Institutional distance and Turkey’s outward foreign direct investment

This study empirically examines the relation between institutional distance (ID) and Turkey’s outward foreign direct investment (TODI). The empirical results use panel data from 2002 to 2016 to show that TODI is attracted to countries with better institutional quality. We also find that host country political stability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, and rule of law attract TODI. We also document that TODI is positively related to cultural distance (CD) and ID is not moderated by CD.     

Regionality revisited: An examination of the direction of spread of currency crises

What determines the direction of spread of currency crises? We examine data on waves of currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion. We simultaneously consider trade competition, financial links, and institutional similarity to the “ground zero” country as potential drivers of contagion. To overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion. In particular, we use the Bayesian averaging of binary models that allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the appropriate set of regressors.We find that institutional similarity to the ground zero country plays an important role in determining the direction of contagion in all the emerging market currency crises in our dataset. We thus provide persuasive evidence in favour of the “wake-up call” hypothesis for financial contagion. Trade and financial links may also play a role in determining the direction of contagion, but their importance varies amongst the crisis periods.     

Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa

This paper examines the effectiveness of six institutional quality measures, namely corruption control, effective government, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability, in inhibiting self-rewarding behaviour of boards in terms of their compensation as well as in influencing the likelihood of disclosure of individual executive salaries in IPO listings prospectuses. Using a unique and comprehensive dataset of 78 hand-collected IPO firms from across North Africa from 2000 to 2012 I find substantial evidence that government effectiveness and corruption control are important in inhibiting director self-reward and expropriation while political stability is more associated with increased likelihood of transparency in reporting of salaries. In addition firms from poor informational environments are more likely to initiate enhanced self-governance and transparency so as to overcome institutional deficiencies.     

Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence

Do banks’ responses to changes in deposit insurance vary across countries even if the countries have comparable institutions? If so, by how much? Using data on the financial performance of large banks in 15 financially and economically developed countries, we find that where deposit insurance has an effect, it is large and varies depending on the level of economic freedom, rule of law and corruption in the bank’s home country. As in prior papers, we show that during stable economic periods, increases in deposit insurance are associated with higher bank risk, both problem loans and leverage. In most, but not all, cases stronger institutions temper these effects. The institutions’ effects are substantial. For example, average changes in the rule of law double the impact of a change in deposit insurance on bank leverage. We contribute to the substantial literature in this area by showing that the institutional effects are significant even across a set of countries with comparable institutions; by conducting a careful calibration of the economic significance of the effects; by providing evidence that during stable periods changes in deposit insurance only affect bank risk and not other measures of performance; and finally by showing that the effects of both deposit insurance and institutions vary across stable and crisis economic periods. The stable period results are consistent with the moral hazard effects of deposit insurance, while the crisis period results are consistent with endogeneity concerns that poor bank performance could drive changes in regulations.     

REIT Institutional Ownership Dynamics and the Financial Crisis

Collectively, institutional investors hold large ownership stakes in REITs. The traditional view is that institutions are both long-term and passive investors. The financial crisis beginning in 2007 provides an opportunity to analyze the investment choices of institutional investors before, during, and after the crisis. Our results indicate that institutional ownership increased prior to the financial crisis, declined significantly during the period of market stress, but rebounded after. These results hold for four institutional investor subtypes: mutual funds/investment advisors, bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions, with mutual funds/investment advisors and bank trusts most clearly exhibiting this pattern. We also find evidence that institutions actively manage their REIT portfolios, displaying a “flight to quality” after the market downturn by reducing beta and individual risk exposure, and by increasing ownership in larger REITs.     

DOES PRIVATIZATION FOSTER CHANGES IN THE QUALITY OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS?

We analyze the effect of privatization on the quality of legal institutions of governance. Our findings suggest that large-scale privatization (in terms of progress and volume) increases the risk of corruption in developing countries but has no effect on the legal institutions of governance (i.e., law and order and investor protection). The method of privatization (public share issues versus private sales) helps curb corruption and improve the quality of law enforcement and of investor protection. In developed countries, the progress and volume of privatization reduce the risk of corruption, and the method of privatization enhances the quality of law enforcement.     

Corporate social responsibility and corruption risk: A global perspective

This paper extends our knowledge on corporate corruption risk by examining whether and to what extent corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firm-level corruption risk. Using a cross-country sample of major multinational firms, we find that firm-level CSR mitigates corruption risk. On closer examination, we find that the relationship between CSR and corruption risk is mediated by country-level variables such as institutional quality, protection of minority shareholders’ rights, stock market development and freedom of the press. Further, we find that in emerging countries, CSR mitigates corruption risk only when the country-level institutional quality is high and citizens enjoy press freedom. Our findings suggest that both formal institutions and the quality of civil society influence the effect of CSR on corruption risk. Our results remain robust to controls for endogeneity and potential sample selection bias.     

