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1.
Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more. 相似文献
2.
Horatiu A. Rus 《Review of International Economics》2016,24(2):364-391
Detrimental spillovers from industrial activity onto resource‐based productive sectors are very common, yet their effects remain understudied. While international trade often creates conditions for the over‐exploitation of open‐access renewable resources, it also provides opportunities for separating different productive sectors spatially. The existing literature suggests that a diversified exporter of the renewable resource good tends to lose from trade in both welfare and conservation terms as a result of over‐depletion, while the exporter of the non‐resource good gains. However, the resource stock externality of harvesting and the inter‐industry pollution externality often coexist in reality. In a small open economy framework, this paper shows that acknowledging their interaction changes the nature of the autarkic equilibrium and enriches the set of resource conservation and welfare outcomes from trade. Depending on the relative damage inflicted by the two industries on the environment, which in turn are functions of the pollution intensity and bioeconomic parameters, it is possible that the inter‐sectoral pollution externality persists and specialization in manufacturing is not optimal from a welfare perspective. 相似文献
3.
In this paper, we develop a R&D-based growth model with a pollution externality and a health production sector. We study how health-impairing pollution affects long term growth, and the effect of an emissions' reduction policy (tax). We show that a tighter environmental tax has positive effects on growth via two channels. On the one hand, it improves workers' health and, thereby, productivity; on the other hand, it induces a reallocation of resources towards R&D and, thereby, higher research intensity. The size of the growth effect of a tighter environmental tax, and the level of the optimal environmental tax, are both positively correlated with the weight individuals place on health relative to consumption. As for welfare, a tighter environmental tax brings about utility gains in the long run and, potentially, also in the short run. 相似文献
4.
The paper shows that global pollution need not rise under free trade in goods and/or emissions even in the complete absence of income effects. Differences in environmental concerns across the countries lead to differences in the pollution intensity of production and, thus, generate the possibility of increasing world output and income without increasing the world pollution by shifting the production of the polluting good from the country with higher pollution intensity of production to the country with lower one. We show that free trade in goods and/or emissions can induce precisely such a shifting of production with the country with greater environmental concern exporting the polluting good. The paper also demonstrates the possibility of a first-best international treaty on global pollution in which each country or group of countries is better-off. 相似文献
5.
Using a two‐country, two‐good model of international trade, we examine gains from trade and strategic interaction in resource management among countries that share renewable resources such as fishery stocks. Two goods are a resource good, which is the harvest of the shared stock, and some other good that may be thought of as manufactures. The productivity of the resource good depends on harvesting technology and the stock level. This paper focuses on technology standards (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas, and time) over other methods for resource management because they are most commonly implemented in fisheries. Technology standards are modeled as a restriction on the harvesting technology; that is, under strict technology standards, firms exploit resources as if they are using inferior harvesting technology. We show that an opening up of trade may reduce the shared stock and cause steady‐state utility to decrease in a resource‐good importing country and increase in a resource‐good exporting country. Strikingly, when the shared stock is in jeopardy (a high demand for the harvest), steady‐state harvest is maximized after an opening up of trade by what we call multilateral resource management in this paper and both countries gain from trade. 相似文献
6.
We consider trade between a ‘consumer’ country with an open access renewable resource and a ‘conservationist’ country that regulates resource harvesting to maximize domestic steady-state utility. In what we call the mild overuse case, the consumer country exports the resource good and suffers steady-state losses from trade, as suggested by the conventional wisdom that weak resource management standards confer a competitive advantage on domestic firms in the resource sector but cause welfare losses. Strikingly, however, when the resource stock is most in jeopardy, the conservationist country exports the resource good in steady state and both countries experience gains from trade. 相似文献
7.
Wolfram Berger 《The Scandinavian journal of economics》2007,109(2):267-290
A stochastic general‐equilibrium model is used to explore the welfare effects of optimal monetary policy and the potential benefits of policy coordination. Cross‐country perfectly symmetric shocks in the traded goods sectors and imperfectly correlated shocks in the non‐traded goods sectors are considered. In this set‐up, monetary policy may not be able to achieve efficient sectoral resource allocations within countries and avoid inefficient relative price changes across countries. Welfare gains from coordination are sizable if the shocks to the traded and non‐traded goods sectors are negatively correlated and both sectors are of roughly equal size. 相似文献
8.
Susana Ferreira 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2007,37(2):361-376
This paper presents a simple way for countries to reap the benefits of trade liberalization without exacerbating problems
of overexploitation of natural resources. In the context of a Ricardo–Viner dynamic trade model, it is shown that when a binding
quantitative restriction regulates extraction of a natural resource, free trade is optimal. This is true even if the quantitative
restriction is not optimal. In contrast, in the presence of a suboptimal tax (including a zero tax in the special case of
open access) on the use of natural resources, trade liberalization is not necessarily welfare improving. 相似文献
9.
We study the effects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium framework where production of consumption
goods requires two resource inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the
former contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which affects welfare. There is a specific research
sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths
in a decentralized economy. We go on to study the effects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the polluting
resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental policy has two main effects; it delays the extraction
of the resource and with it the level of polluting emissions and it reallocates research efforts, decreasing the amount put
into “grey” research to the benefit of “green” research. We also show that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the
short-term, and green-biased in the long-term. Finally, we compute the optimal values for these tools.
相似文献
10.
This paper examines the implications of growing international production fragmentation-induced trade in intermediate goods on environmental quality. Specifically, by making use of a general equilibrium framework, this paper explores the link between trade in intermediate goods and pollution in a setting of endogenous environmental policy. The paper shows that international trade in intermediate goods, through an increase in the number of components available to the international producers, affects the level of pollution and environmental quality. Specifically, developed countries may reduce pollution at the cost of more pollution in developing countries. 相似文献
11.
