Joining a Queue or Staying Out: Effects of Information Structure and Service Time on Arrival and Staying Out Decisions

We study a class of single-server queueing systems with a finite population size, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking or reneging. In contrast to the predominant assumptions of queueing theory of exogenously determined arrivals and steady state behavior, we investigate queueing systems with endogenously determined arrival times and focus on transient rather than steady state behavior. When arrival times are endogenous, the resulting interactive decision process is modeled as a non-cooperative n-person game with complete information. Assuming discrete strategy spaces, the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution for groups of n = 20 agents is computed using a Markov chain method. Using a 2 × 2 between-subject design (private vs. public information by short vs. long service time), arrival and staying out decisions are presented and compared to the equilibrium predictions. The results indicate that players generate replicable patterns of behavior that are accounted for remarkably well on the aggregate, but not individual, level by the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution unless congestion is unavoidable and information about group behavior is not provided.JEL Classification: C71, C92, D81     

Habit,aggregation and long memory: evidence from television audience data

Many economic outcomes appear to be influenced by habit or commitment, giving rise to persistence. In cases where the decision is binary and persistent, the aggregation of individual time series can result in a fractionally integrated process for the aggregate data. Certain television programmes appear to engender commitment on the part of viewers and the decision to watch or not is clearly binary. We report an empirical analysis of television audience data and show that these series can be modelled as I(d) processes. We also investigate the proposition that temporal aggregation of a fractionally-integrated series leaves the value of d unchanged.     

Adjusting the model to adjust the world: constructive mechanisms in postwar general equilibrium theory

Economic methodologists most often study the relations between models and reality while focusing on the issues of the model's epistemic relevance in terms of its relation to the ‘real world’ and representing the real world in a model. We complement the discussion by bringing the model's constructive mechanisms or self-implementing technologies in play. By this, we mean the elements of the economic model that are aimed at ‘implementing’ it by envisaging the ways to change the reality in order to bring it more in line with the model. We are thus concerned mainly not with the ways to change the model to ‘fit’ the reality, but rather with the model's own armature that is supposed to transform the world along theoretical lines. The case we study is Arrow–Debreu–McKenzie general equilibrium model. In particular, we show the following: gradient methods and stability could be regarded as constructive mechanisms of general equilibrium modeling in the context of market socialism debates; the obsession of general equilibrium theorists with these concepts can be partly explained by the fact that they hoped not to be faithful to reality, but rather to adjust it to fit the theoretical model; mechanism design theory initiated by the stability theorist Leonid Hurwicz could be seen as a successor of this position. We conclude by showing the relevance of this analysis for epistemic culture of much of contemporary economics and hence, claim that it is an important complement to the traditional philosophy of economic modeling.     

Unfolding Social Hierarchies

Consider a large population of finitely-lived agents organized into n different hierarchical levels. Every period, all those placed at each level are randomly matched to play a given symmetric game. Based on the resulting outcome, a ρ-fraction of agents who (within their own level) attain the highest payoffs are promoted upwards. On the other hand, newcomers replacing those who die every period enter at the lowest level and choose irreversibly the strategy to be played for the rest of their life. This choice is made, with some noise, by imitating one of the strategies adopted at the highest level.  In this setup, the unique long-run behavior of the system is fully characterized for the whole class of 2×2 coordination games and two alternative variations of the model. The results crucially depend on the key “institutional” parameters ρ and n. In particular, it is shown that inefficient behavior prevails in the long run (even when risk-dominated) if promotion is only mildly selective—high ρ—and the social system is quite hierarchical—large n. In a stylized manner, these parameter conditions may be viewed as reflecting a sort of institutional deficiency that impairs economic performance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C73, D72.     

Equilibrium without prices: A central issue in pareto’smanuale

Pareto in hisManuale asserts that the price concept is inessential for the notion of equilibrium. This view deeply contrasts with the Arrow-Debreu’s dominant approach of Walrasian derivation. This identifies general equilibrium with a system of prices at which the decentralized choices of economic agents match. In this paper the author justifies and gives substance to the Paretian point of view. The differential merit of the Paretian approach is its independence of assumptions of price taking and of convexity in preferences and in production possibility sets. These assumptions are necessary, in the walrasian framework, only to maintain the centrality of prices, but they clash against the request of realism. (JEL:BOO, D51, D60)     

Petty corruption

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium. I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful conversation.     

