总经理继任对创新可持续性的影响

创新活动具有较高调整成本,因而保证创新可持续性对中国企业发展意义重大。以2006-2014年A股制造业上市公司为样本,分析了总经理继任对创新可持续性的影响,并考虑了产品市场竞争和期望绩效反馈的情境效应。实证结果显示：总经理继任对创新可持续性具有负向影响;产品市场竞争越激烈,总经理继任对创新可持续性的负向作用越强;当企业实际绩效低于期望绩效时,产品市场竞争的负向调节作用更为显著;然而,在实际绩效高于期望绩效的情况下,产品市场竞争的负向调节作用被减弱。     

New evidence on the sources of EU countries’ productivity growth—industry growth differences from R&D and competition

Recent studies on productivity growth show how competition affects innovation and TFP growth in OECD countries, but do not explicitly account for sectoral parameter heterogeneity. This paper examines whether competition and innovation have a direct effect on labor productivity growth in EU goods-producing industries separated by three different industry types. The results show that the effect of R&D on labor productivity growth is not equal across industries, but rather depends on the innovation activities of sectors. The same is true for competition and labor productivity growth. The empirical evidence indicates that in unleveled industries (i.e. industries characterized by technologically unequal firms) like Specialized Goods Suppliers and Science-Based Innovators strong labor productivity growth originates with decreased competition and increased R&D, thereby supporting Schumpeterian arguments. The findings suggest Schumpeterian effects in Supplier-Dominated Goods-Producing Industries, but reveal decreasing labor productivity growth in these sectors when competition is strongly restricted.     

科技创新体系的动力机制设计

本文运用演化经济学、组织知识管理等方法,对科技创新体系进行动力设计。该体系原动力是人的需要和利益追求,竞争和环境波动会增强这些原动力;惰性、既得利益者以及路径依赖构成体系内在惯性;两者的制衡维体系平衡,创新意识是体系的导向。体系在微观、行业和宏观分别表象为企业对环境波动的适应性反馈、合作竞争形成的制度网络、国家的宏观控制和超国界的科技合作。体系具有系统性、风险性、路径依赖性和制度性等特征。     

Russian Business Interests and the Enlarged European Union

The European Union is Russia's most important partner in foreign economic activities. With its eastward enlargement in 2004 the European Union has—not only in geographical terms—moved even closer to Russia. It should be expected that strong economic ties cause Russian business interests to influence related matters of foreign policy. This study therefore starts by identifying Russian business interests vis-a-vis the EU. Apart from those businesses already heavily involved in transactions with the EU, businesses with ambitious plans for future engagement and businesses which face heavy competition from EU companies are also included. In a second step these business interests are then analysed in detail. The specific interests of Russian companies are depicted to establish the points of conflict with EU positions. The article then describes how Russian companies lobby their government in order to gain support and how the Russian government reacts. The result is a more detailed assessment of the role of Russian business in Russia's policy towards the EU.     

Does China’s emissions trading system foster corporate green innovation? Evidence from regulating listed companies

Carbon emissions trading system is expected to be both efficient and flexible in carbon reduction through green innovation. As the world’s largest CO₂ emitter, China has launched the emissions trading system (CN-ETS) since 2013 in 7 pilot areas and vowed to build a nation-wide system in the second half of 2017. This study provides preliminary evidence on the impact of the CN-ETS on green innovation and the moderating role of market competition on this relationship at the firm level. Based on data of regulating listed companies in seven pilots, the results show that CN-ETS is significantly positively correlated with green innovation, and market competition weakens the positive relationship, indicating that CN-ETS is effective in the aspect of green innovation, and the effect would be better in less competitive markets.     

企业产学研主体地位对创新绩效的影响

构建产学研深度融合的技术创新体系,加速推进企业高质量发展是我国当前阶段的重要任务。基于陕西省112家企业问卷调查数据,探讨企业产学研主体地位对企业创新绩效的影响,并分析吸收能力在企业产学研主体地位对创新绩效影响的中介作用,以及政策支持、市场竞争在上述影响过程中的调节作用。结果表明,企业产学研主体地位对企业创新绩效具有显著正向影响;吸收能力中介了这一正向关系;政策支持加强了企业产学研主体地位对企业吸收能力的正向作用,而市场竞争强化了企业吸收能力对企业创新绩效的正向作用。研究结论可为企业产学研协同管理实践、国家产学研创新体系完善发展提供借鉴和参考。     