Does the currency regime shape unhedged currency exposure?

This paper examines how unhedged currency exposure of firms varies with changes in currency flexibility. A sequence of four time periods with alternating high and low currency volatility in India provides a natural experiment in which changes in currency exposure of a panel of firms is measured, and the moral hazard versus incomplete markets hypotheses tested. We find that firms carried higher currency exposure in periods when the currency was less flexible. Our results support the moral hazard hypothesis: that low currency flexibility encourages firms to hold unhedged exposure in response to implicit government guarantees.     

The dark side of transparency in developing countries: The link between financial reporting practices and corruption

This paper examines the impact of financial reporting practices on corruption obstacles for about 150,000 firms across 143 mostly developing countries from 2006 to 2019. We document a strong positive relationship between the production of audited financial statements (AFS) and corruption obstacles (CO) faced by the firm. We argue that in a corrupt business environment, rent-seeking bureaucrats use the credible financial information to optimize their bribe demands. Our baseline results remain robust after addressing endogeneity concerns. We further show that country-level institutional quality has a moderating effect on the AFS-CO relation. The evidence from surveying entrepreneurs also provides qualitative support for our empirical findings. Our study sheds light on a previously under-explored adverse consequence of transparency - exposure to corrupt bureaucrats where institutions are weak.     

The legacy of the Eurozone crisis and how to overcome it

I argue first that the Eurozone crisis has left a legacy of unsustainable government debt levels. These will continue to exert a deflationary dynamics in the Eurozone. Second, I argue that the institutional innovations since the start of the debt crisis fall short of what is needed to solve the design failures of the Eurozone. In addition, they are not sustainable, mainly because they have led to a situation where bureaucratic institutions have been vested with more responsibilities without a concomitant increase in the democratic legitimacy of these institutions.     

Government auditing and corruption control: Evidence from China’s provincial panel data

Since its foundation, China’s government auditing system has played a very important role in maintaining financial and economic order and improving government accountability and transparency. Though a great deal of research has discussed the role of government auditing in discovering and deterring corruption, there is little empirical evidence on whether government auditing actually helps to reduce corruption. Using China’s provincial panel data from 1999 to 2008, this paper empirically examines the role of government auditing in China’s corruption control initiatives. Our findings indicate that the number of irregularities detected in government auditing is positively related to the corruption level in that province, which means the more severe the corruption is in a province, the more irregularities in government accounts are found by local audit institutions. Also, post-audit rectification effort is negatively related to the corruption level in that province, indicating that greater rectification effort is associated with less corruption. This paper provides empirical evidence on how government auditing can contribute to curbing corruption, which is also helpful for understanding the role of China’s local audit institutions in government governance and can enrich the literature on both government auditing and corruption control.     

Institutional environment and qualified foreign institutional investors' trust in auditing

Even though corporate governance is a channel for qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) to mitigate information asymmetry and is essential in substituting for poor institutional quality in the host countries of QFIIs, systematic evidence is scanty due to the challenge of capturing institutional quality changes in the host country. Thus, this study examines how improvements in country-level institutional quality affect QFIIs' trust in a firm's audit quality. Using a propensity score matching method, we found that after the 2013 anti-corruption reform improved the institutional quality level in China, Chinese firms without an audit committee experienced a sharp increase in QFII ownership relative to their peers. This finding is more pronounced in regions where the government exerted more effort in combating corruption. Our findings provide supporting evidence that the improvement in institutional quality increases QFIIs' trust in the audit quality, thereby decreasing their reliance on the audit committee as an internal corporate governance mechanism.     

Government finance in the wake of currency crises

We address three questions: (i) Can classical models be reconciled with the fact that many crises are marked by high rates of depreciation and small increases in seignorage revenue? (ii) What are the implications of different financing methods for post-crisis rates of inflation and depreciation? (iii) How do governments pay for the fiscal costs associated with currency crises? To study these questions we use a general equilibrium model in which prospective government deficits trigger a currency crisis. We then use our model in conjunction with fiscal data to interpret government financing in the wake of three recent currency crises: Korea (1997), Mexico (1994) and Turkey (2001).     

