Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility

This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

生态赤字税：绿色发展与税制改革*

本文在量化生态占用并评估生态价值基础上,提出运用税收实现超额生态占用价值补偿的税收方案,也称生态赤字税。根据税制生态化的改革思路,本文运用CGE模型分析了征收生态赤字税和降低所得税的政策效应。本文研究发现：(1)在各税收方案中,生态赤字减少,就业增加,支持双重红利假说,全行业中间投入减少相对总产出减少更大,名义GDP保持增长;(2)实际GDP在生态赤字税基础上仅减少企业所得税的方案中下降,同时减少个人所得税则能实现增长,此时减税额低于生态赤字税收入;(3)在开征生态赤字税同时,降低个人所得税在保持经济增长方面较好,降低企业所得税在减少生态赤字方面较好,但降低企业所得税所减少的生态赤字价值低于降低个人所得税时劳动和资本增加值的提高。本文建议在完善生态占用核算基础上开征生态赤字税,并减轻所得税,促进经济增长由资源环境消耗转向劳动和资本投入的绿色发展。     

The incidence of a tax on pure rent in a small open economy

This paper analyzes the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment in a life-cycle small open economy with endogenous labor-leisure choices. The consequences of land taxation critically depend on how the tax proceeds are used by the government. A land tax depresses capital formation, crowds out foreign investment and increases national wealth and consumption when the land tax revenues are distributed as lump-sum payments. If the proceeds from land taxation are used to finance unproductive government expenditure, the land tax will be neutral in its effects on the capital stock, nonhuman wealth and labor. When the tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the land rent tax spurs nonhuman wealth accumulation and ambiguously affects the capital stock and labor.     

Environmental Taxes and the Double Dividend

This paper investigates the employment and welfare effects of an environmental tax reform, i.e. raising environmental taxes and using the revenues to cut labor taxes. The analysis reveals that such a reform does not necessarily raise employment: it may replace explicit labor taxes by higher implicit taxes on labor. However, employment may rise if the reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers to those outside the labor force. The paper explores also how distributional concerns affect optimal environmental taxes.     

Growth effects of a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform

This paper analyzes tax-policy measures within a two-sector endogenously-growing economy with elastic labor supply. Pollution is either modeled as a side product of physical capital used as a production factor in the final-good sector or as a side product of production. The framework allows us to analyze the consequences of isolated tax changes or of a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform for economic growth. Although pollution does not directly affect production processes, it can be shown that a higher pollution tax as well as a revenue-neutral environmental tax reform boost economic growth, whereas a tax on capital, consumption, or labor reduces the long-term growth rate of the economy.     

Environmental capital flight and pollution tax

This paper analyzes the impacts of a production pollution tax on environmental capital flight and national product in a two-country static general equilibrium model with two-way foreign investment. It is assumed that the capital input in both countries is a composite good of domestic and imported capital. And pollution is assumed to originate in the production process. The productivity of capital in each country is negatively (or positively) related to the worldwide aggregate emissions.The analysis shows that when a domestic pollution tax is levied, domestic capital outflows increase and foreign capital inflows decrease for sufficiently high elasticities of substitution between labor (immobile input) and capital (mobile input) in both countries. Moreover, with negative transnational externalities, increases of a domestic pollution tax reduce domestic production and increase foreign production. The difficulty of substitution between immobile and mobile inputs hinders the optimal allocation of worldwide capital and national product. In this paper, the optimal pollution tax is based on global welfare maximization, not on global income maximization, taking into consideration the impact of income change on individual welfare. Therefore, an optimal pollution tax in the developing country should be lower for a given rate of pollution.     

Involuntary Unemployment and Environmental Policy: The Double Dividend Hypothesis

An environmental tax reform might bring about gains over and above improved environmental quality. In particular, if tax revenues from environmental taxes are used to reduce the tax on wage income, positive employment effects can result in second-best economies. An efficiency wage model is used to analyze the impact of an ecological tax reform on involuntary unemployment. The government controls emissions by selling emission permits. Employment of labor and wages are determined endogenously. Conditions are identified under which an environmental tax reform reduces unemployment and increases welfare.     