非正规部门竞争与企业创新行为关系研究

非正规部门快速发展在缓解中国就业压力、满足低端需求和促进经济增长的同时,对中国制造业企业经营带来了很大影响。基于2012年世界银行营商环境调查数据,分析非正规部门灰色竞争对中国制造业企业创新活动的影响。研究发现：非正规部门灰色竞争显著增加企业研发投入倾向和研发投入强度;灰色竞争与企业产品创新活动有显著正相关关系,但未发现与企业流程创新活动有显著关系;制造业中高新技术企业创新活动受非正规部门灰色竞争的影响相对较弱。用工具变量控制内生性后,以上结论依然成立。为了应对非正规部门的灰色竞争,制造业企业应不断强化研发投入,通过模仿创新和微创新的方式加速产品更新升级,以区分于非正规部门的产品。     

Technology and international competitiveness

This article analyses the structure of trade and trade performance of the largest six OECD economies in the 1980s. The article is concerned in particular with the role of technology and innovation and the relationship between specialization in sectors of high, medium or low technology intensity and trade performance. It assesses the argument that the maintenance of international competitiveness requires the advanced economies to become internationally competitive, and to specialize, in higher technology sectors, given that there is increasing competition, especially from newly industrializing countries in low technology products. Section I considers the theoretical basis of this hypothesis; Section II assesses whether it is compatible with data on manufacturing trade performance in the 1980s.     

经营期望落差是否促进了企业探索性创新

经营期望落差是大部分企业可能面临的问题，但这种情况能否激发企业探索性创新尚无定论。以2013—2018年A股制造业高新技术企业数据为样本，对企业经营期望落差与探索性创新关系，以及产品市场竞争和技术多样性对于二者的调节效应进行检验。实证结果表明：经营期望落差往往会抑制企业探索性创新；产品市场竞争、技术多样性在经营期望落差和探索性创新间起显著负向调节作用，即促进经营期望落差状态下企业探索性创新；产品市场竞争和技术多样性之间存在联合情境效应，相比于低强度的市场竞争，激烈的产品市场竞争更能增强技术多样性对于经营期望落差和探索性创新关系的调节作用。结论对于深入理解业绩落差与探索性创新之间的关系，探究企业创新策略选择制约因素具有一定意义。     

Innovation and economic performance in services: a firm-level analysis

This paper explores the two-way relationship between innovationand economic performance in services using a longitudinal firm-leveldataset which matches data from the second Community InnovationSurvey, CIS II (1993–95), against a set of economic variablesprovided by the System of Enterprise Accounts (1993–98).The results presented show that innovation is positively affectedby past economic performance and that innovation activities(especially investments in ICTs) have a positive impact on bothgrowth and productivity. Furthermore, productivity and innovationact as a self-reinforcing mechanism, which further boosts economicperformance. These findings provide empirical support for theendogenous nature of innovation in services and the presencein this sector of competition models and selection mechanismsbased on innovation.     

供应链间横向竞合战略对信息共享与创新绩效的影响研究

以往对供应链信息共享的研究较多,但以供应链间横向竞合战略作为前因变量、以创新绩效作为结果变量的研究相对较少。通过构建供应链间横向竞合战略、信息共享与创新绩效关系理论模型,对广东省163家制造企业进行了问卷调查,利用结构方程模型对竞合战略、信息共享与创新绩效的关系进行了实证研究。将信息共享分为信息共享内容和信息共享质量两个维度,将创新绩效分为工艺创新和产品创新两个维度。结果表明：竞争与合作对创新绩效均有显著正向影响,合作相对于竞争而言对创新绩效的影响作用更大;竞争与合作均可通过信息共享间接作用于创新绩效;合作对信息共享具有显著正向影响,而竞争对信息共享和合作均有显著负向影响。     

质量管理实践对企业创新绩效的影响——市场竞争强度的调节作用

质量管理实践是促进还是阻碍企业创新绩效提升,学界至今仍存在较大分歧。区别于传统质量管理实践的界定，基于组织学习理论，既考虑组织内外部因素的影响，也考虑与创新相关的应用式与探索式学习类型，对质量管理实践重新进行划分，并将企业创新细分为产品创新与过程创新。在此基础上，构建质量管理实践与企业创新绩效关系的概念模型，引入市场竞争强度作为调节变量，提出相关假设，运用198个制造业企业有效数据进行实证检验。研究表明：质量管理实践对企业创新绩效具有显著正向作用；探索式质量管理实践相较于应用式质量管理实践，对企业创新绩效有更强的正向作用；市场竞争强度在4种质量管理实践与企业产品创新绩效和过程创新绩效的影响关系中具有不同调节效果。     

Do interest groups reward politicians for their votes in the legislature? Evidence from the great recession

ABSTRACT

Interest groups lobby politicians in various ways to influence their policy decisions, especially, their voting decisions in the legislature. Most, if not all, of the studies on this issue examine ”pre-vote” lobbying activities of interest groups that occur before politicians vote in the legislature. In this paper, however, I examine ”post-vote” lobbying activities of interest groups that occur after politicians vote in the legislature. By using data on the amount of monetary contributions given by interest groups to the members of the U.S. House of Representatives who have served in the 109th (2005–06) through 111th (2009–10) Congress, I find evidence that voting in favour of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, one of the most significant pieces of legislation and possibly the biggest government bailout in U.S. economic history, has increased the amount of monetary contributions that politicians receive from the interest groups in the financial sector after the passage of the EESA. I also discuss two reasons for such post-vote lobbying and find empirical evidence for one of them.     

