Discount window borrowing after 2003: The explicit reduction in implicit costs

In 2003, the Federal Reserve introduced primary credit as its main discount window lending program. This program replaced the adjustment credit program, which, subject to a number of restrictions, had generated a stigma associated with borrowing from the Federal Reserve. Lessening the stigma of borrowing was viewed as essential for reducing the reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve. We develop a structural model of daily borrowing. Using this model, we estimate the implicit cost associated with borrowing. Our results suggest that the stigma of borrowing is significantly reduced.     

Implications of a TAF program stigma for lenders: the case of publicly traded banks versus privately held banks

Term auction facility (TAF) was created during the financial crisis as a substitute for the Federal Reserve’s discount window, the lender of last resort. We hypothesize if TAF borrowing is viewed as a bailout then publicly traded banks would borrow relatively fewer TAF funds to avoid a bailout stigma. We find publicly traded banks did borrow less (as a percent of total assets) in the TAF program than privately held banks. Further, too-big-to-fail banks and investment banks borrowed relatively less than other publicly traded banks indicating greater levels of public scrutiny reduces borrowing under emergency government liquidity programs. We also find that publicly traded banks pledged lower quality and less liquid collateral than private banks when borrowing under the program. Our results suggest TAF provided more benefit to traditional privately held banks with strong balance sheets that were able to borrow relatively greater amounts in anticipation of either future liquidity needs as suggested by Ivashina and Scharfstein (J Financ Econ 97:319–338, 2010) or increased lending as found by Berger et al. (The Federal Reserve’s discount window and TAF programs: “pushing on a string?” Working paper, University of South Carolina, 2014).     

A note on discount rate policy and the variability of discount window borrowing

The purpose of this note is to evaluate the appropriate discount rate policy rules consistent with minimization of the variability of borrowing at the Federal Reserve discount window. In the context of Goodfriend's (1983) model of the bank borrowing decision, it is demonstrated that either a penalty rate or a subsidy rate policy will produce minimized variability of borrowing, so long as the subsidy rate adjusts point for point to changes in the value of the Federal funds rate. These policy rules are compatible with a policy procedure designed to target borrowed or non-borrowed reserves. If the Fed does not adhere to one of these specific rules, minimization of borrowing variability requires an open market procedure in which the Fed pegs the Federal funds rate.     

EFFECT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES ON BANK EQUITY RETURNS

We investigate the reaction of bank equity returns to changes in the relevant Federal Reserve (Fed) policy tool, which is the federal funds rate during periods of interest rate targeting and the discount rate during periods of reserves targeting. Three policy periods from 1974 to 1996 are investigated. We find that bank equity returns are inversely related to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool and that the degree of sensitivity of bank equity returns is conditioned on the direction of the change in the Fed policy tool. Also, we find that values of larger commercial banks and low‐capital‐ratio commercial banks are more exposed to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool. JEL classification: G11, G12, G14.     

Discount window borrowing,monetary policy,and the post-October 6, 1979 federal reserve operating procedure

A demand schedule for discount window borrowing based on profit-maximizing bank behavior is derived. A feature of non-price rationing at the discount window making longer duration borrowing more costly is shown to make lagged borrowing and expected future spreads between the Federal funds rate and the discount rate relevant to the current borrowing decision. Consequently, both the size of the coefficients in the borrowing functions as well as the form of the function itself depend on expected Fed policy toward the spread. The demand function for discount window borrowing provides the critical link by which non-borrowed reserve control affects short-term interest rates and ultimately the money supply under post-October 6, 1979 reserve targeting. The analysis suggests some reasons why the Fed has experienced difficulty in specifying, estimating, and utilizing a discount window borrowing function in the non-borrowed reserve operating procedure.     

Discount rate changes,stock market returns,volatility, and trading volume: Evidence from intraday data and implications for market efficiency

We examine the effect of discount rate changes on stock market returns, volatility, and trading volume using intraday data. Equity returns generally respond negatively and significantly to the unexpected announcements; however, the effect of expected changes on equity returns is insignificant. Furthermore, our results indicate that equity prices respond to announcements within the trading period/hour after the information release. An indication of a return reversal is too small to cover the full transaction costs. Unexpected discount rate changes also contribute to higher market volatility although the volatility is short-lived. Similarly, unexpected changes in discount rates induce larger trading volume while expected changes do not. Abnormal trading volume occurs only in period t. Our results also support the notion that unexpected changes in the discount rates impact market returns irrespective of the Federal Reserve operating procedures.     

The evolution of the Federal Reserve’s Term Auction Facility and FDIC-insured bank utilization

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

Liquidity Risk,Bank Networks,and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal loan demand was one reason for founding the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, less than 8% of state‐chartered banks joined the Fed in its first decade. Banks facing high liquidity risk from seasonal loan demand were more likely to join the Fed in its first decade. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that banks could obtain some indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers. Some banks apparently joined the Fed to pass through discount window liquidity to other banks via the interbank network.  Joining the Fed increased member banks’ lending.     

Bank-Equity returns and changes in the discount rate

The ex ante value of discount window operations is modelled as an option providing financial institutions with a right to purchase reserves at potentially below market rates of interest. The value of this option varies according to terms specified by the Federal Reserve. Changes in the value of this option are linked to the equity returns of participating banks. An empirical method is proposed to separate the signal impacts of a discountrate change from the firm-specific impacts of changes in the hypothesized option value. Evidence consistent with changes in the value of the option is reported.     

