Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Equilibrium Determinacy under Monetary and Fiscal Policies in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper studies the issue of equilibrium determinacy under monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules in an optimizing general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and flexible prices. It is shown that equilibria may be determinate also when monetary and fiscal policies are both 'passive'. In particular, under passive monetary rules, equilibrium uniqueness is more likely to be verified when fiscal policies are less committed to public debt stabilization.     

Rule-of-thumb behaviour and monetary policy

We investigate the implications of rule-of-thumb behaviour by consumers or price setters for optimal monetary policy and simple interest rate rules. This behaviour leads to endogenous persistence in output and inflation and alters the policymaker's welfare objective. Our main finding is that highly inertial policy is optimal regardless of what fraction of agents occasionally follow a rule of thumb. We also find that a first-difference version of Taylor's (Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Ser. Public Policy 39 (1993) 195-214) rule generally has desirable properties. By contrast, the coefficients in other optimised simple rules tend to be extremely sensitive with respect to the fraction of rule-of-thumb behaviour.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Price and Wage Rigidities

In this paper, I search for an optimal configuration of parameters for variants of the Taylor rule by using an accurate second‐order welfare‐based method within a fully microfounded dynamic stochastic model, with price and wage rigidities, without capital accumulation. A version of the model with distortionary taxation is also explicitly tested. The model is solved up to second‐order solution. Optimal rules are obtained by maximizing a conditional welfare measure, differently from what has been done in the current literature. Optimal monetary policy functions turn out to be characterized by inflation targeting parameter lower than in empirical studies. In general, the optimal values for monetary policy parameters depend on the degree of nominal rigidities and on the role of fiscal policy. When nominal rigidities are higher, optimal monetary policy becomes more aggressive to inflation. With a tighter fiscal policy, optimal monetary policy turns out to be less aggressive to inflation. Impulse‐response functions based on second‐order model solution show a non‐affine pattern when the economy is hit by shocks of different magnitude .     

The optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy

Abstract.  This paper studies how the nature of shocks affects the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy. Three classic rules, fixed exchange rates, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting are studied and ranked by comparing with the optimal monetary policy under commitment. We find that the ranking of the simple rules can be mapped to the terms-of-trade variability that the rule allows relative to what a particular shock optimally calls for. It turns out that inflation targeting dominates the other two rules under productivity or velocity shocks, whereas monetary targeting is the best performer under fiscal shocks.     

QUEST III: An estimated open-economy DSGE model of the euro area with fiscal and monetary policy

This paper develops a DSGE model for an open economy and estimates it on euro area data using Bayesian estimation techniques. The model features nominal and real frictions, as well as financial frictions in the form of liquidity-constrained households. The model incorporates active monetary and fiscal policy rules (for government consumption, investment, transfers and wage taxes) and can be used to analyse the effectiveness of stabilisation policies. To capture the unit root character of macroeconomic time series we allow for a stochastic trend in TFP, but instead of filtering data prior to estimation, we estimate the model in growth rates and stationary nominal ratios.     

Federal fiscal transfer rules in monetary unions

This paper considers simple rules for federal fiscal transfers that automatically redistribute funds among member states of a monetary union to counteract adverse idiosyncratic shocks. The transfer rules target regional differences in nominal GDP, consumption spending, labor income, and fiscal deficits. Targeting regional fiscal deficits is the only rule that reduces consumption fluctuations and that promotes interregional consumption risk sharing, but the overall welfare effect is negative. In contrast, targeting regional differences in labor income yields the largest welfare gains, but it also yields the largest fluctuations in consumption and real GDP. It is demonstrated that the welfare gains primarily stem from reducing the allocative inefficiency of input factors caused by nominal rigidities. The optimal transfer rule essentially implies a combination of consumption spending and labor income targeting, and it primarily targets the allocative inefficiency of factor inputs at the cost of lower interregional consumption risk sharing.     

Credit and inflation under borrower?s lack of commitment

In this paper we study the effects of monetary policy on privately supplied credit in model economies where money is needed for transaction purposes and agents who default on their loans cannot participate in the credit market but are allowed to accumulate money. In our deterministic benchmark economy where agents alternate in productivity, credit has the role of smoothing consumption. We show that deflation crowds out credit completely. The reason is that deflation increases the value of being excluded from the credit market and eliminates the incentive to repay loans. When inflation is positive but low, credit, consumption smoothing and welfare increase with inflation, until inflation reaches a threshold at which the allocation is efficient and money becomes superneutral.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions: Evidence from emerging European economies

This paper examines the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy for some former transition, emerging European economies over the 1995Q1–2010Q4 period by using a Markov regime-switching model. We consider the monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and the fiscal policy rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2007) in accounting for monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Empirical results suggest that monetary and fiscal policy rules exhibit switching properties between active and passive regimes and all countries followed both active and passive monetary policies. As for fiscal policy, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia seem to have alternated between active and passive fiscal regimes while fiscal policies of Poland and the Slovak Republic can be characterized by a single fiscal regime. Although the policy mix and the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy point a diverse picture in our sample countries, the monetary policy seems to be passive in all countries after 2000. This finding is consistent with the constraints imposed by European Union enlargement on monetary policy.     