Alain-Désiré Nimubona 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2012,53(3):323-346
During the Doha Round at the World Trade Organization, reductions in trade barriers on environmental goods (EG) were put forward as a means of helping developed and developing countries alike deal with current environmental problems. We examine the potential effectiveness of such a strategy in a developing country that imports all its consumption of EG from an imperfectly competitive foreign eco-industry. We point out that trade liberalization of EG might in fact lead to less stringent pollution taxes, which can result in an actual rise in pollution levels. We then show that the environmental effectiveness objective of this trade reform can be achieved when the regulator uses quantitative abatement standards as an alternative pollution policy instrument. However, this environmental achievement comes at the expense of social welfare. 相似文献
12.
Nikos Tsakiris Michael S. Michael Panos Hatzipanayotou 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2014,58(4):563-578
We build a model of cross-border pollution between two large open economies, one importing the polluting good and the other exporting it, and derive their non-cooperative trade and environmental tax policies. We show among other things, that (1) in response to a bilateral reduction in trade taxes by both countries, the former country’s optimal policy is to lower its Nash emissions tax while the latter’s is to raise it, and (2) in response to an increase in emissions tax rates by both countries, the former country’s optimal reaction is to raise its Nash import tariff, while the latter’s is to reduce its Nash export tax. That is, in the present context, freer trade leads the exporting country to adopt stricter while the importing country laxer environmental tax policies. 相似文献
13.
Eco-Dumping, Capital Mobility, and International Trade 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A small open economy’s optimal environmental policy is studied in a model with international capital mobility and local pollution. The country produces traded as well as non-traded goods. Is it in the country’s interest to engage in ecological dumping by choosing generous pollution allowances for the traded-good sector? The answer depends decisively on the policy regime in use. Dumping is not optimal if the country ensures that the implicit rent on pollution is completely appropriated within the country. However, if the implicit factor reward on pollution leaves the country because it accrues to (foreign) owners of mobile capital, the local welfare maximizing government tends to discriminate against the traded-good sector, the opposite of ecological dumping. 相似文献
14.
In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities. 相似文献
15.
This paper examines the effects of an export tax (on a processed resource good), the number of harvesters and an afforestation policy in a small, open economy with urban unemployment. The export tax increases the urban unemployment rate, but improves the quality of the environment. Here, the optimal export tax is lower than the adjusted marginal environmental damage. Reducing the number of harvesters has a similar resource allocation effect to that of an export tax. However, the afforestation policy can resolve the trade‐off between urban unemployment and the quality of the environment and may also improve the welfare of a country. 相似文献
16.
Soham Baksi 《The Canadian journal of economics》2014,47(1):232-249
The paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries. 相似文献
17.
Akihiko Yanase 《Review of International Economics》2010,18(3):493-512
This paper examines the effects of international trade in a model with global pollution that accumulates over time because of production emissions in each country. If countries cooperatively determine their environmental policies, autarky and free trade in the absence of trade costs generate the same optimal solution. By contrast, if environmental policies are determined noncooperatively, the effects of trade on global pollution and welfare are ambiguous because policy games can result in multiple equilibria. Although trade increases both the lower and upper bounds of the pollution stock, whether trade expands the range of possible steady‐state pollution levels is ambiguous. The analysis then extends to consider trade costs. 相似文献
18.
Rögnvaldur Hannesson 《The Canadian journal of economics》2000,33(1):122-132
The Brander-Taylor small, open-economy model of trade in a renewable resource and other goods is modified to allow for diminishing returns in the other goods sector. It is shown that opening up for trade may result in steady-state gains from trade, even when there is open access to the resource and the country does not specialize fully in resource extraction. It is also shown that transition to optimal management, with price-taking behaviour, may result in a welfare loss.
Resources renouvelables et gains en provenance du commerce international. L'auteur modifie le modèle Brander-Taylor de commerce international d'une ressource renouvelable et d'autres biens dans le cas d'une petite économie ouverte afin de tenir compte des rendements décroissants dans le secteur des autres biens. On montre que I'ouverture au commerce international peut entraîner des gains en provenance de l'échange international en régime permanent, et ce même quand l'accès à la ressource est ouvert et que le pays ne se spécialise pas dans l'extraction de la ressource. On montre que dans la période de transition vers un management optimal, quand il y a ajustement aux prix de marché, il peut y avoir perte de bien-être. 相似文献
Resources renouvelables et gains en provenance du commerce international. L'auteur modifie le modèle Brander-Taylor de commerce international d'une ressource renouvelable et d'autres biens dans le cas d'une petite économie ouverte afin de tenir compte des rendements décroissants dans le secteur des autres biens. On montre que I'ouverture au commerce international peut entraîner des gains en provenance de l'échange international en régime permanent, et ce même quand l'accès à la ressource est ouvert et que le pays ne se spécialise pas dans l'extraction de la ressource. On montre que dans la période de transition vers un management optimal, quand il y a ajustement aux prix de marché, il peut y avoir perte de bien-être. 相似文献
19.
Akihiko Yanase 《Review of International Economics》2007,15(3):592-611
The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game. 相似文献
20.
William K. Jaeger 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,49(1):101-119
Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best
setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best
optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been
approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social
damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making
it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions
and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with
increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value,
the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue
recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark
models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements
rather than competes with the provision of other public goods. 相似文献