Empirics of currency crises: A duration analysis approach

This paper empirically analyzes the origins of currency crises for a group of OECD economies from 1970 through 1998. We apply duration analysis to examine how the probability of a currency crisis depends on the length of non‐crisis periods, contagion channels, and macroeconomic fundamentals. Our findings confirm the negative duration dependence of a currency crisis—the likelihood of speculative attack sharply increases at the beginning of non‐crisis periods and then declines over time until it abruptly rises again. The results also indicate the hazard of a crisis increase with high values of the volatility of unemployment rates, inflation rates, contagion factors—which mostly work through trade channels, unemployment rates, real effective exchange rate, trade openness, and size of economy. To address concerns regarding validity of the identified crisis episodes, we exploit crisis episodes that are identified by a more objective approach based on the extreme value theory. Our results are robust under various specifications including two different crisis event sets that are identified on monthly and quarterly basis.     

Extreme risk spillover network: application to financial institutions

Using the CAViaR tool to estimate the value-at-risk (VaR) and the Granger causality risk test to quantify extreme risk spillovers, we propose an extreme risk spillover network for analysing the interconnectedness across financial institutions. We construct extreme risk spillover networks at 1% and 5% risk levels (which we denote 1% and 5% VaR networks) based on the daily returns of 84 publicly listed financial institutions from four sectors—banks, diversified financials, insurance and real estate—during the period 2006–2015. We find that extreme risk spillover networks have a time-lag effect. Both the static and dynamic networks show that on average the real estate and bank sectors are net senders of extreme risk spillovers and the insurance and diversified financials sectors are net recipients, which coheres with the evidence from the recent global financial crisis. The networks during the 2008–2009 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis exhibited distinctive topological features that differed from those in tranquil periods. Our approach supplies new information on the interconnectedness across financial agents that will prove valuable not only to investors and hedge fund managers, but also to regulators and policy-makers.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Foreign currency debt,financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view

Foreign currency debt is widely believed to increase risks of financial crisis, especially after being implicated as a cause of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. In this paper, we study the effects of foreign currency debt on currency and debt crises and its indirect effects on short-term growth and long-run output effects in both 1880–1913 and 1973–2003 for 45 countries. Greater ratios of foreign currency debt to total debt are associated with increased risks of currency and debt crises, although the strength of the association depends crucially on the size of a country's reserve base and its policy credibility. We found that financial crises, driven by exposure to foreign currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. We estimate some implications of our findings for the risks posed by currently high levels of foreign currency liabilities in eastern Europe.     

The injustice of inequality

In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form of corruption, intimidation, and other forms of influence. We present a model of such institutional subversion—focusing specifically on courts—and of the effects of inequality in economic and political resources on the magnitude of subversion. We then use the model to analyze the consequences of institutional subversion for the law and order environment in the country, as well as for capital accumulation and growth. We illustrate the model with historical evidence from Gilded Age United States and the transition economies of the 1990s. We also present some cross-country evidence consistent with the basic prediction of the model.     

The institutional determinants of IPO firm prospectus length in a developing context: A research note

This study focuses on the impact of institutional quality on the amount of disclosure in IPO firms listing prospectuses using the six well established World Bank Governance indices, namely corruption control, government effectiveness in promotion of private sector development, political stability and absence from terrorism, regulatory quality, rule of law and lastly democratic voice and accountability. Using a unique hand-collected sample of 165 IPO firms from across Africa from 2000 to 2011 I find evidence that enhanced rule of law and regulatory quality impact on the amount of disclosure by firms, reflected in length of IPO listings prospectuses. In addition I find evidence that founder-led entrepreneurial firms are more likely to disclose more alongside firms in extractive and technology industries that rely on local stock exchanges as a source of external finance. In contrast IPO firms that have significant long term foreign partners or are subsidiaries of foreign Multinational Enterprises are likely to disclose less than other types of firm underscoring their apathy to domestic investors and relative lack of dependence on indigenous stock markets as a viable source of external finance.     

Households’ foreign currency borrowing in Central and Eastern Europe

Foreign currency loans represent an important feature of recent financial developments in CEECs. This might pose a serious challenge for macroeconomic stability. Against this background, we study the determinants of foreign currency loans of households, using data on the behavior of households in nine CEECs. Our results reveal that foreign currency loans are driven by households’ lack of trust in the stability of the local currency and in domestic financial institutions. Moreover, special factors including remittances and expectations of euro adoption play an important role in selected regions. The financial crisis reduced foreign currency borrowing, but there is some indication this effect might be only temporary.