The Benefits of Environmental Fiscal Reforms in an Integrated Europe

This paper analyses the effects of an environmental fiscal reform where the environmental tax revenue is used to reduce the tax burden on labor in order to increase employment. The study tries to assess the benefits generated by this type of reform in an integrated Europe where different degrees of tax harmonization can be achieved. The differential impact of cooperative fiscal reforms versus noncooperative ones is quantified through the use of a newly developed general equilibrium model. The results suggest that only a high degree of harmonization, in which both revenue and expenditure policies are coordinated, can provide significant environmental and employment benefits.     

Optimal Tax Policy, Market Imperfections, and Environmental Externalities in a Dynamic Optimizing Macro Model

This paper develops a dynamic real business cycle model that highlights pollution externalities (on welfare and production) and market imperfections and uses it to determine the socially optimal tax policy that encompasses labor income, capital income, and emission taxes. We show that the optimal tax on capital and labor income only addresses the production inefficiency (and is time-invariant), while the tax on the environmental externalities affects both the production inefficiency and the environmental spillovers (and is time-varying). More interestingly, the socially optimal emission tax will be characterized by a Keynesian-like stabilizer that is designed to mitigate business cycle fluctuations, i.e., that will stimulate the economy with a lower emission tax during recessions. In a positive analysis, we show that the beneficial effects arising from pollution taxation will become larger the greater is the degree of the firms' monopoly power. In addition, a triple dividend in terms of improving environmental quality and increasing employment and firms' profit can be simultaneously realized if the environmental production externality is more significant and if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is relatively small.     

Cap and trade policies in the presence of monopoly and distortionary taxation

We extend an analytical general equilibrium model of environmental policy with pre-existing labor tax distortions to include pre-existing monopoly power as well. We show that the existence of monopoly power has two offsetting effects on welfare. First, the environmental policy reduces monopoly profits, and the negative effect on income increases labor supply in a way that partially offsets the pre-existing labor supply distortion. Second, environmental policy raises prices, so interaction with the pre-existing monopoly distortion further exacerbates the labor supply distortion. This second effect is larger, for reasonable parameter values, so the existence of monopoly reduces the welfare gain (or increases the loss) from environmental restrictions.     

Environmental Goods and Measures for Their Promotion: An Analysis Using a Fair Wage Model

In this paper, we model a two‐sector small open economy with emissions and unemployment associated with the fair wage effort hypothesis, and investigate the environmental and employment impact of an emission tax, a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods in the downstream polluting industry, and a subsidy to the upstream eco‐industry. We then show that if the eco‐industry is skilled labor intensive relative to the polluting final goods industry, while a subsidy for purchasing environmental goods decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled labor, it may increase total emissions. In contrast, the emission tax and the subsidy to eco‐industry firms worsen the unemployment rate, though both policies decrease total emissions. Hence, if the emission tax is set equal to the marginal environmental damage, and either a downstream or upstream subsidy is used to mitigate unskilled unemployment, the optimal subsidy to purchase the goods is positive whereas the optimal subsidy to the eco‐industry is negative, i.e., a tax on the eco‐industry.     

Environmentally aware households

The rising environmental awareness induces a changing landscape for policymakers and real economic prospects. We examine the properties of a general equilibrium model with endogenous household preferences (for labor, consumption, and environmental quality) and a negative environmental externality. The endogeneity of labor creates an additional channel of substitution between environmental quality and labor, besides the channel of substitution between environmental quality and consumption. We show that a key requirement for improved output following a positive shock in the weight of environmental quality (household environmental awareness) is that environmental awareness trades off the weight on labor and not the weight on consumption. An interesting feature of the model is that the existence of the environmental externality gives a non-zero capital tax in the long run.     

Second-Best Pigouvian Taxation: A Clarification

This paper argues that the search for a “purely environmental” component of a tax on goods or factors of production that impact the environment—separate from its redistributive and distortive effects—is fraught with difficulties. The quest is often impossible because of the interconnectedness between labor supply, consumption decisions and the environmental quality. The paper differentiates between two conceptualization for “the Pigouvian tax” that have been employed in the literature and argues that each has tried to isolate the environmental component in its own way. One conceptualization, due to Cremer et al. (J Public Econ 70:343–364, 1998) does so by ruling out direct feedback from changes in environmental quality on the incentive effect of the tax. In the second conceptualization, due to Bovenberg and Ploeg’s (J Public Econ 55:349–390, 1994), incentive effects are ruled out by making consumers’ valuation of environmental quality independent of the labor supply. This is achieved by assuming separability between labor supply and other goods (including environmental equality). To convey its message, the paper studies the properties of optimal polluting and non-polluting non-labor input taxes in a Mirrleesian model with endogenously determined wages.     