经济改革和宪政转轨

该文研究经济改革和宪政转轨之间的关系,论证国家之间和国家内部不同政治力量间的竞争是宪政转轨的推动力量.通过对俄罗斯和中国的例证,该文分析了两种转轨模式下的特征和问题.结论是,在政治垄断下的经济转轨将被国家机会主义所挟持.经济转轨双轨制产生了宪政转轨的非常高的长期代价,大大超过它赎买既得利益平滑转型的短期好处.经济转轨是后社会主义国家的制度与WTO规则下的全球经济趋同的过程,而不是创造一个本质上不同的制度的创新过程.     

专利战略情境下企业技术知识基础多元度对创新绩效的影响效应

在当今竞争格局中,专利是技术创新的重要载体,专利战略必然成为企业参与全球竞争的重要手段。通过建立专利战略情境、技术知识基础多元度及知识整合能力对创新绩效的影响效应模型,采用负二项回归法进行实证检验。研究结果显示：企业技术知识基础多元度通过知识整合能力影响创新绩效,而专利申请动机在上述过程中存在显著调节作用。具体为：(1)国际市场开拓、谈判筹码以及声誉动机均负向调节技术知识基础相关多元度与创新绩效关系;(2)阻挡动机、国际市场开拓、谈判筹码以及声誉动机对企业技术知识基础非相关多元度与技术创新绩效关系具有显著负向调节作用;(3)阻挡动机强化了企业技术知识基础相关多元度与技术创新绩效之间的正向关系。     

国际化双元效应有利于提升中国跨国企业创新绩效吗——东道国管制制度调节视角

我国企业国际化经营活动呈现明显的探索与利用兼顾的双元特征。为研究两种国际化活动平衡与联合对企业创新绩效的影响，从组织双元理论和制度理论出发，通过对403个中国跨国企业样本数据进行分层回归发现：探索性国际化与利用性国际化平衡维度和联合维度对企业创新绩效均有显著正向影响，企业资源在探索性国际化与利用性国际化中的分配越均衡，两种国际化活动水平越高，越有利于企业创新绩效提升。东道国管制制度对这一关系起调节作用，随着东道国管制制度水平提升，平衡维度和联合维度对企业创新绩效的正向效应增强。研究结论可为利用性国际化和探索性国际化理论划分提供实证证据，丰富并细化制度理论在国际化领域的应用研究，对我国跨国企业有一定的实践启示。     

Political constraints to growth in an economic union

This paper studies the political economy of growth in an economic union such as the EU. In the spirit of Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti [Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F., 2006a, Distance to frontier, selection and economic growth, Journal of the European Economic Association, 4:1, 37–74; Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., and Zilibotti, F., 2006b, Growth, development and appropriate versus inappropriate institutions, mimeo MIT.], as the economy approaches the world technology frontier, structural reforms that increase competition in intermediate goods sectors are necessary to boost innovation and productivity growth. Reforms, however, raise the opposition of incumbents and, therefore, are politically difficult to implement. When there are important cross-border policy spillover effects, national governments are more easily captured by vested interests, as they fail to internalize the benefits of reforms on the rest of the union. In this situation, productivity growth may be sluggish and the economy can fail to converge to the frontier. On the other hand, when policy is chosen by a union government (or a collective body that takes into account union welfare), the internalization of spillovers raises the perceived benefit of reforms and, consequently, lowers the ability of lobbies to obtain high levels of protection.     

Join hands or walk alone? Evidence on lobbying for trade policy in India

Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.     

Collective vs. individual lobbying

This paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities.     

欧盟合并控制竞争执法中创新损害问题研究

创新是欧盟竞争法中重要的非价格竞争要素之一，在分析企业合并对创新的影响时，欧盟委员会传统上主要从与特定及明确产品市场相关联的潜在竞争角度进行评估。近几年的执法实践表明，欧盟竞争执法范围已经扩展到具有动态性的创新竞争领域，开始关注无形的创新损害，并通过个案审查逐渐在理论基础、制度依据、执法政策、分析框架和方法等方面形成相对体系化的应对方案。欧盟应对创新问题的竞争执法经验为当下我国反垄断法修订以及执法完善提供了良好参考。