Bringing customers into the boardroom

Misguided marketing strategies have destroyed more shareholder value than shoddy accounting or shady fiscal practices. Yet marketing functions typically reside deep in the organization, far from the executive suite and boardroom, and they are often poorly aligned with corporate strategy. Boards of directors, it would seem, have compelling reasons to monitor their companies' marketing activities. The authors argue that boards lack a clear understanding of how their companies are meeting customers' needs and how their marketing strategies drive (or often fail to drive) top-line growth. To help remedy that problem, they've devised a "marketing dashboard," a series of management reports that could give the board this critical knowledge. The dashboard has three parts, each of which the board should review regularly. The first part tracks the company's main business drivers--those business conditions that, when manipulated or otherwise changed, will directly and predictably affect the company's performance. The second part describes the specific innovations in a pipeline of growth ideas that will allow the company to reach its short- and long-term revenue goals. And the third part provides an overview of the company's marketing skill set so the board can determine not only if the company has enough marketing talent but also if it has the right marketing talent. Unlike isolated measures of marketing performance that are often insufficient, irrelevant, or misleading, the dashboard allows the board to quickly and routinely assess the effectiveness of its company's marketing strategies. Armed with a clear understanding of marketing's role and performance, the board can expose inadequate marketing campaigns, direct management to address the problem, and monitor progress.     

Four rules for taking your message to Wall Street

Managers fail to communicate effectively with Wall Street for all sorts of reasons. But neglecting the investment community--particularly the analysts whose opinions shape the market and whose recommendations often make or break a company's share price--can knock the most carefully conceived and brilliantly executed strategy off course. The companies that struggle the most with providing good information to analysts are those in rapidly evolving industries, where the gap between traditional performance metrics and economic realities is at its widest. In these industries, a company's strategy and the variables that govern its performance can change radically in a short time. What's more, the metrics used to report performance often fail to capture the drivers of value in today's information economy. Few accounting measures are helpful when it comes to assessing the intangible assets--knowledge, skilled employees, and so forth--on which many of today's fastest-growing companies build their strategies. According to Amy Hutton, an associate professor at Harvard Business School, there are four basic rules for clear communications with Wall Street. First, make sure that your company's financial reporting reflects your strategy as closely as possible. Second, popularize the nonfinancial metrics that best predict--and flatter--the performance of your businesses. Third, appoint managers with recognized credibility to your strategic operations. Finally, cultivate the market experts who cover the industries in which you seek to compete. Hutton shows how AOL successfully followed these rules as it significantly changed its strategic direction and competitive arena.     

The balanced scorecard--measures that drive performance

Frustrated by the inadequacies of traditional performance measurement systems, some managers have abandoned financial measures like return on equity and earnings per share. "Make operational improvements and the numbers will follow," the argument goes. But managers do not want to choose between financial and operational measures. Executives want a balanced presentation of measures that allow them to view the company from several perspectives simultaneously. During a year-long research project with 12 companies at the leading edge of performance measurement, the authors developed a "balanced scorecard," a new performance measurement system that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of the business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements those financial measures with three sets of operational measures having to do with customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's ability to learn and improve--the activities that drive future financial performance. Managers can create a balanced scorecard by translating their company's strategy and mission statements into specific goals and measures. To create the part of the scorecard that focuses on the customer perspective, for example, executives at Electronic Circuits Inc. established general goals for customer performance: get standard products to market sooner, improve customers' time-to-market, become customers' supplier of choice through partnerships, and develop innovative products tailored to customer needs. Managers translated these elements of strategy into four specific goals and identified a measure for each.     

Strategy as ecology

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.     

Does fair value accounting contribute to market price volatility? An experimental approach

This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of accounting measurement rules for financial assets. We examine the association between fair value accounting for financial assets and market price volatility for nonfinancial firms in an experimental setting. One group of participants was provided with financial statements where held‐for‐trading securities were reported at fair market value (FVA). Another group received financial statements with investments reported at historical cost (HCA). Controlling for accounting data, we find no systematic difference between FVA and HCA for three different measures of market price volatility, despite higher earnings volatility and marginally heavier trading under FVA.     

How do different performance measures affect managerial time orientation? Empirical evidence from sales managers in the oil and gas industry

This study investigates the relative effect of performance measures on managerial time orientation. We collect survey data on the actual time allocation of sales managers for tasks that affect financial performance on the short-, medium-, and long-term horizons. In addition, we obtain survey data on the specific metrics used by an oil and gas firm and classify them into three groups: traditional accounting (gross margin and budgeted costs), nonfinancial (market share and sales volume), and accounting returns (economic value added — EVA). Based on partial least-squares analysis, our results suggest that, in our setting, both nonfinancial and accounting return measures can supplement traditional accounting metrics to mitigate potential short-term orientation by inducing sales managers to consider mainly not only sales tasks but also investing tasks, which will affect the firm results more than a quarter ahead. In addition, our results imply that accounting return metrics are not better than nonfinancial measures in inducing a longer-term orientation in our research setting.     

