedge fund managers' herding behavior over their careers. I first examine managerial incentives for herding, and show that more senior managers that deviate from the herd have a significantly higher probability of failure and do not experience higher fund inflows than their less-senior counterparts. These implicit incentives should encourage managers to herd more as their careers progress. I find strong support for this hypothesis: using a number of proxies for herding, I show that more experienced managers herd more than less-experienced managers. Finally, I examine performance differences between more and less-experienced managers, and find that while more experienced managers underperform less-experienced managers, this underperformance does not appear to be caused by differences in herding. Overall, these results are in direct contrast with studies of mutual fund managers, reflecting important difference in implicit incentives between the two industries.