环保产业财税扶持的国际比较

通过对比分析国内外对环保产业的财税扶持政策现状,指出我国环保产业在财税扶持方面存在着财政支出不足、财政补贴手段单一、税制不健全等弊端;提出综合运用财政工具、配置税收政策等对策,为环保产业架构一个有利于发展的空间,使我国环保产业跨越式发展,以吻合国民经济发展的需求。     

生态赤字税：理论与实证研究框架

文章基于生态足迹核算方法和生态服务价值理论所确定的价格体系,在核算生态赤字及其价值并提出其价值补偿的环境税方案的基础上,将生态占用作为一种要素投入,构建绿色社会核算矩阵和环境税 CGE 模型,通过数值模拟比较分析了在5%、10%和30%的补偿强度下税收方案的环境效应、就业效应、增长效应、分配效应和贸易效应。模拟结果表明：(1)生态赤字税方案具有减少生态占用和增加就业的双重红利效应;(2)各部门的总产出和中间投入总体上下降,但名义 GDP 增长,绿色 GDP 增幅更大,而实际 GDP 则下降,表明税收政策会造成价格指数一定程度的上升;(3)政府税收收入因生态赤字补偿额度较大而增长较快,且增速高于劳动和资本要素报酬的增长,但居民收入和企业收入比重略有下降。基于我国资源与环境等税收在总税收中的比重,以及 OECD 国家的税制结构和变化趋势,文章最后建议生态赤字税的补偿性税率应低于5%。     

Environmental Quality,Medical Care Demand and Environmental Tax Interactions

Assuming that improvements in environmental quality lead to lower demand for medical care, it has been shown that general-equilibrium interactions with the tax-distorted labor market reduce the benefits from such improvements, and thus lower the second-best optimal environmental tax. This paper provides some insights on how the link between environmental quality, individual’s health capital, and the demand for medical care affects the analysis of pollution taxes. The paper develops structural conditions under which improvements in environmental quality decrease/increase the demand for medical care and discusses their implications for environmental tax interactions.      

Double Dividend with Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency and Intergenerational Equity

This paper analyzes the double dividend and distributional issues within an overlapping generations model framework with involuntary unemployment. We characterize the necessary conditions needed to obtain a double dividend, when the revenue of the environmental tax is recycled by a variation of the labor tax rate. We show that an employment dividend may occur without any efficiency dividend and that the young generation is not always harmed by the fiscal reform, even without any intergenerational transfers. Therefore, three dividends (environmental, efficiency and intergenerational equity) can occur simultaneously.     

Reassessing the effects of environmental taxation when pollution affects health over the life-cycle

We introduce the link between pollution, morbidity and productivity over the life-cycle in a two-period overlapping generations model. As the environmental tax improves the health-profile over the life-cycle, it influences saving, investment in health, labor supply and retirement. As a result, we identify effects of environmental taxation beyond the standard crowding-out and productivity effects captured by the past literature. We show that whether those effects are positive or negative for the economy crucially depends on the degree of substitutability between young and old labor. Our numerical examples suggest that that those new effects alleviate the negative effects of environmental taxation on output and decrease potential positive welfare effects.     

A general equilibrium model of the incidence of corporation income tax under uncertainty

In this paper we investigate the incidence of the corporation income tax in terms of a two-sector, general equilibrium model, where production decisions are made under uncertainty. The conventional result, derived originally by Harberger (1962), is that if the corporate sector is the capital-intensive sector, then capital must bear a greater burden of the tax, in proportion to its initial share in national income, than labor. This result continues to hold unambiguously under uncertainty only if the relative and the absolute risk aversion of the corporations are non- increasing in profits. Otherwise, the Harberger result may not hold.