The effect of the Federal Reserve’s lending facility on PPP lending by commercial banks

We investigate whether the Federal Reserve’s Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) boosted commercial bank Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) lending. To determine whether this facility had a causal effect, we use pre-existing familiarity with the Federal Reserve’s discount window as an instrumental variable. We show that the PPPLF materially bolstered bank PPP lending and provided a meaningful funding backstop for banks that did not use the facility. Our paper is one of the first to quantitatively illustrate the effectiveness of a central bank facility as a funding backstop.     

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936–37 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment

We analyze the impact of contractionary monetary policy through increases in reserve requirements on bank lending. We compare the lending behavior of banks that were subject to the requirement increases in 1936–37, Federal Reserve member banks, to a group of banks that were not subject to the reserve increase, Federal Reserve nonmember banks. After implementing the difference‐in‐difference estimators, we find that the increases in reserve requirements did not create financing constraints for member banks and lead them to reduce lending. Therefore, the actions of the Federal Reserve concerning the required reserve ratios cannot be blamed for instigating the economic downturn of 1937–38.     

On the wealth and risk effects of commercial bank expansion into securities underwriting: An analysis of Section 20 subsidiaries

We investigate the abnormal returns and market-based risk effects of four Federal Reserve Board decisions to allow bank holding companies to engage in investment banking through Section 20 subsidiaries. Positive abnormal returns for commercial banks were observed for initial, limited powers granted by the Federal Reserve. However, authorization to engage in underwriting corporate debt and equity and subsequent expansion of potential revenues from underwritings produced negative abnormal returns and increases in risk.     

中国上市银行票据贴现业务的行业角色、运营效率与启示

2009年,中国上市银行票据承兑与贴现业务在较好地发挥支持和调节信贷投放作用的同时也获得了良好的收益。该文对中国14家上市银行2009年年度报告中披露的有关票据业务数据进行了系统的比较分析后发现,在票据产业链中中小型银行更侧重于发挥签票承兑的票源供应商的角色,大型银行更侧重于发挥票据贴现的融资供应商角色;同时,中小型银行票据贴现业务的收益率和运营效率相对较高。以此为基础,文章总结了商业银行开展票据业务的主要经营模式,并提出了票据业务发展的对策建议。     

When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation

In this paper we investigate whether inefficient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing firms when expropriation of the stock of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese banks, we find that bank loan announcements generate significantly negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. In line with this expropriation view, negative stock price reactions following bank loan announcements are concentrated in firms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we find evidence that a negative relationship between market reactions and firm vulnerability to expropriation exists only when firms borrow from the least efficient banks.     

The effect of the Federal Reserve interest rate policies on the returns of commercial banks stocks

This study uses a sample of 272 banks to examine the effect of the Federal Reserve's interest rate change on the banks’ stocks. For that purpose, two events of change in interest rate were selected. The event s tudy is used to determine abnormal returns, which are then explained by a set of financial strategies in a multiple regression model. The results seem to imply that the effect of the Federal Reserve interest rates action depends on both the magnitude of the rate change and the expected versus the actual change.     

The financial conglomerate discount: Insights from stock return skewness

Diversified banks (i.e. financial conglomerates) trade often at a discount compared to matched portfolios of specialized stand-alone banks. The existing research explains this evidence primarily with inefficiencies in the cash flow management of banks. This article analyzes the financial conglomerate discount by focusing on the role of expected returns approximated by measures of stock return skewness. Our empirical findings support the hypothesis that diversified banks have less skewed stock returns, i.e. they are more likely to perform badly than non-diversified banks. Due to the lower skewness exposure investors demand higher future returns, thereby lowering corporate value. Although the conglomerate puzzle is observed across industries, the previous literature examines banks separately, as the financial industry is hardly comparable to other sectors. We follow this field of research and show that huge banks quote at a discount as diversification into investment banking activities affects negatively the corporate performance.     

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FEDERAL FUNDS CASH AND FUTURES MARKETS

The introduction of futures contracts did not alter the regularity in the cash market that results from the Federal Reserve regulation of the bank-settlement process. Although we find a positive preholiday effect in the Fed funds futures returns, we do not find evidence that Federal Reserve regulations cause that effect. Contrary to previous observations for other futures contracts, we find Fridays and preholidays have the largest net volume. We suggest this finding of high volume is consistent with hedging activity by financial institutions before market closings.     

Bank loan supply responses to Federal Reserve emergency liquidity facilities

The Federal Reserve injected unprecedented liquidity into banks during the recent crisis through the discount window and Term Auction Facility. We examine the use and effectiveness of these facilities. We find that recipient banks increased their lending overall, both short- and long-term, and in most loan categories. The facilities resulted in enhanced lending at expanding banks and reduced declines at contracting banks. Small banks increased small business lending and large banks increased large business lending. There were no significant changes in loan quality or loan contract terms by either large or small banks.     

MODELS OF STOCK MARKET PREDICTABILITY

I briefly review the success of past studies purporting to explain equity valuations and predict future equity returns. The Campbell‐Shiller mean reversion models are contrasted with an expanded version of the so‐called Federal Reserve model. At least from 1970 to 2003, Federal Reserve–type models did somewhat better at predicting long‐horizon returns than did a mean reversion model based on dividend yields and price‐earnings multiples. However, timing investment strategies based on any of these prediction models do no better than a buy‐and‐hold strategy. Although some predictability of returns exists, there is no evidence of any systematic inefficiency that would enable investors to earn excess returns.