On the failure of the linkage principle with financially constrained bidders

This paper provides a class of examples of two-bidder common value second price auctions in which bidders may be financially constrained and the seller has access to information about the common value. We show that the seller's expected revenue under a revelation policy may be lower than that under a concealing policy. The intuition for the failure of the linkage principle is as follows. In the presence of financial constraints, the bidders’ upward response in their bids to the seller's good signals is limited by their financial constraints, while their downward response to bad signals is not.     

The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout option

Summary. An auction with a buyout option is modelled. Such an option allows a bidder to purchase the item being auctioned at a pre-specified buyout price, instead of attempting to obtain the item through the traditional auction procedure. This analysis is motivated by internet auctions where such options are present. If all auction participants are risk neutral, the seller will choose a buyout price high enough so that the option is never exercised. However, a risk averse seller facing risk neutral bidders will choose a price low enough so that the option is exercised with positive probability. Further, if bidders are risk neutral and the seller is risk averse, this option may result in a Pareto improvement compared to a sealed bid second price auction.Received: 3 December 2002, Revised: 28 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D44, L86, D8. Correspondence to: Timothy MathewsWe would like to thank Yair Tauman, Thomas Jeitschko, Pradeep Dubey, Konstantinos Serfes, Abraham Neyman, Qihong Liu, and an anonymous referee, as well as participants of the 2001 Canadian Economic Association Conference and the 2001 Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory. This paper is based upon Chapter Two of Mathews doctoral dissertation.     

An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion

We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (CARA preferences, binary types), and characterize the optimal mechanism for a risk-neutral seller. We show that the optimal auction extracts all buyer surplus whenever the correlation is sufficiently strong (greater than 1/3 in absolute value), no matter how risk averse the buyers are. In contrast, we note that a sufficiently risk-averse seller would not use a full rent extracting mechanism for any positive correlation of the valuations even if the buyers were risk neutral.     

The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Eur Econ Rev 49(8): 2041–2055) to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-firm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using firms’ historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using firms’ historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism.     

A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller

This paper describes a nearly optimal auction mechanism that does not require previous knowledge of the distribution of values of potential buyers. The mechanism we propose builds on the new literature on the elicitation of information from experts. We extend the latter to the case where the secret information shared by the experts–potential buyers in our model–can be used against them if it becomes public knowledge.     

Mental processes and strategic equilibration: An fMRI study of selling strategies in second price auctions

This study is the first to attempt to isolate a relationship between cognitive activity and equilibration to a Nash Equilibrium. Subjects, while undergoing fMRI scans of brain activity, participated in second price auctions against a single competitor following predetermined strategy that was unknown to the subject. For this auction there is a unique strategy that will maximize the subjects’ earnings, which is also a Nash equilibrium of the associated game theoretic model of the auction. As is the case with all games, the bidding strategies of subjects participating in second price auctions most often do not reflect the equilibrium bidding strategy at first but with experience, typically exhibit a process of equilibration, or convergence toward the equilibrium. This research is focused on the process of convergence.In the data reported here subjects participated in sixteen auctions, after which all subjects were told the strategy that will maximize their revenues, the theoretical equilibrium. Following that announcement, sixteen more auctions were performed. The question posed by the research concerns the mental activity that might accompany equilibration as it is observed in the bidding behavior. Does brain activation differ between being equilibrated and non-equilibrated in the sense of a bidding strategy? If so, are their differences in the location of activation during and after equilibration? We found significant activation in the frontal pole especially in Brodmann’s area 10, the anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala and the basal forebrain. There was significantly more activation in the basal forebrain and the anterior cingulate cortex during the first sixteen auctions than in the second sixteen. The activity in the amygdala shifted from the right side to the left after the solution was given.     

An analysis of cost-reduction innovation under capacity constrained inputs

This article focuses on duopoly cost-reduction innovation with the upstream input subjected to capacity constraints. By two-stage duopoly model, some interesting conclusions are achieved. Firstly, the higher efficiency firms invest the less in cost-reduction innovation and require the fewer resources under capacity constraints. Therefore, lower efficiency firms launch the lower price strategies. To our surprise, lower efficiency firms seem to be more aggressive both in innovation and in outputs. Secondly, symmetric firms’ innovation decreases with the total resources while asymmetric firms’ innovation increases with the total capacity. Finally, innovation gap decreases with both the total capacity and the degree of substitutability.     

Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis

Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% efficiency and higher revenue for the seller. We employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures. The data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency, while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure. Our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis.     

