Expected Future Budget Deficits,the Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Dynamics in a Finite Horizon Model

This paper uses an optimizing open economy general-equilibrium model to investigate the macroeconomic effects of current and expected future budget deficits. It is shown that current and expected future budget deficits are positively correlated with the current account deficit, the capital stock and the real exchange rate, but negatively correlated with the domestic real interest rate and consumption, along the stable path approaching the steady state. The paper also demonstrates that the world real interest rate is positively correlated with consumption, foreign assets and the domestic real interest rate, but negatively correlated with the capital stock and the real exchange rate. Received April 11, 2001; revised version received October 25, 2001     

利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构

企业的契约性与利益相关者理论具有一致性 ,它们都隐含了企业是一种再谈判机制。利益相关者对企业的所有权分配进行谈判 ,谈判结果决定出企业的治理结构。在这个过程中 ,各方的谈判破裂结果效用、谈判力和对谈判破裂的担心程度是关键变量。我们使用Nash谈判模型及其推广模型分析了这个过程。我们的结论是 ,企业治理结构是内生的 ,每个企业的治理结构都是特殊的个案 ,一种治理结构并不具有普适性。这个结论具有重要的立法含义。     

Time Horizon and the Discount Rate

We consider an economy à la Lucas (1978, Econometrica46 , 1429-1446) with a risk-averse representative agent. The exogenous growth rate of the economy follows a random walk. We characterize the set of utility functions for which it is efficient to discount more distant cash flows at a lower rate. The benchmark result is that, when the growth rate is almost surely nonnegative, the yield curve is decreasing if and only if relative risk aversion is decreasing with wealth. Relaxing the assumption on the absence of recession requires more restrictions on preferences, such as increasing relative prudence. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D81, D91, Q25, Q28.     

Taxation and Wage Bargaining*

The paper analyzes the effects of personal taxes on wage bargaining It concludes that an increase in tax progressivity will normally increase union wage-bargaining pressure and so raise the equilibrium wage This is the opposite result to that recently derived by Creedy and McDonald (1990).     

Penalty Rates and Enterprise Bargaining

Industrial relations procedures in both Australia and New Zealand are changing from a system based on centralised arbitration towards enterprise level negotiation. This article considers how this change will affect overtime and other penalty rate payments. In particular, we show how, despite the existence of a legislative ‘safety net’, enterprise level negotiations can lead to the widespread removal of penalty rates, possibly to the detriment of both employees and employers. Such changes will, however, enhance competition and benefit consumers.     

Bargaining, coalitions and competition

We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods.     

Delegation and Threat in Bargaining

Two principals (“nations”) appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, and C72.     

Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power

Abstract. We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal–agent (P–A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P–A model and in the alternating offer game.     

Bargaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge

We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interimresearch knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate,patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the'amount of knowledge disclosed', by the leading to the laggingagent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes andvarying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In hersequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicitfull disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type ofthe licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminatingknowledge licensee.     

Bargaining under Uncertainty and the Monotone Path Solutions

Uncertainty with respect to the feasible set of utility vectors is introduced in an axiomatic bargaining model. Given a criterion for nonprobabilistic decision-making under uncertainty, a natural efficiency requirement can be imposed on a bargaining solution. Using the maximin ordering, thestrictly monotone pathsolutions (generalizations of theegalitariansolution) to the bargaining problem are characterized as the only continuous solutions that satisfy this efficiency axiom. If the maximin criterion is replaced by the maximax ranking or a strict convex combination of the maximin and the maximax criterion, imposing our efficiency axiom and continuity leads to thedictatorialsolutions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C78.     

谈判能力与标价策略

厂商能够通过策略性地选择不标价销售,利用其较强的谈判能力获取更多的利益。当厂商谈判能力较弱时,厂商将选择标价以最大化其利润。考虑消费者的谈判成本,厂商选择不标价时,其利润和谈判能力呈倒U型关系。当厂商谈判能力过高时,由于消费者将无利可图而放弃购买,因而厂商将选择标价的策略。在一定条件下,厂商实施策略性不标价不是市场有效的,可以通过强制标价实现市场的有效性。     

Bargaining in the Shadow of Power

Often a bargainer can use some form of power—legal, military, or political—to impose a settlement. How does the “outside” option of being able to impose a settlement, albeit at some cost, affect the bargaining? And, how does the probability that the bargaining will break down vary with the distribution of power between the bargainers? These questions are examined by adding the option of imposing a settlement to Rubinstein's game of dividing a pie. Each actor can accept an offer, make a counteroffer, or try to impose a solution. Imposing a settlement is, however, costly and each bargainer has private information about its cost.Journal of Economic Literatureclassification number: C72.     

Bargaining and markets: complexity and the competitive outcome

Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome.     

On the Least Core and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set

We show that the least core of a TU coalitional game with a finite set of players is contained in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. This result is extended to games with a measurable space of players in which the worth of the grand coalition is at least that of any other coalition in the game. As a consequence, we obtain an existence theorem for the Mas-Colell bargaining set in TU games with a measurable space of players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.     

讨价还价：政策法规与村民行为——对郊村拆迁过程的解读

本文是对大城市扩展过程中经常发生的拆迁问题的研究.在社会转型时期,多重知识与多重秩序同时共存,影响着村民的选择.本文从这样一个视角出发去解读发生于郊村的近十年的拆迁过程,分析村民如何以讨价还价的方式争取利益.本文认为,拆迁中村民与单位的冲突实质上是村民的普遍主义诉求与单位的特殊主义处理方式之间的矛盾.     

Bargaining regimes and wages in Portugal

In this paper we analyse the bargaining regime wage-effect in Portugal. The results indicate that the bargaining regime coverage is important in explaining the variability of wages. Wage differentials between bargaining regimes are substantial, a fact which may be related to a decentralised wage setting which prevails in Portugal. The highest wages are generated by multi-firm negotiations and the lowest are generated by sectoral contracts. Single-firm contracts align at an intermediate level in the ranking.Received: April 2001, Accepted: May 2002, JEL Classification: J31Correspondence to: Pedro T. PereiraWe are very grateful to an anonymous referee. Financial support from program PRAXIS XXI under grant PRAXIS/2/2.1/CSH/781/95 and FEDER is acknowledged. The third author also acknowledges financial support from program PRAXIS XXI under grant BD/3486/94 and from the University of the Azores.     

Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games

This paper identifies a source of gradualism in bargaining and contribution games. In the bargaining games we examine, each party can opt out at any time, and the outside option outcome is assumed to depend on the offers made in the negotiation phase. Specifically, we assume that (1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the other party's outside option pay-off and (2) the outside option outcome induces an efficiency loss as compared with a negotiated agreement. The main finding is that the mere presence of such history-dependent outside options forces equilibrium concessions in the negotiation phase to be gradual, and the degree of gradualism is characterized. The model also applies to contribution games in which the outside option may be interpreted as the option to implement a partial project using the total contributions made so far.