The effects of fiscal spending shocks on the performance of simple monetary policy rules

We examine the effects of fiscal shocks on the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in a small dynamic general equilibrium framework. We explicitly consider the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy rules which may be present in the real world. We use a simple specification for the fiscal policy rule and various specifications for the (simple) monetary policy rule. Our analysis suggests that some form of flexible inflation targeting regime would perform well in response to fiscal shocks compared to other forms of policy regimes.     

Optimal monetary policy for a small open economy

This paper focuses on the design of monetary policy rules for a small open economy. The model features optimizing behavior, general equilibrium and price stickiness. The real exchange rate is shown to affect the firm's real marginal cost, aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The welfare objective depends on the openness of the economy, and the optimal policy rule differs from that which obtains in a closed economy. The inflation versus output gap stabilization trade-off is caused by the real exchange rate. The implied optimal monetary policy regime is domestic inflation target coupled with controlled floating of the real exchange rate.     

Stabilization policy,infrastructure investment,and welfare in a small open economy

Using a two-sector neoclassical growth model in an open economy setting with heterogeneous agents, this paper studies the distributional effects and welfare implications of a joint monetary and fiscal policy response to public infrastructure expansion in emerging market economies. The results show that fiscal stabilization policy is critical for achieving fiscal sustainability and price stability. With joint support of monetary and fiscal policy, government infrastructure investment provides significant welfare gains to the economy, and the choice of fiscal instruments has major distributional effects across agents: saving households accrue the highest welfare gains with new bond issuance, while hand-to-mouth consumers are better off when non-distorting taxes are adjusted. These potential tradeoffs in welfare due to households’ differing responses to infrastructure expansion have important implications for policy making.     

Cyclical fiscal rules for oil-exporting countries

Budget-balance tax-gap rules are preferred to other fiscal policy rules to stabilize the macroeconomic volatility and welfare in oil-exporting countries. The output-inflation trade-off is of particular concern for oil exporters relative to non-oil commodity exporters due to the pass through of oil prices into headline inflation which warrants fiscal reaction to crude oil revenue. This result is robust to several instruments satisfying the rule but with reduced efficiency for those instruments that impact potential output such as government investment and capital taxes. These rules are desirable for fixed exchange rate regimes but are unable to achieve the same degree of stability as when coordinated with inflation-targeting monetary policy. Even under optimal inflation-targeting regimes, the adoption of budget-balance tax-gap rules can produce reductions in macroeconomic volatility and welfare gains.     

Monetary Policy Rules for a Small Open Economy

In this paper, the optimal choice of a monetary target is investigated for a small open economy that is subject to foreign monetary policy shocks. In contrast to large parts of the literature, pegging the exchange rate is never the best policy choice for the small open economy in our model. Instead, monetary targeting and, depending on the parameter combination, producer price index targeting come closest to the optimal policy rule in terms of welfare. Generally, the welfare performance of the simple targeting rules under consideration hinge critically on the degree of pass-through in the home economy and in the rest of the world.     

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a search theoretic model of monetary exchange

Search models of monetary exchange commonly assume that terms of trade in anonymous markets are determined via Nash bargaining, which generally causes monetary equilibrium to be inefficient. Bargaining frictions add to the classical intertemporal distortion present in most monetary models, whereby agents work today to obtain cash that can be used only in future transactions. In this paper, we study the properties of optimal fiscal and monetary policy within the framework of Lagos and Wright (2005). We show that fiscal policy can be implemented to alleviate underproduction while money is still essential. If lump sum monetary transfers are available, a production subsidy can restore the efficiency of monetary equilibria. The Friedman rule belongs to the optimal policy set, but higher inflation rates are also possible. When lump-sum monetary transfers are not available, equilibrium allocations are generally not first-best. Nevertheless, fiscal policy still results in substantial welfare gains. Money can be extracted from circulation via a sales tax on decentralized market activities, and the Friedman rule is only optimal if the buyer has relatively low bargaining power.     

Inflation bias and markup shocks in a LAMP model with strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper investigates the effects generated by limited asset market participation on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, where monetary and fiscal authorities are independent and play strategically. It shows that: (i) both the long run and the short run equilibrium require a departure from zero inflation rate; (ii) in response to a markup shock, fiscal policy becomes more aggressive as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents increases and price stability is no longer optimal even under Ramsey; (iii) overall, optimal discretionary policies imply welfare losses for Ricardians, while liquidity constrained consumers experience welfare gains with respect to Ramsey.     

Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.     

Optimal simple rules for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy

Stabilization policy involves joint monetary and fiscal rules. We develop a model enabling us to characterize systematic simple monetary and fiscal policy over the business cycle. We principally focus on the following question. What are the key properties of the joint simple rule governing the conduct of systematic stabilization policy? We find that conducting stabilization policy incorporates not only a set of monetary policy choices governed by the so-called ‘Taylor principle’ but also fiscal policy that gives considerable force to automatic stabilizers. Recent US and UK monetary and fiscal choices seem broadly consistent with this model. This result is found to be robust to a number of alternate modeling strategies.