Sequencing strategies in large, competitive, ascending price automobile auctions: An experimental examination

This paper reports on a large-scale field experiment testing strategies available to a seller participating in simultaneous competitive sequential ascending price automobile auctions. Every other week, the seller offered approximately 100 vehicles for sale in an auction environment in which several competing sellers offered on the order of 3000 vehicles. The experiment tested various sequences in which the seller could offer the vehicles, such as high values first or low values first. Surprisingly, and contrary to intuition drawn from the theory of single item and single seller auctions, the worst performing sequence from those tested is for the seller to order vehicles from highest to lowest values. The best sequence is to group the vehicles by type and offer the low valued vehicles first and then move to offer the higher valued vehicles.     

The economic impacts of drought on the economy of Iran: An integration of linear programming and macroeconometric modelling approaches

In this paper, we provide economy-wide estimates of the costs of drought in the cropping sector of the Iranian economy, using a linear programming model to estimate the direct costs on agriculture, and a macroeconometric model to trace the indirect impacts on the rest of the economy. The results indicate that a severe drought such as the one that occurred in the crop year 1999-2000 imposes a direct cost of 1605 million USD, equivalent to 30.3% of the total value added of the cropping sector in Iran. This, in turn, leads to a 12.7% reduction in the value added of other agricultural sub-sectors (livestock, fisheries and forestry). In the rest of the economy, the manufacturing and service sectors experience value added declines of 7.8 and 3.7%, respectively. In addition, there is a substantial decrease in investment in the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. Thus, such a drought reduces overall GDP by about 4.4%, and it would also result in decreased non-oil exports, increased food imports, and a rise in inflation. The results of some drought mitigation simulations are reported in brief. Such estimates strengthen the case for increased attention to drought strategies and management in agriculture in Iran and elsewhere.     

The relationship between innovation network and innovation capability: a social network perspective

The key for acquiring innovation capability is knowledge transmission which is primarily based on the closer and tighter connections among businesses and other actors within innovation networks. Previous literature of patent analysis based on social network only explains the most influential corporations within an industry through social network indicators, but did not investigate the impact of these indicators on a firm’s innovation capability. This study uses social network perspective ‘centrality, cohesion and density’ to investigate the relationship between innovation network and innovation capability in the global semiconductor industry. Two purposes of this study are: (1) to investigate the innovation network relationship within the semiconductor industry at different periods and its evolution and (2) to study whether network position occupied by a firm in innovation network influences innovation capability. The empirical results show that firms with higher centrality and higher density have stronger innovation capability, but the weaker innovation capability with closer connection of sub-cluster (cohesion).     

Determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU: An optimal currency area perspective

In the light of the recent financial crisis, we take a panel cointegration approach that allows for structural breaks to the analysis of the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in nine economies of the European Monetary Union. We find evidence for a level break in the cointegrating relationship. Moreover, results show that (i) fiscal imbalances – namely expected government debt-to-GDP differentials – are the main long-run drivers of sovereign spreads; (ii) liquidity risks and cumulated inflation differentials have non-negligible weights; but (iii) all conclusions are ultimately connected to whether or not the sample of countries is composed of members of an Optimal Currency Area (OCA). In particular, we establish (i) that results are overall driven by those countries not passing the OCA test; and (ii) that investors closely monitor and severely punish the deterioration of expected debt positions of those economies exhibiting significant gaps in competitiveness.     

The dynamics of technological partners: a social network perspective

The selection and establishment of research partners is increasingly important in innovation and strategic research. Using a panel dataset of patents by 2846 researchers from a large US biotechnology company between 1976 and 2013, we examined the relationships between spanning structural holes and partner dynamics, which are captured by the entry of new partners and the persistence of existing partners. Then, we tested the possible moderating effect of dynamic exploratory ability. Based on the results of negative binomial regression models with fixed effects in the longitudinal design, we found that spanning structural holes was negatively associated with the entry of new partners and positively associated with the persistence of existing partners. Furthermore, exploratory ability positively moderated these relationships. Aside from having managerial implications for innovators, the findings of our interdisciplinary study are relevant for research on partner dynamics, strategy research, and exploration processes.     

The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU member states to procure small contracts. In this article, we investigate this paradox. Using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009, we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward, and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result. To our knowledge, this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts.     

Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete information and fully characterize its Nash equilibria, and show that the uniform-price Prosper mechanism, while simple, can lead to much larger payments for the borrower than the VCG mechanism. We next compare the Prosper mechanism against the borrower-optimal auction in an incomplete information setting, and conclude by examining the Prosper mechanism when modeled as a dynamic auction, and provide tight bounds on the price for a general class of bidding strategies.     

The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis

Summary. This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares. Received: July 4, 2001; revised version: October 31, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has benefited from a number of comments from the anonymous referees. Correspondence to: C. At     

Transition economies and trust building: a network perspective on EU enlargement

Many transition economies are characterised by a relativelyrudimentary institutional framework. Weak legislative structuresand the absence of effective market regulation and propertyright enforcement rules diminish the chance of mutually profitablebusiness transactions and—more generally—restrictthe chances for innovation and sustainable growth. Against thisbackground, we analyse the extent to which more efficient governancemechanisms can contribute to a more favourable business environment.In doing so, we adopt a network perspective. We argue that bothin developed market economies as well as in centrally plannedeconomies much of economic exchange takes place in networks.However, the characteristics of these networks, in particularthe concept of trust, can differ significantly. This leads usto conclude that the real challenge of the process of economictransition is connected to building new economic exchange networks.In this paper, we discuss this argument and analyse how thecurrent enlargement of the EU into Eastern Europe may favourablyaffect this process of institutional change in the accessioncountries.     

Spectrum allocation in Latin America: An economic analysis

As elsewhere, wireless markets play a crucial role in Latin American economic growth. Mobile telephone networks increasingly provide the communications infrastructure that has largely been lacking throughout the region. Yet, governments have generally made only modest allocations of bandwidth available to Latin American wireless operators, either absolutely (in terms of spectrum each country could allocate at modest opportunity cost) or relative to countries in North America, Asia and the European Union. Using an empirical model estimated on mobile phone data for international markets, we show that very large social benefits are available to countries that make more spectrum available for mobile phone markets. We conduct simulations using our calibrated model to provide lower bounds for country-by-country gains from larger allocations. We also discuss the impact of alternative regulatory regimes on the feasibility to achieve those social gains.     

Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective

This paper investigates the performances of an inflation targeting regime in a learning economy framed as an Agent-Based Model (ABM). We keep our ABM as close as possible to the original New Keynesian (NK) model, but we model the individual behaviour of the agents under procedural rationality à la Simon. Accordingly, we assume that their behaviour is guided by simple rules of thumb – or heuristics – while a continuous learning process governs the evolution of those rules. Under these assumptions that also allow the emergence of agents heterogeneity, we analyze the dynamics of the economy without assuming rational expectations, and study the role that a central bank, implementing an inflation targeting regime via a monetary policy rule, can play in the orientation of these dynamics. Consequently, our main goal is to analyse the interplay between the learning mechanisms operating at the individual level and the features and performances of the inflation targeting regime. Our results point to the prime importance of the credibility of central bank's inflation target regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, as well as the beneficial role played by that target as an anchoring device for private inflation expectations. We also establish the potential welfare cost of imperfect public information and contribute to the current debate on optimal monetary policy rules under imperfect common knowledge and uncertainty.     

Inter-basin water transfers under uncertainty: Storage capacity and optimal guaranteed deliveries

This paper deals with water transfers between jurisdictions not claiming riparian rights to the same water source, and taking place through straightforward sales. Taking into account the uncertain nature of water surpluses, we investigate, within a partial equilibrium framework, the implications of a third party's provision of storing facilities upon the potential supplier's decision whether, and to what extent, it is worthwhile to guarantee a constant amount of water exports. The analysis suggests that there exists a minimum storage capacity below which the potential supplier will never find it profitable to divert a constant amount of water outside his boundaries; the greater the uncertainty about future surpluses and/or internal costs due to even occasional water shortages resulting from the water export commitment, the higher the required minimum storage capacity will be. Above this minimum, an increase in the capacity would be better for the surplus agent, but in a situation in which water surplus is expected to decrease over time, increases in storage capacity would make him willing to guarantee a smaller amount of water deliveries.This work has been carried out under the auspices of the European Science Foundation's research program Sharing fresh water resources in the Mediterranean region: An economic perspective. Previous versions have been presented at ESF workshops held at the Universities of Haifa, Padova and Crete. Financial support from MURST (funds 40% — 1992) is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank Nunzio Cappuccio, Haluk Akdogan, Karl Mäler, Mordechai Shechter, Naomi Zeitouni, and two anonimous referees for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.