Coming up short on nonfinancial performance measurement

Companies in increasing numbers are measuring customer loyalty, employee satisfaction, and other nonfinancial areas of performance that they believe affect profitability. But they've failed to relate these measures to their strategic goals or establish a connection between activities undertaken and financial outcomes achieved. Failure to make such connections has led many companies to misdirect their investments and reward ineffective managers. Extensive field research now shows that businesses make some common mistakes when choosing, analyzing, and acting on their nonfinancial measures. Among these mistakes: They set the wrong performance targets because they focus too much on short-term financial results, and they use metrics that lack strong statistical validity and reliability. As a result, the companies can't demonstrate that improvements in nonfinancial measures actually affect their financial results. The authors lay out a series of steps that will allow companies to realize the genuine promise of nonfinancial performance measures. First, develop a model that proposes a causal relationship between the chosen nonfinancial drivers of strategic success and specific outcomes. Next, take careful inventory of all the data within your company. Then use established statistical methods for validating the assumed relationships and continue to test the model as market conditions evolve. Finally, base action plans on analysis of your findings, and determine whether those plans and their investments actually produce the desired results. Nonfinancial measures will offer little guidance unless you use a process for choosing and analyzing them that relies on sophisticated quantitative and qualitative inquiries into the factors actually contributing to economic results.     

Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups

Emerging markets like India have poorly functioning institutions, leading to severe agency and information problems. Business groups in these markets have the potential both to offer benefits to member firms, and to destroy value. We analyze the performance of affiliates of diversified Indian business groups relative to unaffiliated firms. We find that accounting and stock market measures of firm performance initially decline with group diversification and subsequently increase once group diversification exceeds a certain level. Unlike U.S. conglomerates' lines of business, and similar to the affiliates of U.S. LBO associations, affiliates of the most diversified business groups outperform unaffiliated firms.     

Observability and Subjective Performance Measurement

Accounting research provides theory and evidence on the choice and use of subjective performance measures for evaluating managerial performance. However, accounting research does not focus on the subjective performance measurement of managerial behaviour once measures have been chosen. We extend accounting research by investigating the factors that influence the subjective performance measurement decision. We predict that the level of subjective performance measurement is influenced by the informativeness of financial performance measures and by the verifiability of the nonfinancial measures in a formula‐based incentive plan. We expect that the measures' informativeness and verifiability depends on the observability of both the managerial behaviour being subjectively measured and the reliability of the financial and nonfinancial performance measures. More specifically, we hypothesize that the influence of the levels of the financial performance measures on the level of subjective performance measurement is moderated by the observability of either the managerial behaviour being measured (for the financial measures) or the performance measures' reliability (for the nonfinancial measures). Data from a firm provide support for our hypotheses.     

Nonfinancial performance measures,externalities and target setting: A comparative case study of resolutions through planning

This paper presents an analysis of the resolution of organisational externalities through the use of nonfinancial performance measures for planning. Using a comparative case study, this paper illustrates how centralised controllers’ choice of nonfinancial performance measures and target setting in two companies provides critical information to decentralised agents regarding how to balance their performance with the performance of other decentralised agents in their organisation. This work complements current management accounting research in that it focuses on the role of nonfinancial performance measures with respect to the design of performance plans for decentralised agents that can be used to internalise externalities. To date, discussions of externalities in management accounting research have primarily focused on how performance measurements can be used as a price mechanism to provide decentralised agents with incentives to internalise externalities. In addition, this case study illustrates some of the difficulties related to acquiring general knowledge about the externalities of nonfinancial performance measures and, therefore, about whether specific nonfinancial performance measures are appropriate for a particular type of organisation.     

REINVENTING A CORPORATION: THE "SATELLITE" STRUCTURE OF THERMO ELECTRON

Thermo Electron has created a unique–and highly productive—corporate structure by selling to the public minority equity interests in 19 of its business units over the period 1983 to 1996. Since 1983, the company has achieved extraordinary gains for stockholders, both those of the parent company and those of most of its publicly traded subsidiaries.
The company's "satellite" structure is intended to preserve the benefits enjoyed by small entrepreneurial organizations without sacrificing many of the advantages enjoyed by larger firms. Although decentralization is a key element of the organizational design, another important feature of the Thermo Electron approach is that administrative activities unrelated to the focus of the unit's operations continue to be managed at the parent level. The combination of an entrepreneurial atmosphere with the financial and administrative support of a larger organization is used extensively by the company to attract and retain management and technical talent. In fact, the company made the remarkable claim in a 1995 Forbes article that "no developer or entrepreneur has ever left Thermo Electron."
Another major contributor to the company's entrepreneurial culture is an incentive structure that is tied directly to the equity performance of both the public units and the parent. Managers of the publicly traded units are granted significant amounts of stock options, but only 40% of those options are based on the performance of their subsidiary. Of the remaining 60%, 40% are granted in the stock of the parent and the other 20% are in stock of the other subsidiaries.     

Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers

Using a sample of 140 managers, we investigate the use of various performance metrics in determining the periodic assessment, bonus decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. We show that the weight on accounting return measures is associated with the authority of these managers, and we document that both disaggregated measures (expenses and revenues), and nonfinancial measures play a greater role as interdependencies between business units increase. The results suggest separate and distinct roles for different types of performance measures. Accounting return measures are used to create the proper incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies.     

STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO RESULTS

A large and growing number of companies worldwide are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems to help them execute their business strategies. SPM systems use some combination of financial, strategic, and operating measures to evaluate management's success in improving operating efficiency and adding value for shareholders. In many cases, the SPMs also provide the primary basis for rewarding top management, divisional operating managers, and, increasingly, rank‐and‐file employees. Some SPM systems are based entirely on a financial measure like economic value added (or EVA), which encourages managers to consider the opportunity cost of investor capital in making all operating and investment decisions. Other systems are based heavily on nonfinancial considerations, such as the balanced scorecard's emphasis on customer and employee satisfaction, operational excellence, and new product introduction. In this article, the author uses the findings of his recent survey of 113 North American and European companies to shed light on a number of questions: What are the most popular measures in such systems—are they primarily financial, nonfinancial, or amix of the two? To what extent is incentive compensation tied to such measures—and how far down in the organization are such measures (and incentives) extended? What are the most formidable challenges to implementing SPM systems in large corporations, with often diverse collections of businesses and tens if not hundreds of thousands of employees? Among the article's most notable conclusions, a majority of companies expect in the next three years to publish SPM targets and results in their annual reports. The most commonly cited financial SPMs will be cash flow, return on capital employed, and other variations of EVA. The most frequently cited nonfinancial SPMs are customer satisfaction, market share, and new product development. The greatest challenge in implementing SPMs is translating the vision and strategic objectives at the corporate level into performance measures that are relevant to activities at the business unit level, and securing buy‐in from business unit managers and employees.     

The CEO as organizational architect: an interview with Xerox's Paul Allaire. Interview by Robert Howard

As chairman and CEO of the Xerox Corporation, Paul Allaire leads a company that is a microcosm of the changes transforming American business. With the introduction of the first plain-paper copier in 1959, Xerox invented a new industry and launched itself on a decade of spectacular growth. But easy growth led Xerox to neglect the fundamentals of its core business, leaving the company vulnerable to low-cost Japanese competition. Starting in the mid-1980s, Xerox embarked on a long-term effort to regain its dominant position in world copier markets and to create a new platform for future growth. Thanks to the company's Leadership through Quality program, Xerox became the first major U.S. company to win back market share from the Japanese. Allaire describes his efforts to take Xerox's corporate transformation to a new level. Since becoming CEO in 1990, he has repositioned Xerox as "the document company" at the intersection of the worlds of paper-based and electronic information. And he has guided the company through a fundamental redesign of what he calls the "organizational architecture" of Xerox's document processing business. Few CEOs have approached the process of organizational redesign as systematically and methodically as Allaire has. He has created a new corporate structure that balances independent business divisions with integrated R&D and customer operations organizations. He has redefined managerial roles and responsibilities, changed the way managers are selected and compensated, and renewed the company's senior management ranks. And he has articulated the new values and behaviors Xerox managers will need to thrive in a more competitive and fast-changing business environment.     

The impact of intangibles on firms’ financial and market performance: UK evidence

This study provides empirical evidence about the effect of intangible assets on firms’ current and future financial and market performance by utilizing a sample the UK FTSE 150 nonfinancial companies. Generally, the findings of this examination reported a strong evidence on the role of intangibles in boosting firms’ performance. In particular, the results indicate that while goodwill (GW) does have a statistically positive effect on firms’ current and future performance, research and development (R&D) is only associated with firms’ future performance. The results of the current research is consistent with the market-based and resources-based theories which posits that intangible investments are the main driving factors of wealth creation in the long-run; Specifically, R&D operations can create new technologies and products that would enhance firms’ performance and value. In addition, the results reveal that both GW and R&D can explain variations in firms’ financial performance measures suggesting that such investments can enhance firms’ earning leading to capitalization such earnings in the market value. Finally, the results of this research provide practical implication for policy makers and managers.     