An Arrears Crisis and Stabilization Failure in a Transition Economy

The paper addresses the problem of the arrears crises in transition economies using a war-of-attrition type dynamic game of incomplete information. Analysis of the sequential equilibrium of the game reveals how a representative firm's perception of the government's ability to enforce adjustment to the announced stabilization program affects the firm's decision whether to adjust or to postpone adjustment and fall into arrears. An extension of the basic model is used to explore the opportunity for the government to signal its commitment to a tight monetary policy by applying for an IMF loan.J. Comp. Econom., December 2000, 28(4), pp. 665–699. University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada.     

Random belief equilibrium in normal form games

In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust.     

The complete removal of individual uncertainty: multiple optimal choices and random exchange economies

Summary. The aim of this paper is to develop some measure-theoretic methods for the study of large economic systems with individual-specific randomness and multiple optimal actions. In particular, for a suitably formulated continuum of correspondences, an exact version of the law of large numbers in distribution is characterized in terms of almost independence, which leads to several other versions of the law of large numbers in terms of integration of correspondences. Widespread correlation due to multiple optimal actions is also shown to be removable via a redistribution. These results allow the complete removal of individual risks or uncertainty in economic models where non-unique best choices are inevitable. Applications are illustrated through establishing stochastic consistency in general equilibrium models with idiosyncratic shocks in endowments and preferences. In particular, the existence of “global” solutions preserving microscopic independence structure is shown in terms of competitive equilibria for the cases of divisible and indivisible goods as well as in terms of core for a case with indivisible goods where a competitive equilibrium may not exist. An important feature of the idealized equilibrium models considered here is that standard results on measure-theoretic economies are now directly applicable to the case of random economies. Some asymptotic interpretation of the results are also discussed. It is also pointed out that the usual unit interval [0,1] can be used as an index set in our setting, provided that it is endowed together with some sample space a suitable larger measure structure. Received: September 14, 1998; revised version: January 6, 1999     

Implementation in Economic Environments with Incomplete Information: The Use of Multi-Stage Games

This paper shows that, in economic environments with incomplete information, incentive compatibility and a preference reversal condition are sufficient for implementation in sequential equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D71, D82.     

Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!

We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed.     

Public policies as specification errors

Treating public policies as computable dynamic general equilibrium model specification errors offers computational and conceptional advantages for comparing models with data. The set of policies calculated to rationalize observed behaviors raises the substantive economic question whether, in any particular market, actual public policies sufficiently coincide with the model's behavior-rationalizing policies, or whether the model offers correct hypotheses about the determinants of demand and supply. As illustrations, public policies are calculated to rationalize, with respect to the stochastic neoclassical growth model, capital market behavior since WWII and labor market behavior in 1929–1950. One conclusion is that capital taxation drives a wedge between consumption growth and the expected pre-tax capital return, in the direction and amount predicted by the theory, and that capital taxation is the major intertemporal distortion in the postwar capital market. Second, a good theory of the Great Depression labor market must explain why measured MRS and MPL diverged so dramatically in 1929–1933 and why the wedge persisted.     

Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria

We show that every N-player K ₁ × ... × K _N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K × ... × K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games. We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.”     

Testing for the Presence of a Tremble in Economic Experiments

The classical trinity of tests is used to check for the presence of a tremble in economic experiments in which the response variable is binary. A tremble is said to occur when an agent makes a decision completely at random, without regard to the values taken by the explanatory variables. The properties of the tests are discussed, and an extension of the methodology is used to test for the presence of a tremble in binary panel data from a well-known economic experiment.     

Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games

Amechanismfor a Bayesian gameGis a mapping μ from the set of states of nature to the set of players' actions. μ isself-fulfillingif players are truthful at the communication stage and, given the information revealed by μ, no player can gain in unilaterally deviating from the action prescribed by the mechanism. We investigate the properties of self-fulfilling mechanisms and we show in particular that they correspond to inert solutions of the infinitely repeated game generated byG. We also discuss applications to market games, regulation, and R&D games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72.     

Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant

In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly against nonsignatories determine their emissions in a dynamic setting defined in continuous time. A numerical simulation shows that a bilateral coalition is the unique self-enforcing IEA independently of the gains coming from cooperation and the kind of strategies played by the agents (open-loop or feedback strategies). We have also studied the effects of a minimum participation clause finding that for this case a self-enforcing IEA just consists of the number of countries established in the clause.JEL Classification: C73, D62, Q28 Corresponding author : Santiago J. RubioThis paper is based on chapter four of Begoña Casinos Ph. Dissertation. Financial support from the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under grant BEC2000-1432 and Fundación BBVAis gratefully acknowledged. We also appreciate the helpful comments of three anonymous referees, whose suggestions improved the paper. Regarding any remaining inadequacies, the usual caveat applies.     

COHERENCY AND COMPLETENESS OF STRUCTURAL MODELS CONTAINING A DUMMY ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE*

Let y be a vector of endogenous variables and let w be a vector of covariates, parameters, and errors or unobservables that together are assumed to determine y. A structural model y=H(y, w) is complete and coherent if it has a well‐defined reduced form, meaning that for any value of w there exists a unique value for y. Coherence and completeness simplifies identification and is required for many estimators and many model applications. Incoherency or incompleteness can arise in models with multiple decision makers, such as games, or when the decision making of individuals is either incorrectly or incompletely specified. This article provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the coherence and completeness of simultaneous equation systems where one equation is a binomial response. Examples are dummy endogenous regressor models, regime switching regressions, treatment response models, sample selection models, endogenous choice systems, and determining if a pair of binary choices are substitutes or complements.     

China's interest in a revaluation of the yuan 1

This paper aims to illustrate how an equilibrium exchange rate of the Yuan would contribute to China's achievement of non-inflationary full employment – defined as internal balance by James Meade in 1951 Meade, James E. 1951. The theory of international economic policy, Vol I: The balance of payments, London: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar], as well as the balance of international payments. In terms of Meade's model, China currently has both excess demand and a payments surplus, so that it would benefit from revaluation, which helps curb internal inflation and the external foreign surplus simultaneously. For China, specifically, revaluation would support combating price increases and facilitate a shift of resources into consumption and raising living standards. The paper also examines three common reasons advanced by groups in favor of avoiding appreciation of the RMB, finding none of them theoretically or empirically convincing. The pursuit of both growth/employment and price stability objectives makes China unable to afford having an undervalued exchange rate.     

Clinical outcomes and economic impact of transcatheter mitral leaflet repair in heart failure patients

Background: Mitral regurgitation (MR) is a common valvular heart disorder requiring intervention once it becomes severe. Transcatheter mitral repair with the MitraClip device is a safe and effective therapy for selected patients denied surgery. The authors sought to evaluate the clinical outcomes and economic impact of this therapy compared to medical management in heart-failure patients with symptomatic mitral regurgitation.

Methods and results: The study was comprised of two phases; an observational study of patients with heart failure and mitral regurgitation treated with either medical therapy or the MitraClip, and an economic model. Results of the observational study were used to estimate parameters for the decision model, which estimated costs, and benefits in a hypothetical cohort of patients with heart failure and moderate-to-severe mitral regurgitation treated with either standard medical therapy or MitraClip. The cohort of patients treated with the MitraClip was propensity matched to a population of heart failure patients, and their outcomes compared. At a mean follow-up of 22 months, all-cause mortality was 21% in the MitraClip cohort and 42% in the medical management cohort (p?=?.007). The decision model demonstrated that MitraClip increased life expectancy from 1.87–3.60 years and quality-adjusted life years (QALY) from 1.13–2.76 years. The incremental cost was $52,500 Canadian dollars, corresponding to an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) of $32,300.00 per QALY gained. Results were sensitive to the survival benefit.

Conclusion: In heart failure patients with symptomatic moderate–severe mitral regurgitation, therapy with the MitraClip is associated with superior survival and is cost-effective compared to medical therapy.     

Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in N-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves

Summary. Nishihara [3] showed that N-person prisoners' dilemma has a cooperative Nash equilibrium, if the players decide their actions sequentially in the order determined by Nature under a certain information structure, and if each player's payoffs satisfy a certain inequality. This paper examines the stability of this cooperative equilibrium against two matters: players' slight mistakes and deviations by coalitions. The main results are as follows: (i) if the inequality on each player's payoffs strictly holds, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strictly proper equilibrium; (ii) if N≤3, and if full cooperation is Pareto efficient in N-person prisoners' dilemma, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium; (iii) the cooperative equilibrium is in general a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Received: June 23, 1997; revised version: December 2, 1997