财务会计的本质、特点及其边界

为了指明财务会计的本质特点 ,我认为财务报表是财务报告的中心部分 ,而报表附注、其他财务报告等传送财务信息方法仅是次要的手段。在财务报表上确认的任何项目 ,都必须符合可定义性、可计量性、相关性与可靠性的特征。会计程序包括计量、记录和报告都必须以确认为基础。因此 ,财务报表的信息可以按真实和公允的要求来描述财务业绩和现金流量。财务会计的基本职能既不试图提供可能的未来的信息 ,又不产生非财务信息。财务会计的主要目的是通过它的报表反映一个企业经济活动及其结果的真实图像。结论 :财务会计作为一门学科是历史科学 ;作为一项实务是一个信息系统 ,它的任务是为企业提供历史的财务信息。     

The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy

When it comes to philanthropy, executives increasingly see themselves as caught between critics demanding ever higher levels of "corporate social responsibility" and investors applying pressure to maximize short-term profits. In response, many companies have sought to make their giving more strategic, but what passes for strategic philanthropy is almost never truly strategic, and often isn't particularly effective as philanthropy. Increasingly, philanthropy is used as a form of public relations or advertising, promoting a company's image through high-profile sponsorships. But there is a more truly strategic way to think about philanthropy. Corporations can use their charitable efforts to improve their competitive context--the quality of the business environment in the locations where they operate. Using philanthropy to enhance competitive context aligns social and economic goals and improves a company's long-term business prospects. Addressing context enables a company to not only give money but also leverage its capabilities and relationships in support of charitable causes. The produces social benefits far exceeding those provided by individual donors, foundations, or even governments. Taking this new direction requires fundamental changes in the way companies approach their contribution programs. For example, philanthropic investments can improve education and local quality of life in ways that will benefit the company. Such investments can also improve the company's competitiveness by contributing to expanding the local market and helping to reduce corruption in the local business environment. Adopting a context-focused approach goes against the grain of current philanthropic practice, and it requires a far more disciplined approach than is prevalent today. But it can make a company's philanthropic activities far more effective.     

激烈竞争下的制胜之道——朗讯科技在中国的研发本土化战略

<正> 作为全球最大的通讯设备公司,朗讯科技积极在世界各地投资,努力拓展海外业务,在1999年财政年度,朗讯科技的海外业务增幅为47％,占公司总销售额的32％。在中国市场上,朗讯科技取得了良好的投资绩效。到目前为止,朗讯科技在中国建立了7个办事处,8家合资企业和3家独资企业,拥有员工数已超过3500名。朗讯科技越来越意识到中国市场的巨大发展潜力,除了在中国发展新的技术含量高的投资项目以外,还对原有的合资项目追加研发性投资,来提升其研发的本土化程度。 为了更好地理解朗讯科技近年来在中国的研发性投资的发展情况,我们粗略地将朗讯科技在中国投资活动分为以下三个阶段:(1)1990-1993年,谨慎进入,稳打稳扎阶段。这一阶段的主要投资活动包括朗讯科技在上海建立上海朗讯科技通讯设备有限公司和上海朗讯科技传输公司。(2)1993—1996年,网络扩张,快速发     

Emerging Derivatives Markets: The Case of Chile

We compare the performance of firms affiliated with diversified business groups with the performance of unaffiliated firms in Turkey, an emerging market. We address the question of whether group-affiliated firms create internal capital markets or control large cash flows. Our findings indicate that group affiliation improves a firm's accounting performance, but not stock market performance. Deviation of cash-flow rights from voting rights has a negative but insignificant effect on accounting performance, but a significant effect on market performance. We also find that a firm's accounting, but not stock market, performance increases with the level of group diversification. Our results show that internal capital markets play an important role for the existence of business groups in an emerging market context.     

The Impact of Enterprises’ Shadow Banking Activities on Business Performance: A Test Based on Mediator Effect of Investment Scale and Investment Efficiency

ABSTRACT

In recent years, China’s financial sector has gradually been alienated from the real sector, allowing financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage add their own value to finance. High interest rates in the financial industry have led to changes in the real sector, revealing a trend toward “financialization” and “quasi-financialization”; a typical example of this includes nonfinancial enterprises’ shadow banking activities. In this article, we use annual data from 2004 to 2015 of A share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, to examine the influence of nonfinancial enterprises’ shadow banking activities on business performance. The results show that, overall, enterprises’ shadow banking activity improve operating performance. In addition, from the perspective of earning structure, nonfinancial enterprises’ shadow banking business increases financial benefits, but has a significantly negative effect on operating income. Further tests show that enterprises engaged in shadow banking activities will impact operating income through the two intermediary variables of investment scale and investment efficiency. However, the negative effect of investment in crowding out operating income is greater than that of the efficiency-improving effect on operating income. This article provides policy guidance in terms of recognizing diverse aspects of shadow banking system that divorce the real economy from the financial economy.